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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
Toygar Sinan Baykan 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
ELECTORAL SUCCESS of the JUSTICE and DEVELOPMENT PARTY: the ROLE 
of POLITICAL APPEAL and ORGANIZATION 
Summary 
 
The Justice and Development Party (JDP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in Turkey was 
founded by a reformist spin-off from the Islamist National View (Milli Görüş) tradition 
in 2001 and came to power in 2002. Between 2002 and 2014, the JDP and its leader 
Erdoğan remained in power by receiving 35–50% of all votes in several elections despite 
many social, economic and political crises. The literature on the “normalization” of 
Islamist politics and the JDP’s unprecedented electoral resilience in Turkey 
overwhelmingly focused on the economic and social-structural reasons. This dissertation 
aims to complement existing explanations by focusing on the role of party agency: the 
political appeal and organization of the JDP. The research relied on in-depth interviews 
with around 50 participants, the overwhelming majority of which came from various 
hierarchical levels and branches of the JDP across Turkey. It is argued that the party’s 
“low-populist” political appeal/style consolidated the JDP’s connection with the low-
income, peripheral and provincial majority of the country. The JDP leadership also 
encapsulated divergent segments within the party organization and within its electoral 
base (the pluralization caused by Islamist party normalization) through a tightly 
controlled, year-round active, large and pervasive membership organization. The 
personalistic leadership of the party supported this massive membership organiza t ion 
with political marketing techniques. As a result, the JDP became a “personalis t ic 
membership party”, which blended mass and elite-based party models. Thus, the 
dissertation highlights the combination of a “low-populist” appeal with a “personalis t ic 
membership party” as a convenient mode of agency for electorally succesful Islamist 
party normalization. Another implication of the research is that despite the rise of elite -
based party models and capital intensive campaign techniques, particular ly in the 
developing world which is characterized by uneven socio-economic development, 








1 INTRODUCTION  
                                                                              
1.1 The research question and an initial glance at the JDP 
Turkish politics were reshaped by a remarkable transformation at the beginning of the 
2000s. The decreasing vote for the parties of the Islamist National View tradition (Milli 
Görüş Hareketi)1 and of the total votes of the traditional centre-right2 corresponded to the 
electoral breakthrough and success of a new party. The Justice and Development Party 
(JDP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which was founded only a year before the general 
election in 2002 by politicians coming from different right-wing political backgrounds 
under the control of a formerly Islamist elite, won a landslide victory. The JDP continued 
to receive 35–50% of all votes until the presidential elections in 2014, when the JDP 
leader Erdoğan received more than 50% of votes and became the first president of the 
Turkish Republic who was elected by popular vote. Figure 1.1 illustrates this 
extraordinary transformation of Turkish politics. 
Throughout this period, apart from intraparty organizational difficulties entailed by the 
initial formation of the JDP by politicians with different backgrounds, the party also 
encountered many problems stemming from the corrosive effects of incumbency3 as well 
as social, political and economic crises. For example, in 2008 a legal case was initiated 
by the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) in order to ban the JDP, and the global 
financial crisis hit the country in the same year. In 2011 an earthquake left 600 people 
dead in provincial Turkey. Two years later, nine young people were killed under the 
circumstances of disproportionate police violence during a weeks-long wave of mass 
protests against the government. Episodic eruptions of armed struggle with the Kurdish 
insurgents caused the death of many more people. The corruption probes against four 
ministers in 2013 imposed enormous damage to the image of the JDP government. A 
mine blast killed more than 300 workers in 2014, and many other “work accidents” killed 
                                                                 
1 These Islamist parties are the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) and the National Salvation Party 
(Milli Selamet Partisi) of the 1970s, and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) 
and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) of the post-1980 period. For brief information on these parties as 
well as other significant political parties and movements in Turkey, see Appendix 1. 
2 These are the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi).  
3 See Rose and Mackie (1983) for consideration of incumbency in government as a liability for parties 




hundreds of workers throughout the JDP years. On top of all these, a huge humanita r ian 
crisis emerged after the outbreak of Syrian Civil War, which brought almost three million 
refugees to the country.   
The extremely surprising fact was that these enormous problems neither influence d 
popular support for the party negatively nor caused any massive discontent within the 
JDP organization. Thus, the rise of the JDP in Turkey was a dramatic story of politica l 
success in its own right. The rise and subsequent electoral and political predominance of 
the JDP was also a qualitative transformation, a solid example illustrating one of the 
potential trajectories of the transformation of Islamist politics. What kind of politica l 
circumstances paved the way for the rise of the JDP? More importantly: what kind of 
strategic choices and actions of the JDP politicians substantially contributed to the party’s 
unprecedented electoral achievements and political resilience in Turkey? This research is 
a systematic explanation of the rise, electoral achievements and the political resilience of 
the JDP in Turkey between 2002 and 2014 that particularly focuses on the political agency 
of the party, in other words, its political appeal and organization. 
 
Figure 1.1: The electoral breakthrough and the rise of the JDP 
 






The rise and enduring electoral success of the JDP in Turkey has drawn remarkable 
attention from students of political Islam, Middle East politics and party politics in 
general.4 The JDP’s exceptionally successful “normalization”,5 as a party with an Islamis t 
background, was one of the underlying reasons for this enormous interest. The JDP was 
strikingly successful, too, in protecting and increasing its vote steadily during previous 
elections, despite its position in power, or the negative incumbency effect – a situation 
that has also increased interest in the party. The wide-ranging literature focusing on the 
rise and electoral achievements of the JDP, as I will illustrate in the literature review 
section below, predominantly embraces the following perspectives: economy-based 
explanations; ideology/discourse-based perspectives; leadership-based approaches; and 
constituency-based perspectives (the rise of the so-called Islamic bourgeoisie).  
In this disseration, I propose an overwhelmingly agency-based explanation for the 
normalization and electoral achievements of the JDP that focuses on the organizationa l 
and strategic reasons behind the JDP’s political success and aims to complement the 
current literature on the party, which frequently focuses on the external-structural reasons 
for the rise and the electoral success of the party. In this dissertation, it is argued that the 
rise, electoral success and political resilience of the JDP relied on the “low-populis t”6 
appeal of the party and its tightly controlled, year-round active, massive membership 
organization which penetrated into the remotest corners of the country. This massive and 
pervasive organization was built by and around a personalistic leadership and was 
supported by political marketing techniques. Therefore, in this dissertation, the JDP is 
called a “personalistic membership party”. In short, this dissertation has defined the 
political appeal and organization of the JDP – the “low-populist appeal” and the 
“personalistic membership party” – as the essential agency-based factors behind the 
unprecedented political predominance of this new party in Turkey for over a dozen years. 
                                                                 
4 See Atacan (2005), Atasoy (2009), İnsel (2003), Jang (2005), Mecham and Hwang (2014), Mecham 
(2004), Somer (2007), Şen (2010), Tanıyıcı (2003), Taşkın (2008), Tezcür (2010), Tuğal (2009) and Yavuz 
(2009). 
5  For the term “normalization”, see the volume by Mecham and Hwang (2014), and particularly their 
introduction in which authors propose the term “normalization” instead of “moderation” since the latter 
term also assumes an ideological liberalization of Islamist movements. According to Mecham and Hwang , 
“normalization is a process by which Islamist parties increasingly accommodate themselves to the rules of 
the political regimes in which they operate; in other words, they become less unique and more normal 
political actors when compared with other parties in the competitive system” (2014: 6–7). Hence, 
“normalization” has less normative implications than terms such as “liberalization” and “moderation”. 
6 In this dissertation I am using the approach proposed by P. Ostiguy (particularly 2009c and forthcoming )  





Before moving on to the literature review, and then explaining the rationale behind the 
methodological and theoretical approach embraced in this research, I briefly introduce 
the main characteristics of the JDP.  
1.1.1 An initial glance at the ideology, organization and policies of the JDP 
One of the most illustrative documents defining the JDP’s position vis-a-vis the party’s 
Islamist legacy (the Islamist National View tradition), its electoral and elite competitors 
in the Turkish political system, and the party’s position within the Turkish politica l 
history in general, is a booklet written by one of its ideologues and prominent figures, 
Yalçın Akdoğan (2004) titled The Justice and Development Party and Conservative 
Democracy (Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi). Although the party was a coalition of 
politicians with different right-wing backgrounds at the beginning, as repeatedly 
underlined in various studies on the JDP,7 the majority of the party’s founders came from 
the Islamist National View tradition. The suspicion of the powerful secularist circles 
surrounding the National View tradition pushed JDP leaders to define their ideology in a 
very careful manner, and Akdoğan’s work was an outcome of this concern.  
It is interesting to see that, in line with Bayat’s definitions of Islamism and post-Islamism 
(1996; 2007), the party’s most prominent ideologue defines political Islam as a strategy 
which pursues a top-down method to Islamicize society through the seizure of the state 
and political power (Akdoğan 2004: 92). Akdoğan defines the political stance of the JDP 
quite differently from this understanding, calling it “conservative democracy” (2004: 12–
21). Akdoğan refers to the incompatibility between the Islamic symbolism and the 
political position and goals of the JDP (2004: 119). Instead, he defines the JDP as the 
party of those with religious sensibilities (2004: 111).  
In his book, Akdoğan repeatedly refers to an evolutionary and gradual approach to social 
and political change as the marker of a conservative democratic stance (2004: 15–16, 46, 
121). These emphases on gradual change and refusal of a revolutionary top-down change 
strongly evoke the “idea that Islam does not have answers to all societies’ social, politica l, 
and economic problems” (Bayat, 1996: 45–46). He also discusses the importance and 
location of democracy, human rights and secularism to the identity of the party. Akdoğan 
underlines the compatibility of these concepts with the demands of Islam (2004: 62–87). 
Hence, in line with Bayat’s recent definition of post-Islamism, the JDP and its 
                                                                 




conservative democratic identity was a decisive enterprise in conciliating “religiosity with 
rights and liberties” and incorporating “Islam, freedom and pluralism” (Bayat, 2013: 8). 
This is why I define the JDP as a pioneering, electorally succesful “post-Islamist”8 party 
in the Muslim world.  
Although Akdoğan points to a very strong intraparty democracy as the JDP’s primary 
organizational hallmark, he also describes the “charismatic leadership of Erdoğan” as a 
“dominant factor” in this “new representative of the centre-right in Turkey” (2004: 151). 
In contrast to its predecessor, the Islamist Welfare Party, the JDP was much more keen 
to develop relationships with the West and with the European Union in particular, and 
much more careful about protecting the democratic and secular qualities of the regime 
(Akdoğan, 2004: 106). In the economic sphere, Akdoğan emphasizes that the JDP was in 
favour of a free market economy, and a competitive economic understanding, which were 
compatible with the global system (2004: 13).  
Indeed, in the economic field the JDP followed the structural adjustment programme of 
the International Monetary Fund (Ekzen, 2009: 475), which imposed widespread 
privatization and a drastic reduction of the size of the state. Nevertheless, the JDP also 
sought to improve income distribution through the use of public sources (Bakırezer & 
Demirer, 2009: 166). Social expenditure by the state on education, health and social 
security (Bakırezer & Demirer, 2009: 167), together with the amount of direct social aid 
spending by various ministries, increased between 2002 and 2006 (Bakırezer & Demirer , 
2009). The JDP also deployed the networks of religious charities in order to reduce 
poverty (Buğra & Keyder, 2006: 224). Buğra and Keyder (2006) also argue that the JDP 
had an inclination to transform the very hierarchical and uneven corporatist welfare 
regime which ignored the majority who work in the informal sector. Indeed, the reforms 
implemented during the first years of the JDP revealed its willingness to abolish separate, 
hierarchical and corporatist social policy regulations for public employees and people 
working in the private or informal sector (Keyder, 2007: 34). Hence, Keyder and Buğra 
                                                                 
8 I borrow my definitions of Islamism and post-Islamism from A. Bayat (1996). Very roughly, while the 
former term refers to a strictly Islamist politics which follows a top-down strategy to Islamicize the society, 
particularly through the seizure of the state, a post-Islamist movement refrains from such top-down 
strategies, adopts a perspective prone to conciliating religiosity with rights and liberties and embraces a 
pluralist stance where Islam is not considered the single truth and remedy for all social, political and cultural 




argue that there was, at least, a reformist wing in the party which advocated a universa l 
and inclusive welfare regime (2006: 225–227). 
Thus, the JDP can be initially described as a conservative, post-Islamist, centre-right party 
with religious sensibilities. Nevertheless, the party leadership was very careful with 
regards to its emphases on religion and consistently excluded any Islamic symbolism 
from its official image. Not surprisingly, the party leadership tried to give a pro-West and 
pro-European Union impression, and the party leadership repeatedly drew attention to the 
importance of a secular, democratic and pluralist regime, at least during its initial years. 
In line with the definitions of Bayat, these features made the JDP a post-Islamist politica l 
force in Turkey. In organizational terms, despite its emphasis on intraparty democracy, 
the preeminence of the party leader was underlined by its most important ideologue. In 
terms of its economic stance, unlike its Islamist predecessors, the JDP could be defined 
as a party in favour of consolidating a free market economy. Nevertheless, the party also 
deployed various redistributive mechanisms, ranging from public expenditure to 
managing social aid through religious charity networks, in order to reduce the impact of 
neo-liberal reforms on the poor in particular.  
1.2 The literature on the JDP  
In this part of the introduction, I will show that the majority of the literature on the JDP 
focuses on factors other than the role of the party’s strategic and organizational agency in 
its electoral and political resilience. This literature can be separated into four main 
domains: research focusing on the economic reasons; studies focusing on social 
structural- and constituency-based dynamics; studies focusing on discourse/ideology and 
hegemony; and the research focusing partially on party agency through the analysis of 
the organization and leadership of the JDP. As I will illustrate in the following sections, 
even the most agency-based explanations do not fully focus on the role of the JDP’s 
organizational dynamics in the success of the party and see the JDP (and therefore its 
political agency) simply as a reflection of wider external social, economic and politica l 
circumstances. This research, then, aims to contribute to the broad literature on the rise 
and electoral success of the JDP by highlighting the role of organization and strategy, in 




1.2.1 Research focusing on economy  
One of the oft-cited factors behind the electoral success of the JDP in the literature has 
been the growth of the Turkish economy, notably the decrease in consumer price infla t ion 
throughout the JDP’s rule and the dramatic rise of per capita income. Studies by 
Kalaycıoğlu (2010: 39), Dağı (2008: 29), Çarkoğlu (2007: 515–516), and Öniş (2012: 
137) underline the role of the economy in the electoral success of the party. One of the  
most prominent economists in Turkey, Korkut Boratav, also explains the political success 
of the JDP as an outcome of global economic cycles. According to his analysis, while the 
failure of previous coalition governments preceding the JDP corresponded to the 
downturn of the global economic cycles, the electoral breakthrough and the rise of the 
JDP is explained as resulting from the global economic recovery and rising foreign 
investments in Turkey (Boratav, 2009). There are also other economy-based explanations 
of the success of the JDP as resulting from its redistributive policies. In this sense, the 
studies of Bakırezer and Demirer (2009), Öniş (2012: 137), Yıldırım (2009: 102) and 
Yücesan and Özdemir (2012: 143–144) highlight the role of redistributive strategies in 
the party’s success. In short, there is a remarkable literature highlighting the economic 
reasons for the JDP’s success that focuses on the role of macroeconomic trends and 
redistributive mechanisms.  
1.2.2 Research focusing on social structural dynamics and constituency 
Secondly, many studies of the rise and electoral success of the party highlight the role of 
the “Islamic bourgeoisie” in Turkey. In Turkey, for a long time the business community 
developed under the protection of the state. Until the 1980s, the state supported the 
businessmen close to the secularist worldview of the establishment elite of the country 
(the military and bureaucratic elite).9  Nevertheless, since the 1980s, and through the 
introduction of a more liberalized economic regime by the Motherland Party governments 
that replaced the import substitution regime of the previous era, small- and medium-s ized 
businesses that were conservative and religious in orientation gained momentum and 
started to grow. These business networks, or the “Islamic bourgeoisie”, tended to support, 
first, the Islamist parties of the National View tradition such as the Welfare Party, and 
then the JDP.  
                                                                 




The historical and ideological transformations leading to the formation of a pious 
bourgeoisie are well-documented in the literature. In the ESI (2005) report, prominent 
examples can be seen of the development of the pious small- and middle-range enterprises 
and the role of religious factors in their achievements. The studies of Şen (2010) and 
Atasoy (2009) reveal the ideological and economic transformations which gave rise to 
the formation of the pious bourgeoisie. In a comparative study, Buğra (1998) analyze s 
the development of the business association of the pious bourgeoisie. Gümüşçü and Sert 
(2009) and Hoşgör (2011) illustrate the organic relationship between the JDP and the 
pious bourgeoisie. Jang (2005) uses statistical methods in her study to analyze the 
geographical correlation between the votes received by the Islamist parties and the JDP, 
the size of the enterprises of the pious bourgeoisie, and the number of members of their 
business association.   
According to Tuğal, the “pious business community has established hegemony, that is, it 
has made its vision the vision of pious popular sectors and activists, through the AKP 
[JDP]” (2009: 8). İnsel (2003: 299–300), Gümüşçü and Sert (2009: 957–958), Yavuz 
(2006: 1) and Hoşgör (2011: 355) also point out the role of the Islamic bourgeoisie and 
highlight the relationship between this social group and the party. In her PhD dissertation 
on the relationship between the rising Islamic bourgeoisie and the “moderation” of 
Islamism and the electoral success of the JDP, Jang hypothesizes that the rise of Islamic 
capital had a taming effect on Islamism in Turkey (2005: 4).  Hence, although she 
emphasizes that “Islamic capitalists do not share any commitment to political liberalism 
or democracy” (2005: 190), she convincingly illustrates that Islamic capital made a 
decisive contribution to the rise and electoral success of the JDP.  
There is also various research illustrating the socio-economic accord between the JDP 
cadres and JDP voters. One of these studies is the research of Aydın and Dalmış (2008). 
According to Aydın and Dalmış’s interpretation of polling data and public surveys, JDP 
supporters had a lower educational level as well as a lower profile in terms of professiona l 
training than had voters of other parties (2008: 218). Aydın and Dalmış also argue that 
“when the socio-political identities favoured by the deputies were examined, it was seen 
that they shared similar identities as their supporters” (2008: 217). This social resonance 
between party members  ̧ in particular party deputies in the parliament, the electorate of 
the party and the support of the Islamic bourgeoisie, to a certain extent facilitated the rise 




1.2.3 Studies focusing on discourse/ideology and hegemony 
Some studies in the literature have a stronger emphasis on the JDP’s agency. For instance, 
Hale and Özbudun (2010: 24) and Yıldız (2008: 46) underline the central role of an 
evolutionary understanding of political and social change as an important marker of the 
conservative ideology of the JDP leadership. In line with these approaches, Cizre argues 
that the JDP had a more pragmatic and less essentialist and dogmatic strategy, which was 
compatible with the expectations of the rising Islamic bourgeoisie (2008: 5). It could be 
seen that the ideological picture of the party drawn by scholars and party ideologues 
highlighted a quite sophisticated worldview and underlined labels such as “conservat ive 
democracy” or “evolutionary approaches to social change”. These studies did not directly 
address contributions of these ideological and strategical stances to the party’s electoral 
achievements although they implied the role of moderation in the rise of the JDP. 
1.2.3.1 The populism of the JDP: a controversial issue 
The more challenging and promising aspect of the literature on the JDP is the emphasis 
on the concept of populism. Economic and political-ideological explanations of the 
party’s rise and electoral achievements frequently deploy this concept. While some of 
these analyses underline the “non-populist” character of the JDP, some studies emphasize 
the “populism” of the party as a factor in its rise and electoral achievements. This 
contradiction in the literature on the populist qualities of the JDP specifically highlights 
the conceptual ambiguities within the literature, particularly that on the concept of 
populism. For instance, in his study, Yıldız argues that the JDP could be characterised by 
“less populism and more economic rationality” (2008: 43). Similarly, Duran argues that 
the JDP’s leaders tried to construct a political stance that was free from “populism” (2008: 
82). According to Öniş, the JDP implemented in the redistributive field a “controlled 
populism” quite unlike the “old-style populism” of the former centre-right parties in 
Turkey (2012: 137). Similarly, Yıldırım describes the redistributive social policy 
approach of the JDP as “neo-liberal populism” (2009). In contrast, according to White, 
“Erdoğan’s populism” articulated the diverging desires of rising pious middle classes and 
the politically alienated young conservatives (2008: 373). Along the same lines as White, 
Dağı defined the JDP as a “populist political party” (2008: 30). Taşkın, too, argues that 
the outsider character of the founders of the JDP made their “populist claim” much more 




Thus, it is fair to argue that there is a marked disagreement in the literature on the populist 
qualities of the JDP. This “disagreement” signified a gap in the literature which is closely 
related to the overestimation of the role of Erdoğan and redistributive strategies and, 
therefore, to an underestimation of the role of party organization and strategy in general. 
In other words, while some of these studies see populism as a redistributive strategy, some 
of them only evaluate it as the popular appeal of the party leader. Populism, by many 
scholars, is understood either as an economy-based electoral strategy or as a popular-
telegenic leadership. These inaccurate understandings led most of these studies to 
overlook the broader role of party organization and strategy.  
1.2.3.2 The JDP’s hegemony 
There is also a remarkable literature on the success of the JDP, in which the JDP’s 
electoral and political success was evaluated as a part of a wider hegemony based on a 
cross-class coalition including “popular sectors” (low-income, peripheral and provinc ia l 
segments of society). Roughly, these works in the literature see the JDP as an outcome of 
the articulation of low-income, subordinate segments of society through a cultural bond 
by Islamic- leaning dominant classes. This stream of studies implies that this articula t ion 
depended mainly on the overplaying of cultural cleavages, controlled redistributive 
policies and, hence, the absorption of the dissent of popular sectors by the dominant 
classes which had vested interests in the running of neo-liberal processes. For instance, 
Yıldırım argues that, on the ground of the “neo-liberal populism” in Turkey, the JDP and 
Erdoğan underplayed class conflicts and consolidated the rhetoric that depicted politics 
in Turkey as a struggle between the “bureaucratic elite” and the “people” (2009: 85). 
Yıldırım also strongly emphasizes the social policies of the JDP, which heavily relied on 
civil and non-governmental charity activities to support the poor, as one of the main 
reasons of the party’s electoral achievements (2009: 102).  
In a similar vein, another study on the electoral and political predominance of the JDP 
highlights the role of the “technocratic cum culturalist discourse” (Yalman 2012: 23). 
According to Yalman, the “replacement of class-based politics” by the “manipulation of 
identity politics” was the main achievement of the power bloc in Turkey (Yalman 2012: 
23). Yalman contends that the JDP’s struggle with the systemic veto players opened room 
for the JDP elite to enhance the depiction of Turkish politics mainly as a cultural struggle  




anti-democratic secularist elite of the country. Hence, the JDP could become 
“oppositional, yet also hegemonic” (2012: 35).  
Atasoy’s work also problematizes the articulation of a neo-liberal agenda with previously 
redistributive inclinations of Islamic orientation (2009: 14). She underlines the fact that 
democratization and globalisation discourses vis-a-vis Kemalist discourse developed by 
the Islamists had also pushed them to an economic outlook much closer to the neo-liberal 
agenda. In other words, in their struggles against Kemalists, the Islamist elite embraced 
economic liberalization policies in order to curb the power of the Kemalist establishment. 
According to Atasoy, the JDP’s “state transformation policies operate through cross-class 
coalition building between economically disadvantaged groups and large, globally 
competitive firms” (2009: 110). In her work, Atasoy also underlines the importance of 
the ideological and financial support of the Islamic business to the construction of this 
coalition by the JDP (2009: 119–122). Hence, at the heart of the abovementioned 
articulation and the cross-class coalition of the JDP, Atasoy identifies the rising Islamic 
business circles. 
A very similar problematic – that of the cross-class coalition of the JDP – also occupies 
a central place in the work of Tuğal (2009). In his detailed ethnographic study of the 
transformation of Islamism in Turkey, Tuğal searches for an answer to the following 
question: “Why did the activists and popular sectors, who had until that point supported 
the religious and anti-free market platform of the Islamist party, wholeheartedly embrace 
the AKP [JDP] government?” (2009: 9). In line with Atasoy, Tuğal underlines the 
importance of the Islamic business community in the construction of this transformation 
(2009: 9). According to Tuğal, following a phase of bourgeoisification of Islamist lower -
middle and middle classes and the molecular Islamization of society  – in other words the 
bottom-up diffusion of conservative and Islamist values and practices across the society 
– within a “consumerist, secular and capitalist urban world” (2009: 55), Islamic 
radicalism had already started to lose ground. According to Tuğal, the emergence of the 
JDP enhanced these processes (2009: 162). Tuğal argues that the JDP’s success relied 
“on integrating Islamic activists and appropriating many strategies from the Islamist 
tradition, while at the same time shedding the thorns of religious mobilization – a politics 
of absorption” (2009: 147). Thus, Tuğal evaluates the rise of the JDP as an outcome of a 




Islamism and the institutions this leadership had created vis-a-vis the Kemalist-secular ist 
establishment were absorbed by the political system (2009: 236–243).  
1.2.4 Research focusing on the organization and leader  
Apart from the above-mentioned analyses regarding the JDP, I would also like to 
elaborate a bit more on crucial studies focusing fully on the JDP’s organization and the 
leader or devoting considerable attention to this dimension. Apart from the work of 
Kumbaracıbaşı (2009), most of the research regarding the JDP treat the issue of the 
organization as part of a wider framework and deal with this dimension in passing. Given 
the fact that one of the widespread truisms in Turkish political science literature is that all 
the Turkish political parties were very centralised and dominated by the leadership 
(Massicard & Watts, 2013) due to the framework defined by the Law on Political Parties 
(Law No. 2820), it is hardly surprising to not see an interest in party organizations as an 
explanatory variable of party success. There are, however, some studies on the role of 
leadership and party organization and these studies can be evaluated as evidence of the 
contribution of a certain political and organizational strategy to the electoral success of 
the JDP, which encourages further examination of organizational factors beyond the 
analysis of formal evidence such as laws, statutes and other written party material. 
One of the most comprehensive analyses of the JDP organization is the oft-cited study of 
Hale and Özbudun (2010), although their examination of the JDP only devotes a single 
chapter to party organization. However, in addition to a general exploration of the legal 
basis of JDP activity (2010: 45–46), Hale and Özbudun also draw attention to the 
“organizational culture” beyond “formal structures” (2010: 46). Hale and Özbudun 
underline the importance attached to the “education and indoctrination” by the JDP (2010: 
48). Another remarkable part of their study is their focus on a sub-provincial JDP 
organization in İstanbul (Hale & Özbudun, 2010: 49–51). They underline the fact that 
local JDP organizations were the most active, motivated and elaborately organized among 
Turkish parties (2010: 49).10  
In a work on the Islamist social movement in Turkey, Eligür (2010) also devotes a chapter 
to the organizational dynamics of the Islamist National View parties (2010: 182–213) as 
well as a section on the JDP organization (2010: 243–275). Apart from generally 
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illustrating the centrality of the informal networks for National View parties as well as 
for the JDP, Eligür especially underlines the role of “strong organizational networks of 
the JDP” (2010: 258) in distributing selective incentives to the urban poor.  
There are also many accounts of the rise and success of the JDP which highlight the role 
of its leader, Erdoğan. For instance, Hale and Özbudun argue that Erdoğan has been 
perceived as “a ‘man of the people’”, coming from a modest background (2010: 154–
155). Similarly, Tuğal draws attention to the popular perceptions of Erdoğan as “one of 
us” (2009: 176). Cizre also underlines a similar point on the perception of Erdoğan as a 
“man of the people” (2008: 5). In parallel, Tezcür emphasizes the role of Erdoğan in the 
JDP’s electoral victory in 2011 (2012: 122). In their study on Erdoğan, Heper and Toktaş 
stress the role that he played and argue that he “belongs to Turkey’s cultural periphery” 
(2003: 160). In a comprehensive and oft-cited work on the JDP by Hakan Yavuz, a 
separate chapter is devoted to the ideology, leadership and organization of the party (2009: 
79–117). In this chapter Yavuz strongly underlines the personalist organizationa l 
structure of the JDP and the party’s lack of a well-defined ideology and identity. Indeed, 
previous works on the JDP (as well as my personal observations) affirmed the importance 
of the JDP leader Erdoğan within the organization as the glue of “too many diverse groups 
within the party” (Yavuz, 2009: 85) and “a set of informal networks” (Yavuz, 2009: 99).  
That the above-mentioned studies emphasize the importance of the JDP’s leader, on the 
one hand, and the role of organization, on the other hand, in the party’s electoral success, 
does indicate a certain political and organizational strategy. Nevertheless, as I have 
illustrated so far, the literature on the JDP either focuses exclusively on the image of 
Erdoğan or on the role of redistributive mechanisms, and therefore has overlooked party 
organization and strategy in general. In fact, the centrality of the leader of the JDP was 
complemented by the very centralised and hierarchical party structure. According to the 
analysis of the JDP’s organization by Kumbaracıbaşı, the party was mainly characterised 
by the “lack of internal democracy and leadership accountability” (2009: 124). These 
characteristics also caused members and activists to be excluded from decision-mak ing 
processes (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 124–153). According to Kumbaracıbaşı, besides the 
“charisma” of the JDP leader, a highly autonomous leadership and strong centraliza t ion 
were decisive in protecting the party from fragmentation by different ideological elements 
(2009: 146). In short, as Özbudun maintains, what we observed in the case of the JDP 




that, although local organizations were tightly controlled by the centre, they could not be 
seen as absolutely submissive extensions of the central organizations (2006: 552).  Hence, 
it seems that the party had a very fragile balance between absolute leadership control and 
widespread grass roots participation in intraparty politics. 
In this context, it is also necessary to note that many studies pointed out the role of 
normalization in the electoral success of the party. According to R. Q. Mecham, before 
the foundation of the JDP, dissident members of the parties of the Islamist National View 
tradition knew that “electoral rewards could be found” outside a narrow Islamist politica l 
stance (2004: 350). Murat Somer also looks at the role of “moderation” in the electoral 
success of the JDP (2007). According to Somer, too, the JDP leadership realized that a 
revolutionary Islamic stance would not attract a majority of Turkish voters (2007: 1277). 
Nevertheless, further normalization of Islamist parties in Turkey and the rise of the JDP 
contributed to the enlargement of the party base (as a result of the move beyond core 
Islamist constituency) and therefore also to the ideological and socio-economic 
pluralisation within the party and its electoral base.  
It seems that the organizational structure of the JDP was, to a large extent, shaped by the 
problems imposed by normalization. In other words, the party itself started its politica l 
life as a coalition of former Islamic cadres, centre-right politicians, far-right politic ians 
and members with divergent ethnic and class backgrounds. This fragmented party 
leadership also corresponded to a fragmented electoral base as a coalition of the “Islamist 
core constituency”, “part of [the] far right constituency”, “centre-right votes” and the 
“Kurdish Vote” (Aydın & Dalmış, 2008; Erder, 2002). Thus, the normalization of 
Islamism and subsequent electoral victories of the JDP imposed a dual problem on the 
party: a fragmented party organization consisting of people coming from diverging 
political backgrounds and a fragmented electoral base consisting of diverse voter groups. 
For the JDP elite, keeping the party together and protecting and enlarging its fragmented 
electoral base have required a very specific political, organizational and discursive 
strategy.   
In his study, Kumbaracıbaşı (2009) outlines a very similar problem for the party. He 
argues that the JDP gradually found itself in a situation where it was wedged between the 
restrictions of a secular system, and the expectations of a non-Islamist centrist electorate 




According to Kumbaracıbaşı, in order to overcome this problem and protect and enlarge 
its electoral base, the JDP leadership deployed a “tight [...] control over the party base 
and factions that [might] be more partisan in nature” (2009: 78). He defines the strategic 
consequence of this problem as a “dilemma” with reference to Panebianco, one in which 
a party can neither move towards further “systemness” nor towards further “autonomy” 
(Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 3). The difference between Kumbaracıbaşı’s approach and 
Panebianco (1988: 57) is that Kumbaracıbaşı defines an inverse relation between 
autonomy and systemness in the specific case of the JDP (2009: 18–19). This is to say 
that the JDP elite was not able to accept further grass roots participation – a move towards 
further systemness – and at the same time the JDP leadership was not able to increase its 
control over the external environment by strongly appealing to median voters – a move 
towards further autonomy. Increased participation by the radical-leaning grass roots of 
the JDP would cost the median voter, and further moves towards policies designed to 
target median voters and consolidate the party vote and image in such a way that allows 
the party to exert control over its systemic environment – such as the establishment elite 
of the country – would cost the core grass roots support.  
Thus Kumbaracıbaşı defines the main dilemma of the JDP as that between its allegedly 
more radical-leaning grass roots and its leadership’s inclination towards targeting the 
median voter (2009: 19). According to Kumbaracıbaşı, this dilemma was solved “through 
tight leadership control over the party base and factions” (2009: 78). Relying on one of 
his senior interviewees from the JDP, he underlines that the JDP elite “believed an 
equilibrium needed to be found among religious, conservative nationalist, liberal, and 
traditionalist ideas within the party. The leadership of Erdoğan is the primary factor that 
keeps these groups under control and prevents break-aways” (2009: 146).  Nevertheless, 
Kumbaracıbaşı’s work demonstrates little about how the JDP leadership exerted this tight 
control over the party base and over the diverse groups within the organization and the 
party’s electoral base in general. One of the main undertakings in this dissertation is to 
empirically illustrate how the JDP leadership exerted this tight control over the party base 
without alienating its massive membership organization and to illustrate the 
organizational mechanisms that helped Erdoğan to tighten his grip over the party 





Figure 1.2: Current explanations of the rise, electoral success and political resilience of the JDP and 
the location of the approach embraced in this dissertation 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
1.3 The approach and purpose of the research: shifting the focus to party agency 
A graphic illustration of the relevant literature and the position of the approach embraced 
in this dissertation can be seen in Figure 1.2. The main issue addressed by all relevant 
major works on the JDP examined above is the articulation of diverse tendencies, 
segments, social classes and political actors by the JDP. Most of these works reviewed 
above try to explain the co-existence of the dominant as well as subordinated segments 
of society under the roof of the JDP. Which mechanisms and processes provided the 
consent of the subordinated sectors and convinced them to remain loyal to the (formerly 
Islamist, then initially post-Islamist) dominant social segments? The works I evaluated 
above point out discursive- ideological change/interventions (such as emphases on 
cultural differences and the language of democracy, rights and liberties ), redistributive 
policies of the dominant sectors, or social transformations of the Islamist elite and Islamist 
sectors of society as the basis of this coalition. Hence, on the one hand, they treat the JDP 
either as the generator of ideological-discursive interventions or as a redistributive 
mechanism. On the other hand, most of the studies analysed above tend to see the JDP as 




these accounts evaluate the JDP simply as an outcome of a wider social process and tend 
to underline the external-structural conditions of the current predominance of the JDP.   
All of these external-structural processes highlighted by the major scholars, in fact, had 
an impact on the rise and electoral predominance of the JDP. However, while these 
accounts highlight the structural processes, and to a certain extent the discursive agency 
of the party, they fail to notice the role of the party’s broader organizational and strategic 
agency. This is why, in most of these accounts, the JDP was everything but a party 
organization. These works, which focus predominantly on the wider structural reasons 
for the rise, electoral achievements and political resilience of the JDP, are characterized 
by a lack of interest in the JDP’s organizational mechanisms because most of these studies 
considered the party as a given, a reflection of the social hegemony of conservative 
dominant classes. In fact, my argument in this dissertation is that the party organiza t ion 
played a crucial role in the success of the party, and was at the heart of the current 
conservative hegemony in Turkey, and it was this that resulted in the electoral and 
political resilience of the JDP. In other words, consent was first and foremost produced 
within the party and extracted from the party base, and then extended beyond other 
spheres of the public life. As an intense and intricate relationship11 between diverging 
segments, tendencies and desires, party organization was the kernel of the JDP’s 
hegemony where dominant and subordinated social elements met each other on the basis 
of a particular organizational dynamic. This is the broader rationale that led me to focus 
primarily on the party’s organizational agency. 
This review also pointed out a couple of interrelated theoretical and methodologica l 
lacunas in the literature on the rise and electoral success of the JDP. First of all, studies 
focusing on external-structural economic and social reasons for the JDP’s rise and 
electoral achievements have a predominant position in the relevant literature. In addition, 
when it comes to the analysis of the party agency, past studies either showed a conceptual 
inaccuracy – as in the case of the concept of populism – or they exclusively focused on 
the role, and more precisely the image, of Erdoğan and the ideological-discursive aspects 
of the JDP politics from a narrow perspective. Furthermore, the analyses of the JDP 
organization have not properly demonstrated the crucial intraparty dynamics of the JDP, 
which played a central role in the cross-class coalition of the party and the conservative 
                                                                 




hegemony in Turkey in general, either.  In other words, exclusively focusing on the 
leader, or patronage/pork-barrel politics, or ideology/discourse [as “mere words” 
(Ostiguy forthcoming)] has overshadowed a much broader organizational-strategic 
dynamic behind the rise and electoral achievements of the JDP. This research’s primary 
theoretical and methodological aim is to fill this caveat in the current literature on the JDP 
by analyzing the case through more rigorous conceptual tools borrowed mainly from 
literature on party politics (and, to a certain extent, from the literature on populism).  
Given the state of current literature analysed above, the lack of a systematic focus on the 
role of party agency – the immediate discursive/stylistic and organizational mechanisms 
connecting the JDP with its electorate and protecting the party from fragmentation – 
becomes rather puzzling. After all, the JDP as a party has capitalized upon convenient 
economic circumstances and social transformations within Turkey, and the party’s 
agency was not restricted to pork-barrel politics, its leader’s image and official messages 
indicating moderation and normalization. The party’s agency was also about emotiona lly 
engaging with its voters and supporters and creating and sustaining a unique 
organizational culture conducive to winning elections. As popular commentators in 
Turkey argued, there were indeed an “economy” (careful economic management 
according to pro-JDP columnists, and “food-baskets and coal” according to the opponents 
of the party), a specific “sociology” (conservative wealth and bourgeoisie and/or devout 
and humble Anatolian people) and a “leader” (Erdoğan’s image) behind the JDP’s 
success. But there were also “politics”, things done by the party as an organization, the 
actions and choices made by its elite, their engagements with the organization, and their 
emotional and stylistic appeal to the electorate beyond discursive and programmatic links.  
In my view the political agency of the party in this sense was key to transforming these 
external-structural economic and social circumstances, as well as the redistributive 
mechanisms and the leader’s image, into concrete electoral gains for the JDP. Thus, in 
this research I wanted to focus on this “politics” with a highly empirical and, to a large 
extent, inductive approach. I wanted to explore and demonstrate discursive/stylistic and 
organizational mechanisms behind the JDP’s electoral success and political resilience.  
1.4 Method, fieldwork and sources  
In the literature review, I pointed out that specific organizational mechanisms and 
strategic choices, which protected a balance between diverse desires and interests of 




JDP’s electoral success. In this sense, as illustrated above, the study of Kumbaracıbaş ı 
(2009) underlines a very similar point in the organizational and strategic problems and 
choices of the party and diverges from the rest of the literature. Nevertheless, his study 
mainly depends on a top-down perspective and focuses on the central organizations of 
the party. In order to see the effect of the specific organizational dynamics and strategic 
choices of the party elite that helped the party to protect its electoral predominance, I 
embraced a broader – and, to a greater extent, a bottom-up – approach which takes into 
account the different levels of party organization ranging in size and influence. This is in 
line with the perspective of Levitsky (2003), who places a special emphasis on the 
intraparty relationships of various hierarchical units within parties. 
Neither the examination of the central organization nor the examination of the local or 
provincial organizations of the party alone could accurately depict the political and 
organizational strategy of the JDP. This is why I conducted in-depth interviews with the 
JDP deputies and central elites as well as provincial (il) and sub-provincial (ilçe) chairs, 
members and neighbourhood representatives across Turkey. I asked my interviewees 
open-ended questions about the organizational characteristics of the party and these 
characteristics’ contributions to the JDP’s electoral success. The length of my interviews 
varied between half an hour and two hours. I spoke to more than 50 people12 during my 
interviews. I conducted interviews with participants from the JDP as well as people who 
were neutral observers or indirectly related to the party. Of my interviewees, 39 were JDP 
members, 26 of whom were active members and 13 of whom were former members at 
the time of interview. The rest were experts from bureaucracy, journalism, academia and  
politicians from other relevant parties. I started my fieldwork in September 2013 with 
several initial interviews, and I conducted the overwhelming majority of my interviews 
with the JDP members and relevant participants between January 2014 and May 2014.13  
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Appendix 3. In fact, I saw more than 50 people for my research – the exact number is 55. Nevertheless, a 
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individual interviewees from this information. Hence, in the bibliography, I did not indicate the provinces 
of party chairs or any sub-province name that might lead to the identification of individual participants 
amongst a limited number of names.  




I conducted my interviews in different cities and regions across Turkey such as Ankara, 
İstanbul, Konya, Trabzon, Diyarbakır, Batman, Şanlıurfa and Mardin, which can be seen 
in Figure 1.3. I conducted 26 interviews in Ankara, 9 in İstanbul, 6 in Trabzon, 6 in Konya 
and 5 in Mardin. I also conducted 3 interviews each in Diyarbakır, Urfa and Batman. Each 
of these cities represents various degrees of electoral success of the party as well as 
diverging regional and socio-demographic features. While İstanbul and Ankara more or 
less represent the national average for the party in terms of electoral success, Mardin, for 
example, represents the least successful and Trabzon and Konya represent the most 
successful instances for the party in my sample. Looking at these different regional 
settings also provided an idea about the degree of centralization of the party by providing 
an amount of uniformity of the same levels of party organization in different regions.  
 
Figure 1.3: Cities visited for the research 
 
Source: http://www.mapsopensource.com/turkey-outline-map-black-and-white.html (accessed: 27.5.2016) 
 
I also conducted my interviews with members of the JDP who represented different 
hierarchical positions. On the one hand, I did interviews with JDP deputies and vice-
ministers, JDP Central Executive Committee (Merkez Yürütme Kurulu) and Central 
Decision and Administration Board (Merkez Karar ve Yönetim Kurulu) members and 




On the other hand, I also conducted interviews with chairs of the youth and women’s 
branches of the party and neighbourhood representatives.14 There were 9 high-ranking 
interviewees among the sample, including deputies, ministers and Central Executive 
Committee members of the party. There were 14 members from the provinc ia l 
organizations and 16 members from the sub-provincial organizations of the party in 
various cities. This variety of interviewees provided me, as I expected, with a chance to 
see the vertical relationships between the party echelons and a better understanding of the 
implementation of JDP centralism. The rest of my interviewees were more or less neutral, 
non-JDP participants coming from academia, bureaucracy, journalism and other relevant 
parties. 
The sample also included current and former members. Interviews with active party 
members as well as former party members and failed candidates provided me with two 
different, yet complementary perspectives. I also conducted some interviews with 
prominent figures of the former centre-right Motherland Party, Islamist Felicity Party and 
experts on the centre-right and Islamist parties in Turkey, which helped me to better 
understand the distinguishing features of the JDP organization and its strategies in the 
context of Turkish party politics. The interviews with former JDP members or non-JDP 
members in particular provided me a control narrative. 
I also encountered many unexpected yet quite illustrative obstacles during my research 
that re-shaped my methods and research design substantially, such as the corruption 
probes against JDP ministers in the middle of December 2013 (and just before the local 
elections on the 30 March 2014). These circumstances naturally caused considerable 
difficulties in getting in touch with even junior and local party members, let alone senior 
party members from the headquarters. Yet this difficulty in getting in touch with the party 
members provided some first-hand insight about the organizational characteristics of the 
JDP.15 It seems that in times of political crisis, highly hierarchical and centralized parties 
like the JDP show a natural tendency to be much more vigilant and conservative against 
                                                                 
14 An important detail illustrating the hierarchical and socio-economic variety of the sample emerged in my 
attempts to get in touch with my participants. As could be expected, while it was very easy to get in touch 
with senior and central JDP members and receive answers via email, it was extremely difficult to get in 
touch with more junior, provincial members of the party in this way. Some of them did not check email 
accounts properly or they simply did not have an email adress or any computer literacy at all. 
15 As Dexter stated, “frequently the circumstances of the refusal, the way in which it is done, the excuses 
given, the reaction to the interviewer, may provide valuable data or, at least, hypotheses about the situation” 
(Dexter 1970: 31). It was indeed the case, and indicative of the change of reactions I got over time after my 




external demands such as interview requests.  One should also note that previous 
researchers investigating party politics and organizations in Turkey frequently had similar 
difficulties, and even in quite stable periods party elites and members have held a deep 
suspicion towards these kinds of requests.16  
The practical consequence of these circumstances, as mentioned above, led me to find 
and talk mostly to the former members of the party until the March 2014 local elections. 
After the party’s victory, it became much easier to find party members as interviewees : 
even the high-ranking members of the party headquarters. Nevertheless, my init ia l 
interviews with former party members and failed candidates, and their more critical 
voices, provided me with a “control narrative” against which I could test the more 
reserved and “diplomatic” narratives of active party members that depicted an idealized 
picture of party life and remained within the limits of the “official story” of the party as 
defined by Katz and Mair (1994). This is also to say that, by talking to the active members 
of the party after the elections, I obtained yet another “control narrative” where I could 
test critical but potentially biased interpretations of some of the former members and 
failed candidates of the party. 
In addition to the above, I also had difficulty getting in touch with local party branches in 
peripheral, low-income and recently urbanized sub-provinces and the neighbourhoods of 
big cities such as İstanbul and Ankara. My attempts at getting in touch with any member 
of these JDP strongholds failed even in cases where I had the help of “gatekeepers” such 
as relatives and friends. This situation represented a pattern and it is plausible to think 
that the nature of the party activity in these kinds of settings might be remarkably different 
than in party branches, where I mainly conducted my interviews. On the one hand, in 
these JDP strongholds, party activity and the duties of the party chairs and activists should 
indeed be very intense. Therefore it is plausible to think that party activists in these 
settings had no time for responding to such requests. On the other hand, there were certain 
reasons to think that the nature of party activity in these settings might also be different 
in terms of the prevalence of selective incentives –distribution of goods and aids in 
                                                                 
16 See research conducted 15 years ago by Çarkoğlu et al. (2000). “In evaluating the fieldwork results of 
the project, the point that needs to be borne in mind right at the start is perhaps  the difficulties encountered 
in working with the various parties during the course of this research. It was extremely difficult to gain 
access to these party workers and to persuade them to answer the questions put to them of their own free 




particular – for the party branches.17  Perhaps this was why, in these regions, it was 
unusually difficult to get in touch with the chairs or members of governing bodies of the 
party. In contrast, I realized that it was much easier to get in touch with the local party 
branches where the party was electorally relatively unsuccessful, such as central sub-
provinces of Ankara and İstanbul.  
The lack of full access to these kinds of settings – low-income, peripheral sub-provinces 
in metropolitan cities such as İstanbul and Ankara – during my fieldwork could be 
considered the major limitation of my sample. However, I should also note that although 
I could not speak to party activists from branches of the JDP in poor sub-provinces in 
İstanbul and Ankara, I was able to conduct interviews with party activists from relative ly 
poor provincial and sub-provincial settings in other Anatolian cities. This gave me some 
solid impressions about the JDP politics in localities where the overwhelming majority 
of inhabitants come from socio-economically lower-status groups. Overall, during the 
fieldwork I was able to see vertical ties amongst various JDP branches and the leadership. 
Despite its limitations, the fieldwork process provided rich empirical material for my 
dissertation, and its contribution to my understanding of the JDP’s political appeal and 
organization was invaluable. 
Apart from interviews, there is already a vast amount of information on the organizationa l 
dynamics of the party on the internet. Thanks to the ease of internet publishing, it was 
possible to access local newspapers and the personal blogs and websites of politicians, as 
well as videos on local JDP activities such as consultation meetings (istişare toplantıları), 
non-binding elections among selected members (teşkilat temayül yoklamaları) and 
provincial conventions. I was aware that the use of personal blogs on local politics and 
media might entail special problems for neutrality since I had a strong impression that 
these sources were often controlled by the local power holders and politicians. Thus, I 
tried to double-check the information from this type of source with other websites and, if 
possible, with reports from national media. Another source that I used, apart from 
secondhand accounts and some newspapers close to the JDP such as Yenişafak and Sabah, 
was the official publication of the party, Turkey Bulletin (Türkiye Bülteni), which to a 
                                                                 
17 A short illustration of the JDP activity in these kinds of settings can be found in Hale and Özbudun’s 




certain extent helped me to understand the main emphases of the organizational activity 
in the JDP. 
Another source I extensively drew upon, as the reader will notice, was the work of Hulusi 
Şentürk. Şentürk, formerly a high-ranking member of the İstanbul branch of the Islamist 
National View parties and the JDP, has written several books regarding practical aspects 
of party politics and organizations in Turkey as guides for aspiring politicians. Apart from 
his book on Islamism (Şentürk, 2011), where he briefly discusses the formal structures of 
the National View parties and the JDP, he has written some empirically rich works on 
intraparty politics which contain crucial information and clues about the formation of 
governing bodies of the party and candidate selection processes as well as about the 
worldview of the JDP elite (Şentürk, 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c).  It is plausib le 
to think that all of these publications depend mostly on Şentürk’s experience in the 
Islamist National View parties and the JDP.18 These works should be considered some of 
the most important publicly accessible observations by an insider of the Islamist National 
View parties’ and the JDP’s organizational and strategic features. As this provided 
relatively neutral and, from time to time, humorous accounts of intraparty politics of the 
National View parties and the JDP, I extensively used the empirical evidence provided 
by Şentürk’s works throughout this dissertation. 
1.5 Structure of the dissertation  
As I have illustrated in the literature review section, a considerable majority of the works 
on the JDP focused on the external-structural social and economic reasons behind the 
extraordinary electoral and political achievements of the party. In this dissertation, by 
diverging from these overwhelmingly structural explanations, I put a strong emphasis on 
the role of party agency – the “low-populist” appeal and the robust organizationa l 
leverage firmly controlled by the leadership – in the rise, electoral success and politica l 
resilience of the JDP. Hence, the majority of chapters following this introduction focus 
on the organizational characteristics of the JDP as well as the strategic discursive and 
stylistic manoeuvres and preferences of the party elite. Although I highlight the role of 
party agency, all the chapters of the dissertation in one way or another take into account 
the inevitable interaction and interpenetration of external-structural and agency-based 
factors in the rise and electoral and political resilience of the party. After all, from the 
                                                                 




party elites’ discursive, strategic and stylistic preferences to the organizationa l 
characteristics and leadership modes within the JDP, agency-based factors in the electoral 
and political resilience of the JDP cannot be understood unless they are evaluated as 
responses to certain socio-political and historical developments in Turkey. Yet, as I make 
clear throughout the dissertation, the party agency of the JDP was the constitut ive 
dynamic that capitalised upon the opportunities for electoral and political success created 
by these socio-political and historical developments. 
In Chapter 2, I focus on the broad political structural factors that facilitated the rise of 
Islamism and eventually the post-Islamist JDP. Even here, in this most structural part of 
the dissertation, I put special emphasis on the interaction of the political actors who 
created the political institutional setting that facilitated the JDP’s rise and electoral and 
political resilience. In this chapter I illustrate how the establishment elite of the country 
after the 1980 coup prepared the ground for the rise of Islamism, and eventually post-
Islamism, through the inhibition and destruction of leftist organizational networks, 
through a virtual consensus with the conservative-Islamist elite, through the introduction 
of a new conservative and nationalist indoctrination of the masses, and through selective 
limitations on the political space with restrictive constitutional and legal regulations. This 
strategy, which I call “selective pluralism”, later on became a political and institutiona l 
opportunity space for the Islamist and post-Islamist elite that facilitated the electoral and 
political resilience of the JDP. 
After this rather structural chapter, I focus in Chapter 3 on the political appeal/style of the 
JDP. Here, I again highlight a relatively structural aspect of Turkish politics : its “populist 
emphasis”. In this chapter I adopt the perspective of Ostiguy (forthcoming) on populism, 
taking the concept as a political appeal/style, and use his high and low divide in order to 
locate the JDP’s political appeal. This chapter makes it clear that, more than the party’s 
position along a left-right or secular-religious divide, the JDP’s success at reaching 
economically and culturally unprivileged segments of society was strongly connected to 
a “low-populist” political appeal/style that created a strong sense of similarity between 
the party elite and the ordinary people. I demonstrate evidence from both the party’s 
discursive interventions to the public debate and its communication and propaganda style.  
In Chapter 4, I focus on the JDP leader, Erdoğan, since he was key to the appeal and 




concepts such as charisma, personalism and personalization, I evaluate the role of 
Erdoğan within the party by relying on my interviews and some secondary sources such 
as biographies written about him. I highlight the central role of organization building and 
“robust action” (Ansell & Fish, 1999) in his leadership style. In contrast to existing 
descriptions of him as a charismatic leader, I define him as an inventive and diligent 
organization man (teşkilatçı) who exclusively focused on achieving and maintaining 
power. Hence, I call the relationship between Erdoğan and the JDP as “non-charismatic 
personalism” (Ansell & Fish, 1999). 
In Chapter 5, I elaborate on the JDP’s strategic approach to redistributive tactics, 
organization and communication. In this chapter I again focus on the historica l 
background, and demonstrate the contribution of the organizational and strategic 
experience of the JDP elite, who came from different backgrounds such as centre-right 
parties and the Islamist National View parties. I demonstrate that these previous 
experiences provided the JDP elite with a highly effective strategic inclination, which led 
them to certain organizational and electoral-tactical preferences. In order to mainta in 
electoral predominance, the JDP elite embraced an organizational and electoral strategy 
that struck a balance between the short-term requirements of elections (responsiveness) 
and the long-term requirements of government processes (responsibility), between 
collective and selective incentives, and between idealism and pragmatism. The 
combination of robust organizational leverage – a year-round active, tightly controlled 
massive membership party present in neighbourhoods – with a strong and decisively pro-
JDP media was key to this balance and, therefore, to the JDP’s electoral predominance. 
In Chapter 6, I exclusively focus on the JDP’s organization by following the classics of 
the party organization studies as well as new perspectives highlighting the importance of 
the interaction between various hierarchies within parties (Levitsky, 2003; Massicard & 
Watts, 2013). In this chapter, I illustrate the formal territorial and membership structure 
of the party and put a special emphasis on how this massive membership organiza t ion 
was kept under the control of the central JDP elite. Here, I demonstrate the details of the 
central control mechanisms in the JDP, such as public opinion surveys (anketler), 
technological communication instruments and party coordinators. I also underline the role 
of “controlled participation” channels in the JDP, such as regular consultat ions 
(istişareler), non-binding elections among selected members (teşkilat temayül 




absorption of the potential dissent against the firm leadership control through the creation 
of a very strong sense of participation in the party base. In this chapter, relying on a 
discussion of party typologies, I also argue that these organizational traits of the JDP 
made it difficult to identify the party’s organization simply as either a mass-based (mass 
party) or an elite-based one (such as cadre, catch-all or cartel party). Instead, I propose to 
diverge from Eurocentric conceptualizations regarding party organizational typologies 
and define the JDP organization as a hybrid electoral machine, or more precisely “a 
personalistic membership party”, combining a firmly controlled massive membership 
organization with political marketing techniques.  
In Chapter 7, I take a closer look at the elite recruitment processes of the JDP. I 
demonstrate the rise of the leadership domination within the party just after its foundation. 
I also focus on how the provincial and local governing bodies of the party were accurately 
designed by the central party elite and how candidate selection processes were kept under 
the firm control of the party leadership. Here I also focus on the different narratives 
deployed by, on the one hand, high-ranking party elites and, on the other hand, junior 
party members, failed candidates and “true democrats” in struggles over elite recruitment 
within the JDP. In this chapter I also focus on the characteristics of the relationship 
between local and provincial elites and the JDP leadership, which represents one of the 
novel elements in JDP politics compared to its rightist predecessors in Turkish politics.  
In the conclusion, I summarize the crucial empirical findings and broader theoretical 
implications of the research regarding the literature on the JDP and Turkish politics in 
general. In this chapter I also take a closer look at the JDP as a case of electorally 
successful Islamist party normalization, with a brief comparative discussion on post-
Islamist parties/movements in Egypt, Iran and Turkey. I then highlight some of the 
theoretical implications of the analysis of the case of the JDP in the dissertation in general, 
with a brief comparative discussion with regards to the relationships between Islamist 






2 The TRANSFORMATION of the TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM: SELECTIVE 
PLURALISM and the RISE of the JDP 
 
2.1 Introduction1 
The literature on the transformation of Islamism and the rise of the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in Turkey usually highlights the 
role of the pressure from external actors such as the army and judiciary.2 In this chapter, 
I argue that a much more complicated relationship between external actors and Islam and 
the Islamist elite caused the transformation of Islamism in Turkey and the rise of the JDP.3 
Without the permissive attitude of the powerful external actors and a degree of consensus 
between them and the Islamist elite, prospects for Islamism in Turkey would have been 
remarkably different.  
I use two central concepts in this analysis: “establishment elite” and “selective pluralism”. 
By the concept of “establishment elite” I refer to the high-ranking ruling cadres of the 
military and judiciary as well as the President of the Republic, who always had a decisive 
effect on the formation of Turkey’s legal political space and the “official doctrines”: a 
restrictive official ideology and restrictive narrative of national identity. The 
establishment elite in Turkey – like its counterparts in other Muslim countries where the 
concept might refer to royal monarchies, high-ranking religious clerics, high-rank ing 
military officers, established ruling families, or personalized dictatorships4  – tried to 
protect its power position, and frequently the wider status quo, through defining the 
boundaries of the legal political space and the official doctrines.  
The strategy of selective pluralism mainly refers to the exclusion of the particular elite 
groups and their organizations from political competition and representation through legal 
and coercive means while including others who are seen as compatible with the status 
                                                                 
1 All translations of excerpts from interviews and Turkish sources in the text are mine. 
2 For this kind of approach to the transformation of Islamism and the rise of the JDP see Atacan (2005: 
196), Çarkoğlu (2007: 504–505), Çınar (2006a: 473–474), Dağı (2008: 27), Hale and Özbudun (2010: 10), 
Jenkins (2003: 51), Öniş (2001: 286–287), Özbudun (2006: 547) and Taşkın (2008: 58–59). 
3 There is a new tendency in the scholarship on Islamism and the JDP in Turkey. This new approach 
underlines the interaction between external actors and Islamist movements. The volumes by Cizre (2008) 
and Turam (2012) represents two solid examples of this approach. My perspective in this chapter has 
remarkably benefitted from these approaches.  




quo.5 Most of the establishment elites across the Muslim world chose the strategy of 
authoritarianism and monopolised the legal political space by inhibiting the existence of 
opposition through legal as well as coercive means. However, in Turkey, the 
establishment elite chose to engineer a peculiar pluralism which excluded the meaningful 
political representation of the left and the Kurdish opposition through high national 
electoral thresholds, a restrictive party and election law as well as coercion. The very 
same strategy was relatively permissive towards the Islamist elite and their organizations. 
In addition, the establishment elite also initiated the semi-official indoctrination of 
nationalist and religious values since the beginning of the 1980s, like its counterparts in 
the Muslim world, and this created the wider social context for the rise of Islamism and 
post-Islamism in Turkey. Gradually, selective pluralism started to work against the 
establishment elites themselves due to the fragmentation of the party system and the 
decline of the legitimacy of the political system in general throughout the 1990s. Thanks 
to selective pluralism, the JDP enjoyed a disproportionate majority in the parliament and 
relied on this majority as well as a discourse of reform and democratization in their 
struggle with the establishment elite.  
One of the widespread convictions in the literature on Islamism and the JDP is that the 
Islamist elite, and later on the JDP elite, had to overcome secularist6 systemic pressure. 
There is no doubt that there was always a certain tension between the establishment elite 
and first the Islamist, and then the JDP, elite. However, focusing on this tension usually 
overshadowed the ultimately consensual nature of this relationship. Hence, apart from 
Eligür’s work (2010), few studies underlined the contributions of the strategic choices of 
the allegedly secularist elite of the country in the rise of Islamism and the JDP. Similar to 
                                                                 
5 From a historical institutionalist point of view, “selective pluralism” can be considered as a strategic 
decision taken by the establishment elite in Turkey at a critical juncture, namely during the 1980 coup 
which created a certain “developmental pathway” for every political actor of the country. Gradually, this 
strategic decision, compatible with the restrictive political cultural legacy of the country, became a formal 
as well as an informal institutional context which defined the rules and boundaries of the political game in 
Turkey. One of my interviewees, an experienced politician from the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) 
succinctly described this “path dependency” and the contradictions it entailed: “The 1980 coup brought this 
10% threshold. Everybody knows that this is not right and the party holding the majority  – in other words 
the foremost beneficiary of the threshold – has to change it. This is why the system cannot fix itself” 
(Interviewee 22 2014, March 5). Hence, selective pluralism in Turkey was a strategy which later became a 
binding structural context for the original decision makers as well as their opponents. For historical 
institutionalism, path dependency and critical junctures , see Thelen (1999).  
6 By the term “secularist” I refer to a particular worldview consciously embraced by the establishment elite 
in Turkey which relies upon a highly exclusionary modernising attitude towards religious symbols in public 
life and devout segments of society. “Secular”, in this context, unlike “secularist”, would refer to the 
spontaneous predominance of non-religious attitudes and mentalities in the public space as the case in the 




the “inadvertent elite ally” argument of Eligür, which underlines the importance of the 
introduction of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and repression of organized leftist networks by 
the military elite in the rise of Islamist movement (2010: 277), I argue that, without the 
strategic choices of the establishment elite of initiating a gradual Islamization of society 
and of constructing a selectively pluralist political space, the JDP’s spectacular electoral 
achievements and its resilience before the establishment elite would have been impossib le. 
Although my argument is in line with Eligür’s recent work, I put a special emphasis on 
the selectively pluralist political space and the electoral system of Turkey since the 
foremost beneficiary of the exclusion of small, organizationally weak and more 
ideological parties through the 10% national electoral threshold, and the restrictive 
electoral and party laws in general, was the JDP.  
In the following section I firstly describe the introduction of selective pluralism by the 
establishment elite in the 1980s through legal and coercive interventions as well as the 
gradual Islamization process, which created unexpected opportunities for the Islamist 
political elite. In section three, I briefly describe the fragmentation in the Turkish party 
system and the decline of the legitimacy of the regime in 1990s, which caused the rise of 
Islamism and the backlash of the establishment elite towards the end of the decade. 
Following this, in section four, I demonstrate how the JDP benefitted from the 
fragmentation of the party system and the political environment that was created by the 
strategy of selective pluralism in the previous period after it came to power. In conclusion, 
I argue that, to a certain extent, the JDP owed its electoral success and political resilience 
against the assaults of the establishment elite of Turkey to the political environment 
created by the strategy of selective pluralism.  
2.2 1980s: restoration through selective pluralism  
2.2.1 The coup and selective pluralism  
The politics of Turkey after the military coup on 27 May 1960 was characterized by a 
rapid pluralisation of the political space on the basis of a liberal constitutional framework. 
As underlined by Çavdar (2008: 110), the Constitution of 1961 opened the political space 
for various democratic demands repressed in the previous period. The new political forces 
of the era represented workers and marginalised urban segments and were mostly led by 
the radical intelligentsia of Turkey (Ahmad, 1977: 186). This liberal legal framework, 
alongside the accelerating urbanisation and industrialization of the country throughout 




political actors. In other words, the pluralisation of the political space unintentiona lly 
created a fertile ground for the radical political forces. During the 1970s, the country also 
witnessed the leftwards turn of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)7 
as a response to these political and socio-demographic changes. The overall result of these 
changes was the rising salience of the left-right cleavage in the country (Özbudun, 2013: 
43). This pluralisation and simultaneous radicalisation of the political scene throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s resulted in unstable and weak coalition governments and rising street 
violence among militant leftist and rightist groups, particularly during the last seven years 
of the 1970s (Zürcher, 2004: 261–264). A crisis of the import substitution economy 
completed this bleak political picture towards the end of the decade (Boratav, 2005: 139–
145).   
On 12 September 1980, the military elite decided to intervene on the ground of the rising 
economic problems and the lack of public security (Ahmad, 2003a: 181). Although the 
coup was successful in erasing political violence, this was achieved at a high human cost 
and through the heavy violation of basic rights and liberties (Zürcher, 2004: 279–280). In 
the eyes of the military elite, the conditions triggering the intervention were mainly the 
excessive plurality of the political system and its radicalisation. In the military junta’s 
view, the political instability was mainly due to the weak coalition governments that were 
in power throughout the 1970s. The rising violence between ultra-nationalist forces and 
the leftist movements in particular was seen as a major destabilising factor by the military 
elite. Thus, the military coup grimly crushed these movements (Ahmad, 2003a: 184–185; 
Zürcher, 2004: 279–280).  
The military elite’s strategy ruthlessly crushed some movements and drove some of them 
towards a decisive and prolonged armed struggle with the armed forces. As Belge 
underlined, the coup created a “political exodus” for leftists due to torture and heavy 
interrogations in prisons and caused thousands of them to flee to European countries 
(2008: 43). Most notably, facing the heavy repression of the military regime was the main 
body of the Kurdish left, namely the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party). Unlike the Turkish left, thanks to their underground organizations and 
timely flight to Syria just before the military coup, the PKK could protect its 
organizational strength and, to a great extent, avoid the heavy repression (Romano 2006: 
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49–50).8 The PKK later followed a much more nationalistic direction (Bozarslan 2008: 
860–868). Apart from state repression towards the left, the armed struggle between 
Kurdish separatist forces and the state drove the more centrist left-wing actors of the 
country, namely the Republican People’s Party and the Democratic Left Party 
(Demokratik Sol Parti), towards a more nationalistic direction, particularly throughout 
the 1990s. Hence, unlike the previous period, the political space of the post-coup period 
in Turkey was deeply shaped by the absence or the weakness of the organizationa l 
networks of genuinely leftist movements.  
At this point it should be noted that the mainstream Islamist movement among the radical 
political forces – in other words the Islamist National View Movement (Milli Görüş 
Hareketi) – avoided street violence throughout the 1970s (Eligür, 2010: 24). These 
strategic choices of the Islamist actors and the military elite protected, to a great extent, 
the Islamist movement and its organizational networks from heavy repression after the 
military coup in 1980. According to Türköne, “if there was not Necmettin Erbakan and 
the National View tradition, Islamism in Turkey would have become an anti-systemic 
ideology which uses violent means similar to its counterparts in other Islamic countries” 
(2012: 87). He contended that through channelling the energy of the Islamist opposition 
to legal-electoral political struggle, Erbakan could inhibit the radicalisation of Islamism 
in Turkey (Türköne, 2012: 87). Indeed, the organization of the National View tradition 
was characterised by a tight leadership grip over the grass roots and this, to a large extent, 
prevented the movement from using violence.9   
In electoral politics, the military junta was also aiming for the elimination of potential 
tendencies towards radicalization as well as the potential for coalition governments 
through sustaining a two or a two-and-a-half party system (Özbudun, 2013: 73). The main 
device introduced for this purpose, and hence the main component of the establishment 
elite’s strategy of selective pluralism, was the Law on Political Parties and the Law on 
Election of Deputies, which were both accepted in 1983. The main measure introduced 
to inhibit the excessive fragmentation of the party system, and hence radicalization, was 
the 10% national electoral threshold. Another measure introduced against the 
                                                                 
8 For further information on the PKK, also see Marcus (2007). 
9 A similar point was also underlined by a high-ranking Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) member in a personal 
interview. As a response to a question regarding the reaction of the National View supporters after the soft 
military intervention on 28 February 1997, he underlined the role of the tight leadership control over the 




pluralisation of the system, and which hence kept parliamentary fragmentation low, was 
the inhibition of participation for parties without a certain number of branches across the 
country in elections. According to the legal regulations prepared on the order of junta, in 
order to be eligible to take part in elections a party should have branches in the majority 
of Turkey’s provinces, and at least one-third of the sub-provinces in each of these 
provinces should contain a party branch. Hence, the Law on Election of Deputies and the 
Law on Political Parties effectively inhibited the representation of small, organizationa lly 
weak, and somewhat more ideological parties in the parliament.  
2.2.2 Gradual Islamization of society 
In the eyes of the military elite, the remedy for the rising polarization between left and 
right and the violent outcomes of this polarization was a more religious and conservative 
society. More precisely, considering communism and socialism as the most dangerous 
enemies of the state and society, the military regime initiated a new indoctrination and 
restoration process depending heavily on a mixture of Turkish nationalism and moderate 
Islam (Zürcher, 2004: 288). Kenan Evren, the leader of the military junta, repeatedly 
argued that “those who are loyal to religion cannot rebel against the state and nation” (Şen, 
2010: 67). In order to construct such a society, the military elite embraced the “Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis”, which was proposed by the conservative nationalist intellectual circle 
known as the “Hearts of the Enlightened” (Aydınlar Ocağı), as the semi-official doctrine 
of the recently restored regime (Şen, 2010: 65–66).  
“The National Culture Report”, a concrete expression of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
as the semi-official doctrine of the new regime, was prepared and published by the State 
Planning Organization in 1983. The report advocated the restoration of Islam and the 
“essential values” of the nation by the intervention and protection of the state (Güvenç et 
al., 1994: 43–44). A heavily religious curriculum became a part of the education policies 
of the new regime (Kaplan, 2006: 73–124; Copeaux, 2006). The military elite also opened 
state institutions and civil society associations to the influence of the religious 
brotherhoods and groups (Cizre, 1998: 107–108). The main outcome of the 
implementation of this new semi-official doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, alongside 
the harsh repression of the left, was a narrower political space and the predominance of 
more conservative and nationalist views on politics in society (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 




2.2.3 The re-introduction of party politics and the rise of the Motherland Party 
After three years of junta rule, the military elite decided to re-introduce party politics. The 
political engineering project of the military elite was deeply affected by the radicaliza t ion 
of politics in the country throughout the two decades before the coup. As mentioned above, 
the military elite were also in favour of a two or a two-and-a-half party system in which 
radicalization of politics could be prevented. In order to realize this idea, the military 
regime banned the parties of the pre-coup period and their leaders from politics and 
increased the national electoral threshold to 10% (Özbudun, 2013: 73). The military elite 
also effectively narrowed down the political space through a new constitution which 
curtailed the liberal and pluralist articles of the Constitution of 1961. 
In the first general elections in 1983 after the coup there were only three parties: the 
Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi), the Populist Party (Halkçı 
Parti) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi). The military elite were in favour of 
the rule of the Nationalist Democracy Party and the party was explicitly supported by 
Evren, the leader of the junta. The Populist Party was expected to be the loyal, slightly 
left-wing opposition party (Zürcher, 2004: 282). The Motherland Party was not expected 
to take part in the parliament at all. The result of the first election must have been shocking 
for the junta since the Motherland Party won a landslide victory by receiving the 45% of 
the votes. As Zürcher emphasized, the Motherland Party benefitted immensely from the 
military junta’s open support of the Nationalist Democracy Party during the elections by 
simply appearing to be the only democratic and independent party among those three 
alternatives (2004: 282).  
In the following general elections, the Motherland Party was still predominant with 36% 
of the votes, despite the significant decrease in its total number of votes. Thanks to new 
electoral regulations prior to the 1987 general election, the Motherland Party gained more 
seats in the parliament than the previous election and maintained a single-party majority 
government from 1983 to 1991. Thus, throughout the 1980s, the military junta’s idea of 
a stable two or a two-and-a-half party system seemed to be realized, albeit under the 
dominance of an unexpected political actor (see Table 2.1). Table 2.1 illustrates the 
fragmentation of the party system in Turkey starting with the 1991 general election. In 
1987, the ban on the parties and leaders of the pre-coup period was lifted through a 
referendum (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 49). In the 1991 general election, the monopoly of the 




Süleyman Demirel and his True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi) on the Turkish politica l 
scene. The centre-left also gave signals of fragmentation with the re-emergence of Bülent 
Ecevit and his Democratic Left Party. The particular importance of the 1991 general 
election was the appearance of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in the parliament 
through an election coalition with far-right Nationalist Work Party (Milliyetçi Çalışma 
Partisi – this later became the Nationalist Action Party) and the representation of Islamist 
politics in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) with a 
remarkable number of deputies.  
Although the establishment elite’s strategy was running smoothly at the beginning, the 
military regime’s top-down project of creating a slightly more religious and nationalist 
society in order to save the country from the “perils of the left” gradually created some 
unexpected consequences from the point of view of the secularist segments of Turkish 
society, such as the rise of Islamism at the beginning of the 1990s. As illustrated in the 
next section, the repression of the leftist and ultra-nationalist forces, the Turkish-Islamic 















Table 2.1: Results and significant actors of last seven general  elections 
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Source: Election results from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2012) 
*Due to the political bans the Republican People’s Party was represented in the parliament as the Social 
Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti) until 1995. The Islamist Welfare Party also re-
appeared under different names due to party closures during the 1990s and beginning of 2000s. 
 
2.3 1990s: fragmentation in the party system and the legitimacy crises  
2.3.1 The decline of the Motherland Party and fragmentation in the party system 
The importance of favourable political and electoral circumstances – such as high levels 
of electoral volatility and fragmentation throughout the 1990s – in the rise and electoral 
success of the JDP has been frequently underlined by the students of Turkish politics 
(Tezcür, 2012: 119–122). Indeed, Turkish politics had been characterised by the 
fragmentation of the centre-right and centre-left in 1990s. Governments formed by these 




strongest party of the post-coup period, the Motherland Party, started to lose momentum 
at the end of the 1980s after the election of its influential leader, Turgut Özal, as the 
President of the Republic. Given the leader’s weight in this party’s organizational life, 
this decline was no surprise. The Motherland Party failed to find a successful substitute 
for its influential leader and/or to construct a stable party identity, which resulted in the 
emergence of electoral competitors and the fragmentation of the party system 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 58).  
This period also overlapped with the return of the experienced centre-right politic ian 
Demirel to the political game. As a result, during the 1990s the centre-right in Turkey 
was represented by two political parties: the Motherland Party and the True Path Party. 
After Özal’s election to the presidency, the leadership of the Motherland Party became 
contested. Mesut Yılmaz, a well-educated, Westernized man, became the leader of the 
party in 1991 (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 49–50). After the unexpected death of Özal in 1993, 
Demirel became the president of the Republic. A Westernized, modern-looking woman 
and a professor of economics, Tansu Çiller became the leader of the True Path Party in 
the absence of Demirel (Cizre, 2002: 88–89). It must be underlined that these two new 
leaders of the centre-right had quite different personalities and backgrounds compared to 
the former leaders of their parties. Because of their wealthy and well-educated 
backgrounds, Westernized looks and cold attitudes towards the electorate, the majority of 
the traditional Turkish centre-right voters had great difficulty in seeing these figures as 
being one of them. 
These developments in the leadership of the centre-right forces in Turkey remarkably 
contributed to the fragmentation of the Turkish party system alongside other economic 
and social problems that triggered the dissatisfaction of voters from the centrist forces of 
Turkish politics. It is striking that between 1991 and 2002 Turkey had nine different 
governments (See Table 2.2 for government types between 1983 and 2013). From 1991 
to 2002, Turkey was ruled by various weak minority and coalition governments. Politica l 
instability was a major visible and persisting feature of Turkish politics alongside other 
social and economic problems such as Kurdish insurgency, inflation, a financial crises, 
corruption and natural disasters in the background. It would not be an exaggeration to 
argue that voters, to a great extent, saw the minority and coalition governments, and the 
fragmentation of the party system, as being responsible for the economic and social 




In 1987, there were only three parties in parliament, and the Motherland Party had a clear 
majority with 299 deputies. During the 1990s the number of parties increased and the 
number of the deputies of different parties became almost equal. In this sense the 
composition of the parliament after the general elections in 1999 is very striking: the 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) won 126 seats, the Motherland Party 
won 88 seats, the Democratic Left Party won 134 seats, the True Path Party won 83 seats 
and the Virtue Party won 102 seats (see Table 2.1). This almost even distribution of seats 
among five parties in the parliament created many opportunities for different 
configurations of coalition governments but, at the same time, the very same abundance 



















Table 2.2: Government types since 1983 
No Years Party or Parties Government type Prime 
Ministers 
45 1983-1987 Motherland Party single majority  Özal 
46 1987-1989 Motherland Party single majority  Özal 
47 1989-1991 Motherland Party single majority  Y. Akbulut 
48 1991 Motherland Party single majority  Yılmaz 
49 1991-1993 True Path Party – Social 
Democratic Populist Party 
majority coalition Demirel – 
E. İnönü 
50 1993-1995 True Path Party – Social 
Democratic Populist Party 
majority coalition Çiller 
51 1995 True Path Party single minority  Çiller 
52 1995-1996 True Path Party – 
Repunlican People’s Party 
majority coalition Çiller 
53 1996 Motherland Party – True 
Path Party 
majority coalition Yılmaz 
54 1996-1997 Welfare Party – True Path 
Party 
majority coalition  Erbakan 
55 1997-1999 Motherland Party – 
Democratic Left Party - 
Democratic Turkey Party 
minority coalition  Yılmaz 
56 1999 Democratic Left Party single minority B. Ecevit 
57 1999-2002 Democratic Left Party – 
Nationalist Action Party 
and Motherland Party 
majority coalition  Ecevit 
58 2002-2003 JDP single majority A. Gül 
59 2003-2007 JDP single majority  Erdoğan 
60 2007-2011 JDP single majority  Erdoğan 
61 2011-2015 JDP single majority  Erdoğan 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
2.3.2 The legitimacy crises of the establishment and the rise of the Islamist elite  
The fragmentation of centre-right politics and the instability of the minority and coalition 
governments in Turkey exacerbated the demise of the legitimacy of the political system 
in general. During the 1990s, some scandalous incidents of political corruption were 
publicised. Most notably, the notorious Susurluk Incident in 1996 in a sub-province in 
western Turkey revealed the close ties between organized crime groups, parliamentar ians 
and security forces.10 In the background of the Susurluk Incident, less sensational yet 
                                                                 
10 The investigation of the accident did not go too far and, therefore, abovementioned bonds among state 




highly publicized incidents of political corruption were also taking place (Şener, 2001). 
According to research published in 1997, although Turkish people had a commitment to 
democracy, there was also a widespread distrust in the political institutions of the country 
such as governments, the parliament and the bureaucracy towards the end of the decade 
(Akgün, 2000: 18).  
The 1990s were also characterised by the crimes committed by the forces of the Turkish 
“deep state” against civilian Kurdish dissidents. The methods of struggle with the 
insurgency of the pro-Kurdish PKK hardly distinguished between violent and non-vio lent 
Kurdish opposition and criminalised a wider community including Kurdish intellectua ls, 
artists and businessmen. The war waged against the PKK also frequently crossed the 
borders of legitimate action with the involvement of criminal underground organizat ions 
in the process (Hamdan, 2009: 234). Paramilitary techniques deployed in coping with the 
Kurdish insurgency caused massive human rights violations during the 1990s. Murders 
of well-known Kurdish activists as well as of ordinary citizens in the name of the struggle 
against terror had a corrosive effect on the image of the Turkish state as a “state of justice”.  
In contrast with this picture, the clean image of the Islamist Welfare Party was 
consolidated by the performance of Islamist municipalities in two major cities of Turkey 
in the mid-1990s: İstanbul and Ankara. The relatively transparent and effic ient 
management of these two cities under the rule of Welfare Party mayors increased the 
image of managerial competence for the Islamist elite in the eyes of the electorate (Öniş , 
2001: 286). The electorate started to see the Islamist National View parties as a decent 
political alternative against the corrupt centrist politics of the country. As noted above, 
oppression towards the leftist organizations after the coup in 1980 and the rightwards turn 
of the centre-left forces in Turkey during the 1990s completed this picture. In the absence 
of robust leftist organizational networks that could channel the grievances of the poor 
urban masses stemming from the declining legitimacy of the system and rising economic 
problems, Islamist politics started to be seen as the only reliable political choice for the 
disillusioned and unprivileged urban voters. 
The outcome of these circumstances was a remarkable victory for the Islamist Welfare 
Party in the 1995 general election with 21% of the votes. Afterwards, the formation of a 
coalition government of the centre-right True Path Party and the Welfare Party under the 




triggered the resistance of the establishment elite, which was already alarmed by the rise 
of the Islamist Welfare Party in the middle of 1990s. 
2.3.3 The establishment elite strikes back: the soft intervention of  
28 February 1997  
The coalition government shortly became the target of high military circles after a number 
of controversial activities. As part of Erbakan’s foreign policy strategy of enhancing the 
cultural and economic bonds among Muslim countries, he and a group of ministers, 
bureaucrats and businessmen from Turkey visited Libya and a couple of other Middle 
Eastern and African countries in October 1996. In Libya, the Turkish group was accepted 
in a tent in the middle of the desert by the Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. Before 
the negotiations began between the two sides, Qaddafi decided to hold a press conference. 
Qaddafi, in front of the cameras, criticized Turkey’s attitude towards Kurds and the 
United States. Although the bombastic and undiplomatic style of Qaddafi was not 
unknown, this meeting in Libya was depicted in the mainstream media as a major 
humiliation stemming from the Islamist inclinations of the government (Ahmad, 2003b: 
170).  
Some very controversial speeches by Welfare Party members addressing the issues 
around sharia rule and secularism of the country were publicized on several occasions 
through mainstream media during the rule of the Welfare-Path (Refah-yol) coalition 
government.11 A very debatable plan for the regulation of working hours according to the 
local fast-breaking (iftar)12  times by the government was also followed by the fast-
breaking invitation made by Erbakan in the Prime Minister’s residence (Sabah, 1997). 
This invitation was harshly criticized in the mainstream media due to the attendance of 
sheiks and leaders of religious brotherhoods and communities in their religious dress  
(Ergin, 1997). The last highly controversial event was the “Jerusalem Evening” (Kudüs 
Gecesi), where a theatre play on the Palestinian resistance against Israel was staged under 
the sponsorship of the Welfare Party municipality of Sincan, a sub-province of Ankara, 
in January 1997. In this play, one of the guests at the play was the Iranian ambassador 
                                                                 
11  Later on these controversial speeches were used as proof of the anti-secular and anti-constitutional 
activities of the party in the closure case opened by Vural Savaş , the Chief Prosecutor of the High Court of 
Appeals of the era. These excerpts from the speeches of prominent  party figures can be found in the 
indictment for the case (Hürriyet, 2008).  
12 According to the Islamic calendar, the month of Ramadan is considered holy and observant Muslims do 




and there were posters on the walls of the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah. This event 
was followed by the so-called “practice manoeuvres” of military tanks on the streets of 
Sincan at the beginning of February 1997 (Ahmad, 2003b: 171–172).   
One of the prominent researchers of the Islamist movement in Turkey, Hakan Yavuz, 
evaluated all these minor incidents as signs of frustration since the Welfare Party elite 
was not able to implement the redistributive economic programme called “just order” 
(adil düzen) under the constraints of the coalition government and International Monetary 
Fund agreements (Yavuz, 2009: 64). In other words, despite the radical tendencies of the 
party’s grass roots, the party elite had to remain within the boundaries of the given 
systemic constraints. Instead, some of the Welfare Party elite appealed to highly 
sensational activities in order to satisfy the party’s grass roots. One should also note that 
this political picture was preceded by a wider process in which assassinations of some of 
the country’s prominent secularist intellectuals had already started to represent a concrete 
threat. The most dreadful incident was the mob arson of a hotel full of secularist- left ist 
intellectuals and artists in 1993. Those people came to the inner Anatolian province of 
Sivas for the celebration of an Alawi religious festival. The attack resulted in the death of 
36 people. 
The enmity of the military elite against the ruling Islamist Welfare Party ended with the 
declaration of a series of “anti-reactionary” measures imposed on the coalition 
government in a notorious National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) meeting on 
28 February 1997. These measures included the taking control of non-registered Quran 
courses by the Ministry of National Education; the implementation of eight years of 
continuous education, which would undermine the educational strongholds of Islamist 
politics in Turkey, namely the Imam and Preacher Schools; and a ban on religious 
brotherhoods (Zürcher, 2004: 300). These measures were unacceptable for the Welfare 
Party elite in terms of the party’s strictly Islamist ideology and the expectations of its core 
constituency. After a couple of days of hesitation, the Prime Minister and the leader of 
the Welfare Party, Erbakan, had to sign the document known as the “February 28th 
Decisions”, which was prepared by the military elite.  
Later on, the Welfare Party was banned by the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) 
on the grounds of anti-secular activities (T.C. Resmi Gazete, 1998). The leaders of the 




2004: 301). After the closure of the party, prominent figures of the Welfare Party brought 
the case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The decision of the ECtHR 
(ECtHR, 2003) confirmed the anti-secular and anti-constitutional activities of the Welfare 
Party and, to a large extent, was in accordance with the decision of the Turkish 
Constitutional Court. This was a decisive point in the history of the Islamist National 
View tradition (Yavuz, 2009: 69). After the decision of the ECtHR, the Islamist politica l 
elite must have recognized the importance of the support of domestic and foreign 
democratic circles in the survival of Islamist political movement.  
The military elite’s soft intervention, or its non-violent methods of dealing with the 
Islamist forces, should also be underlined. Despite the tensions between these two 
political forces in Turkey throughout the 1990s, the interaction between them had been 
sustained, particularly within a non-violent framework. In a sense, there was a kind of 
“virtual consensus” between the establishment elite and the mainstream Islamist elite. On 
the one hand, as underlined above, mainstream Islamist politics in Turkey never resorted 
to political violence despite the use of violence by the marginal radical Islamist groups 
such as Kurdish Hezbollah and İBDA-C. On the other hand, the establishment elite used 
considerably light methods in the struggle with Islamists when the heavy and repressive 
measures deployed against Kurdish and left-wing political movements were taken into 
account. According to Cizre, there was a strong connection between the transformation 
of Islamism in Turkey and the fact that the members of the Islamist movement were not 
jailed and their sympathizers were not tortured or massacred by the establishment (Cizre, 
1998: 116). The transformation of Islamism and post-Islamist developments in Turkey 
should be understood on the basis of this “virtual consensus” between the establishment 
elite and Islamist elite over the means and limits of political struggle.  
After the military intervention in 1997 and the collapse of the Welfare-Path coalition 
government, Islamist politics entered a period of decline and reformation. In fact, the 
Islamist National View movement had already started to gain a new direction with the 
rise of internal opposition to the decades-old dominance of the party leader Erbakan. 
Experiences in consequent elections and in office, particularly in local governments, had 
a crucial influence on the younger generation of the Islamist National View tradition. This 
experience had a very decisive impact on the would-be leader of the JDP, Erdoğan. 




embraced a “service”-oriented outlook during his years as the mayor of İstanbul (2008: 
28). 
Indeed, some of the Islamist politicians, and particularly Erdoğan, realized the 
opportunities that lay beyond a narrow Islamist appeal due to their municipal experience. 
In the literature, as underlined in the introduction of this chapter, the repression by the 
secularist elite has been frequently addressed as the main factor behind the moderation of 
the Islamist movement in Turkey. But it seems that the pressure from the secularist forces 
was only a catalyst for the internal transformation of the movement triggered by the 
opportunities of a permissive democratic system, or a selectively pluralist environment, 
which accommodated Islamist parties of the National View tradition within the system 
and which did not choose to criminalize them as it did the leftist and Kurdish nationalist 
forces.13  
As one member of the Islamist Welfare Party, who later on became a JDP deputy, 
underlined in an interview, “intensive state interventions or the closures by the oppressive 
coups only provided an opportunity for the party to interrogate itself” (Interviewee 29 
2014, April 16). Another interviewee explained the transformation of the Islamist Welfare 
Party in similar lines: “we went beyond this more Islamic discourse of the National View 
because we wanted to be a more inclusive party. You cannot make it with an Islamic 
discourse. This is why we remained at 18, 20, 22 per cent. [When the party was using an 
Islamic discourse] we got 24, 25 per cent in our best performance” (Interviewee 26 2014, 
April 4). Another experienced former member of the Islamist National View parties and 
the JDP underlined the same inclination of the Islamist elite prior to the intervention of 
the establishment elite: 
The National Salvation Party [Milli Selamet Partisi – the Islamis t 
National View party of 1970s] received 11 per cent in the general 
election in 1973 and 7 per cent in 1977. Hence, the number of deputies 
was reduced from 48 to 24. So there was an electoral failure. If there 
was no September 12th [military coup in 1980] the party would have 
received many fewer votes. Because you can’t renovate yourself and 
people start to move away. The Welfare Party received 22 per cent of 
the votes in the 1995 general elections but the Virtue Party received 15 
per cent in the general elections in 1999. These were electoral failures. 
Why did the votes of the Virtue Party decrease? People started to 
discuss these things. […] The February 28th intervention was unfair but 
                                                                 
13 Mecham strongly emphasizes the permissiveness of the system, but the repression towards the leftist and 




why was this unfair treatment of the party not corrected by the electorate? 
These discussions within the party gave rise to the change (Interviewee 
21 2014, February 28–March 4).  
As argued above, the soft intervention of the military elite was only a catalyst for this 
transformation. As one of the experienced National View members of the era pointed out 
in an interview, the main dynamic behind the transformation of the Islamist elite and the 
rise of the post-Islamist JDP was the desire to be more successful in elections:  
[In 1999], for the first time in Turkey, local and general elections were 
held together. […] The Virtue Party lost 8 per cent of the votes [the 
Welfare Party recieved in the previous elections]. Its votes decreased to 
15 per cent. […] But at the local level we protected our votes and even 
increased it. Thus, the Democratic Left Party was the winner [of the 
general elections] in my sub-province but we got the municipality [in 
local elections]. The Democratic Left Party crushed us in the central 
government elections but we crushed them in the elections for the 
municipality. As a result, an 8–10 per cent gap, almost the vote of a 
single party, appeared between the votes received by the Virtue Party 
municipalities and the Virtue Party itself. The local level was much 
more successful and this was an indication of the fact that the 
headquarters could not bear the young cadres anymore and there would 
be an interrogation of this situation [within the party] (Interviewee 29 
2014, April 16). 
Thus, it would be fair to argue that the divide within the Islamist National View tradition 
and the rise of the so-called reformist wing within the party were rather results of interna l 
interrogations of the party’s electoral failures than a response to external pressures.14 
Mainly on this background, at the 2000 convention of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi – 
which became the home to many members of the Islamist Welfare Party after it was 
banned by the Constitutional Court), Abdullah Gül challenged the authority of the old 
guard of the Islamist National View tradition. He lost the competition for the party 
leadership by a very slim margin. Nevertheless, in 2001, the JDP was founded by this 
same, younger, reformist generation of the National View Movement led by Erdoğan and 
Gül, and which was influenced, to a lesser extent, by figures such as Bülent Arınç and 
Abdüllatif Şener, with the support of some centre-right and even left-wing politicians.15   
When we focus on the wider political scene of the decade we see that the years following 
the 28 February 1997 intervention and the decline of the coalition government, includ ing 
                                                                 
14 For a very rich empirical source revealing the pragmatism and electoral concerns of the reformist wing 
in the Islamist National View see Selim (2002). 




Islamists, did not change a lot in terms of the fragmentation and volatility of the Turkish 
party system and the instability of the governments. The first general elections in 1999 
after the military intervention brought five parties into the parliament with roughly the 
same numbers of seats. The first party of the elections, the Democratic Left Party, and its 
old and experienced leader, led the coalition government formed from his party, the 
Nationalist Action Party and the Motherland Party against the Islamist Virtue Party 
(Ahmad, 2003b: 173). 
The already declining legitimacy of the system was made worse in 1999 by the biggest 
earthquake since the 1940s and by the financial crises in 2000 and 2001. The earthquake 
devastated the most developed parts of the country, namely İzmit and some parts of 
İstanbul, and left over 17,000 people dead and a quarter of a million homeless. The 
amount of damage caused by the earthquake was around 3–6 billion dollars (Jalali, 2002: 
120). The coalition government’s inability at dealing with this catastrophe, particula r ly 
just after the earthquake (Jalali, 2002: 124–126), was never erased from the public 
memory. This tragic event was also complemented by the 2000 and 2001 financial crisis 
(Uygur, 2001).  As Öniş made clear, there was a dramatic decline in GNP and per capita 
income, and the crises affected highly skilled and educated people, small- and medium-
size businessmen, and the very poor (2003: 14–15). Despite the technocratic steps taken 
with the appointment of the Kemal Derviş, a former World Bank executive, as the 
Minister of Economic Affairs (Öniş, 2003: 18), the image of the managerial incompetence 
of the coalition governments barely improved and was made even worse by the sickness 
of the Prime Minister Ecevit.   
2.4 2002 onwards: the rise of the post-Islamist elite 
2.4.1 The JDP benefits from fragmentation and selective pluralism 
Under the abovementioned political and electoral circumstances, the JDP achieved a 
spectacular electoral victory in the November 2002 general elections. The JDP won 34% 
of the votes and gained 363 seats in parliament, a clear majority. The Republican People’s 
Party received 19% of the votes, gained 178 seats and became the second largest force in 
the parliament. Although the True Path Party and the Nationalist Action Party won 9% 
and 8% of the votes respectively, they could not gain any seats in parliament due to the 
10% threshold. The other coalition parties of the pre-election period, namely the 
Motherland Party and the Democratic Left Party, did much worse in the 2002 election. 




get 1% (see Table 2.1).  As one of the JDP elite emphasized, one of the main factors in 
the political and electoral success of the JDP was the negative experience Turkish people 
had had under the minority and coalition governments and the instability caused by this 
political environment throughout the 1990s (Şentürk, 2008b: 108). Apparently, the 
coalition partners were heavily penalized by the voters.  
The following years and elections brought a total dissolution of the centre-right parties of 
the period before 2002. To a certain extent, the JDP voters’ main intention in the 2002 
election was voting against the established Turkish parties (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 10). 
Indeed, the JDP was the main beneficiary of the diminishing popular appeals of its rivals 
in 2002 (Sayarı, 2007: 201). Not only the coalition partners’ failures but also the 
fragmentation and weakness of the opposition parties, as Sayarı underlined, paved the 
way for the JDP’s achievements in the general elections in 2002 (2007: 202).  This picture 
clearly addressed the weakness of the centre-right and coalition partners in 2002.  
However, the relatively poor performance of the Republican People’s Party remained 
unexplained. The Republican People’s Party’s absence in parliament in the period 
between 1999 and 2002 protected its image, to a great extent, from the negative impacts 
of the deterioration of the political and economic circumstances after 1990 – a very 
similar situation to the clean image of the JDP. Electoral fragmentation, government 
instability, managerial incompetence of the coalition governments, economic crises of 
2000 and 2001, and the decline of the legitimacy of the regime in general during the 1990s 
might have also worked in the Republican People Party’s favour. However, this was not 
the case, and the party could not reach beyond the traditional electoral limits of the centre-
left in Turkey. As I will discuss in the following chapters on the political appeal, 
organization and leadership of the JDP, the relative failure of the Republican People’s 
Party in this particular election illustrated the importance of effective political agency: 
the role of a robust organization as well as suitable political appeals. Hence, convenient 
political circumstances were not a sufficient condition for electoral success in its own 
right. In other words, agency matters.  
After its electoral victory, the JDP formed a single-party majority government. The first 
years of the JDP corresponded to the recovery of the Turkish economy thanks to the 
upwards trend in global economic cycles (Boratav, 2010: 463) and regulations introduced 




price index dropped dramatically and the GDP per capita began to increase (Öniş, 2012: 
140). This promising picture was also complemented by the determination of the early 
JDP government in the European Union accession process. The consecutive liberal and 
democratic reforms created an optimism and trust towards the democratic credentials of 
the party in the country and abroad (Hale & Özbudun, 2010: 55–67).  
2.4.2 Resistance of the establishment elite  
Despite the ideological change of Islamist politics and the initial liberal image of the JDP, 
the party had to deal with the resistance of the establishment elite since the beginning of 
its formation. The clear majority the party gained in the 2002 general elections made a 
remarkable contribution to the resilience of the JDP before the attacks of the 
establishment elite. In the absence of other centre-right and rightist parties in the 
parliament, the JDP found an opportunity to stand as the only representative of the right-
leaning majority of the country vis-a-vis the establishment elite. As a result, the 
establishment elite lost its social support, which stemmed partly from its right-wing 
political allies such as former centre-right parties. As Sayarı highlighted, “in the absence 
of an effective political opposition in parliament, the Constitutional Court and the 
Presidency have emerged as the two principal institutional sources of counter -
majoritarianism in Turkish politics” (2007: 203). The relationship between the 
establishment elite and the Republican People’s Party was not that crucial in providing 
social legitimacy to the interventions of the former since the Republican People’s Party 
was usually seen by the majority of the population as the representatives of the 
establishment elite. Hence, the establishment elite remained weak in front of the JDP’s 
parliamentary majority due to the lack of right-wing political allies, with considerable 
seats in the parliament sympathetic to their interventions. In this section I will give a brief 
descriptive account of this tension between the JDP elite and its elite opponents through 
some critical interventions of the establishment elite.  
2.4.2.1 The Presidency of the Republic 
The Presidency of the Republic, despite its lack of effective executive authority, always 
held a significant veto power in Turkey. According to article 104 of the Constitution of 
1982 prepared on the order of the military junta, the President of the Republic had the 
authority to return laws prepared and decisions made by the parliament and call for 
elections (TBMM: 50–52). Hence, the ideological leanings of presidents made a great 




had been traditionally occupied by persons who were more or less in consensus with the 
establishment elite of Turkey until the selection of Gül by the Parliament in 2007. 
In its initial years, the JDP had to work with committed secularist and jurist Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer until 2007. Sezer, the former chief of the Constitutional Court, was elected as the 
President of the Republic for seven years with a consensus in the parliament in 2002. On 
the grounds of his secularist tendencies, the military elite were positive towards his 
election as the President of the Republic (Demirdöğen, 2007a). His fair attitude towards 
the victims of the 28 February military intervention was also received with sympathy by 
Islamists. Nevertheless, after the JDP came to power, the relationship between Sezer and 
the JDP immediately started to grow more tense.   
Due to his imprisonment after citing a poem allegedly praising religious war in 1997, 
Erdoğan became ineligible to become a deputy. The only way for Erdoğan to make it into 
parliament was a change in the constitution. Sezer resisted this change but ultima te ly 
confirmed it (Demirdöğen, 2007b). Another significant case of resistance by Sezer was 
his rejection of the decision to provide scholarships to students in private schools. Sezer 
rejected this law on the grounds of the potential danger of financing reactionary activit ies 
(Demirdöğen, 2007c). Sezer vetoed the appointment of ministers and many high-rank ing 
officials in the JDP years. He also showed a ruthless and rough symbolic resistance to the 
JDP elite stemming from his firm secularist world view. For instance, he did not accept 
or invite the veiled spouses of JDP deputies to presidential receptions (Demirdöğen, 
2007b; 2007c). He was one of the most active presidents in the history of the Republic in 
terms of the laws that he had vetoed and returned to the parliament (Demirdöğen, 2007d).  
2.4.2.2 High Judiciary, Constitutional Court and the Military 
Towards the end of Sezer’s term in office in 2007, the election process of the new 
president triggered a political crisis between the secularist establishment elite and the JDP. 
With a clear majority in parliament, the JDP wanted to elect its own candidate to the 
presidency. Secularist circles, given the abovementioned veto power of the President, 
advocated the idea of reaching a meaningful political and social consensus on the next 
presidential candidate. In other words, they were not willing to accept a candidate from 
the ranks of the JDP. At this point, high judicial circles were involved in the discussion. 
Sabih Kanadoğlu, ex-chief prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals (Yargıtay), through 




presence of 367 deputies, or two-thirds of the all deputies of the parliament, for a 
legitimate election process. Otherwise, he contended that the first round of the election of 
the president might be cancelled by the Constitutional Court and the process would not 
be completed. This argument was embraced by opposition parties in the parliament and 
by many law experts in the country (Uluşahin, 2007: 19). In the first round of the elections, 
opposition parties simply did not attend the voting. As expected, the first round of the 
election process was annulled by the decision of the Constitutional Court (Eroğul, 2007: 
171) and the crisis led the JDP elite to call for an early general election. 
The military were also involved in the discussions. On the evening of 27 April 2007, a 
declaration was published on the website of the Turkish Armed Forces. The declaration 
indicated that the military was determined to reassert its role in Turkish politics. The 
discussion over secularism which was triggered by the crisis regarding the election of the 
new president gave the pretext that the Turkish Armed Forces was looking for.16 This 
declaration was called “e-memorandum” (e-muhtıra) later on. Unlike the previous 
obedient attitude of the elected political cadres of the country towards military 
interventions, the JDP elite strongly criticized the declaration. Immediately after the e-
memorandum, the government spokesman, Cemil Çiçek, underlined the fact that the chief 
of staff was bound to the prime minister but not the other way around (Yetkin, 2007).  
In the 2007 election, the JDP increased its share of the vote dramatically due to the image 
that the JDP had been treated unfairly by the establishment elite. The party won 46% of 
the popular vote and gained 341 seats in parliament. This was slightly less than the 
number of seats the party gained in the previous election as a result of the entrance of a 
third party in the parliament, the Nationalist Action Party, which passed the 10% 
threshold in the 2007 election. Afterwards, the party could elect Gül as president without 
any legal discussion thanks to the presence of the Nationalist Action Party with its own 
candidate in the first round of the presidential elections in parliament.  
The most significant political event that followed the JDP’s 2007 electoral victory and 
presidential election was the case opened by the Constitutional Court for banning the JDP. 
On 14 March 2008, the Chief Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals of the era, 
Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya initiated a case against the party in the Constitutional Court on 
                                                                 
16  For a longer version of the e-memorandum and the screenshot of the Turkish version see 




the grounds that the JDP became the “focal point of anti-secular activities” (Bianet, 2008). 
The prosecutor demanded the closure of the party and a ban on 71 people from politics 
for five years, including Erdoğan and Gül. In the end, the Constitutional Court found the 
party guilty but decided not to close it, instead cutting its financial support from state 
sources (Milliyet, 2008). During this process, both conservative and liberal circles in 
Turkey criticized the case as a gross mistake and a massive violation of democratic 
politics.  
As the course of events illustrated, the JDP elite were much more resilient than their 
Islamist predecessors. The disproportional parliamentary majority enjoyed by the JDP 
since its first years was the main basis of this resilience. Under the circumstances of the 
political framework that had been created by the strategy of selective pluralism, the main 
losers were small parties with weak organizational networks. Because of its robust and 
extensive organizational networks, analysed in the following chapters of this dissertation, 
restrictions imposed by the laws regarding elections and political parties, as well as the 
10% threshold, were not real impediments for the JDP. On the contrary, the party was the 
foremost beneficiary of the abovementioned election and party rules in place in the 2002 
general election.  
Hence, the “selective pluralism” introduced in Turkey after the 1980 coup worked in the 
JDP’s favour. As a consequence, the JDP could secure 66% of the seats in the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey after receiving 34% of the votes in 2002. Hence almost 50% 
of the votes cast in the 2002 election could not be represented in the parliament. Relying 
on its parliamentary majority and a new language of reform and democratization, after 
2002 the post-Islamist JDP elite gained the upper hand against the establishment elite in 
Turkey. After all, as noted by Toprak, “the military finds it difficult to show open 
resistance to civilian decisions when these are taken through legitimate democratic 
procedures and rest on consensual politics” (2005: 179). As long as selective pluralism 
worked in favour of the JDP, despite the discourse of change, reform and democratizat ion, 
the party elite did little to promote further pluralisation of the political system. They 
neither reduced the national electoral threshold nor changed the Law on Political Parties. 
In short, the strategy of selective pluralism remained intact and started to work to the 




2.4.3 Political conflict under the conditions of selective pluralism and the JDP 
The discussion in this chapter in general, and the demonstration of the confrontat ions 
between the establishment elite and the Islamist political entrepreneurs in the previous 
section in particular, pointed out a couple of important features regarding the politica l 
context in which the JDP – or initially the post-Islamist party – emerged and came into 
prominence. One of the main features of this political context is the weakness of the 
liberal democratic architecture. In other words, in Turkey, at least since 1980, there have 
been decisive restrictions upon certain political actors in the legal political space, and 
powerful, highly politicized, non-party systemic actors including the military, high 
judiciary and bureaucracy were always central to the political game. Although for a 
certain period these circumstances worked in the Islamist elite’s favour, particularly from 
the middle of the 1990s onwards, political actors behind these restrictions decisive ly 
turned against the rise of the Islamist elite. Under these restrictive conditions, and in their 
encounters with powerful, non-party elites, it is plausible to think that organizationa l 
capacity was seen as key for political survival by the Islamist elite.   
The Islamist and anti-systemic ideology of the predecessors of the JDP also consolidated 
this need to rely on a robust organizational network. Although the relationship between 
the establishment elite and the JDP did not include violent confrontations, it was not an 
entirely peaceful one, either. Given the methods used by the establishment elite, ranging 
from military memorandums to legal intimidations, and given the extent of the change 
aimed by the Islamists, and later by the JDP elite – such as more freedom for religious 
expression – the political conflict in Turkey was remarkably deep. These characterist ics 
and the degree of political conflict described in this chapter deeply shaped JDP politics 
in terms of its political appeal and organization. 
The impact, as I will discuss in the rest of this dissertation, was twofold. While the 
resistance of highly visible and powerful non-party elites led the JDP to easily embrace a 
“low-populist” appeal, the party also carefully protected its hierarchical, centralized and 
robust organizational legacy that stemmed from the party’s Islamist past and which 
proved remarkably resilient. In this context, “political organizations” should be 
considered as “a means of collective empowerment”, which is “a counterwailing power 
to the concentrated economic or institutional resources of elite groups” (Roberts, 2006: 
136). It is plausible to think that the nature of conflict with the establishment elite, and 




to perceive party organizations as something beyond an electoral apparatus in a peaceful 
democratic game – as it is in liberal Western democracies – and a potential resource that 
they could deploy against the systemic pressure. Hence, the JDP elite constructed robust 
organizational leverage on the one hand, and a very strong leadership relying on a 
decisively pro-JDP media and a “low-populist appeal” on the other. This paved the way 
to deepen the already hostile divides among political actors of Turkey in the following 
years and decisively shaped the JDP politics – its political appeal and organization – as 
delineated in the following chapters. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, in contrast to the widespread emphases on the struggle between secular ist 
actors and the Islamist and post-Islamist elite, I have argued that the permissive attitude 
of the establishment elite paved the way for the rise of Islamism and post-Islamism in 
Turkey. As illustrated in the second section of the chapter, the military junta’s strategy of 
selective pluralism against the fragmentation and radicalisation of the political space 
destroyed leftist organizational networks, deepened the Kurdish opposition’s armed 
struggle and drove the centre-left forces of the country in a nationalist direction since 
1980s. As a part of its strategy of selective pluralism, the establishment elite introduced 
highly restrictive regulations on political parties and elections and a very high national 
electoral threshold, which inhibited the representation of small parties in the parliament. 
The military elite did not only use restrictive coercive and legal measures to inhibit the 
emergence of a genuinely plural political space, but they also initiated a societal process 
of gradual Islamization like its counterparts across the Muslim world.  
Nevertheless, the military elite’s desire to inhibit the fragmentation of the party system 
and the radicalisation of politics was not fully realized. After the re-appearance of the 
traditional leaders of the centre-right and centre-left in the political stage of the country, 
the Motherland Party lost momentum and this caused the fragmentation of the centre-
right and centre-left from the beginning of 1990s. Representation of five parties with more 
or less equal numbers of seats in the parliament throughout the 1990s caused politica l 
instability due to weak coalition and minority governments. Social and economic 
problems accompanied these political developments and accelerated the decline of the 
legitimacy of the political system in general. In the middle of the 1990s, this background 
gave rise to Islamism in Turkey, and towards the end of the decade triggered the 




intervention”, and mainly relying on their experience in elections and in office, some of 
the Islamist elite developed reformist ideas, and an elite spinoff from the main body of 
the Islamist National View tradition founded the JDP.  
In the election held on 3 November 2002, the JDP achieved a spectacular victory over the 
protest votes of the electorate to the existing political actors of Turkey that held power 
throughout the 1990s. Thanks to selective pluralism – in other words, a restrictive party 
and election law, an unusually high national electoral threshold, and the gradual 
Islamization of the society – the JDP acquired a disproportionate majority in the 
parliament, particularly in its first term. The deployment of a language of 
reform/democratization and the parliamentary majority of the JDP helped the party elite 
to overcome the resistance of the establishment elite. Hence, selective pluralism started 
to work in favour of the post-Islamist elite and against the establishment elite. In the last 
section of this chapter I also pointed out that these characteristics of the political conflict 
in Turkey deeply influenced the JDP politics in terms of its political appeal and 
organization. I argued that, despite its mainly non-violent framework, the hostility 
between powerful non-party elites and Islamist political entrepreneurs have led the 
Islamist elite and, later, the JDP elite to embrace a “low-populist” appeal and to construct 
a robust organizational leverage for electoral success and political resilience. As I 
illustrate in the following chapters, the role of agency, in other words, the political appeal 
and the organization of the JDP, was essential in the exploitation of the opportunit ies 






3 The HIGH-LOW DIVIDE in TURKISH POLITICS and the POPULIST 
APPEAL of the JDP 
 
[Two prominent characters of the traditional Turkish shadow theatre are] 
Karagöz and Hacivat. Karagöz is an extrovert, a tactless and frank man of the 
people who does not pretend to be someone else. People connect to him 
emotionally and ignore some of his little vices, such as cheating his business 
partner.  Karagöz is representative of the morale and common sense of the 
ordinary people. […] He always struggles to make a living since he has got 
neither a particular occupation and education nor charm. […] He wants to use 
nice words like Hacivat but can’t pull it off. […] He does not understand 
elegance. He is realistic and can’t take dreams, pretensions and illusions too long. 
[…] With his full beard and big eyes he is a real man of the people. On the other 
hand, Hacivat is pretentious, somewhat hypocritical […] [yet] prudent and 
earnest. […] He gives advice, guides and mediates. He speaks well. […] He 
observes the minute details of manners and gives advice to Karagöz accordingly. 
His knowledge is superficial but he knows everything (And, 1977: 297–300).  
 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a widespread tendency in various evaluations on Turkish politics to underline 
the conservative-religious content of the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP - Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi) political appeal.1 In this chapter, by shifting the focus from religion 
to a wider socio-cultural bond between the party and the electorate, I argue that the JDP 
owed its political success, to a great extent, to the “low-populist” political appeal as 
defined by Ostiguy (2009c; forthcoming). The JDP was the last actor playing the role of 
Karagöz, “a thick voiced man of the people”, and skilfully pushed its political opponents 
to play the role of Hacivat, “a soft voiced Istanbulite gentleman”, in the political drama 
of Turkey.2  
In section two, starting with a discussion over the concepts of cleavage and divide and 
their relevance for Turkish politics, I briefly discuss the relevance of left-right, centre-
periphery and high-low divides, and argue that the high-low divide, which consists of 
                                                                 
1 There are many studies focusing on the centrality of religion for the JDP and its supporters (Çınar, 2013;  
Başlevent et al., 2005). It is undeniable that religiosity is a central asset for the JDP leadership. But in this 
chapter I put a special emphasis on a wider context which made the JDP’s appeal particularly attractive for 
the less educated, provincial and low-income majority of the country.  




rival perceptions of the social and cultural inequalities in politics, provides the most 
appropriate lens to fully see the nature of the JDP’s political appeal. In section three, in 
order to complement this theoretical discussion over cleavages and divides I elaborate 
further on the concept of populism. In section four, I give a brief political sociology of 
the JDP phenomenon by focusing on voter profiles of the JDP and its main competitor, 
the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi),3 and show the relevance of the 
high-low divide through several examples from the Turkish political practice.  
In section five, I empirically support the argument for the importance of a wider socio-
cultural divide than religious appeal for JDP voters through the speeches and writings of 
the JDP elite and the pro-JDP media, as well as through my interviews. In the analysis of 
these speeches it becomes clear that the JDP elite and the pro-JDP media see the role of 
religion as part of a wider socio-cultural divide, which we can refer to as the high- low 
divide. In section five I also focus on the presidential election in 2014 in order to 
consolidate my argument. The nomination of a highly conservative figure by the 
opposition parties for the 2014 presidential race against Erdoğan highlighted the salience 
of the high-low divide vis-a-vis a secular-religious divide for the JDP’s political appeal. 
In section six, I analyse the JDP’s communication style. This also shows the highly 
conscious engagement of the JDP elite with “low” political appeal and demonstrates the 
relatively unimportant place of religion in JDP propaganda. 
3.2 Defining the relevant divide: how to locate the JDP’s political appeal? 
In this section, I briefly draw attention to an important theoretical discussion around 
concepts of “cleavage” and “divide” and point out a couple of important characterist ics 
of the social and political confrontations in Turkish history. I argue that the JDP’s politica l 
appeal is understood best within the framework of the high- low divide proposed by 
Ostiguy in his various works.4 In order to illustrate the importance of the high- low divide 
in the formation of the JDP’s political appeal, in the following subsections I briefly 
discuss the relevance of the left-right and centre-periphery (or secular-religious) divides 
with regards to Turkish politics.  
                                                                 
3 For brief information on the Republican People’s Party and parties other than the JDP cited in the chapter 
and for their relative position to each other, see Appendices 1 and 2. 
4 Ostiguy has produced the high-low divide from his earlier analyses of the Argentinian politics (1997;  
2009b). In this chapter I heavily rely on his works in which he proposed the high-low divide as a more or 
less universal, but not always present, political phenomenon that can travel across different contexts (2009 a;  




3.2.1 Cleavages or divides? The Turkish case and the high-low divide 
A highly important concept for the analysis of political appeals in Turkey is “cleavage”. 
In its original exposition in the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan, the centre-periphery 
and state-church (which together represent the national revolution process), and land-
industry and owner-worker (which together represent the industrial revolution process) 
conflicts prepared the formation of cleavage structures within the Western party systems 
(1967). According to Kriesi (1998), Lipset and Rokkan’s idea of “cleavage structures” 
was an attempt to relate the social and cultural divisions of Europe to the European party 
systems. Kriesi also underlined two other features of the notion of cleavage: “the groups 
involved must be conscious of their identity” and it “must be expressed in organizationa l 
terms” (1998: 167). Hence, the notion of “cleavage structures” presumes relatively stable 
party systems where, at least for a certain period of time, political identities and 
organizations have more or less fixed relationships with certain social segments. However, 
in many party systems, it is hard to come across such institutionalized cleavage structures 
connecting parties and their identities relatively stably to clearly identifiable social 
segments. Hence, Deegan-Krause (2007: 539) has pointed out the necessity of using 
“something less”, in a sense, something softer and fuzzier than the concept of cleavage 
proposed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and later by Mair and Bartolini (1990). Hence, I 
use the term “divide” as suggested by Deegan-Krause (2007) in order to underline a 
fuzzier and less institutionalized relationship between political actors, political appeals 
and specific social segments.  
When analysed from this perspective, at first glance the main political confrontation in 
modern Turkey since the foundation of the secular Republic in 1923 appears to be a 
cleavage between secular urban nation builders (Kemalists) and conservative and 
traditional rural-provincial power holders (an amalgam consisting of social segments 
ranging from tribal leaders, local notables and respected religious authorities). 
Immediately after the foundation of the Republic, the Kemalist secular nation builders 
tried to politically incorporate popular sectors (low-income rural segments, either with or 
without land, and poor urban populations) through top-down ideological narratives of 




Kemalist elite ultimately failed to sustain a lasting and widespread popular sector support, 
particularly in rural-provincial Turkey.5  
One of the ideological hindrances for the early Republican elite of the country that 
undermined their capacity to reach out to popular sectors was their strictly positivis t-
secularist worldview, which was deeply hostile to any religious symbol in politics 
(Hanioğlu, 1997; 2011). The outcome was the disappearance of a common language 
between secular nation builders and popular rural and urban sectors, which would provide 
a suitable ground to the regime in the initial stages of their attempt to mobilize and 
incorporate popular masses. One of the strategic hindrances, on the other hand, was that 
the Kemalists were very reluctant to mobilize and eventually politically incorporate 
popular sectors to the Republican People’s Party since they were extremely worried that 
this mobilization would lead to the increasing political salience of masses – and ultima te ly 
to chaos, from their perspective – due to the loosening of the Kemalist elite’s tutelage 
over society (Karaömerlioğlu, 2006: 84; 1998: 70). 
It was not surprising that one of the massive attempts by Kemalists to incorporate rural 
popular sectors to the regime, namely “Village Institutes” (boarding schools for poor 
peasant children across Anatolia), was prematurely cancelled before achieving any 
extensive outcome under criticism from opponents claiming that communist 
indoctrination was taking place in these institutions (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998: 65–67). And 
the so-called “people’s houses” (Halkevleri), opened by the Republican People’s Party to 
incorporate the popular masses to the regime in urban Turkey through various social 
activities, lacked the proper language and organization to appeal to these social segments. 
These institutions ironically became centres of attraction for bureaucratic and intellec tua l 
upper and middle classes (Şimşek, 2005: 88). It also seems that another fundamenta l 
reason was the lack of sufficient financial and organizational capacity available to the 
Kemalist elite for a much fuller political incorporation of the rural and provincial masses. 
Instead, the early Republican elite usually made deals with certain segments of traditiona l 
provincial and rural power holders of the country, giving them concessions in order to 
keep the popular sectors under the control of the regime in provincial Turkey.6  
                                                                 
5 For populist and peasantist narratives during the early Republican period between 1923 and 1945, see the 
studies by Karaömerlioğlu (1998; 2006). 
6 For evidence of the lack of financial and organizational capacity of the early Republican regime wh ich 
deprived Kemalist elite of directly reaching out the provincial and rural popular sectors for a remarkab ly  




One should also add that Kemalist nation builders always had a very strong inclina t ion 
towards economic liberalism and attached great importance to the growth of a national 
bourgeoisie. Since the beginning of the Republic, the Kemalist elite supported a small 
business community that was submissive to the secularist worldview of the Kemalist elite. 
In addition, unlike their counterparts in Western Europe (Bartolini, 2000), secular nation 
builders in Turkey established a remarkably institutionalized organization, the 
Republican People’s Party – which was, to a large extent, incorporated with state 
institutions – well before the formation of the party system and the transition to mult i-
party politics in the middle of 1940s. These historical- institutional developments, as well 
as the Kemalist nation builders’ close relationship with the embryonic secular bourgeoisie 
of the country, were impediments blocking the chances of the incorporation of the popular 
sectors by the Republican People’s Party on the one hand, and the rise of a strong and 
independent working-class party after rapid industrialization and urbanization on the 
other.   
The transition to a multi-party system in Turkey was also made before the rise of the 
political salience of urban working classes during the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, a politica l 
divide between secular nation builders (the Republican People’s Party) and their 
opponents (the Democrat Party – Demokrat Parti) was already present and well-
established, suffrage for men and women had already been introduced, and therefore the 
considerably weak working classes and poor rural segments were not able to establish 
their own rigorous political institutional expression in the form of an agrarian, mass 
socialist or social democratic party for the pursuit of political and social rights. Instead, 
the working classes, alongside poor rural segments, were incorporated to a large extent 
by the elite victims of the secular nation building process (who were primarily composed 
of conservative provincial-rural power holders such as certain segments of the large 
landowners and local religious leaders), in other words, by the populist centre-right. What 
followed the failure of the full incorporation of popular sectors into the secular nation 
building project during 1930s, 1940s and 1950s was, from 1960s onwards, accelerating 
industrialization, domestic immigration to urban centres, and unorganized urbanizat ion. 
At this second critical juncture, political institutions of Kemalist nation builders, and the 




to the secular nation building process despite a short-term success during the 1970s with 
Ecevit.7  
These circumstances did more than simply contribute to the weakness of the “left” on the 
one hand, and to a very well-organized, robust “right”, on the other, as usually argued by 
popular commentators in Turkey. In fact, these circumstances were the main factors that 
inhibited the growth of a clear and pre-dominant left-right divide in the country in general 
since there was no clear and rigorous institutional expression of the working classes  
(either through an alliance with secular nation builders or through the construction of a 
mass socialist or social democratic party, as was the case in Western European party 
systems [see Bartolini, 2000]).8 Instead of a predominant left-right cleavage as a solid 
expression of the workers vs. employers conflict, early political development of the 
Republican era created a predominant high-low (or anti-populism-populism) divide, as I 
will elaborate in the following sections. To put it succinctly, the critical historical dynamic 
behind the predominant high-low divide (and the lack of a neat left-right divide) in 
Turkish politics was the “democratization – the introduction of universal suffrage and 
transition to multi-party politics – before rapid and widespread industrialization” or 
“democratization before the rise of politically salient urban working classes”. A graphical 








                                                                 
7 For these processes see classical accounts on modern Turkish history by Ahmad (2008b) and Zürcher 
(2004). For an account of the Ecevit’s appeal to popular sectors du ring the 1970s, see Erdoğan (1998).  
8 Not surprisingly, during the 1960s, one of the prominent economists of the country, İdris Küçükömer, 
claimed that what was known as the “left” (the Republican People’s Party) in the country was actually 
“right” and “right” (the Democrat Party and the Justice Party) was actually “left” given the policies they 
defended and profiles of their supporters (1994). Küçükömer’s argument caused a heated debate among 
Turkish intellectuals of the period not simply because it was a very sensational claim, but also because there 
was a degree of truth in it since centre-right parties in Turkey were overwhelmingly supported by the most 
unprivileged urban and rural segments. What Küçükömer failed to see at that time was that the confro ntation 




Figure 3.1: Cleavage structures and the formation of the high-low divide in Turkey 
 




As I will discuss in length in the rest of the chapter, what eludes observation when Turkish 
politics is evaluated around a secular-religious cleavage is that religion was only an 
element of a wider socio-cultural divide in the country, that of the high- low divide 
(elaborated below). Taking the centre-periphery (or secular-religious) divide as a 
cleavage is misleading because cleavages (in the fashion of Lipset and Rokkan’s analys is) 
require a relatively more stable party systems with highly institutionalized expressions of 
self-aware social and political forces such as socialist or social democratic working class 
parties or denominational parties of liberal Western democracies. Instead, using divides 
rather than cleavages would help to better understand volatilities and fragmentations in 
the Turkish political system as well as the lack of predominance of highly institutionalized 
political actors associated with relatively homogeneous social segments such as the 
working classes, denominational groups or rural social groups. This kind of approach 
would help to grasp many hybrid forms, interpenetration and transitivity among politica l 
actors and their ability to articulate seemingly heteregenous social groups and 
expectations, in other words the cross-class nature of Turkish party politics since the 
trasition to the multi-party regime. 
3.2.2 Left-right divide 
As a consequence of the above-mentioned formation of the Turkish party politics, a strong 
social support for the centre-right political parties among most of the lower income urban 
and rural masses has been one of the most enduring features of Turkish politics since the 
transition to multi-party politics. Since 1945, subsequent centre-right parties in Turkey, 
namely the Democrat Party, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), the Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi) and the JDP – except for a short period during 1970s – have always 
been much more successful in elections than the so-called centre-left Republican People’s 
Party due to the support of the most unprivileged social segments of Turkey. Hence, it 
has always been very puzzling for Turkish leftists to see the workers and peasants support 
the centre-right parties in Turkey. The first influential socialist political organization, the 
Labour Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi), was strikingly lacking in lower-class 
support compared to the centre-right Justice Party, as Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, one of the most 
prominent socialists of Turkey, noted at the end of 1960s: 
Two parties campaigning side-by-side were observed. Meetings of the 
Justice Party were full of shabby (külüstür) “common rabble” (ayak 
takımı) with calloused hands (nasırlı eller), peasant caps (kasket), 




who attended the meetings of the Workers’ Party of Turkey were more 
or less well and nicely dressed citizens with ties and leather shoes 
(iskarpin). In Turkey, “people”, as everybody knows, is the 
congregation of the penniless (züğürt) poor. Despite the fact that the 
Labour Party of Turkey uses the language of the poor, the poor continue 
to support the Justice Party. Well-dressed gentlemen support the Labour 
Party of Turkey more than the Justice Party (Kıvılcımlı, 1969: 27–8). 
Today, it is known that when competitive politics in Turkey began with the foundation of 
the Democrat Party in 1945 there was a striking confusion amongst both the founders of 
the party and the public regarding the position of this new party along the left-right axis 
(Demirel 2009: 417). Not surprisingly, the two dimensions of the left-right divide9 in 
Turkish politics, the “socio-economic policy” dimension and the dimension of “polit ica l 
attitudes towards order and authority” (Ostiguy, 2009c: 13), usually could not help 
distinguish between “left-wing” and “right-wing” political forces in Turkey, particula r ly 
those close to the centre. On the one hand, with regard to economic policies, it is hard to 
distinguish the redistributive inclinations of the centre-right from the centre-left in Turkey, 
given that pro-market attitudes exist alongside redistributive political strategies in both 
political camps. On the other hand, with regard to the attitudes towards authority and 
order, liberal, non-hierarchical, anti-authority, and horizontalising attitudes (Ostiguy 
2009c: 13–14) are, to a large extent, lacking in both the centre-right and centre-left forces 
of the country. 
When the Democrat Party started to gather momentum in the mid-1940s, there was, 
however, a remarkable conviction among the rural and urban poor people that, compared 
to the single-party rule of the Republican People’s Party, this new party was “taking them 
seriously” (adam yerine koymak) and “treating people humanely” (insanca davranmak) 
(Demirel, 2011: 123). Not surprisingly, even from the perspective of the Turkish 
bourgeoisie, the successor of the Democrat Party, the Justice Party, was considered to be 
rural and far from the civilized life, whereas the leader of the “left-wing” Republican 
People’s Party was considered to be more familiar, “Westernised”, “refined” (kültürlü) 
and “civilised” (uygar) (Demirel, 2004: 91). No surprise then that the historical tension 
between the centre-right parties of the country and the Republican People’s Party has 
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authority as a fundamental aspect of the divide (2009c: 13–14). As one accepts more hierarchical authority 
structures, s/he moves towards the right, and as one defends more horizontal authority structures and orders, 




always been perceived, first and foremost, as a clash between two lifestyles: an allegedly 
westernized, modern, civilised (çağdaş, uygar) one vs. an allegedly native, national (yerli, 
milli) one in line with the custom and tradition (göreneğe ve geleneğe uygun).  
In each other’s perceptions, rightist (those supporting centre-right parties such as the 
Democrat Party and the Justice Party as well as more radical rightist parties such as the 
Nationalist Action Party [Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi] and Islamist National View parties 
[Milli Görüş Partileri]) and leftist (those supporting the centre-left Republican People’s 
Party, the socialist Labour Party of Turkey and other minor legal and illegal leftist parties 
and factions) intellectuals attached little importance to attitudes regarding economic 
policies and authority. Instead, as Demirel illustrated, their criteria have been highly 
socio-cultural.  
According to the leftist narrative in Turkey, rightists are “first of all, ignorant” and they 
are not “individuals”; they are prone to violence; “they do not read and interrogate”; they 
are peasants and/or provincial town dwellers; and therefore “they lack horizon and they 
are shallow and rude” (Demirel, 2009: 425). They are philistine and they lack manners 
(Demirel, 2009: 426).  They exploit the religious inclinations of the ignorant masses 
(Demirel, 2009: 427). On the other hand, according to the rightist narrative, leftists are 
anti-religious and anti-Islam. Left is the ideology of the anti-religious “minority elite” 
(Demirel, 2009: 431). They are “cosmopolitans” and they lack “notions of country and 
nation” (Demirel, 2009: 435). They are “rich”, and as the “heirs of the westernized elite” 
they have been eating the “cream of the system” (Demirel, 2009: 436).  
Given the abovementioned socio-cultural content of the left-right divide, it was no 
surprise that there was a strong quest for a new understanding of the main divide of 
Turkish politics. The centrality of the attitudes towards religion in the perception of the 
left and right by the leftists and rightists illustrated above played a crucial role in the 
formation of a new understanding of the Turkish politics under the “centre-periphery” 
divide. 
3.2.3 “Centre-periphery” divide or “religious-secular polarisation perspective” 
In the analysis of the multi-party politics in his highly influential study titled Centre-
Periphery Relations: a Key to Turkish Politics?, Mardin argues that “the electoral 
platform of the opposition, especially as seen in Democrat Party political propaganda, in 




and ‘bureaucrats’” (1973: 185). Also, Mardin himself defined the contradiction between 
the Democrat Party and the Republican People’s Party in a similar vein, whereby the latter 
“represented the ‘bureaucratic’ centre, whereas the Democrat Party represented the 
‘democratic’ periphery” (1973: 186). According to Mardin, especially after the 
foundation of the Republic, secularist attitudes of the centre deepened the divide between 
the centre and the overwhelmingly religious periphery (1973: 182). After Mardin’s work, 
Turkish politics and society have started to be seen by the majority of its students as 
having a centre-periphery cleavage, a struggle between the secularist and authorita r ian 
state (centre) and the religious yet pro-democracy social forces (periphery). The “centre-
periphery” approach has dominated the analyses of Turkish politics and society since its 
publication in 1973 and has obtained, so to speak, a paradigmatic status (Hale & Özbudun, 
2010: xviii). 
The centre-periphery paradigm recently received some very substantial criticism. First of 
all, the centre-periphery paradigm had some strong normative presumptions (Ahıska , 
2006: 18). Centre-periphery analysts in Turkey, depending on their ideological stance, 
either praised the allegedly secularist high-politics of the centre or the allegedly 
democratic and religious stance of the periphery. The centre-periphery paradigm depicted 
only two important conflicting actors in Turkish politics on the basis of secular-religious 
divide and a zero-sum political game: the secular state and the religious social forces, 
with nothing in between them. This so-called “culturalist” and “dualist” approach to 
politics (Açıkel, 2006) tended to identify the concept of centre with the state and ignored 
the plurality of the social forces, called the periphery (Gönenç, 2006: 131–132), while 
oversimplifying the complexities of the social and political struggles by reducing them to 
a simple struggle around the position of religion (Çınar, 2006b: 163). Apart from this, as 
many studies on Turkish political parties have illustrated, the centre-periphery approach 
led researchers to identify the centre-left and centre-right parties of Turkey with the 
concepts of centre and the periphery respectively.10 
Nevertheless, the centre-periphery paradigm implied a very resilient and fundamenta l 
dimension of Turkish politics. The resilience of the centre-periphery paradigm should be 
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seen as connected to the different political appeals/styles in Turkey. From this perspective, 
the main problem with the centre-periphery approach and its various interpretat ions 
appears to be the misleading identification of this divide with a full cleavage in the fashion 
defined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Mair and Bartolini (1990), which corresponded 
to neat differences between two main identity-conscious social segments stably 
represented under highly institutionalized organizations and party systems.11 In fact, the 
main divide in Turkish politics that gave rise to the centre-periphery paradigm, as 
mentioned above, has always been “something less” (Deegan-Krause, 2007: 539), 
something fuzzier and softer than a “full cleavage”. This divide, which I will call the high-
low divide in the following parts of the chapter in the fashion of Ostiguy (forthcoming), 
stemmed from widespread reactions to a civilizing intervention, a “proper” civilizationa l 
project which created an “unpresentable Other”.12  
Indeed, as illustrated above, attitudes toward religion played a crucial role in the 
formation of this divide. Nevertheless, I would argue that religion was an important yet  
subordinate dimension of a mainly socio-cultural divide. The puzzle of the lack of popular 
support for the Islamist National View parties of the old guard after the foundation of the 
JDP by a new reformist generation within the tradition indicated the true position of 
religious rhetoric and symbols in the formation of political appeals in Turkey. In other 
words, parties explicitly using religious symbols and rhetoric in their political appeals 
could not be more successful than the centre-right forces, and particularly not more than 
the JDP.  
3.3 The concept of populism 
In order to understand the puzzle of the stronger popular appeal of the centre-right parties 
compared to the parties with predominantly religious or ideological appeals, it will help 
a lot to have a closer look at the concept of populism. In this section of the chapter I will 
focus on three main conceptualizations of populism: those of Mudde (2004), Weyland 
(2001) and Ostiguy (forthcoming). The concept of populism, or the populism/anti-
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12  “I wish here to start at the most abstract (and perhaps not most helpful) level, by conceptualizing 
populism, independently of continent, as an antagonistic appropriation for political, mobilizational 
purposes of an ‘unpresentable Other’, itself historically created in the process of a specific ‘proper’ 
civilizational project.  Proceeding in reverse, what is that ‘proper’, civilizational project? It may be as 
variegated as liberalism, multi-culturalism, adapting to the ways and manners of the First World or the 
West, orthodox ‘textbook’ economics, European integration, racial integration, colonial France’s ‘mission  




populism divide, might be seen as the proper approach to Turkish politics, given the 
highly socio-cultural nature of the competing political appeals in Turkey. This is why the 
concept of populism has been frequently deployed by the students of Turkish politics, 
albeit with a surprising lack of attention to the definitional problems inherent to the 
concept.13 Just like the centre-periphery approach, to see the Turkish politics from the 
perspective of the concept of populism usually reproduced dichotomous approaches. This 
could be explained by the fact that most of the general academic definitions of the concept 
were not ordinal and led researchers to only a nominal understanding of the politica l 
positions and actors. In other words, most of the definitions usually result in researchers 
labelling political actors as either populist or anti-populist, and generally inhibited a 
definition of the degrees of populism14 since these definitions did not distinguish politica l 
actors from political appeals or styles.  
3.3.1 Populism as an ideology or [organizational] strategy 
Highly influential current definitions of the term do not help us to understand the core of 
the populist phenomenon, namely the socio-cultural and political cultural stylistic aspect, 
for reasons convincingly illustrated by Ostiguy. Ostiguy (2013; forthcoming) presents a 
critique of two main, oft-cited conceptualizations of the term by Mudde (2004) and 
Weyland (2001). Mudde defines populism “as an ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ 
versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people” (2004: 543). Weyland’s definition is as 
follows: “populism is best defined as a political strategy through which a personalis t ic 
                                                                 
13 For a discussion on the concept of populism with a special emphasis on the Turkish case, see Baykan 
(2014). 
14 In this regard an exceptional position belongs to Sikk. According to him, “analysing degrees of populism 
in party rhetoric or programs is much more promising than the so far dominant dichotomous approach. To 
some extent, all parties are or appear to be populist” (2009: 12). It should also be noted that when the 
researchers start to look at degrees of populism they should also give up understanding populism as “a 
thing” or “a physical object”. In this case, they need to look at the political appeals of actors instead of 
ideologies or organizations. For when a researcher evaluates populism as an ideology in line with Mudde 
(2004), this would lead him/her to consider political parties either populist or not since ideology is the 
essential rationale of the existence of any political party. An ideology, thin or not, should be classified either 
as populist or not, but not something in between. As, for example, we do not label parties as liberal and less 
liberal, but rather talk about liberal and conservative parties , we also cannot talk about populist and less 
populist parties if populism is evaluated as an ideology. The same thing is valid for the organizational-
strategic definition of Weyland (2001), too. If certain organizational traits are decisive in the populist 
strategy, a political party or leader would either be a populist or not. In this case , too, we logically should 
not talk about parties or leaders being more or less populist. In other words, looking at degrees of populism 
automatically imposes a requirement to understand populism as “an emphasis”, as a dimension of political 
culture in a given context. Hence researchers should talk about populist appeals, styles or discourses rather 




leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, 
uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (2001: 
14).  
As Ostiguy points out, by focusing on “discourses as mere words”, the minimal populism 
definition as an ideology proposed by Mudde (2004) underestimates the centrality of the 
political styles/appeals in the populist phenomenon and might cause “many false positives” 
(forthcoming). The same problem, in other words the underestimation of the style in the 
identification of the populist phenomenon, with the additional problem of focusing on 
organizations (or lack of organization) as one of the main criteria of populism, is central 
to Weyland’s definition (2001). This approach fundamentally ignores the centrality of the 
style/appeal as the content of the “direct and unmediated” link between the populist leader 
and the people (Ostiguy, forthcoming). These approaches do not help in understanding 
the central role of the social tastes and emotions in the formation of the political divides 
in a considerable number of political contexts, as illustrated in great detail by Ostiguy.  
The case of the JDP particularly makes it clear that, as elaborated in the following 
chapters of this dissertation, populism can be seen side-by-side with a highly routinized 
and remarkably bureaucratized organization. Hence Weyland’s approach helps little in 
grasping the populist component of the JDP politics since lack of a proper organiza t ion 
is central to his definition. As pointed out by Ostiguy, the understanding of populism as 
a Manichean ideology separating the elite and the people as proposed by Mudde does not 
help much, either, since this kind of dichotomy can be seen in the discourse of many non-
populist political actors. In addition, as the case of the JDP illustrates, the search of the 
systematic use of this kind of dichotomy can also lead researchers to underestimate the 
populist aspect of many political parties with a catch-all approach to the electoral 
processes. After all, as in the case of the JDP, a party can be populist in style and appeal 
by avoiding a systematic deployment of a Manichean worldview and by slightly 
underplaying the moral dimension of populism in their written material, which is central 
to Mudde’s definition and approach. In order to grasp the populist aspect in such cases 
one should take populism as a political style/appeal,15 as an emphasis of politics16 rather 
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16 Here I see a certain proximity between the approaches of Ostiguy and Worsley. Worsley, decades ago, 




than a physical object or thing, and rely on other methods to understand the populist 
phenomena, ranging from the observation of the day-to-day activities of parties and 
spontaneous speeches of leaders to watching and observing numerous videos and 
meetings. Hence I rely to a large extent on methods proposed by Ostiguy17 and embrace 
the definition of populism proposed by him: “the antagonistic and mobilizationa l 
flaunting of the culturally popular and ‘native’ in politics with personalism as the 
hypostasis of its mode of decision making”.18  
3.3.2 Populism as a socio-cultural and political cultural phenomenon: the high-low 
divide 
Thus, the high-low divide developed by Ostiguy, which evaluates populism as a 
style/appeal,19  can help researchers overcome the weaknesses of the centre-periphery 
(secular-religious) divide and mainstream definitions of populism analysed above, as well 
as avoid the insufficiencies of evaluating Turkish politics from the perspective of the left-
right divide. First of all, as Ostiguy underlined, the high-low divide approach refrains 
from seeing populism as a “thing” or “physical object”, as other common nomina l 
understandings do (Ostiguy, 2013: 27). Instead, Ostiguy’s approach helps researchers to 
grasp populism (and therefore anti-populism) as a space of symbolic, emotional, stylis t ic 
and discursive resources that parties and leaders could deploy and locate themselves. This 
methodological caution helps the high-low divide travel extremely easily across different 
settings (2009a: 2). According to Ostiguy, particularly in the contexts where the left-right 
and the liberal-conservative divides do not have strong salience, the high-low divide is a 
useful perspective in explaining the structure of political appeals (2009a: 2). Ostiguy 
emphasizes that the high-low divide is about “ways of relating to people, as such, they go 
beyond discourses as mere words, and they include issues of accents, level of language, 
body language, gestures, ways of dressing” (2009c: 5). He also adds that this way of 
relating to people covers different decision-making styles as well (Ostiguy, 2009c: 5). 
                                                                 
better regarded as an emphasis, a dimension of political culture in general, not simply as a particular kind  
of overall ideological system or type of organization” (1969: 245). 
17 “The political style of the low is clearly recognizable and delimited, empirically. It simply requires a 
different method of observation and a different acquired comparative expertise: the watching of 
innumerable videos of campaign rallies, political advertising, speeches, televised appearances, etc.” 
(Ostiguy, 2009c: 49). 
18 P. Ostiguy, personal communication, 25 January 2016. 
19 Ostiguy, by the term “appeal”, as explicitly stated in his various works, understands it to mean something 
including discourse but at the same time something that goes beyond “mere words”: “An appeal in politics 
is simply a way in which a politician or a political party attempts, usually voluntarily, to woo voters or 




Ostiguy asserts that the high- low divide consists of two components: a “socio-cultura l” 
and a “political cultural” one (2009a: 5). 20  According to him, the socio-cultura l 
component of the high-low divide is about “manners, demeanours, ways of speaking and 
dressing, and tastes displayed in public”, while the political cultural component is about 
“forms of leadership and preferred decision making modes” (Ostiguy, 2009a: 6–8). He 
emphasizes that while the high tend to be “refined”, the low tend to be “crude” in socio-
cultural terms. In political-cultural terms, the high tend to be “formalistic and procedural”, 
whereas the low tend to be highly “personalistic” (2009b: 9). When the high tend to be 
“cosmopolitan”, the low is rather “nativist” (Ostiguy, 1997: 5). As underlined by Ostiguy, 
the high-low divide is also quite often connected to resentments and is also deeply 
embedded in societies’ history and existing group tensions (2009c: 5–6).  
As underlined by Ostiguy, through showing the attractiveness of each side of the high and 
low, this approach also helps researchers to avoid normative bias (2009c: 4). This is why 
when defining the assets of the high and low in socio-cultural and political cultural terms, 
Ostiguy uses the mutual point of view of each side of the separation. According to him, 
in socio-cultural terms, the low tend to see the high as “stiff, rigid, serious, colourless, 
somewhat distant and boring” (2009c: 6). On the other hand, the high tend to see the low 
as “grotesque” (2009c: 6). According to Ostiguy, in political cultural terms, while the 
high claim to be “formal, impersonal, legalistic, institutionally mediated”, the low tend to 
attach importance to “personalism” and “strong (generally male) leadership” (2009c: 9).  
3.4 The high-low divide in the political practice of Turkey and a brief political 
sociology of the JDP phenomenon  
Before discussing the socio-cultural content of the JDP’s political appeal in length in 
section five and six using the conceptual and theoretical tools introduced so far, in this 
section I will give some examples of the relevance of the high-low divide in recent 
Turkish politics through a brief evaluation of significant political figures of the last couple 
of decades, and try to provide a background to the later discussion focusing on the “low-
populist” appeal of the JDP. In addition, in this section, I also underline similar socio-
economic origins of the JDP elites and members. This information regarding the 
similarity of the social profiles of JDP elite and voters will support the argument that the 
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“low-populist” appeal was central in the construction of a very resilient bond between the 
JDP leadership and its constituency. In the third part of the section I give some brief 
information about the profiles of the JDP and the Republican People’s Party voters which 
shows that the JDP supporters came overwhelmingly from underprivileged segments of 
Turkish society.  
3.4.1 What does high and low as a socio-cultural divide mean in Turkey? A 
glance at the socio-cultural affinity between voters and leaders 
In this part I will try to give a solid idea about the practical reflections of the high- low 
divide through a couple of fictive example and through a closer look at the recent party 
leaders and their political appeals in Turkey. A fictive voter who could fully respond to 
an extremely “high” appeal in Turkey would come from a small family with only one or 
two children. In this family, parents who receive a salary would have either executive, 
white-collar occupations or high bureaucratic positions. Her family would likely have 
been urban for more than a couple of generations. She would be highly educated, with a 
university degree from one of the reputable higher education institutions of the country 
in Ankara or İstanbul and with fluency in at least one European language. She would be 
working in the service or creative sector in an executive position. If she lives in İstanbul, 
or any other big city, she would be living either in recently gentrified urban centres or in 
suburban gated communities. This position on the high end would also have specific 
consequences regarding her “judgement of taste”. She would listen to classical music or 
jazz and would show open disdain for popular genres such as pop or arabesk.21 She would 
not enjoy football. She would show an interest in literature and “European movies” 
instead of Hollywood cinema and TV serials. She would tend to be not too religious, at 
least in appearance. Politically, she would attach importance to secularism with an extra 
emphasis to environmentalism and minority rights (particularly to those of non-muslim 
religious minorities and LGBT communities more than the rights of the Alawis and 
Kurds). 
In contrast, a fictive voter who could respond to an extremely “low” appeal in Turkey 
would come from a large family with many siblings.  His family would be one of urban 
and rural working-class families in which the salary-earning parent in the house –usually 
the father – either works in agriculture as a share cropper (yarıcı) or as a seasonal worker 
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(günlükçü) in the rural parts of the country. If the father is living in urban Turkey he would 
be a street vendor in the large informal sector. The voter himself would be either from the 
socio-economically deprived provinces of Anatolia or a new immigrant in the ever-
enlarging slums of big cities. His immigration story would only go back to his parents. In 
big cities, he would be either living in decayed urban centres or in faraway slums filled 
with squatter buildings (gecekondu). He would have only a primary school degree. He 
would be working in agriculture as a seasonal worker if he is living in rural Turkey, and 
as a street vendor or in a small- or mid-range business as a manual worker with a very 
limited salary and without social security if he is living in urban Turkey. If he is young, 
he would be involved with local ruffian networks and under the influence of the deeply 
macho sub-culture in his neighbourhood. He would listen to pop and arabesk – and, more 
recently, hip-hop, electronic and Turkish rap, too – and enjoy watching football. He would 
not pretend to have good taste in literature and cinema and would, probably, find those 
claiming to be so bookish and pretentious. He would be fine with watching soap operas 
on TV. He could be highly religious in terms of rituals such as fasting in Ramadan and 
praying on Fridays but would be far from observing a very strict religious code. 
Politically, he would be highly conservative and/or nationalist. He would attach greater 
importance to leaders than party ideologies and programmes.  
Between these two fictive extremes, there would be numerous individual cases. Yet voters 
in Turkey have always been inclined to see political options through the prism of these 
socio-cultural experiences. Different political appeals ranging between extremely high 
and low positions have articulated voters’ different socio-cultural experiences. Their 
likes, dislikes and socio-cultural affinities have played a major role in voters’ decision-
making and have strongly influenced the electoral fortunes of parties in Turkey. Apart 
from the overall representation of parties in the media, one of the central mediums of this 
crucial socio-cultural information that leads to association with a certain party and dislike 
of the rest for voters in Turkey is the party leader22  (and, less important than that, 
prominent figures from the leadership circles of parties). In this context, a closer look at 
a couple of recent leaders from prominent parties in Turkey would clarify the concrete 
meanings of the high and low in Turkey.  
                                                                 




Compared to a series of leaders of the centre-right tradition in Turkey, leaders of the 
Republican People’s Party always had a relatively high appeal. For example, Bülent 
Ecevit, one of the prominent leaders of the Republican People’s Party in Turkey, despite 
the familiarity and popularity he acquired during the 1970s in the eyes of lower classes, 
had a remarkably high appeal. With his strictly urban background,23 flawless manners, 
quite fluent English, perfect “İstanbul Turkish” and intellectual and artistic occupations 
as a translator, poet and writer, 24  Ecevit’s appeal could be predominantly located 
somewhere higher than Süleyman Demirel. On the other hand, despite his degree from 
one of the best higher education institutions of the country, and a background in higher-
echelons of the bureaucracy in Turkey, with his upbringing in provincial-rural Turkey 
and slightly rural accent, Süleyman Demirel – who was called “father” or “Shepherd 
Sülü” (Çoban Sülü) – had always been a much familiar figure in the eyes of the electorate 
who were socio-culturally more open to “low-populist” appeals.  
After the coup in 1980, the predominant figure in the centre-right, and on the low 
politically, was Turgut Özal. Despite his engineering degree from one of the best higher 
education institutions of the country, and his work in higher bureaucratic positions, with 
his provincial upbringing in a Turkish-Kurdish family from Malatya, relaxed manners,25 
interest in popular culture and unpretentious religiosity, Özal had been more familiar for 
voters socio-culturally open to “low-populist” appeals in Turkey than the leader of the 
centre-left party of the era, Erdal İnönü. In contrast, İnönü, a physics professor with a 
PhD degree from US, was the son of İsmet İnönü, a national independence war hero. 
Highly urban and intellectual, his appeal was more familiar for the voters prone to respond 
to high appeal during the short period he was active in politics.  
A similar pattern can be observed between the recent leaders of the Republican People’s 
Party and Erdoğan, too. Deniz Baykal, the leader of the Republican People’s Party for 
almost two decades, had his degree from one of the best higher education institutions of 
the country. He also studied in US and lectured as a professor of law in Ankara Univers ity 
until the mid-1970s. He is articulate when speaking, yet somewhat distant, serious and 
rigid. His successor, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, despite his origins in provincial Turkey in a 
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very modest family and having lower, more populist appeal than his predecessor, would 
also be located somewhere higher than Erdoğan in terms of his appeal to the electorate. 
He had a successful career in state bureaucracy and worked in the top positions of the 
Ministry of Finance and related state institutions. He was a late-comer to politics, with 
his political career starting only in the 1990s. His rhetorical skills were by no means 
perfect and far from being attractive to a broad and heterogeneous audience. With his 
glasses and proper-official appearance, his appeal was more on the high than the low. One 
should also remember that, in a quite contemptuous way, Erdoğan used to call 
Kılıçdaroğlu “general director” (genel müdür) in order to emphasize his bureaucratic 
origins and, perhaps, his alleged lack of political experience.  
One should also add that for a very long time, and until recently, the primary position the 
Republican People’s Party adapted in its political criticism of centre-right parties in power 
was to defend “secularism” (laiklik). Even their attempts at reaching out to the popular 
sectors of Turkish society was weakened by the terminological enframing of their 
promises, such as arguing that the Republican People’s Party was pro welfare state (sosyal 
devlet). While criticizing the JDP, they usually underlined the decline of institutions and 
state of justice (hukuk devleti) in the country. This style and discourse, which put a special 
emphasis on abstract notions such as “secularism”, “welfare state”, and “state of justice”, 
usually failed to create an emotional bond between the Republican People’s Party and the 
popular majorities of the country.  
In contrast to the leaders of the Republican People’s Party and the party’s high appeal, 
the appeal of Erdoğan and the JDP could be considered remarkably lower. The JDP leader 
Erdoğan was never bright academically26 and, until he became the mayor of İstanbul in 
the mid-1990s, he did not have an idea about bureaucracy. However, he spent his youth 
and adult life in the middle of very intense party activity, and worked in every possible 
position in the Islamist predecessors of the JDP, which also helped him meet all kinds of 
people from every walk of life (Interviewee 28 2014, April 10). As would be illustrated 
in length in the next chapter, he was the son of a low-income, immigrant family and he 
was brought up in one of the rough neighbourhoods of İstanbul. Although he was 
physically quite above the Turkish average to the point that he was called “tall man” (uzun 
adam) by his supporters, he also had a very peculiar, slightly bulging posture, which 
                                                                 




resembled traditional Turkish roughnecks. There were many instances where he was quite 
rough and harsh. For example, he scolded citizens who complained to him and physica lly 
assaulted a man in one of the Turkish provinces after the tragic mine blast which killed  
more than 300 workers.27  
He is a football lover, and it is also known that many popular media figures were quite 
supportive of him, ranging from pop and arabesk singers to former models. Singers in 
arabesk genres – mostly listened to by low-income, immigrant populations of urban 
centres in Turkey – such as Adnan Şenses and Niran Ünsal were publicly-known admirers 
of Erdoğan. A fast-breaking invitation by Erdoğan revealed this relationship between 
Erdoğan and the popular culture. Unlike the one held by Erbakan (the founding figure of 
the Islamist National View tradition) almost two decades ago, which was full of sheikhs 
and religious personalites, the JDP’s highly publicized fast-breaking dinner was full of 
popular media figures ranging from pop singers to popular soap opera actors, football 
players to popular TV personalities (T24, 2014). Not surprisingly, a pop singer who wrote 
the following lyrics (which also highlighted the “low-populist” appeal of the party) for 
the JDP in the 2014 local elections later on became a JDP deputy: 
He is the strong voice of the oppressed  
He is the free voice of the silent world 
He is as he looks, he gets his strength from the nation,  
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
The man of the people, the lover of the God, 
He is the light of hope to millions, 
He is confident to the downtrodden,  
He is comrade to the excluded,  
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
He has always been loyal to his word, 
He did not return from the way he started to walk, 
He is determined in his cause,  
He is in the prayer of mothers,  
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
His word is true and he has no hypocricy, 
He is the nightmare of the oppressors, 
He walks in the way he believed,  
He is the leader who has been awaited for years, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.28 








Nevertheless, Erdoğan has always been received with hostility by the cultural elite of the 
country – particularly by secularist artists and intellectuals as would be illustrated in 
length in the following parts of the chapter.29 In order to illustrate the importance of this 
socio-cultural bond between party leaders and voters of the centre-right and rightist 
parties it would be very illustrative to have a look at the political destiny of a couple of 
other prominent leaders in recent Turkish politics who did not fit well into this pattern.  
One of these leaders was Tansu Çiller. As the first woman prime minister of the country, 
at the beginning of her political career in 1990s she was very welcome, particularly by 
educated women. Çiller was born in İstanbul and brought up by a wealthy family. Her 
father was a governer of a Turkish province. She had degrees from Robert Kolej, a 
prestigious school in İstanbul, and she also had masters and PhD degrees from renowned 
universities of the US. Until the 1990s, Çiller was a professor of economics in Boğaziç i 
University. With her blonde hair and Westernized appearance Çiller was hardly a familiar 
figure for the True Path Party voters who were still overwhelmingly rural-provincial and 
conservative.30 Çiller herself was also not good at establishing an emotional connection 
with this voter profile. She was not a talented orator and she did not have a warm 
personality like her predecessor Demirel. She was also known for her gaffes in her 
speeches in mass rallies across Anatolia, which were probably taken as evidence by 
popular sectors that she was not in touch with the Anatolian heartland.   
Very similarly, Yılmaz, the leader of other centre-right party of the country, the 
Motherland Party, during the 1990s, was brought up in İstanbul by a bourgeois family. 
He had a degree from one of the prestigious colleges of İstanbul and he was a graduate of 
a reputable public university in Ankara. Like Çiller, he was a highly Westernized man 
who did not attract any sympathy from the low-income and conservative segments of the 
Motherland Party voters. As one of his biographies underlined, he was “cold, distant and 
arrogant” (Bildirici, 2003). It is highly plausible to think that this incompatibility between 
these two leaders and profiles of their parties’ voters was one of the reasons of their short 
(by Turkish standards) political careers. Here, one should also add Necmettin Erbakan to 
this picture. Although he had a very long predominance as a leader within the Islamist 
movement, Erbakan cannot be considered to be a figure with a strong “low-populist” 
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appeal. Until the mid-1990s his parties remained small and marginal without any 
considerable support from large segments of the urban poor.  
The spectacular support for the Islamist parties in the middle of the 1990s in poor urban 
contexts was an exception. These new bonds between the Islamist National View tradition 
and the popular sectors in big cities were based more on the Islamist ideology and its 
redistributive just order (adil düzen) promise than the personality of Erbakan. As 
elaborated in the following chapters, it was also due to the enhanced organizationa l 
capacity of the Islamist movement achieved during the 1990s. Despite the deep personal 
respect of his colleagues and friends for Erbakan as the founder of mainstream Islamist 
politics, he was by no means a man of the people. Erbakan was born in provincial Turkey 
as the son of a local notable family. His father was a judge. He received a degree from 
the prestigious Istanbul Technical University in mechanical engineering and he also had 
a PhD degree from Germany. Despite his sense of humour and intelligence, he was not a 
particularly modest figure. His allegedly Versace ties and expensive taste in clothing were 
a topic of heated debate during 1990s. Given these brief biographies and socio-cultura l 
characteristics of recent prominent figures of Turkish politics, Erdoğan had a much more 
convincing “low-populist” appeal than a series of recent Turkish political leaders. These 
short evaluations on party leaders and their political stories in Turkey demonstrated the 
salience of the high- low divide in Turkish politics.  
3.4.2 A glance at the social profiles of the JDP elite and activists   
There is reason to believe that the majority of the JDP voters are highly open to a “low-
populist” appeal since a study published in 2008 confirmed that supporters of the JDP 
came from lower and middle socio-economic status groups of Turkish society, as 
illustrated in detail in the next part of this section. According to Aydın and Dalmış, “the 
JDP’s support base lies in the peripheral elements of society” (2008: 215). The important 
point of Aydın and Dalmış’s study, however, is the argument that the JDP deputies, 
despite their present high socio-economic and educational levels, overwhelmingly came 
from backgrounds similar to their voters. This is to say that the socio-economic status of 
families of the JDP representatives in the parliament were by no means high. According 
to data presented by authors, while 85% of JDP deputies had a university or a 
postgraduate degree, the percentages for individual deputies’ spouses and mothers and 
fathers were remarkably lower. Only 32% of spouses of JDP deputies had a university or 




taken into account, the difference was extremely striking. Only 6% of fathers of JDP 
deputies were university graduates and 71% of them had only a primary school degree. 
While mothers of JDP deputies were overwhelmingly primary school graduates (87%), 
only 1% of them had a university degree (Aydın & Dalmış, 2009: 215). Another striking 
finding from Aydın and Dalmış’s study was that more than half of JDP deputies spend a 
considerable amount of their childhood in rural Turkey, away from the cities (2008: 215).  
This pattern regarding the backgrounds of JDP deputies was also clearly observable in 
my fieldwork.31 For example, when one of my interviewees, a former JDP deputy, talked 
about his family, he mentioned that his father was an illiterate (ümmi) farmer (Interviewee 
23 2014, March 7). Another former JDP deputy highlighted that he came from a low-
income, provincial family (Interviewee 21 2014, February 28-March 4). One of the 
founders of the JDP in one province also argued that he had a blue-collar occupation when 
he started out in politics in the Islamist National View Parties in the 1980s (Interviewee 
18 2014, February 26). Only relatively younger JDP members among my interviewees 
came from relatively better-off families with roots in prominent urban centres of the 
country.  
3.4.3 Voter profiles of the JDP and the Republican People’s Party 
In this section I will underline a couple of important features about the profiles of the JDP 
and the Republican People’s Party voters. Since the JDP’s rapid rise, many studies 
underlined the relatively strong support for the JDP among less educated and low-income 
segments of the electorate. According to research conducted in 2002, voters with primary 
school education or with an education below this level were the biggest group of the JDP 
voters (Erder, 2002: 74). Small shopkeepers and craftsmen comprised the largest segment 
of JDP voters and, at the same time, voters with white-collar occupations comprised the 
smallest group (Erder, 2002: 74). In contrast, the largest group among the Republican 
People’s Party in terms of education was comprised of people with university degrees and 
those with white-collar occupations (Erder, 2002: 79). Akgün’s research also confirmed 
these findings. According to Akgün, as education levels increase, voters’ tendency 
towards the Republican People’s Party becomes stronger (2007: 209). In contrast, JDP 
supporters predominantly come from social segments with lower education levels, such 
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as primary or secondary school graduates (Akgün, 2007: 209). It should be also noted 
that the JDP elites were also aware of the pattern to the extent that one of the former JDP 
ministers underlined the difficulties the party had in reaching out to well-educated 
voters.32 
Another study, which depends on data from various opinion polling companies, 
conducted by one of the JDP elites about the factors influencing voter preferences in 
Turkey, paints a similar picture (Şentürk, 2008b). According to Şentürk, the lower the 
education level of voters, the stronger the support for the JDP (2008b: 24). Not 
surprisingly, as education level increases, voters are more likely to support the Republican 
People’s Party (2008b: 40). According to Şentürk, the Republican People’s Party’s votes 
increase as the income level increases. Not surprisingly, support for the JDP is stronger 
among those segmets of voters with the lowest income levels (Şentürk, 2008b: 112). 
Another important point underlined by Şentürk is that support for the JDP among large 
families with many children and elders is stronger (2008b: 90). In Turkey, family size 
could be considered a proxy for the socio-economic and socio-cultural level of families. 
The larger the size of the family, the more likely they are to fall lower on the socio-
economic and educational scale.33 
Another study also underlines similar characteristics of JDP voters: “AKP [JDP] voters 
appear to be religious, young, shantytown dwellers” (Başlevent et al., 2005: 560). In a 
later study Başlevent also underlines the predominance of the JDP preference among 
lower- and middle-class residents of metropolitan areas and particularly in regions where 
“lower class migrant populations are concentrated” (2013). According to Başlevent, “the 
party has been particularly successful in identifying the worldviews and addressing the 
needs of conservative and, generally, underprivileged segments of voters, many of whom 
are first or second generation migrants” (2013). Başlevent also underlines the importance 
attached to provision of public services in the low-income neighborhoods as an important 
reason behind the JDP’s electoral success (2013). The following graph from Başlevent’s 
study on the correlation between the JDP vote and lower levels of education in 39 sub-
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provinces (ilçeler) of İstanbul overwhelmingly overlaps with previous evaluations on the 
voter profiles of the party. 
 
Figure 3.2: The JDP (AKP) vote share vs. the mean years of education in 39 sub-provinces of 
İstanbul 
 
Source: Başlevent (2013) 
 
In order to explain this graph I will give some brief information about the two sub-
provinces located at the extreme ends of the imaginary line stretching from the top-left to 
the bottom-right, between Sultanbeyli and Beşiktaş. According to data published by the 
Turkish Statistical Institute, in Beşiktaş almost one-third of the total population above 15 
years old – 150,000 people – are university graduates and almost 10% of the population 
in the same sub-province have masters or PhD degrees (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2013: 
107). In this sub-province, the vote share of the JDP in the 2014 local elections was only 
16%. In contrast, the Republican People’s Party received 76% of votes in Beşiktaş. When 
the vote shares of the two parties in Sultanbeyli is considered, the pattern is the opposite. 
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only received 7%. According to data from the Turkish Statistical Institute yearbook, there 
are only around 11,000 people with graduate degrees from universities in the total 
population aged above 15 (slightly over 210,000 people) (Turkish Statistical Institute, 
2013: 111). Other data from the Turkish Statistical Institute confirming this pattern is 
household size. While the average household size in Beşiktaş is 2.49, it is 4.67 in 
Sultanbeyli (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2013: 117).  
In order to make this dramatic difference between the support for the JDP and the 
Republican People’s Party in these two different settings clearer, it would be useful to 
give a couple of other details about these two sub-provinces of İstanbul. Beşiktaş is one 
of the central sub-provinces of İstanbul in the European part of the city which stretches 
along the Bosphorus strait. The sub-province is known for its touristic (such as Ortaköy) 
and extremely wealthy neighbourhoods (such as Bebek). The sub-province includes some 
of the most important historical heritages of the late Ottoman period that reflect the 
modernization efforts of the Empire, such as Çırağan, Dolmabahçe and Yıldız Palace. 
The sub-province also includes one of the financial centres of the city, Levent. Nightli fe 
in Beşiktaş has always been vibrant and the central parts of the province are full of 
bookstores, cafés and live music venues. Some of the best higher education institut ions 
of the country, such as Boğaziçi, Yıldız and Galatasaray University, are located in 
Beşiktaş. According to a socio-economic categorization report prepared by REIDIN, a 
real estate market information service, the highest socio-economic and socio-cultura l 
records in Turkey belong to the Bebek neighborhood of Beşiktaş (Trthaber, 2014). As a 
consequence, real estate prices in Bebek are extremely high and, not surprisingly, in the 
2014 local elections the Republican People’s Party received around 3,000 votes in this 
neighborhood while the JDP received only around 500.34  
When we look at the Sultanbeyli, what we see is a remarkably different setting and very 
low levels of support for the Republican People’s Party. Sultanbeyli is located in the 
Anatolian part of İstanbul. It is far from the historical centre of the Anatolian part, namely 
Üsküdar and Kadıköy, and therefore from the wealthy sea side. Sultanbeyli’s population 
started to increase during the 1990s as a result of large numbers of domestic immigrants 
from provincial Turkey. Immigration to the region also brought rapid and unorganized 
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urbanization.35 Despite the remarkable development Sultanbeyli underwent throughout 
the JDP local government, some of the longtime landmarks of the sub-province had been 
squatter buildings (gecekondular). 36 In the sub-province, it is hard to come across pubs 
or shops selling alcohol and “cafés” where young people – both men and women – spend 
time together. Instead, one would come across many a la turca coffee houses 
(kahvehane), with unemployed young men spending time around mosques and religious 
endowements. The sub-province hosts the poorly-paid working classes of İstanbul.  
Unlike Beşiktaş, some of the cheapest real estate options in İstanbul could be found in 
Sultanbeyli.  
Not surprisingly, one of my interviewees associated real estate prices with voting 
preferences in such a way that he was able to underline the proximity of the JDP to poor 
people:  
I mean, if the real estate prices in an area are above five hundred 
thousand Turkish Liras, the people living there most probably support 
the Republican People’s Party. […] For example, in Ataşehir, when the 
sub-province was a slum [varoş, as called by my interviewee] and 
prices were around a hundred or two hundred thousand Turkish Liras , 
the support for the JDP [was much stronger]. Now if you go and conduct 
research there you would notice that those people left their land and 
moved to Ümraniye (a relatively low-income sub-province of İstanbul) 
for the construction of new buildings worth a million dollars. Now, in 
Ataşehir, those people were replaced with people who can afford these 
prices and you have the fact that as people get richer they tend to support 
the Republican People’s Party. [...] It is very interesting that rich people 
lean towards the Republican People’s Party. [...] The Justice and 
Development Party is still the hope for the poor people (gariban 
insanlar) (Interviewee 12 2014, February 6). 
The voting patterns in Turkey indeed confirmed my interviewee’s association of high real 
estate prices with the Republican People’s Party vote. However, one would also find 
exceptions to this pattern in relatively wealthy strongholds of the JDP: a few relative ly 
wealthier but conservative sub-provinces in metropolitan cities, such as Keçiören in 
Ankara and Başakşehir in İstanbul, and several cities in the conservative Anatolian 
heartland of the country, such as Konya and Kayseri. In the following part of this chapter 
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I will elaborate on the “low-populist” appeal of the JDP and its central role in the party’s 
connection with the constituency profile outlined above.  
3.5 Political appeals of the JDP: from “high” to “low” 
In this section I illustrate that after a temporary engagement with a much more liberal and 
procedural (in a sense “high”) post-Islamist appeal, the JDP has adapted a full-scale low 
appeal. In the first sub-section I briefly illustrate this high appeal of the party, or 
“conservative democracy”. Conservative democracy served the JDP in monopolizing the 
centre-right field of Turkish politics and in overcoming the oppression of secularist 
systemic forces through the implementation of pro-democracy and pro-EU reforms. In 
the following sub-section I elaborate the subsequent “low” appeal deployed by the JDP, 
which clearly emerged after the first term of the party between 2002 and 2007. I illustrate 
that the JDP elite and the pro-JDP media have constructed a “peripheral identity” for the 
party that to a great extent overlapped with what is called “low” by Ostiguy.  
3.5.1 Conservative democracy: a “high” prologue  
During the foundation of the JDP, there was a vigorous debate around whether the 
founding cadres of the party sincerely gave up their Islamist convictions or not. 
Particularly in the critical secularist and Kemalist circles, there was a strong belief that 
the JDP had a hidden Islamist agenda, and that the party elite engaged in a religious ly 
permitted dissimulation (takiyye). In response, the party leader Erdoğan and prominent 
party members repeatedly underlined that they had founded a new centrist party which 
has no connection whatsoever with the Islamist National View tradition. Party 
intellectuals made a remarkable effort at making a strong case in favour of this new 
identity. According to Yalçın Akdoğan, then chief political advisor to Erdoğan, the JDP 
was not an Islamist party that saw the solution for change in the seizure of the state’s 
apparatuses (2004: 92). Unlike its predecessor, the Welfare Party of the Islamist National 
View tradition, which used religious symbols and appealed to the highly religious 
segments of society (2004: 101), the JDP was a conservative party whose members 
attached importance to religious values (2004: 111).  
To Akdoğan, a conservative democratic identity had a conciliatory role between the 
demands of the state actors (such as the unitary character of the state as well as secularism), 
median voters and the centrifugal tendencies of Islamists, Kurdish and Turkish 




democratic appeal, or post-Islamist appeal as described in Chapter 1, served two aims of 
the party: overcoming the boundaries of a classical Islamist party base by reaching the 
more centrist electorate, and overcoming the secularist sensitivities of systemic actors by 
downplaying religious symbols and language. By using this conservative democratic 
appeal, the JDP could easily engage with the pro-market and pro-EU policies and 
overcome the systemic actors’ resistance by the support of domestic and internationa l 
pro-democratic forces.  
Strategically, the period from 2002 to 2007 is called “politics of patience” by Duran, a 
close observer of the party (2013: 98). As underlined by Duran, after the crisis of the 2007 
presidential elections and the case opened against the JDP in 2008 attempting to ban the 
party, the JDP entered a new phase in which the dominant strategy became “controlled 
tension” instead of “politics of patience”. During this phase, according to Duran, the JDP 
elite eroded the power of the Kemalist elite (2013: 98). This change of strategy and the 
decline of the systemic pressure on the party gradually entailed the disappearance of the 
conciliatory, democracy- and rights-based post-Islamist appeal of the JDP, in other words 
the high appeal of conservative democracy. In its place, the JDP elite and the pro-JDP 
media substituted not an Islamist but a wider “low-populist” appeal, which aimed to 
deploy the resentments of the majority of the electorate to the socio-cultural inequalit ies 
in the country.  
Although the conservative democratic appeal served the JDP well for a short period until 
2007, after this point the JDP elite might also have realized the insufficiency of a narrow 
conservative democratic identity in keeping its very diverse electoral base intact. A 
political appeal mainly grounded on democracy, the European Union process, and rights 
and liberties was neither emotional enough nor sufficiently flexible and simple to keep 
the party’s core Islamist, nationalist, conservative and low-income constituency together. 
At this point, a return to a full-scale Islamist appeal would also have been extremely 
detrimental to the electoral fortunes of the party. It would have alienated the non-Islamist, 
median voter who had supported the JDP since the party’s foundation. The “low-populist” 
appeal, tested and deployed by the centre-right predecessors37 of the JDP, and which 
focused on the historical grievances of the masses as well as the role of the leader and 
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practical achievements of the party, was much more flexible and solid and was much 
more suitable for the electoral aims of the party. In the following sub-section I focus on 
this low appeal of the JDP through my interviews with JDP members, examination of the 
JDP elite’s speeches and writings, and the writings of the pro-JDP columnists. 
3.5.2 Elitist centre versus the JDP, the defender of the peripheral and 
downtrodden majority: the “low” in Turkish politics  
The strategic calculations of the JDP elite entailed the gradual downplaying of the 
conservative democratic framework or “high” appeal of the party. This is why, in most 
of my interviews, conducted mainly in 2014, participants rarely identified themselves 
with the official narrative of the party, namely, conservative democracy (Interviewee 10 
2014, January 18). Instead, in some of my interviews, party members tended to refer to a 
rather abstract notion of the party “cause” (dava) (Interviewee 11 2014, January 22). In 
one of my interviews I had a chance to listen to the content of the JDP’s “cause” from a 
high-ranking party member in a provincial city (Interviewee 48 2014, May 6). 
Surprisingly, the content of the party cause was very much in line with the centre-
periphery analysis of Turkish politics provided by Mardin (1973), as outlined above. 
According to my interviewee, this narrative refers to the domination of minority elites 
over the peripheral majority of the country. Here, as illustrated through further examples 
in the following sections, a social-scientific narrative, namely the centre-periphery 
approach, was transformed into a crucial element of the JDP’s political appeal. 
This plot (used by my interviewee in particular and the JDP elite in general), which also 
deploys some of the rightist stereotypes of the country such as “international Jewish 
conspiracies”,38 identified the authoritarian modernist and Westernist political traditions 
of the country since the late Ottoman period as a minority yoke over the segmented 
religious and traditional “silent majority” of the country. This narrative also evaluated the 
Republican People’s Party as a continuation of the central minority oppression over the 
silent majority until the centre-right Democrat Party’s coming to power in 1950. 
Nevertheless, this same discourse, despite the rightist parties’ long-lasting rule in Turkey 
since the 1950s, also suggests that Turkey could not get rid of the central elite’s 
oppression over the conservative majority until the rise of the JDP.  
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According to the same interviewee, with the help of American imperialism, “White Turks, 
White Kurds, capitalists and elite” owned 90% of the wealth of the country while the rest, 
the unprivileged majority, had only 10% of the wealth. Hence he identified the cause of 
the party, “Great Turkey” (Büyük Türkiye) [or “New Turkey” (Yeni Türkiye) in its 
contemporary interpretation by the JDP elite], which has always been a centre-right motto, 
as the changing of this order by the JDP. As one of my interviewees, a close observer of 
the party and one of the experts of centre-right politics in Turkey, underlined, it seems 
that this narrative, perhaps without strong emphases on the centre-right stereotypes such 
as Jewish conspiracies, also had a deep impact on the worldview of the central JDP elite  
(Interviewee 28 2014, April 10). According to one of my high-ranking interviewees from 
the JDP headquarters, a particular minority segment of society had, since the late Ottoman 
period, enjoyed disproportionate power compared to its social support. As such, 
according to the same interviewee, large parts of society that were conservative and 
religious in orientation had an insignificant influence over the politics of the country 
despite the fact that they were the majority (Interviewee 36 2014, April 24). In the 
following subsections, I give other examples of this centre-periphery narrative from the 
speeches, interviews and writings of the prominent party figures as well as the writings 
of the JDP supporters in the media.  I will also illustrate the highly exclusionary socio-
cultural or, more precisely, “high” attitudes of some of the JDP critics.  
3.5.3 The JDP’s “low” appeal and its “high” critiques  
Particularly since 2008, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speeches were dominated by elements 
recalling the centre-periphery divide in Turkey. Here one should also note that, in the JDP 
discourse, the periphery was not simply a geographical entity but a metaphor representing 
the excluded social segments in urban-metropolitan as well as provincial Turkey that the 
JDP elite tried to reach through the low appeal. Erdoğan frequently complained about the 
bureaucratic oligarchy in the judiciary and the state (Sabah, 2012). He frequently argued 
that the JDP represented the “nation” against the “happy minorities, privileged classes 
and shadow power holders” (Zaman, 2011). He frequently defined the mission of the JDP 
as the “liberation of the social segments despised and excluded by people who think that 
they are superior” (Bugün, 2012). He ridiculed old diplomats and academics who 




undiplomatic39  in the Davos Economic Forum in 200940  and called them “monşer”41 
(Ensonhaber, 2009), a term that apparently denoted a pejorative meaning in Erdoğan’s 
vocabulary and which implied the so-called westernized elite’s lack of courage and 
responsiveness.42  
The salience of the high-low divide in Turkish politics became clearer with the 
presidential elections in 2014. A conservative candidate of the opposition in this 
particular elections led the JDP elite and the pro-JDP media to an extensive use of low 
appeal. In the 2014 presidential election, Erdoğan called the joint candidate of the 
Republican People’s Party and the Nationalist Action Party, who was a reputable 
academic and the former secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 
“monşer” (Aktifhaber, 2014b). The following parts of Erdoğan’s address to the crowd on 
the day he declared his candidacy for Presidency of the Republic were rather typical of 
the abovementioned motives characterizing the discourse of Erdoğan and the JDP elite. 
Here we also find a symptomatic identification of religiosity with poverty and exclusion, 
which reproduced a certain distinction between secular, bourgeois, metropolitan 
segments and religious, poor, peripheral-provincial groups:43 
We are in politics for our worker brothers who try to earn their life 
decently in the mines. We are in politics for the poor people in the 
suburbs of the İstanbul Sultangazi and Diyarbakır […] We are in 
politics for our girls who returned from the gates of the universities due 
to their headscarves […] We are in politics for the man who is despised 
just because he is poor. We are in politics for those with clean hearts 
who were ill-treated and despised in hospitals, schools and government 
offices […] My brothers and sisters, from our early youth years those 
who did not understand us and did not want to understand us tried to 
keep us out of the equation by using disparaging adjectives. They tried 
to despise us when we were studying in Imam and Preacher Schools. 
They called us cleaners of the dead.44 They called us reactionaries just 
                                                                 
39 “The low generally does not worry overly much about appearing improper in the eyes of the international 
community and also at times apparently seems to enjoy it” (Ostiguy , 2009c: 10).  
40 For the details of the event, see CNN (2009).  
41 It seems that the term originally comes from the French expression mon cher, which means “my dear”. 
However, in Turkish it has gained a derivative meaning which refers to the elitist, somewhat feminine and 
out of touch attitudes of highly educated bureaucratic cadres and upper classes. 
42 See De la Torre, quoted in Ostiguy: “[Bucaram] ridicules his rivals’ delicate manners and tastes, which 
he contrasts to his own and the common people’s masculine ones. The representation of the oligarchy as 
imitators of foreign and effeminate lifestyles is well received by his audiences” (2009: 38). 
43 Pamuk, son of a rich Istanbulite family, emphasized in his memoirs of childhood and early youth years 
that when he was a child he used to think that religion was something belonging to poor people (2012: 167–
176). 
44 Most of the JDP politicians had their secondary and high school education in Imam and Preacher Schools 




because we were using the salute to God, just because we were praying 
to God. They looked at people coming from among the nation from a 
different angle just because they were taking off their shoes in their 
homes,45 crossing their legs when sitting for their meals.46 They called 
these people reactionaries. They looked at us from a different angle just 
because we were defending the values of this land. They tormented our 
girls just because they were using headscarves for their faith. As our 
resistance became stronger they increased their insults and assaults. 
Sometimes they shut down our parties. They imprisoned us for reading 
a poem. They used headlines arguing that we cannot even become a 
village headman.47 They argued that we cannot become Prime Minister 
or President and did not consider us human when it came to elections 
for high office […] They excluded us but we increased our effort, we 
have become stronger by every blow. We confronted statutes, headlines 
against us. We did not look at who said what; we only looked at what 
justice said, what God said (Haberler.com, 2014a). 
The motives and ideas outlined in Erdoğan’s speech can hardly be seen as episodic and 
spontaneous reactions of the party elite, but they are deeply embedded in the worldview 
of the JDP cadres. Hence, many examples of speeches referring to the centre-periphery 
narrative by high-ranking JDP members could be found. According to Şentürk, the former 
vice-chair of the JDP organization in İstanbul, for example, the JDP was the 
representative of the “masses and values called the peripheral”. On the other hand, 
according to Şentürk, the Republican People’s Party has always been the representative 
of the “centre”, in other words of “elites” and their values (Şentürk, 2008b: 53). Şentürk 
argues that the ruling elite never digested the success of the representatives of the 
peripheral segments of society – the centre-right parties – and even the victory of the JDP, 
supported by huge numbers of votes, was seen by the elite as the mistake of the “ignorant 
and mindless” masses.  For Şentürk, elite cadres reflected their vision of the periphery by 
                                                                 
by their opponents as the “home of reactionaries” (irtica yuvası) and schools of “cleaners of the dead” (ölü 
yıkayıcı). The latter term is used because one of the duties of the imams is washing the corpses before they 
are buried with a religious ceremony. 
45 After the appointment of Durmuş Yılmaz, a highly competent technocrat, as the director of the Central 
Bank of Turkey by the JDP, a hot debate was triggered by the publication of a photo in a Turkish daily. In 
this photo, the new director’s wife was seen with a headscarf and there were a couple of pairs of shoes in 
front of the main entrance of his home. After the publication of this picture, an influential columnist, 
Ertuğrul Özkök, openly showed his distaste of the scene reflected in the photo in his colu mn (2006). 
Another columnist from the daily rather vulgarly criticized this scene and argued that leaving shoes outside 
the house was an uncivilized attitude belonging to peasants (Uluengin , 2006). The attitudes of these two 
columnists, who were also fierce political opponents of the JDP, illustrated the predominantly socio-cultural 
content of the political divisions in Turkey. 
46 A low-legged portable ground table was common in poor rural and urban houses where people had to sit 
on the ground to have their meals. 
47 After Erdoğan was found guilty by the High Court of Appeals and banned from politics for an indefinite 
time due to a poem which was argued to incite religious hatred among the people, a Turkish daily used the 
following heading for describing the political prospects of Erdoğan: “He would not even be a village 




calling the majority of the country’s citizens “fool” and “ignorant” just because they voted 
for the JDP (2008b: 58).  
This perception of Turkish politics by the JDP elite was not unsubstantiated and the JDP 
elite could usually find material to use to reproduce the low political appeal which 
constantly marked the JDP as the representative of the downtrodden majority of the 
country. However, in contrast to the common belief, this material did not usually stem 
from the distinction between the secular state and religious society. As the following 
example will make clear, the material originated in socio-cultural inequalities. It was not 
unusual to see that opponents of the JDP tended to belittle the JDP supporters, and the 
JDP elite skilfully exploited this tendency. In a highly debated blog post published after 
the local elections in 2014, the blogger told of his experience in a huge JDP meeting in 
İstanbul, which he attended “undercover” – in other words, he pretended to be a JDP 
supporter: 
We have to talk about this mass of people. Who are these one million 
people? They are the ignored ones [...] yes, they are the people that we 
did not recognize, who we got bored of speaking to for a while, who we 
tended to ignore despite their existence in front of our eyes. They are 
these people […] Our child’s babysitter, Nermin […] The security 
guard of our gated community, Kadir […] Hatice, who is working in a 
textile factory without insurance. Her mother, Meliha […] Her brother, 
Şanlı […] Uncle Necati, who retired from the municipality. They are 
the police, […] the firemen, […] a bus driver, […] workers in the 
subcontractor’s building sites. […] They are the people who work 
without CVs. […] They are those people who did not bring a single 
newspaper with them. […] They are those people who do not look at 
their smartphones, look at the internet, who do not know about Twitter, 
who do not know how to take a “selfie”. […] They are the people who 
raise their flags with an order, […] who obey. They are the people who 
are shorter than I am because of malnutrition. […] They are the ones 
who have always been given orders throughout their lives. […] They 
are the people who obey lest they starve (Öztop, 2014). 
One should also add that not only the supporters of the JDP but the JDP elite were usually 
despised by their opponents and, as is the case with Latin American populists, it is very 
common to hear such statements against the JDP politicians: “this kind of people should 
not be in the government” or “this kind of people cannot rule over me”.48 
                                                                 
48 “These characteristics are important not only or mainly as cultural markers of social differences, but as 
cultural modes, or ways of being, that play a large part in the ‘economy of affection and dislikes’ in social 




In addition to popular bloggers, some very well-known columnists and fierce opponents 
of the JDP also despised JDP supporters. Just after the JDP victory in the 2007 early 
general elections, a columnist and well-known opponent of the JDP in the Turkish daily 
Hürriyet blamed the JDP voters and argued that their votes were for sale at a very low 
price. He called anyone who voted for the JDP a “barrel head” (bidon kafalı) (Özdil, 
2007). In the same daily, another columnist rather openly despised the JDP voters in his 
article titled “the man who rubs his belly” (göbeğini kaşıyan adam):  
He rubs his belly. [...] He does not like news. He likes TV entertainment 
shows. [...] He does not read. [...] He does not know newspapers. The 
only newspaper that he knows is the newspaper of the previous year 
that he spread under the pickle jars. His most comprehensive view on 
leaders is “he is a Muslim guy” and on democracy is “let him steal but 
get things done”. Then, he rubs his belly. This is the man that Tayyip 
Erdoğan trusted when he says “ballot box for everything” (Coşkun, 
2007). 
As I tried to illustrate, not only the self-identification of the JDP elite but also the 
opponents of the party helped to create a very solid high-low divide in Turkish politics. 
3.5.4 The pro-JDP media and intellectuals against “white Turks”: 2014 
presidential elections 
Another stereotype that became quite fashionable in recent years, that of “white Turks”, 
is deeply embedded in the centre-periphery narrative outlined above, and therefore in the 
high-low divide of the country. One could quite frequently come across the use of this 
term by the members and supporters of the JDP to identify the opponents of the party.49 
According to a columnist who writes for the pro-JDP Yenişafak, for example, the white 
Turks were deeply disturbed by the fact that conservative people have become their 
flatmates instead of being their apartment staff (kapıcı). He also argued that white Turks 
could not take Erdoğan’s rise, as he is an Imam and Preacher School graduate and has his 
background in provincial Turkey, in Rize (Esayan, 2014b).   
The abovementioned narrative and the images embedded in it were diligently reproduced 
by the pro-JDP media for the presidential elections in 2014. Although there was no doubt 
about his religious beliefs due to his previous position as the Secretary General of the 
                                                                 
‘I don’t want to associate with ese tipo de gente’ (‘that kind of people’) or ‘I don’t want people like that in 
government,’ or even more simply: ‘Yes, I can relate to [name of politician]!’ (Ostiguy , 2009c: 10–11). 
49  One of my interviewees also used the term to describe the critics and opponents of the JDP. See 




Organization of Islamic Cooperation, even the joint candidate of the opposition parties, 
Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, was delegitimized by the pro-JDP media on the grounds of his 
alleged elitism. According to Barlas, a pro-JDP columnist, the candidate for the 
opposition parties was the candidate of the “white Turks” because they wanted a president 
who knew English and whose wife was not veiled (Barlas, 2014).  Another columnist in 
another pro-JDP daily, Türkiye, argued that there was a crude elitism in every compliment 
to İhsanoğlu. According to the columnist, İhsanoğlu was a “devout of the lounge” (salon 
dindarı) who was much closer to the “white Turk circles” than to religious masses and 
who was always “praised by the elite and the mainstream media due to his academic 
career” (Oğur, 2014a).   
In contrast, pro-JDP journalists framed the story of Erdoğan as the son of a modest  
immigrant family in İstanbul who received his education in an Imam and Preacher School. 
According to this narrative, Erdoğan knows the streets of İstanbul. He played football and 
came from within the political organizations of the Islamist National View by working 
within its every echelon. He suffered for his political ideals. In short, “he has a story that 
does not miss the people. […] In his story we encounter someone who has come from the 
lower class and has climbed the ladder of life despite suffering due to various 
impediments” (Kaplan, 2014). According to Kaplan, “Erdoğan’s story is the history of 
our democracy, history of the march of the destitute, who were oppressed by the regime  
and the centre” (2014). According to Selvi, on the other hand, İhsanoğlu knew little about 
Turkey and the Turkish people and he did not know the problems of the country: “he has 
not smelled the sweat of this people and shared their bread. He has lived abroad three 
times longer than he lived in Turkey” (2014). Hence, while Erdoğan was described as a 
“man of the people”, his opponents were called a “cosmopolitan elite”.  
However, it would be misleading to evaluate the comments of the pro-JDP media on 
Erdoğan as a PR activity, a distorted public-image-making process. Some news reports 
indeed confirmed the “low” political style of Erdoğan. According to a news article in 
Radikal, in a meeting with the JDP deputies Erdoğan harshly criticized some of them for 
not going to their electoral regions frequently and for spending too much time on Twitter. 
It was argued that he warned the deputies with the following words: “Is it possible to be 
such a thing as a deputy who does not visit his electoral region? You either do not become 
the candidate for parliament or, if you do, you have to do what this position requires. You 




you have to smell the dung” (Radikal, 2010). It was also argued by an opposition deputy 
that he slapped some of the deputies and ministers, and also insulted them quite frequently 
(Radikal, 2013). There were also some news reports on how Erdoğan scolded the deputies 
of the JDP (Radikal, 2004).50 These incidents were indicators of the “low” leadership 
style of Erdoğan. Erdoğan decisively, and to a great extent naturally, deployed the assets 
of “low-populist” appeal/style.51  
The use of the term periphery in order to identify the social segments represented by the 
JDP also allowed the party elite to locate the party within a longer historical tradition of 
previous centre-right parties and thus into a wider social, cultural and political milieu. 52 
The concept of periphery and thus the low appeal, which lacks rigid boundaries, might 
have helped the JDP elite to reach more radical segments of the electorate, such as 
Islamists and Turkish nationalists, at the same time that they reached the median voter. It 
seems that the concept of the periphery as the marker of a loose political identity, which 
flexibly included people from different political, social and ethnic backgrounds, was at 
the same time the framework of the elite alliance of the JDP. Since most of the members 
of the JDP high echelons, such as the Central Executive Committee (Merkez Yürütme 
Kurulu) and the Central Decision and Administration Board (Merkez Karar Yönetim 
Kurulu), came from different political backgrounds such as the True Path Party (Doğru 
Yol Partisi), the Motherland Party, the Islamist National View tradition and the 
Nationalist Action Party, overplaying a rigid party identity that explicitly referred to an 
Islamist, nationalist or liberal ideological framework would have been detrimental to the 
elite alliance of the party. It would have also limited the JDP’s space for flexibility in 
terms of policies by decisively ruling out some of the options that might be seen as 
mutually exclusive with a less flexible political identity. Instead, the party leadership 
practically embraced the distinction between the centre and periphery, which to a great 
extent overlapped with the high-low divide in politics. This also helped the party to 
contain seemingly contradictory social and economic policies at the same time.  
                                                                 
50 Compare this with Ostiguy’s arguments: “[the low] values and displays physical contact, use of slangs. 
The body of the low is always at the forefront” (2013: 12–13). 
51 I analyse Erdoğan’s centrality to the party and his low appeal (more precisely the political cultural axis 
of the JDP’s low appeal) in detail in the chapter on the JDP leadership. 
52 Many discussions can be found on the role of the JDP with regards to the history of Tu rkish political 
parties. The party elite made a deliberate effort to place the party within the longer history of the centre-




3.6 Form of the message: a conscious engagement with the “low”  
In the use of communication instruments, the JDP elite and cadres followed a strategy 
which was also consistent with the place of the “low” in the party’s political appeal. 
Simplicity, modesty and consideration to “popular realism”53 can be defined as the main 
stylistic characteristics of the JDP’s communication activities. The JDP was always much 
more successful at interpreting its message into the receivers’ language.  
3.6.1 Simplicity 
One of the main pieces of advice given to JDP candidates by the party headquarters and 
the party elite was to use simple language for the electoral campaigns. According to 
Şentürk, a former JDP vice-chair in İstanbul, messages sent by the parties or individua l 
candidates should be aimed at the targeted constituency (2008a: 104). Şentürk’s 
recommendations also reflect the wider relevance of the high- low divide in Turkish 
politics: 
Socialist discourses in particular have no influence over large segments 
of society in our country. Why? There are of course many reasons, but 
the form of the message has a significant place among them. In our 
country, the academic community in particular uses a very heavy 
language. They not only use invented words instead of the words used 
by the people, but they also use very complicated words. On the other 
hand, rightists shape their messages using the language of the man on 
the street and adapt it to their level. Thus, while the impact of the 
message of the leftists decreases, the impact of the message of the 
rightists increases. In our country, the average education level of the 
electorate is fourth year of primary school. Therefore, the message to 
the masses should be at the level of the fourth year of primary school. 
Whereas our politicians, perhaps partially for satisfying their egos, like 
intellectual speeches, and then they complain that the society does not 
understand them. But it is not society who does not understand the 
intellectuals; rather, the intellectuals do not understand the society 
(2008a: 105). 
Şentürk contends that slogans like “we are uncompromisingly going to protect the secular 
republic” or “we will develop the welfare state” do not make any sense to the “average 
citizen”, the “man on the street”: “How many people know the concept of welfare state? 
                                                                 
53 I borrow the term “popular realism” from Bourdieu’s seminal work Distinction in order to identify the 
practical worldview of the working people, the majority of the electorate, who evaluate practices on the 
basis of their function, outside aesthetical and abstract frameworks (1984: 200). In politics, popular realis m 
would also lead the majority of the electorate towards a much more cautious attitude regarding unrealistic 
economic promises of politicians , as well as towards political propaganda that depends on abstract concepts 




In the coffee houses of the slums how many times is the concept of welfare state is used?” 
(Şentürk 2008a: 97). Hence it is safe to argue that the JDP elite had a sharp awareness of 
the importance of the use of “low” in Turkish politics.  
The guide to candidate deputies published by the JDP headquarters also repeatedly 
underlines the importance of modifying the message according to the circumstances and 
keeping it simple and straightforward. According to this guide, candidates and election 
office workers should have clear and straightforward answers to the questions of voters: 
“The language should be understandable, obvious and clear or relevant to the question 
without rambling on the topic. The language should be at the level of understanding of 
the electorate. […] We should […] avoid polished narratives. We should not ramble and 
we must not forget that our main aim is not to feel good but to transmit our message to 
our addressee” (Ak Parti, 2007: 14). According to the JDP elite, election periods cannot 
take “being seen as intellectual”, “polished expressions” and “heavy concepts” (Şentürk , 
2008a: 84). Hence, the JDP embraced concrete language and defined concrete politica l 
targets in its electoral propaganda, for the JDP elite contended that the lower the education 
level of the electorate, the more they are prone to concrete over abstract thinking (Şentürk , 
2008b: 41).  
This was why the most widely known and enduring slogans of the JDP were those with a 
concrete and a simple message designed to appeal to large segments of society. The 
slogans such as “we don't stop, we keep going” (durmak yok, yola devam), “it used to be 
a dream, it is now realized” (hayaldi, gerçek oldu) and “always nation, always service” 
(daima millet, daima hizmet) had simple and concrete messages that underlined the 
achievements of the “hard-working” JDP cadres and their service-oriented outlook.54 The 
JDP propaganda always pointed out the practical achievements of the party and always 
implied how resourceful the JDP cadres could be.  Here one is also reminded of the 
electoral slogan of the JDP: “I do not look at words, I look at accomplishments!” (lafa 
değil icraata bakarım!). Hence, there has always been a classic statement about Turkish 
politics, particularly for ruling centre-right parties: “They steal but they work hard!” 
(çalıyorlar ama çalışıyorlar!).55    
                                                                 
54 See Yavuz (2009) and Çınar (2013) for the importance of the emphas is on service delivery in the JDP 
propaganda and politics.  
55 For a very similar situation in Latin America, see Ostiguy: “These leaders often also claim that they 





Not only the simplicity of the message but also the modesty of the candidate is apparently 
seen as an important political asset by the JDP elite. For instance, according to Şentürk’s 
recommendations, candidates should avoid expensive clothes lest the electorate feel a 
status gap (2008a: 123). Similarly, in her column, Ayşe Böhürler, one of the founders of 
the JDP, warns the individual candidates against “branded, shiny or ostentatious 
accessories” (2013). Both the image and style of candidates and party members in general 
were taken seriously by the JDP elite. Hence, Böhürler also warned the candidates against 
drawing an arrogant image (Böhürler, 2013). The JDP guide for deputy candidates 
underlined the importance of being modest, too: “you should not create the mood that you 
know the best, you should be moderate and you should avoid exorbitance” (Ak Parti, 
2007: 12). According to the same guide, candidates should not use didactic language : 
“The way to approach the people is by revealing that you are a part of the life they have” 
(2007: 13).  
Strikingly, the guide also emphasizes that the “electoral process is not a didactical but an 
emotional one” (Ak Parti, 2007: 15). In JDP propaganda candidates are told to be 
“friendly and sincere”, and that they should avoid “pretentious” attitudes (Ak Parti, 2007: 
11). This is why one of the founding figures of the JDP warns the candidates against 
excessively devout images: “an excessively religious appearance makes people think that 
you are pretentious” (Böhürler, 2013). This recommendation is rather important since 
there is still a widespread belief that the JDP exploited the religious feelings of the masses. 
It seems that the JDP’s appeal to the lower segments of the society had less to do with 
religious symbols rather than a genuine engagement with the “low” through simplic ity, 
modesty and sincerity.  
Another incident mentioned in the guide by Şentürk illustrated the importance of modesty 
as a political asset in Turkish politics. It is hard to verify whether this anecdote conveyed 
by Şentürk is true or not. Yet even the fact that it was related by one of the JDP elites was 
emblematic of their stylistic approach to politics. 
You know candidates and chairs who, when they visit houses, let the 
ones they're visiting know beforehand. This is like saying, “We are 
coming, prepare the things that you are going to serve.” Especially if 
                                                                 
on Adhemar de Barros in Brazil, it was said without shame that: ‘Rouba, mas faz!’—that is, ‘He steals, but 




the household you are visiting is poor – oh, my God! What kind of an 
attitude is this? He does not like the chair in which he sits, he clearly 
displays that he does not like the smell and appearance of the inside of 
the home in his facial expression; if it is dinner time he cannot cross his 
legs and sit down at all. If he makes it at all, he makes it clear that he is 
uncomfortable. This is obviously insulting for the members of the 
household. Let me tell you what is told about Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: 
‘They went to a poor household and inside it was dirty and smelled. 
While people around Erdoğan did not know what to do and their 
disturbance could be read from their faces, Erdoğan immediate ly 
crossed his legs and sat down in front of the table on the ground. He 
started to drink the soup in the common bowl with a spoon with such a 
great appetite that this established a warm connection between him and 
the owner of the house.’ (2006: 155).  
The main importance of this example is that it clearly illustrates the limits of 
understanding populism “as mere words” and demonstrates the centrality of “manners” 
and “ways of doing things” in grasping the populist phenomenon as repeatedly underlined 
by Ostiguy. Hence, party programs and speeches of party elites help to understand the 
populist phenomenon only to a certain extent. This example also tells a lot about the 
content of the direct and unmediated link between the leader and the supporters, and 
underlined the importance of the style as well as emotions in developing the populist 
rapport.  
3.6.3 Taking “popular realism” into account: “cautious promises” and 
“managerial competence” 
The necessity of simplicity, modesty and having concrete content as put forward in the 
political propaganda did not mean that the JDP used a simple strategy of abundant 
promises. The JDP elite contended that the electorate was not illogical and that they easily 
distinguished realizable promises from unrealizable ones (Şentürk, 2008a: 46). As Çaha 
and Guida observed, this was indeed the practice in the JDP campaigns. In contrast, the 
Republican People’s Party, for instance, was not really careful with its promises in the 
2009 local elections. According to the authors, the Republican People’s Party’s generous 
promises were not found convincing by the majority of the electorate (2011: 78–79). In 
contrast, according to Çınar, the JDP always kept its promises limited, avoided binding 
redistributive strategies and gained a lot from fulfilling these “downsized promises” in 
their time in office (Çınar, 2013: 38). Indeed, as one of my interviewees, a senior 




promises and this contributed to the credibility of its leadership in the eyes of the 
electorate: 
You know, in the first election campaign of the JDP, the Prime Minister 
[Erdoğan] said this: “do not expect anything from us for three or four 
years”. […] Citizens voted for such a party. […] What was our 
presumption? If you do not promise to the citizens… I mean 
communication experts say such things like they should find the answer 
to “what’s in it for me?” [stated in English]. What is that? Unreserved 
promises. Citizens can find the answer of “what’s in it for me” in the 
other strategy, too. He says, “Dude, I do not want anything from the 
state in a stable economy. It only should not steal the money in my 
pocket through inflation and interest rates, etc. I can already earn my 
life. May it not make a shadow”. It was the concern of citizens. These 
were the results of our research (Interviewee 38 2014, April 25). 
Apart from the abovementioned stylistic characteristics of the JDP propaganda, the party 
leader and his managerial achievements occupied a special place in the party’s politica l 
appeal. This was why one of the frequent assaults of Erdoğan (also in line with low appeal) 
against the opposition leaders of Republican People’s Party and the Nationalist Action 
Party, highlighted their managerial incompetence: “Never trust three Karaman sheeps to 
Baykal and Bahçeli. Believe me, they would lose them even in this Tayyare Square; they 
cannot herd them at all” (Gazetevatan, 2009). The JDP propaganda heavily relied on 












Figure 3.3: Assets of low and high in Turkey: engagements from the low and high 
 
 





In this chapter, after a broader theoretical discussion on concepts of cleavages, divides 
and populism, and after some brief information about the importance of socio-cultura l 
divides and the socio-economic profiles of the voters in Turkish politics, I illustrated how 
the JDP elite and the pro-JDP media situated the party and its leadership within the space 
of political appeals in Turkey. I argued that, contrary to widespread assumptions, the JDP 
elite and the pro-JDP media constituted the party’s political appeal neither predominantly 
along the left-right divide nor primarily along the secular-religious divide. Instead, they 
located the party somewhere close to the low end of the high-low divide in Turkish 
politics. Indeed, religiosity had a place in the JDP’s political appeal, as underlined by 
many commentators. However, as the evidence from interviews, speeches of the JDP elite, 
writings in the pro-JDP media, the presidential elections in 2014, and the JDP’s 
communication style illustrated, the role of religious symbols and rhetoric was 
subordinate to a wider “low-populist” appeal of the party.  
Hence, as can be seen in Figure 3.3, in the political cultural axes of the high-low divide 
the JDP’s political appeal situated the party in the low by emphasizing Erdoğan’s strong 
leadership and managerial competence vis-a-vis the so-called inefficient and bureaucratic 
style of his opponents. On the other hand, the JDP’s political appeal also situated the party 
in the low along the socio-cultural axis of the high-low divide by emphasizing the 
peripheral, local-traditional, Anatolian and downtrodden character of the JDP cadres and 
the masses represented by the party. At the same time, the JDP elite depicted the 
opposition as a Westernized, privileged elite or as the “white Turks” located in big cities. 
As a response, the opponents of the JDP usually identified themselves with the high by 
emphasizing their well-educated, urban backgrounds vis-a-vis the less educated, 
provincial, lower-class backgrounds of the JDP elite and JDP supporters. In the politica l 
cultural axis of the high-low divide, the opponents of the JDP tended to locate JDP politics 
in the low by emphasizing the JDP's authoritarian and personalist politics while locating 
themselves in the high by underlining the importance of rule of law, secularism, and 
constitutional and judicial control. 
From a broader, theoretical point of view, this discussion of the JDP’s political appeal 
illustrated the insufficiencies of looking at Turkish politics through the lenses provided 
by the left-right or religious-secular divides. In fact, in Turkey, although religious 




been subordinate to the overwhelming reflection of social and cultural inequalities in 




4 The JDP and ERDOĞAN: NON-CHARISMATIC PERSONALISM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Between the general election in 2002 and the presidential election in 2014, the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in Turkey, under the leadership 
of Erdoğan, won several elections by receiving around 35–50% of all votes. Many studies 
underlined the role of Erdoğan in this unprecedented electoral achievement of the JDP, 
and some of these studies explicitly argued that the achievements of the party could be 
understood primarily on the ground of Erdoğan’s “charisma” and his direct appeal on the 
electorate.1 In this chapter I argue that, contrary to this widespread belief, Erdoğan was 
not a charismatic leader and that his authority over the JDP organization derived from 
another source: “robust action” or “diligence in organization building”.  
Before analysing the relationship between Erdoğan and the JDP I discuss the relationship s 
between the concepts of personalization, personalism, charismatic personalism, non-
charismatic personalism and personal party personalism in section two. In section three I 
evaluate the case of Erdoğan and the JDP. I argue that, despite his very strong and popular 
public image (broadly his “low-populist” appeal) and autonomy of leadership, Erdoğan’s 
political ascent occurred within a stable political climate and he did not have any 
transformational impact on his followers, supporters and organization. Details of 
Erdoğan’s biography demonstrated the fact that he was a diligent, innovative and 
pragmatic “organization man” (teşkilatçı) exclusively focused on achieving and 
maintaining power. In order to do this, Erdoğan heavily relied on a large and pervasive 
organization personally constructed and firmly controlled by him. Defining the true 
nature of Erdoğan’s leadership style was crucial, because as long as researchers evaluate 
him as a charismatic leader they would continue to ignore the remarkable contribution of 
a large and pervasive organization in the electoral achievements and the politica l 
resilience of the JDP.  
                                                                 
1 Many accounts of the rise and success of the JDP highlighted the role of its leader. For instance, Hale and 
Özbudun (2010: 154–155), Tuğal (2009: 176), Cizre (2008: 5), Tezcür (2012: 122) and Heper and Toktaş 
(2003: 160) stressed the role of Erdoğan. Some other accounts, such as Yıldırım et al. (2007) and Sambur 





4.2 Three faces of personalism 
In this section I discuss the relationships between the concepts of personalisat ion, 
personalism, charismatic personalism, non-charismatic personalism and personal party 
personalism. I firstly demonstrate the difference between personalization and 
personalism. From the perspective of this distinction I respectively examine the concepts 
of charisma, non-charismatic personalism and personal party personalism as different 
reflections of personalism in politics.  
4.2.1 Personalization and personalism 
The rising role of personalities in politics in the last several decades has been underlined 
by many political scientists. From the perspective of studies on political communicat ion, 
the “mediatization of politics” (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999) was strongly connected to the 
increasing importance of group leaders at the cost of collective identities. This was seen 
as one of the reasons behind personalized political leadership (Mazzoleni, 2000).  From 
the perspective of studies on party politics, as the role of individual candidates within 
parties became more important, personalization in the media increased, and this in turn 
enhanced the personalization of the behaviours of politicians (Rahat & Sheafer, 2007). 
The rise of catch-all parties and new communication technologies, combined with the 
gradual retreat of squarely programmatic and ideological mass parties, has provided a 
suitable ground for the increasing prominence of the candidates and, most notably, the 
party leaders. This wider process of personalization of politics – in other words, the 
increasing role of personalities and the decreasing role of ideologies and programmes, 
together with the salience of political parties – has strong connections with the change of 
communication technologies (McAllister, 2007).2  
A very broad description of the “personalization” of politics was made by Rahat and 
Sheafer (2007), according to whom “personalization should be seen as a process in which 
the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, 
while the centrality of the political group i.e., political party declines” (2007: 65).  Ansell 
and Fish very similarly and broadly defines “personalism” as “loyalty to persons rather 
than to impersonal ideologies, institutions, or rules” (1999: 286). However, 
personalization and personalism should be seen as different notions despite the common 
                                                                 




ground. As a broader phenomenon, personalization has implications for local and national 
leadership as well as the representation of politics in the media.  
Thus, I tend to see personalism as a more specific concept, something particularly related 
to styles of top national leaders in political groups and organizations that are mostly 
working against collective- institutional arrangements and identities. Following this 
differentiation, the phenomena of charismatic personalism, non-charismatic personalism 
and personal party personalism can be considered to be different reflections of 
personalism in contemporary politics. However, these different reflections of personalism 
can be easily conflated due to their many common features, and this confusion could lead 
researchers to quick and misleading overestimations of the role of personalities in politics. 
In the following sub-sections of this theoretical section I try to distinguish these different 
reflections for a better understanding of contemporary political leadership in context of 
its interaction with followers, supporters and organizations. 
4.2.2 The concept of charisma  
Like many other social scientific concepts, the concept of charisma has a much wider use 
beyond the academic sphere. This broad usage led to unsystematic and descriptive uses 
of the term “charisma”, which was frequently used as a plain adjective referring to a 
superior leadership performance or a popular image. In fact, the concept has a very 
specific meaning in its original use by Weber. In his wider discussion regarding the pure 
types of legitimate authority structures, Weber separately evaluates charismatic authority 
and distinguishes this form from the rational- legal and the traditional legitimate authorit y 
(Weber, 1974: 46–47). In the case of rational- legal authority, obedience is owed to the 
“legally established impersonal order”, and in the case of traditional legitimacy structures, 
it is owed to the “traditionally sanctioned position of authority” (Weber, 1974: 47). Unlike 
these pro-status quo legitimacy structures, in the charismatic authority, obedience is 
mainly produced on the ground of the personal qualities of the leader (Weber, 1974: 47). 
Charisma was seen as an exceptional occurrence by Weber. According to Weber, the 
phenomenon of charisma can be observed under the circumstances of “distress”, when 
the followers usually attribute “supernatural gifts” to the charismatic leader (Weber, 
1946: 245). Weber also defines charisma in contradistinction to any kind of bureaucratic, 
institutional and permanent structure (1946: 248). He underlines the role of personal 




indicators of the phenomenon (Weber, 1946: 249). According to Weber, charismatic 
personalities are, most of the time, outside the family life and its routines (Weber, 1946: 
248). In contrast to the conservative and institutional routines, Weber states that one of 
the indicators of charisma is a revolutionary spirit: 
Genuine charismatic domination therefore knows of no abstract legal 
codes and statutes and of no ‘formal’ way of adjudication. Its 
“objective” law emanates concretely from the highly personal 
experience of heavenly grace and from the god-like strength of the hero. 
Charismatic domination means a rejection of all ties to any external 
order in favour of the exclusive glorification of the genuine mentality 
of the prophet and hero. Hence, its attitude is revolutionary and 
transvalues everything; it makes a sovereign break with all traditiona l 
or rational norms: “It is written, but I say unto you” (1946: 250). 
Given the indicators, circumstances and examples Weber has provided, such as “nationa l 
distress”, “prophets” and “heroes”, “the attribution of supernatural powers to the leader” 
and a “revolutionary spirit”, it is clear he considered charisma a genuinely rare and 
exceptional phenomenon. From the perspective of Weber’s discussion, charisma could 
be seen as an original-mythical source for new, stable, and legitimate authority structures. 
This is why Tucker underlines the fact that charismatic leaders were also defined by a 
concrete proposal of a new way of life and existence (1968: 746).  
In his later examination of Weber’s notion of charisma, Tucker also underlines another 
important feature of charisma. According to Tucker, there would be a spontaneous 
formation of at least a small circle of followers identifiable at the early phases, before the 
leader became politically powerful, if the concept of charisma is relevant for a given case 
(Tucker, 1968: 739–742). The concept of charisma should therefore be seen as something 
strongly affiliated with the circumstances of political crises as well as a revolutionary 
spirit which breaks ties with the current regime and existing institutional and traditiona l 
authority structures. Charismatic leaders usually introduce new ideological and 
intellectual narratives to their followers and expect them to follow this transformationa l 
narrative embodied by their personality. Charisma does not only refer to superior 
leadership qualities or a popular image, but also to an intellectual and moral authority that 
re-shapes its followers and provides them with a new identity.  
A clear distinction between charismatic and other forms of leadership from the 
perspective of political organizations can be found in the seminal work of Panebianco on 




from charisma. To a great extent Panebianco follows the distinction made by Weber and 
underlines the revolutionary character of charisma as well as its anti-institutional and anti-
bureaucratic tendencies which observe no legal, permanent pattern except the charismatic 
leader’s will (1988: 143–144). Panebianco also applies the Weberian concept to the party 
organizations and underlines several indicators of a “charismatic party”. For Panebianco, 
charismatic parties are defined by a “cohesive dominant coalition held together by loyalty 
to the leader” that has no room for factional politics (Panebianco, 1988: 145). Charismatic 
parties, according to Panebianco, do not reveal bureaucratic characteristics. He also 
asserts the “revolutionary”, “anti-party” character of charismatic parties as well as the 
“total symbiosis between leader and the organizational identity” in these kinds of politica l 
organizations (Panebianco, 1988: 147). In a sense, Panebianco tends to see strong, highly 
routinized and remarkably bureaucratized organizations in contradistinction with the 
charismatic party, while underlining the importance of a revolutionary, 
“transformational”3  leadership with a high degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the leader’s 
followers and supporters.  
4.2.3 Non-charismatic personalism and “robust action” 
Non-charismatic personalism is a much more ordinary phenomenon compared to 
charismatic personalism. This is why Ansell and Fish strongly underline the exceptiona l 
features of charisma, stating that “charismatic leadership is no ordinary occurrence. It 
transforms the audience […] The charismatic leader is prophet not merely a personality” 
(Ansell & Fish, 1999: 284). In addition, Ansell and Fish contend that “leaders of 
charismatic parties assume – or attempt to assume – transformational roles. They regard 
themselves as agents of massive social change transcending the party or even any 
particular ideology or program. Their main source of identity is themselves, and their 
personal style is messianic. They maintain power by holding their followers in thrall” 
(1999: 288). In contrast to the exceptional transformational roles of charismatic leaders, 
non-charismatic types of personalist leadership have “transactional roles” (Ansell & Fish, 
1999: 288). Non-charismatic personalist leaders are mainly brokers of power among 
different segments and groups within party organizations, and their authority derives from 
                                                                 
3 The distinction between transactional and transformational leadership is a well-established one in the 
literature on leadership studies introduced by MacGregor Burns  during the 1970s (2010). For Burns, 
transactional leadership is based on exchange of goods or valued things between leaders and followers  
whereas the transformational leadership is based on strong emotional, ideological and moral bonds.  In 
contrast to transactional leadership, transformational leadership seeks to provide a new identity and 




this role. In other words, their identity is rooted in the party itself and they attach greater 
importance to the party cohesion and effectiveness than to political principles (Ansell & 
Fish, 1999: 288). According to Ansell and Fish, they maintain this role and make 
themselves indispensable through “robust action”, which refers to “an aptitude for 
speaking effectively to multiple, often diverse, audiences within the party and for 
convincing each audience that he or she represents its interests and aspirations” (1999: 
288–289).  
For Ansell and Fish, in non-charismatic personalist parties, leaders have great personal 
authority and are symbols of their organizations. However, they lack the exceptiona l 
features of charismatic leaders who aim to transform their followers (1999: 283). In its 
place, non-charismatic personalist leaders use “robust action” – a “multifaceted ” 4 , 
proactive and energetic effort – to deal with multiple flows of requests coming from 
diverging groups and local settings within the organization. In the original exposition of 
the concept of “robust action” by Ansell and Fish (1999) and Padgett and Ansell (1993), 
the authors put a strong emphasis on its transactional role in conciliating diverse interests. 
However, I see extremely tiring physical, bodily activity as equally essential to robust 
action, which requires endless travelling, speeches and negotiations undertaken by the 
party leader. This is why I tend to define “robust action” as the transactional role 
undertaken by the party leader via an extremely proactive political style that consists of 
extensive travelling, numerous meetings and countless speeches with diverse audiences 
within the party for intraparty governance. Robust action increases the party leader’s 
control over the local and centrifugal tendencies within the party, and it also increases 
party cohesion. Hence, in line with Ansell and Fish, it seems important to distinguish 
charismatic forms of personalism from the more common form of non-charismatic 
personalism. As underlined above, revolutionary and transformational roles exceptiona lly 
                                                                 
4 I am using this term in order to describe a certain intermediating leadership quality which connects diverse 
social, political and cultural networks. This is very similar to a dynamic highlighted previously by Padgett 
and Ansell (1993). In the earlier exposition of the concept of robust action through the example of Medici 
rule in Florence, Padgett and Ansell (1993) put great emphasis on the “multivocal” or “sphinx-like” political 
style of the Medici. By the term “multivocal”, the authors underlined the importance of usually obscure and 
ambiguous political moves and reactions of leaders in extracting support from heterogeneous and often 
contradictory networks. According to Padgett and Ansell, multivocality is “the fact that single actions can 
be interpreted coherently from multiple perspectives simultaneously, the fact that single actions can be 
moves in many games at once” (1993: 1263). When I use “multifaceted” I have in mind a slightly more 
active multivocal action in which the leader does not wait for the flow of demands but actively tries to 




claimed by charismatic personalist leaders are differentiated from non-charismatic 
personalism, which relies on a diligent organization building effort or “robust action”.  
4.2.4 Personal party 
Another common reflection of personalism in contemporary politics which can help us to 
better understand the case of JDP and Erdoğan is the “personal party” 5  and the 
overwhelming centrality of political leaders in rapidly rising and falling contemporary 
political parties. Apart from the ideal typical example of Berlusconi’s various parties in 
Italy as analysed by McDonnell (2013), the rapid rise and fall of parties of many populist 
leaders in Latin America could be seen as examples of personal party personalism. 
According to McDonnell, personal parties are defined by the centrality of the leader’s 
decisions and presence in the rise and fall of the party, the lack of any stable, permanent 
grass roots organization, the absolute concentration of power in the hands of the leader 
and the centrality of the party leader in the campaign strategies of the party (2013: 222). 
Given the features underlined by McDonnell (2013), personal parties strongly resemble 
non-charismatic personalism. However, in line with Ansell and Fish (1999), one should 
strongly emphasize the fact that unlike personal parties, in non-charismatic personalism 
leaders put enormous effort in organization building and attach importance to permanent 
organizational structures. Hence, while strategically the emphasis in non-charismatic 
personalism is on the organization, in the personal party the emphasis is on the leader.  
Thus, it would be better to think of charismatic personalism, non-charismatic personalism 
and personal party personalism as related yet different – but not exclusive – reflections 
of the broader notion of personalism in politics. I summarize the common and 
distinguishing features of these three faces of personalism in Table 4.1. Strong public 
image of the leader and the excessive concentration of power in the hands of leaders 
(leadership autonomy) represent the common ground of these different forms of 
personalism. This could also lead researchers to conflate these different forms of 
personalism since the prominence of a “leader’s persona” is essential to all. However, 
there are also decisive differences among these forms with regards to political and social 
circumstances and the linkages between leaders and their followers and between 
supporters and organizations. While charismatic personalism is an outcome of 
                                                                 
5 The first systematic use of the concept of “personal party” could be found in a book titled The Personal 
Party by an Italian political scientist, Mauro Calise, which was published in Italian in 2000 (McDonnell, 
2013: 221). Also see a short description of the concept by Calise (2005: 96-99) in English. In this part of 




extraordinary political and social circumstances, non-charismatic and personal party 
personalism are products of the status quo. In charismatic personalism, the leader enthrals 
the followers and supporters and transforms them in line with the leader’s particular 
worldview – either a narrow and specifically interpreted ideology, a new religion, or a 
loose yet peculiarly radical outlook.  
In contrast, in non-charismatic and personal party personalism leaders have a 
transactional role. They are either located in the centre of various politically salient social 
and individual actors through the use of media and extensive patronage networks, and/or 
within a large and pervasive organization through robust action. Instead of transforming 
the audience, they connect various segments of their followers to unified political action 
in return for material-selective and/or ideational-collective benefits. However, while the 
grass roots organization in particular, and the party organization in general, can be seen 
as a secondary instrument in this transactional political activity in the personal party, 
organization building has been the basis and the main aim of the transactional role of 
leader in non-charismatic personalism as the case of JDP revealed. 
 
Table 4.1: Three faces of personalism 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
4.3 The case of Erdoğan and the JDP: non-charismatic personalism 
In this section of the paper I examine Erdoğan’s personality and leadership style from the 
perspective of the discussion in the previous section. Following the features defined in 






Public image of the 
leader  
Strong Strong or weak Strong 
Degree of leadership 
autonomy 
High  High High 
Political and social 
context  
Crisis/distress Status quo Status quo 
Engagement with 
followers/supporters 
Transformational Transactional Transactional 
Organization building 
efforts 






Table 4.1, I first look at the public image of Erdoğan. Afterwards I demonstrate some 
indicators showing the high degree of autonomy of Erdoğan within the JDP. I also look 
at the context of his political ascent and his personal qualities. In the last, key sub-section 
of this section I focus on the “robust action” of Erdoğan, which mainly relied on a massive 
organizational leverage constructed by him and kept under his firm personal control. 
As early as 2004 the relationship between Erdoğan and the JDP was defined as a 
“charismatic” one by one of the party ideologues (Akdoğan, 2004: 151). It is true that 
Erdoğan’s personality had a dominant role within the JDP and it is the one of the grounds 
of the elite coalition of the party as well as its broad electoral base. Nevertheless, as I will 
illustrate, this dynamic was not charisma but non-charismatic personalism, which has 
always been a resilient aspect of Turkish politics. Through the personality of Erdoğan, 
like previous centre-right political forces, the JDP overcame the potential centrifuga l 
impacts of a lack of a well-defined ideological position, program and institutiona l 
structure as well as a lack of a socially cohesive electoral base.6  
It is not uncommon to see the term “charisma” used as an adjective describing the leaders 
of every major political party in Turkey by various scholars. This situation also represents 
one of the most common yet rarely interrogated truisms of Turkish political science. 
Prominent leaders of the centre-right and right in Turkey, such as Menderes, Demirel, 
Özal, Erbakan and Türkeş, as well as social democrat Ecevit, were called charismatic by 
students of Turkish politics.7 Thus, mainstream political science literature on Turkey has 
an unsubstantiated claim that Turkish politics has produced several charismatic politica l 
                                                                 
6 See Wikileaks document dated 2004 March 27: “8. (C) AKP [JDP] insiders as diverse as deputy party 
chairman for policy Dengir Firat, iconoclast conservative Ankara M.P. Ersonmez Yarbay, Istanbul 
Alibeykoy's veteran activists Erhan Senol and Suat Sar, and Gaziantep's Nizip district party board member 
Salih Uygur readily admit that, despite AKP's formidable grassroots campaign organization, it will take 
years to mold the current formation into a coherent, internally democratic party with a variety of compelling  
personalities. Instead, just as at the national level, at the municipal level AKP is trading on Erdogan as the 
party rather than on the identity and capabilities of its candidates.” 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ANKARA1842_a.html (accessed: 27.5.2016). Also see another 
Wikileaks  document dated as 2005 December 8: “12. (C) AKP MPS are as divided by personality  as by 
politics, but personality-based fault lines crosscut ideological ones.  PM Erdogan is the glue that holds AKP 
together.” https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ANKARA7215_a.html (accessed: 27.5.2016). 
7  See Acar for “Demirel’s personality and charisma” (1991: 191). See Kalaycıoğlu’s study on the 
“charismatic leadership” of Özal (2002). For Ecevit’s charisma see Kınıklıoğlu (2000: 1 and 16). Perennial 
leader and the founding father of the Islamist National View parties, Necmettin Erbakan, was also called  
charismatic (Şimşek, 2004: 124). Also see Gümüşçü and Sert for “Erbakan’s charisma” (2009: 963). 
Cornell calls the founding leader of the Nationalist Action Party, namely Türkeş as well as Erbakan , 
“charismatic” (1999: 211). According to Gürgür, until the military coup on 27 May 1960, Adnan Menderes, 
the leader of the Democrat Party, “was definitely the most charismatic and popular personality of the 




leaders in last seven decades.8 Erdoğan was a stronger case of charisma in the eyes of 
scholars since his direct appeal to the electorate and his authority over the JDP 
organization was much stronger than that of the previous leaders in Turkey.9 A closer 
look at the allegedly most charismatic leader ever in Turkish politics, the JDP leader 
Erdoğan,10 would also reveal the weakness of this sort of approach to political leadership 
in Turkey. 
4.3.1 Erdoğan’s public image11 
An outlier to Ansell and Fish’s presupposition that non-charismatic personalist leaders 
are not usually telegenic characters (1999: 290), Erdoğan was a highly impressive public 
figure.12 He was also a remarkable orator, which was partly a result of his secondary and 
high school education in Imam and Preacher School in İstanbul.13 One of his advisors in 
his first significant electoral victory in the 1994 local government election for İstanbul 
implied that he was a very good actor and argued that “when there is a script, when there 
is a game plan, he easily understands his role in this framework, easily adopts himself to 
the situation and undertakes this role with his body language, with his speeches” (Besli 
& Özbay, 2014: 121).14 
                                                                 
8 From the perspective of this chapter, all of these previous so-called charismatic leaders represented cases 
of personalism. In terms of personalistic leadership style, Erdoğan revealed very similar features to former 
centre-right leaders in Turkey. However, the importance attached by him to the construction of a large and 
pervasive organization as his power base differentiated him from some of his personalist predecessors.  
9 See Yıldırım et al. (2007). Throughout their study Yıldırım et al. repeatedly underlined the charismatic 
appeal and personality of Erdoğan but did not make a satisfying conceptual discussion on the term. They 
also did not refer to the Weberian sources of the concept but explained charisma on the grounds of 
“anthropology”. 
10 For instance, Sambur argued that “the charismatic personality of Erdoğan is its [the JDP’s] real power” 
(2009: 121).  
11 All translations of excerpts from personal interviews and Turkish sources in the text are mine. 
12 One should also note that Erdoğan was much taller than the Turkish average and his sympathizers in the 
[social] media sometimes called him the “tall man” (uzun adam). He also had a slightly bulging posture, 
neither challenging nor subservient. Yet this did not make him look weak but resembled traditional Turkish 
roughneck posture, which enhanced his “low-populist” appeal/style. Not unrelated to his posture, he 
frequently argued that his political attitude was neither challenging nor obedient with the following  
expression: “we were not aggressive but we stand tall” (dikleşmeden dik durduk!).     
13 In Imam and Preacher Schools in Turkey students are taught in rhetoric, and they are expected to become 
good public orators because one of the duties of imams is to give speeches to the congregation in Friday’s 
sermons in mosques. Çakır and Çalmuk also mentioned in their oft-cited biography of Erdoğan that when 
he was a youth branch leader of the Islamist National View party of the 1970s he used to rehearse public 
speeches on his own (2001: 26). 
14 In an interview with an experienced Motherland politician, he underlined the impact of the body image 
as an important political asset in Turkey: “In politics, height, a neat figure (boy, pos, endam) is extremely  
important” (Interviewee 17 2014, February 25). It was not surprising that one of the members of the youth 
organization of the party told me during a lunch that it was even sufficient reason for casting people’s vote 




Even before the foundation of the JDP, Erdoğan was a very popular political figure. One 
of my interviewees, a former provincial chair, related the following incidents that indicate 
the popularity of Erdoğan in the distinct corners of the country around the time of the 
official foundation of the party. This particular interviewee was a former chair of another 
right-wing party before the foundation of the JDP, and he joined Erdoğan during the 
foundation of the party, later becoming the first chair of the party in his province. The 
incidents he portrayed are especially important as he made some striking comparisons 
that indicated Erdoğan’s popularity: 
At the end of August [2001] the JDP sent a commission to X. They 
called me, too, and had also a meeting with me. […] On 24 September 
[2001] Abdüllatif Şener called me and told that I was appointed as the 
X chair [of the JDP]. He called me to Ankara for the appointment. […] 
In this way I became the provincial chair of [the JDP]. […] As I said, 
just three months before I was the chair of another party in X. When I 
reached X airport [from Ankara] I saw that forty or fifty people were 
there for the reception. I hadn’t even told anybody that I went [to 
Ankara for the chairmanship]. Most of those people were willing to 
work in the party. […] After this, I started to work. […] For instance, 
for [my former] party to find people, establishing a party branch 
anywhere was extremely difficult. We could not establish party 
branches in most sub-provinces.  We had had this experience just three 
months ago. For the Y sub-province that I mentioned previously, as I 
remember, three or four days after I became the provincial party chair 
[of the JDP], three or four different groups came to me. In addition, I 
was called by several people recommending various persons to me for 
the foundation of the party branch in Y. […] Later on, when we were 
founding party branches, chairman [Erdoğan] came to Z [a provincia l 
city close to X]. I think it was October. We went to Z. There is a huge 
square in Z called [redacted] Square. We had a meeting with Mr. A., 
[chairman of my previous party] there. That square is a huge one.  I 
think it can take up to fifty thousand people. In our meeting with Mr. 
A. there were a thousand, maximum two thousand people. Four months 
later in a meeting in the same square, you might not believe, but that 
space was not enough. Every corner was full; the avenues were full, too 
(Interviewee 25, 2014, March 21). 
Hence, since the very beginning of his political activity as the JDP leader there was a 
striking public sympathy towards Erdoğan and he was in the centre of the party activity.  
His image has also been an extremely valuable asset for the JDP in the party’s 
communication activities. A poster prepared by a non-governmental organization close 
to the JDP also strikingly illustrated the central role of Erdoğan for the party (see Figure 
4.1). In my fieldwork I also examined catalogues of election posters in the library of the 




contained the image of Erdoğan and underplayed the party identity. One of my 
interviewees explained this situation to me as a communication strategy (Interviewee 49, 
2014, May 8). Nevertheless, as I will try to illustrate, Erdoğan’s role in the organiza t ion 







Figure 4.1: “Sağlam irade”  (Iron will) 
 
  
Source:  Picture taken by author 
Note: A billboard poster and a full-page newspaper advertisement prepared by a non-governmental 






The striking thing about the poster seen on the billboards and newspapers is that the 
identity of the party cannot be seen and the poster refers to the personal “will” of the 
Prime Minister rather than that of the party. Since its foundation, as one of the JDP 
executives underlined in his book, the JDP strategically and intentionally used the image 
of Erdoğan in its electoral campaigns (Şentürk, 2006: 185). Even in the local elections, 
the JDP mostly relied on the personal image of Erdoğan. According to Çaha and Guida’s 
study of the campaigns for the 2009 local elections, “the JDP carried out its electoral 
campaign mostly relying on the strong leader image of the Prime Minister. The JDP 
highlighted the walking full- length portraits of the Prime Minister in its advertisements 
in the media and posters on billboards and posters and banners they use on the streets” 
(2011: 64). 
However, unlike the charismatic appeal in which followers are drawn in by the 
extraordinary personal qualities of the leader, and transformed by the new moral and/or 
ideological proposition by her/him, in the case of Erdoğan there was a strong affinity 
between the existing values and morale of the masses and the leader as delineated in the 
previous chapter. Erdoğan’s popularity could be explained through an overwhelming 
sense among followers and supporters that they share many common values and 
characteristics with the leader – instead of admiration by the masses of the superior 
personal qualities of the leader and their consent to his new ideological and intellec tua l 
propositions.15  The following narratives by the two of my high-ranking interviewees 
indicated this situation: “A taxi driver told me this. He said, when this man talks, implying 
Erdoğan, the man inside me is talking” (Interviewee 36 2014, April 24).  
Not only Erdoğan’s personality but also his family life was relatably similar in the eyes 
of the average, low-income, conservative electorate. After emphasizing the electorate’s 
sense of identity with Erdoğan and his rise from humble origins, one of my high-rank ing 
interviewees from the JDP underlined the people’s affinity with Erdoğan’s family. 
According to her, in the eyes of the majority of the electorate, Erdoğan’s family life and 
particularly his veiled but highly educated daughters represented an ideal: a “Turkish 
                                                                 
15 Also see Yıldırım (2013): “Today, conservative masses cons ider Erdoğan more than a party leader. They 
view the unjust treatments against Erdoğan not simply as against a prime minister or a party leader but as 
if it was against the conservative masses, values and existence. They see these as a violat ion of their identity 




Dream” which implied a better future for conservative and low-income families 
(Interviewee 35 2014, April 22).  
As a previous study on Erdoğan underlined, “in the eyes of ordinary people, he is a leader 
who speaks articulately, refrains from haram (wrong deeds), and takes the poor under his 
wing. He reflects the people’s deprivation and oppression to the political arena using their 
body language” (Yıldırım et al., 2007: 13). Yıldırım et al. also argued that “the masses 
looked at how Erdoğan spoke rather than the content of what he said. His gestures, 
appearance, lifestyle, and tone of voice seemed more impressive than his words” (2007: 
19). According to the authors, “the unprecedented success of the AKP [JDP] was a result 
of the familiarity that the party successfully exhibited in the eyes of voters” (2007: 21).16  
Hence, as İnsel ironically underlined in order to illustrate Erdoğan’s difference from the 
former generation of political leaders in Turkey, he was not simply a “populist” – he was 
the “people” (2002: 24). Therefore it was not uncommon to come across people arguing 
that they cast their votes for Erdoğan instead of the JDP. However, this situation hardly 
indicated the charismatic-transformational effect of Erdoğan’s leadership, but revealed 
his highly convincing “low-populist” appeal17 that relied on a strong sense of similarity 
with the electorate.  
4.3.2 Leadership autonomy in the JDP 
According to Ansell and Fish, the most remarkable benefit of non-charismatic 
personalism for leaders and parties is an “exceptional degree of latitude for public 
manoeuvre in advertising their programs and their positions” and a “tactical flexibility” 
(1999: 308). In the case of the relationship between Erdoğan and the JDP, a similar pattern 
could be observed. Nevertheless, unlike Ansell and Fish’s examples of non-charismatic 
personalist leaderships, such as Kohl in Germany and Ziuganow in Russia, Erdoğan also 
benefitted from a very popular public image. Hence, in the case of Erdoğan, one should 
talk about something beyond “tactical flexibility”, perhaps about a remarkable degree of 
“leadership autonomy” constructed through robust action and the use of “low-populist” 
appeal/style.  
                                                                 
16 Throughout their study they argued that this situation indicated the charisma of Erdoğan. I think this was 
not the case. Instead, this familiarity derived from the non-charismatic situation and the highly successful 
“low-populist” appeal/style of the JDP leadership discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
17 As discussed in length in the previous chapter, I define populism as a political appeal/style and a cultural-
affective bond between parties and their supporters in line with the works  of Ostiguy. Particularly see 




Figure 4.2: A portrait of Erdoğan in a provincial JDP branch 
 





In my fieldwork, a high-ranking interviewee from the JDP implied that Erdoğan actually 
did not need to have intensive consultation meetings (as will be discussed below) because 
he was so powerful and above the party organizations (Interview 37 2014, April 24). 
Another interviewee also underlined the fact that nothing could happen in the JDP against 
the will of Erdoğan (Interviewee 9, 2014, January 17). Most of the JDP members would 
confirm the firm control and undisputable authority of Erdoğan in the party and how he 
was able to make decisions without any limitation stemming from within the party. 
Hence, from the perspective of the JDP members and supporters, Erdoğan’s “robust 
action” seemed to be a politeness granted by him to the party rank-and-file. Nevertheless, 
as I will illustrate, from the perspective of this study, Erdoğan’s leadership autonomy was 
constructed through these intensive meetings, endless travels and numerous speeches to 
the party rank-and-file, in other words, through “robust action”. Erdoğan’s power heavily 
depended on his organizational existence and diligence, rather than his unique personal 
qualities and ideological inventions.  
In the case of JDP and Erdoğan, the impact of the JDP’s position in power should also be 
underlined. The party’s position in power changed the nature of personalism since many 
resources, most notably public posts, were available to the JDP and its leader. Since 
Erdoğan had the power of identifying provincial chairs and candidate deputies, as well as 
ministers and mayors, his role in the party became much more indispensable than the non-
charismatic personalism in opposition. The power in the hands of Erdoğan as party leader, 
as well as the cabinet, provided him with an upper hand in negotiations with other power 
foci within the party. Hence, Erdoğan did not only emerge as an above-faction leader but 
actively prevented the formation of factions and any other minor, centrifugal power-
holding groups within the JDP as illustrated in chapters on the JDP organization.  
As illustrated in Table 4.1, with regards to leaders’ public image and autonomy, all three 
forms of personalism, namely charismatic, non-charismatic and personal party 
personalism, tend to produce highly autonomous leaderships with strong public image s. 
From the perspective of these features it is highly plausible to argue that the relationship 
between Erdoğan and the JDP can be defined as a type of personalism. Nevertheless, 
these features usually led researchers to think that Erdoğan was a charismatic leader. 
However, as I illustrated in Table 4.1, charismatic leadership emerges under extraordinary 
political and social circumstances, and it usually has a decisively transformational impact 




of his political rise and his relation to his followers, supporters and organization, I 
demonstrate the fact that Erdoğan was not a charismatic leader and that his authority was 
not a result of a transformational impact on his followers, but that it derived from his 
organizational intelligence, pragmatism and diligence.  
4.3.3 The context of Erdoğan’s political ascent: ordinary times  
As underlined by Weber and re-emphasized by Tucker, charismatic authority is usually 
associated with massive distress. In other words, just like charismatic personalit ies, 
charismatic situations are not ordinary occurrences. While exceptional personal qualit ies 
represent the supply-side of charisma, exceptional circumstances form the demand-side. 
Charismatic leaders usually emerge in the context of the demise of the legitimacy of 
existing political regimes (Rustow, 1968: 794). Hence, it is no surprise that the rise of 
charismatic personalities has been usually accompanied by critical historical events such 
as revolutions, state collapses, wars, civil wars, national liberation movements and 
decolonization.  
Turkish politics has always been turbulent since the foundation of the Republic in 1923 
due to military coups, social protests and ethnic violence. Nevertheless, it has not 
produced a charismatic situation so far within the Turkish military and political elite. The 
specific period that covered Erdoğan’s political rise was not a particularly extraordinary 
one, either. After the military coup on 12 September 1980, Turkey witnessed a restoration 
of the political regime in line with a new conservative-nationalist identity and culture, in 
other words, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Although Erdoğan started his political career 
in the youth movement of the Islamist National View tradition in the turmoil of 1970s, 
his political ascent was defined by the circumstances of the 1980s: a relatively stable 
period compared to the polarized 1970s.18 
Apart from the lack of a demand side of a charismatic situation, authoritative biographies 
of Erdoğan do not include any sign of at least a small group of early followers. Instead, 
Erdoğan had, for a long time, been one of the figures of a promising younger generation 
of the Islamist National View tradition. He was by no means an ideological shaper of this 
circle. He was not intellectually superior to his friends, either. On the contrary, this 
younger generation had provided a brotherly solidarity until their split from the Islamist 
National View tradition and Erdoğan was, at most, a very active organization man 
                                                                 




(teşkilatçı),19 but not an undisputable leader even after his mayoralty in İstanbul.20 It was 
also known that, despite his disputes with the party leader Necmettin Erbakan and the 
Islamist National View gerontocracy, he was, at the same time, very obedient to Erbakan 
to the degree that he named one of his sons “Necmettin”. He was by no means an 
intellectual or ideological trendsetter. He was rather a committed follower, albeit an active 
and highly visible one, of a loose Islamist outlook just like his peers. In short, Erdoğan 
had neither an intellectual distinction nor did he impose a unique moral-ideologica l 
outlook of his own over his friends and supporters.  
4.3.4 Early life and personality: not a “prophet” but “a man of the people”  
Biographies and studies about Erdoğan usually imply the impact of his childhood and 
early upbringing as the son of a low-income immigrant family in the tough neighbourhood 
of İstanbul, Kasımpaşa, on Erdoğan’s later political career.21 Kasımpaşa is located in the 
periphery of the cosmopolitan Beyoğlu sub-province of İstanbul, alongside other 
conservative and low-income neighbourhoods, and has always been home to new 
provincial and poor immigrants of the city. Kasımpaşa has a peculiar location: it is neither 
completely isolated from the cosmopolitan city centre, such as the faraway slums, nor 
completely identical to it. Hence, this neither urban nor provincial context of his early 
upbringing might have provided Erdoğan some rich experiences about different lifestyles 
and identities, and probably established the emotional grounds for his “multi faceted ” 
political style targeting diverse audiences.  
One should also keep in mind that Kasımpaşa is also known for its strict conservative, 
moralist and macho subculture.22 It has always been home to certain criminal tendencies, 
as is the case with other similar İstanbul neighbourhoods (Çakır & Çalmuk, 2001: 11–
13). According to the introduction of one of Erdoğan’s biographies, Kasımpaşa has 
                                                                 
19 See Kaplan (2007: 62–66) for Erdoğan’s intense political activities as the leader and the orator of the 
youth branches of the Islamist National View party of the 1970s. 
20 It seems that among Bülent Arınç, Abdullah Gül and Erdoğan there was, at least, a balance of power 
when they were splitting from the Islamist National View tradition. See Çakır and Çalmuk (2001: 191). 
Also see Yılmaz (2001: 204–226). Dindar also highlighted the brotherly solidarity of the JDP elite until 
2005 from a psychoanalytical point of view (2014). In a book length interview, Abdüllatif Şener, one of 
the founders of the JDP, argued that “at the beginning no one had envisaged this kind of charismatic 
leadership. Everybody was seing each other as equals” (Toker, 2009: 308). 
21 See Yılmaz (2001: 30–32) and Çakır and Çalmuk (2001: 12–14). 
22 Heper and Toktaş’s study highlighted these features and their effects on Erdoğan: “Erdogan is not an 
easy going man, which seems to be related to the fact that he was brought up in Kasımpaşa. In Erdogan’s 
own words, in that neighborhood ‘there were very close relations between families. There existed a shared 
conscience of the neighborhood. The people who lived there acted like the members of the same family .’ 




always been home to “celebrated roughnecks” (kabadayı) in the past (Yılmaz 2001: 31). 
According to Yılmaz, these roughnecks fight well, but at the same time they observe 
certain manners (racon), help the poor, respect the elderly and find solutions to the 
district’s problems (2001: 31). Erdoğan argued in an interview that “my manliness, 
bluntness, and principled conduct derive from my roots [in Kasımpaşa]” (Heper & Toktaş, 
2003: 162). In a meeting with sport columnists, Erdoğan also implied that he knows 
“every kind of world”.23  
As a result of this early upbringing, Erdoğan was frequently called delikanlı or reis by his 
supporters, and kabadayı or külhanbeyi by his opponents. While delikanlı literally means 
“lad” and reis means “captain” in Turkish, referring to a moralist and macho attitude of a 
[young] man, the latter expressions, particularly külhanbeyi, pejoratively mean “bully”. 
In both of these cases, in terms of political appeal/style, Erdoğan’s personality was close 
to the “low-popular” pole of the political cultural axis of the high-low divide as defined 
by Ostiguy (2009c) with its macho and moralist features. This is why the offic ia l 
biography of Erdoğan put a special emphasis on Erdoğan’s background: “Coming from 
Kasımpaşa (Kasımpaşalılık) […] echoes being a bully yet in daily language it refers to 
the situation of being a lad (delikanlı). [...] In a sense being a delikanlı is a reaction and 
the opportunity of challenge developed by the periphery against the elitist lifestyle of the 
centre” (Besli & Özbay, 2014: 22).  
It should also be kept in mind that one of the main slogans praising Erdoğan was the 
following: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: a man like a man! (Adam gibi adam Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan!). I also observed how ordinary supporters and members of the party were 
attaching great importance to a “strong male leader” (Ostiguy 2009c: 9). While I was 
waiting for an interviewee in a sub-provincial JDP branch in Anatolia, one of the 
supporters of the party sitting in the waiting room told me the following as he pointed to 
Erdoğan’s small portrait on the wall: “Why are we here? Because this guy is a real man!” 
(Biz buradayız çünkü bu adam heriftir herif!).24  
                                                                 
23 In a meeting with sports columnists in Turkey, Erdoğan was reported to have said: “I am in a ser ious 
business now but I came from the heart of the vagabonds (kulağı kesik). I am first of all Tayyip Erdoğan 
from Kasımpaşa. I know every world (alem). My best friends are still playing cards in coffee houses. I have 
chosen a different path due to the manners I got from my family and due to my education. Yet I know this 
kind of business, too. Do not think that I am a fanatic (softa). Most of you have not met the kind of people 
I know” (Güven 2005). 
24 Compare with Ostiguy: “Leaving high-brow political theory for the discourse of the actors, a central 




It is also well-known that Erdoğan played football for several years and was on the edge 
of becoming a professional player. However, his father did not allow him to make 
progress in a football career (Yılmaz, 2001: 49–50). After his primary school education, 
Erdoğan started at the Imam and Preacher School in İstanbul on the recommendation of 
one of his father’s teachers. According to Erdoğan’s biographies, he was not an 
exceptionally successful or intelligent pupil, and his records from his school years support 
this (Yılmaz, 2001: 40). All the evidence from his early years suggest that his personality 
was shaped in accordance with the “low-popular” political appeal and he was seen as a 
particularly familiar figure by low-income, peripheral sectors of Turkish society: son of 
a provincial low-income immigrant family, a moralist and macho youth, and a football 
lover.  
To a great extent, his later years bore the marks of the conditions of this upbringing. His 
quick temper and lack of diplomatic manners,25  his macho and, from time to time, 
bullying style and harshness,26 and his lack of interest in “refined”, intellectual debates 
remained constant. 27  Nevertheless, he was extremely successful at converting these 
features of his personality into political assets through a conscious engagement with the 
“low-populist” political appeal as can be seen in one of his many similar speeches: “How 
dare the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) ask for your votes? They 
are segregationist: they are the party of the upper crust (kaymak tabaka). They say that 
they are the white Turks and we are the Negro. We are here as the servants of the nation. 
If being the servant of this nation is being a Negro, yes, I am a Negro” (Yenişafak, 2014).  
This background had a decisive influence over Erdoğan’s leadership style, too, and was 
the dynamic behind his “low-populist” leadership style or “strong personalistic male 
leadership” (Ostiguy, 2009c: 9) in the JDP. Instead of care or attention to institutiona l 
                                                                 
personalistic) leaders ‘with balls’. ‘Ballsyness,’ however exactly defined, is a central attribute of the low in 
this political-cultural dimension.” (2015: 18–19).  
25 In the Davos Economic Forum, after a harsh discussion with the Israeli Prime Minister, Erdoğan left the 
panel (CNN 2009) and thousands of supporters were present in the airport for celebrating his attitude in the 
Davos (Radikal, 2009). 
26 An opposition deputy stated that Erdoğan physically and verbally assaulted some of the deputies and 
ministers and also insulted them quite frequently (Radikal, 2013). There was also some news regarding 
how Erdoğan scolded the deputies of the JDP (Radikal, 2004).  
27 According to a pro-JDP columnist, although Erdoğan was not very liberal or intellectual, he was the right 
candidate for Turkey’s presidency: “Yes, Erdoğan is not a Danish Prime Minister who goes to his job by 
bicycle. Yes, he has no titles, nor is he a good intellectual. He does not know any languages, either. He is 
not a monument of tolerance, either. But he is the right person who would solve Turkey’s hundred -year-




mediation of state bureaucracy, “procedural normalcy” (Ostiguy, 2009c: 10) and legal 
restrictions imposed by judiciary,28  Erdoğan usually preferred to rely on his personal 
authority and relations in conducting the day-to-day affairs of government. (Also see 
Figure 3.3 in the previous chapter in order to see where Erdoğan’s leadership style could 
be located.) It should be noted that the leadership style Erdoğan embraced “polit ica l 
culturally” complemented the “low-populist” “socio-cultural” appeal of the JDP, as 
elaborated upon in the previous chapter. It is also important to re-emphasize that 
excessive concentration of power in the hands of the leader is an outcome achieved via 
non-charismatic personalist leadership. Non-charismatic personalism is regarding the 
mode of relationship between the leader and the party, and which is characterized by the 
personal presence and control of the leader in organization building and in the micro-
management of organizational affairs that otherwise would be managed and controlled 
via organizational intermediaries and institutionalization. The following sections will 
provide evidence regarding this dynamic between the JDP and Erdoğan. 
4.3.5 The “organization man” (teşkilatçı): diligence and pragmatism 
Erdoğan was not an intellectual- ideological trendsetter and he did not undertake a 
transformational role as a leader. Nevertheless, he was always known as a very innovative 
and diligent “organization man”.29 A biography co-authored by Hüseyin Besli, one of 
Erdoğan’s close friends and a JDP deputy, underlines the innovations made by Erdoğan 
in the early years of his political career during the sub-provincial local government 
elections for which he was a candidate. According to this official biography, women 
started to actively work on the field for the first time in this particular election, and 
Erdoğan had to struggle with the intraparty reactions of his Islamist colleagues to this new 
method (Besli & Özbay, 2014: 44). According to the authors of the same biography, 
women’s branches helped Erdoğan to reach the vital “arteries” of the city and were key 
to his political success (Besli & Özbay, 2014: 66).  
According to a balanced biography on Erdoğan, he introduced the use of women in the 
electoral campaigns around the year 1990 despite the conservative reactions coming from 
within the ranks of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). This method was dependant 
on house visits and vote canvassing of women members, and included the distribution of 
                                                                 
28  Erdoğan has been usually accused of disregard for judicial decisions  and bureaucratic institutional 
restrictions by his opponents coming from very different backgrounds. 




a small package of Turkish coffee and a flower. This was so successful that, according to 
the biography’s author, other parties started to imitate the Welfare Party’s women’s 
organization (Yılmaz, 2001: 59). Indeed, one of my interviewees underlined this aspect 
of the Welfare period, arguing that it was the “discovery of the women electorate” in 
Turkish politics (Interviewee 19, 2014, February 26). Other interviewees also underlined 
the central role of Erdoğan in the active participation of women in electoral campaigns 
(Interviewee 29, 2014, April 16) and in the introduction of other new electoral strategies 
(Interviewee 14, 2014, February 10).  
Public opinion surveys began to be used extensively under the direction of Erdoğan when 
he was a sub-provincial chair of the Beyoğlu, İstanbul branch of the Islamist Welfare 
Party. Although not professionally administrated, Erdoğan started to use teams of 
university students in order to conduct public opinion surveys. Authors of the offic ia l 
biography of Erdoğan argued that he found the results of questionnaires and the strategic 
directions pointed out by these “as clear as a photograph” (Besli & Özbay, 2014: 45). 
According to the same biography, the abovementioned electoral methods –the use of 
women’s branches and public opinion surveys – later on became a model for the entire 
Welfare Party organization (Besli & Özbay, 2014: 61). 
Authors of his official biography repeatedly underline his diligence, too. Perhaps there 
would be a degree of exaggeration in these comments simply due to the authors’ 
sympathy for Erdoğan. Nevertheless, anecdotal remarks about his diligence pointed out 
a very specific feature of his leadership: intensive effort put in organization building and 
intraparty governance. According to the authors of Erdoğan’s official biography, even in 
his early youth he was always a participant or the producer of the activities of youth 
organizations of the Islamist National View parties: “He is always in action” (Besli & 
Özbay, 2014: 32): 
Apart from training and football matches he is either in the party 
building in a meeting, or in a house chatting with sympathizers, or 
travelling daily. Without dispute he is one of the politicians who most 
uses the country’s highway network, either asphalt or paved roads – 
perhaps he is the first. It was not only the case when he was working in 
the youth branch; it has always been the case, both when he was a 
provincial chair and afterwards. […] He used to go every place he was 
invited, regardless of whether it was a village, town or a city (Besli & 




In the same biography, one of Erdoğan’s colleagues says, “If you are working with the 
captain (reis), you should keep pace with him. You should always rush” (Besli & Özbay, 
2014: 36). One of his political and electoral advisors also made a similar point in an 
interview: “He is an extremely hard working person. I had not witnessed this to this extent 
until this campaign [for the 2011 general elections]. He starts in the morning at seven or 
eight o’clock. Every day he has two meetings and five or six other programs. Such a pace 
as if he is new in politics. Until the very last moment he did not lose anything from his 
determination and concentration. If I was him, after a while, I would get exhausted” 
(Aydıntaşbaş, 2011).  
One of the focal points of Erdoğan’s pro-active style was organization building and 
dynamism, and he always expected a similar devotion and punctuality from other ruling 
cadres of the party, as well. According to Besli and Özbay, in a meeting in 1993 with the 
ruling cadres of the Welfare Party, Erdoğan warned them as follows: “Among provinc ia l 
administration board members there are some friends who neither join the administra t ion 
board meetings and the activities of the sub-province for which they are responsible nor 
remain in the party for their turn. They do not show the sufficient accuracy. Sorry, I 
condemn these friends” (2014: 103). 
It is plausible to argue that Erdoğan’s effort and vigilance in building a dynamic 
organization was a result of the lack of reliable financial sources for the Islamist National 
View parties. Hence, the most reliable source for the electoral campaigns was an active 
and pervasive organization that was tightly controlled by the leadership. This was why 
one of Erdoğan’s advisors in his local electoral victory in 1994 in İstanbul, Nabi Avcı, 
underlined the critical role played by an organization “which was present even in the 
remotest neighbourhoods of the city” (Besli & Özbay, 2014: 121): 
The most striking part of the campaign was the volunteers. All of the 
members of the organization worked so hard and devoted themselves to 
the campaign. Mr. Tayyip did not have the material means that the other 
candidates had. He had to work with an extremely limited budget. 
Nevertheless, the loyalty of the organization to the Mr. Tayyip and their 
determination to win was an advantage that the other candidates did not 
have (Besli & Özbay, 2014: 122).30 
                                                                 
30 It must be noted that in the 1994 local elections for İstanbul mayoralty, Erdoğan competed with very 
popular candidates and he was not expected at all to be the winner. Hence, in the mainstream media there 




These components of Erdoğan’s “robust action”, his inventiveness, pro-active style and 
diligence devoted to organization building, were also supported by other personal 
qualities usually common to similar non-charismatic personalist leaders (Ansell & Fish, 
1999: 293). Erdoğan was also known for his pragmatism, multifaceted style, ambitions 
and tactical intelligence. As early as the end of 1980s, according to Yılmaz, Erdoğan was 
aware of the limitations of a narrow Islamist discourse. In the elections around the turn 
of the decade, Erdoğan was pushing party members to reach beyond the Islamist 
electorate: “We are going to reach everybody, we won’t distinguish anybody, we will 
embrace everybody” (Yılmaz, 2001: 60). Yılmaz also argued that, despite his radical 
speeches, Erdoğan was always telling party members that the Islamist Welfare Party 
should become the “party of Turkey” (2001: 60).  
Erdoğan’s nomination for the mayoralty of İstanbul in 1994 made his ideologica l 
flexibility even greater. In this election, according to Yılmaz, “Erdoğan’s strategy was 
actually simple. He was aware of the fact that it was impossible to win the elections with 
the conventional votes of [the Welfare Party] and he was trying to get the support of other 
voters too.” According to Yılmaz, Erdoğan was constantly telling members of the Welfare 
organization, “do not forget that we are not a religious community, we are a party. We 
are the party of Turkey, we have to embrace everybody without distinction…” (2001: 80). 
A very similar point was made in Erdoğan’s official biography, as well. In 1989, with 
regard to moving the Welfare Party’s İstanbul provincial centre building outside Fatih, a 
conservative neighbourhood heavily populated by devout people, Erdoğan argued that 
“the Welfare Party must go beyond Fatih. Being in Fatih isolates the party, and presents 
it as the specific representative of particular groups. […] If the Welfare Party is to reach 
broader social segments it has to get rid of this community-style image” (Besli & Özbay, 
2014: 57).  
A particular incident about Erdoğan shed light on the transformational power of 
participation in electoral politics on radical political actors. According to an incident 
described by two different biographies of Erdoğan, during their search for more votes , 
the Islamist political elite realized how unreliable and unsustainable it was to depend on 
the votes of devout social segments. According to Besli and Özbay’s biography, during a 
1986 election campaign, Erdoğan could not get in touch with a member of a certain 
religious community. Despite of all of Erdoğan’s attempts to speak to him this particular 




right Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi). According to the biography, at that same 
moment, a man approached Erdoğan and his friends and invited them to his shop. His 
shop was a local pub, and there Erdoğan and his friends were very welcome and their 
electoral propaganda was listened to with enthusiasm by the customers. A witness of this 
event later commented that “we have wandered in the wrong places for years, we wasted 
our time in the yards of mosques. This [pub] is the real spring” (Besli & Özbay, 2014: 
89–90).  
The same incident, with minor differences, was also noted in an earlier biography of 
Erdoğan. According to Çakır and Çalmuk, after this event Erdoğan started to consider a 
strategic renovation and targeting the votes of a broader constituency than a narrow, 
Islamist one (2001: 53): “For Erdoğan this event and conversations have revealed the 
necessity of going to coffee houses and even pubs and winning the votes and hearts of the 
people spending time in these places” (Çakır & Çalmuk, 2001: 54).31  Erdoğan also 
literally started to re-shape and deploy the party’s cadres accordingly. For example, for 
the local election in 1989, according to his official biography, he did not find the 
excessively religious appearance of one of the candidates of the Welfare Party appropriate 
and ordered him to shave and to wear a suit (Besli & Özbay, 2014: 58–59). Another 
incident described in his official biography revealed his tactical intelligence and 
flexibility. In the local elections in 1989 he sent unveiled women to the secularist regions 
of the sub-province instead of veiled members of the party (Besli & Özbay, 2014: 44–
45). This pragmatism and multifaceted style that targeted different segments of the 
electorate had a deep impact on Erdoğan’s personal and ideological convictions. 
According to Yılmaz, “in his early years in politics [Erdoğan] did not shake the women’s 
hands because he thought it was a ‘sin’. But now he does” (2001: 269).   
All of these experiences and his strategic learning eventually led Erdoğan in a very 
pragmatic direction, and this was why he rejected an “ideological party” just on the eve 
of the foundation of the JDP (Yılmaz 2001: 274–275). His words, “we took off the 
[Islamist] National View shirt” (Radikal, 2003) during the foundation process of the JDP, 
expressed that he and the JDP cadres changed. This was the final declaration of the 
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gradual transformation of the Islamist National View cadres on the basis of the electoral 
concerns outlined above. Within Erdoğan’s personality we see a pragmatic and 
ambitious32 politician after more votes, rather than a charismatic leader who imposes an 
ideological, intellectual and moral domination upon his followers in order to enthral and 
transform them. Erdoğan’s personality and biography was characterised by a tactical and 
organizational intelligence directed towards coming to power rather than transforming his 
followers and the wider circumstances of the country.  
The abovementioned components of his personality, biography and the circumstances of 
his political rise and, more importantly, his political style after he became Prime Minister 
support the argument that Erdoğan’s approach was that of non-charismatic personalism 
instead of charismatic leadership. The primary indicator of this was Erdoğan’s “robus t 
action”: his endless travelling to meet with party members and attend mass rallies and the 
excessive effort he put into intraparty governance. Through his pro-active style and 
diligence Erdoğan built a large and pervasive organization and tightened his direct grip 
on it, making himself the sole cement of the diverse political, social and ethnic segments 
within the JDP’s electoral base and within its elite coalition.  
4.3.6 Erdoğan’s “robust action”: diligence in organization building  
In contrast to the features of charismatic personalism and personal party personalism as 
discussed in section two, the electoral achievements of the JDP depended on the 
formation of a large and pervasive membership organization personally constructed and 
tightly controlled by Erdoğan. According to the official records, in 2013 the JDP had 
almost eight million members (Milliyet, 2013). These members came from distinct 
backgrounds, and thousands of party branches that penetrated into even the smallest 
corners of the country were kept under the control of the central JDP elite, keeping 
Erdoğan’s leadership intact throughout the organization. Erdoğan invested intense 
political effort in the construction of this organization, and afterwards, this massive yet 
highly hierarchical and disciplined organization was kept under Erdoğan’s firm control 
through his robust action. In order to keep his organization together and under his control, 
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with the help of the preference votes – I know because I was beside him – he lost consciousness and fell 





Erdoğan spent much time on intraparty governance by travelling to distinct corners of the 
country, speaking to diverse audiences within the party, and by controlling minute details 
of candidate selection processes and the formation of provincial governing bodies. 
Erdoğan’s robust action became visible in his central role in regular consultation activity 
within the JDP, his active and decisive involvement in the elite recruitment of the party, 
and his occupation of the centre stage in meetings and mass rallies organized by party 
branches across the country. In addition, the technological surveillance of the party on 
the ground provided him with superior information over the membership organization of 
the party as well as against other national and local power holders inside and outside the 
party, and consolidated his grip over the massive JDP organization. 
4.3.6.1 Consultations (istişareler) 
During my fieldwork, from many interviewees I heard the importance attached to 
consultation meetings by Erdoğan and the JDP elite. As a JDP deputy underlined, the JDP 
is a “party of consultations” (Interviewee 29, 2014, April 16). In fact, the party leadership 
attached great importance to the regular consultation meetings. Intense consultat ion 
activity of the JDP started at the top of the organization. The JDP held strict weekly 
Central Executive Committee (Merkez Yürütme Kurulu) consultation meetings and 
monthly Central Decision and Administration Board (Merkez Karar ve Yönetim Kurulu) 
consultation meetings besides the regular weekly meetings of the cabinet (Interviewee 14, 
2014, February 10).  All these regular consultation meetings were held under the control 
and personal presence of Erdoğan (Interviewee 14, 2014, February 10). Apart from these 
regular consultation meetings, Erdoğan and the party elite consulted frequently with local 
as well as national political and economic elites. They called these meetings with the 
political and economic elite and opinion leaders “private consultations” (özel istişareler) 
(Interviewee 36, 2014, April 24).  
As one of my interviewees underlined, Erdoğan spent considerable time and attached 
greater importance to these meetings than did leaders of other parties in Turkey 
(Interviewee 14 2014, February 10). In the middle of this intense consultation activity 
Erdoğan had a vital role. He was present in monthly regular consultation meetings with 
the provincial chairs and the elite of the party as well as with JDP representatives for local 




even the junior party members from the provinces (Interviewee 35 2014, April 22).33 In 
other words, aside from bureaucratically arranged consultation meetings, Erdoğan also 
had direct control and communication with the provincial party elite and the base. 
4.3.6.2 Tight control over the elite recruitment 
Erdoğan closely supervised the formation of the provincial branches as well as the 
candidate selection processes within the JDP. This was why one of my interviewees 
argued that no one can exist within the party organization against the will of Erdoğan. As 
the same interviewee argued, the JDP was “his store” (Interviewee 9 2014, January 17). 
As one of my interviewees underlined, the party headquarters always encouraged 
provincial party organizations to have a single candidate and thus a single party 
administration list in provincial party conventions (Interviewee 16 2014, February 20). It 
was apparently much easier for the party leader to influence discussions behind closed 
doors than in the transparent competition of different candidates and lists in conventions.  
The tight control over the provincial organizations and local politics was also 
complemented by the close supervision of the candidate selection processes by the party 
leadership. During my interviews, I have observed that questions regarding the candidate 
selection processes within the party had a straightforward answer. Headquarters, and 
particularly party leader Erdoğan, had the ultimate say in the process (Interviewee 9 2014, 
January 17). One of my interviewees defined the ultimate criteria in the candidate 
selection process within the party as “loyalty and fidelity” to Erdoğan (Interviewee 7 
2014, January 15). It also seems that a personal relationship with Erdoğan provided great 
privileges for the competing candidates within the JDP (Interviewee 14 2014, February 
10).34 
4.3.6.3 Meetings 
Meetings and mass rallies held by Erdoğan should be seen in the context of this tireless 
and all-encompassing activity for intraparty governance (Interviewee 28 2014, April 10). 
It should also be noted that meetings and mass rallies that Erdoğan attended should not 
be seen as only targeting the electorate. The intensive meeting activity of the JDP leader 
also served to enforce Erdoğan’s control of leadership over the provincial organizat ions 
and kept the membership party of the JDP active. 
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4.3.6.4 Technological surveillance 
Erdoğan’s robust action targeting a much more coherent organization was also facilitated 
by other instruments. While regular public opinion surveys provided Erdoğan with 
superior knowledge of public tendencies vis-à-vis centrifugal and local forces within the 
party, use of technologically sophisticated central communication instruments such as 
AKBİS (AK Parti Bilgi Sistemi – AK Party Information System) and AKİM (AK Parti 
İletişim Merkezi – AK Party Communication Centre) provided Erdoğan with direct 
feedback from the party base and the electorate. Extremely loyal women’s branches also 
enhanced Erdoğan’s control over centrifugal tendencies within the party. Thus, Erdoğan’s 
pro-active leadership style and his political and organizational diligence were supported 
by a specific organizational mechanism outlined here and delineated in Chapter 6. As a 
result Erdoğan became the most vital element of the elite coalition as well as of the party’s 
electoral coalition, which consisted of diverse social, ideological and ethnic groups. In 
the eyes of this diverse electoral base, Erdoğan’s importance was increased by the 
personalist electoral campaigns. 
In this section I analysed Erdoğan’s public image, the degree of his autonomy within the 
JDP, the context of his political ascent, his personal and biographical background and, 
most notably, the nature of his organizational activity. This examination illustrated the 
fact that, despite his very strong public image and highly autonomous leadership within 
the JDP, the context of Erdoğan’s political ascent and his personal and biographica l 
features did not support the claim that he was a charismatic leader. Instead of personal 
and intellectual qualities that transformed his followers and supporters, Erdoğan’s 
authority relied on the fact that he was a very pragmatic, diligent and innovative 
organization man. On the other hand, unlike leaders of personal parties, Erdoğan 
depended heavily on a massive, highly hierarchical and disciplined organizationa l 
leverage that he personally constructed and firmly controlled.  
4.4 Discussion: are “personalism” and “mass membership organization” mutually 
exclusive? 
At first glance, personalist leadership and mass membership organizations – like the one 
the JDP had in Turkey – could be seen mutually exclusive political phenomena. After all, 
personalism also means the rising importance of leaders, and in the case of the JDP in 
Turkey we also encounter a highly popular and visible leadership. One could assume that, 




popularity, his “low-populist” appeal and the pro-JDP media. It could even be claimed 
that the absence of a mass membership organization would be a better ground for 
personalism since there would be less constraint over the leader’s will and autonomy.  
This kind of approach to personalism, on the one hand, conflates personalism with 
personal party – a single reflection of the personalist phenomenon – and, on the other 
hand, conflates institutionalization with the mass membership organization. Personalism 
in personal parties should be considered a specific reflection of the phenomenon of 
personalist leadership. It should be considered a very specific political response by certain 
leaders to very specific political circumstances underlying the rapidly rising and falling 
parties in Europe and some parts of the Latin America. In contrast, as discussed in 
previous chapters, the JDP phenomenon and the rise of Erdoğan in Turkey emerged under 
the circumstances of deeply entrenched historical and political conflicts and it was a 
continuation of a much older historical tension in the country – perhaps similar to that 
between Peronists and anti-Peronists in Argentina (Ostiguy, 1997; 2009b). Under these 
circumstances, simply relying on the popularity of the party leader, media and capital 
intensive electoral strategies would be a fatal error not only detrimental for the electoral 
fortunes of the personalist leader but for the survival and interests of a wider social 
dynamic represented by the leader and the party. Hence, in the specific context of Turkey, 
the personal party would not be a feasible organizational strategy for Erdoğan and the 
social segments represented by him.  
Another line of reasoning which would lead to the view that personalism and mass 
membership organizations are mutually exclusive phenomena might stem from seeing 
institutionalization as identical to a highly routinized and bureaucratized mass 
membership organization. Indeed, mass membership organizations could be 
institutionalized, particularly if they survive after the disappearance of their founding 
leaders and if they strictly follow written regulations they produced for themselves.35 In 
this sense, it would not be easy for institutionalized organizations to co-exist side-by-side 
personalistic leadership. Nevertheless mass membership organizations are not always and 
necessarily institutionalized organizations. And it is even possible to come across highly 
routinized and remarkably bureaucratized organizations such as the JDP without high 
degrees of institutionalization. In short, “mass membership organizations” should not be 
                                                                 




conflated with “highly institutionalized organizations”. While logically it would be less 
likely to come across personalism in highly institutionalized organizations simply 
because of the predominance of rules and codes the organization produced in its long 
history for its own survival, it is much more likely to see personalism in new but highly 
bureaucratized and routinized organizations as long as the founding leader is present and 
central to the party routine and bureaucracy.  
This also contains two potential routes for the personalistic mass membership party, 
unlike with personal parties. As McDonnell (2013) and Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015) 
illustrated, personal parties are destined to fail if the leader diseappears, decides to leave 
or dissolve the organization. Hence, institutionalization and organizational survival is 
extremely unlikely for the personal party. The predominant possibility for the 
organization without the leader in the personal party is dissolution since the organiza t ion 
is actually nothing more than the personal network of the leader, comprised of friends and 
aidies. In contrast, in the “personalistic membership party” (as defined so in the following 
chapters) there are two potential trajectories. Given their highly routinized and 
bureaucratized intraparty structure with permanent presence in localities and regular 
interactions within the party (which also creates a unique party sub-culture), these 
organizations gradually create a life of their own independent from the leader; they always 
have a chance to survive the disappearance of their leader, and therefore 
institutionalization, besides the possibility of rapid decline. I elaborate on these strategic 
and organizational points in the rest of the dissertation. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the JDP leader Erdoğan was not a charismatic leader 
but that his authority over the JDP was an outcome of robust action or diligence in 
organization building. In order to support my argument I fırst discussed closely connected 
concepts of personalization, personalism, charismatic personalism, non-charismatic 
personalism and personal party personalism. I proposed thinking of personalization as a 
wider phenomenon in politics characterized by the increasing prominence of individua l 
politicians and the decline of the role of collective actors as a result of institutional change 
and advancement of communication technologies. Although personalism is related to this 
phenomenon, I proposed to take the concept particularly as referring to the relationship 




and organization. In this theoretical discussion I argued that charismatic, non-charismatic 
and personal party personalism are different reflections of personalist ic leadership.  
Although all forms usually contain a very strong public image and a highly autonomous 
leadership, I argued that charismatic personalism was distinguished from more common 
forms of non-charismatic and personal party personalism. Relying on the origina l 
exposition of the term by Weber, I defined charisma as a very exceptional phenomenon 
that is characterized by extraordinary political and social circumstances and the 
transformational role of the leader on the followers stemming from a particular 
intellectual- ideological worldview. In cases of non-charismatic and personal party 
personalism, one can find neither such a transformational role nor an extraordinary 
political and social condition. In these forms, leaders have transactional roles among their 
diverse segments of supporters instead of a transformational effect that enthrals and 
transforms followers. However, while the non-charismatic form depends on extremely 
tireless political activity by the leaders that focuses on organization building, in personal 
party personalism one can hardly find this emphasis on organization building and 
intraparty governance.  
In the sections that followed, I used this perspective to analyse the case of Erdoğan and 
the JDP. I examined Erdoğan’s public image, the degree of his autonomy within his 
organization, the context of his political ascent, his personal qualities and his politica l 
style. I have demonstrated that, while Erdoğan had a very strong public image and a high 
degree of autonomy within the JDP, he was lacking the personal-intellectual qualities of 
most charismatic leaders that helped them to transform their followers. Unlike 
charismatic leaders, his political ascent emerged in a quite stable political period. 
However, the biographical details of his personality and political activity illustrated the 
fact that his “low-populist” appeal was extremely vital for his political salience, and at 
the same time he was a very diligent, innovative and a pragmatic organization man 
(teşkilatçı) focusing exclusively on achieving and maintaining power.  
In order to do this, unlike charismatic leaders and leaders of personal parties, he mainly 
relied on a large and pervasive organization constructed personally by him. In order to 
control this massive organization, he put a great amount of effort into intraparty 
governance through robust action. Erdoğan devoted considerable time to consultat ions 




meetings and mass rallies. This robust action, consisting of extensive travelling to distinct 
corners of the country, numerous speeches to diverse segments inside and outside the 
party, and the remarkable time spent on the intraparty governance, was the basis of 
Erdoğan’s authority. The wider implication of the case of Erdoğan and the JDP is as 
follows: discussions over personalism should particularly focus on the relationship 
between the leader and the supporters, followers and organizations surrounding him or 
her instead of exclusively focusing on leaders. From a much narrower perspective this 
discussion demonstrated the crucial distinction between charismatic and non-charismatic 
personalism. In conclusion, a non-charismatic personalist leader is not a prophet but, first 
and foremost, a diligent and pragmatic organization builder. The non-charismatic 
personalist leader’s success is reliant on a large and pervasive organization that he or she 
personally constructs and firmly controls. Another theoretical contention of this chapter 
was that personalism and highy routinized and bureaucratized organizations are not 









The Justice and Development Party (JDP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) won eight 
elections between its foundation in 2002 and the presidential election in 2014 despite 
many political crises. Unlike its rightist predecessors, such as the Democrat Party 
(Demokrat Parti) of 1950s, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) of 1980s and 1990s, 
and the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) of 1990s (at the end of the 1990s it became 
the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)),1 the JDP showed signs of neither electoral failure nor 
any considerable intraparty discontent throughout this period. What distinguished the JDP 
from its rightist predecessors? What made the JDP a novel force in Turkish politics? In 
this chapter I argue that the combination of a year-round active, large and pervasive 
membership organization, tension-increasing electoral propaganda, and a strong and 
decisively pro-JDP media was vital for the electoral achievements and political resilience 
of the party.  
The management of different and mostly diverging expectations of party members, 
supporters and the electoral base was central to the JDP elite’s strategies. In order to 
understand members’ and supporters’ engagements with the party, I borrowed – and, to 
a certain extent, reinterpreted – two interrelated concepts from Panebianco (1988). These 
are “collective incentives” and “selective incentives”. Relying on Panebianco’s 
explanations (1988: 21–32), “collective incentives” have been identified as the extra-
material ideological and emotional bonds between the party and its members and 
supporters. I attribute a rather broad meaning to the term to refer to every possible 
connection between the party and its members and supporters other than links such as 
patronage and clientelism based on material benefits. These bonds can be ideologica l, 
programmatic and emotional, but they can also be a product of traditional politica l 
preferences of families as well as a strong affection for party leaders. In line with 
Panebianco’s explanations (1988: 21–32), I define “selective incentives” mainly as 
                                                                 




individual benefits including every kind of social, symbolic, economic and cultura l 
capital gains expected from being a party member.  
It should be also underlined that this distinction between collective and selective 
incentives had a very concrete reflection in the party life. During my interviews I 
frequently came across the use of two different expressions in order to describe party 
members. One of these expressions was partili and the other one was partici (Interviewee 
48 2014, May 6).2 While the former term referred to the party members with a sincere 
and altruistic engagement with the party, the latter term was used by my interviewees in 
order to define party members who were expecting benefits such as jobs, promotion, aid, 
and posts, and a wider network of potential friends and customers from the party. While 
partili represented JDP cadres driven by “collective incentives”, partici represented the 
JDP members driven by “selective incentives” in the vocabulary of my interviewees. The 
balance struck between these different modes of engagement of the members and 
supporters with the party was central to the JDP’s success. 
In section two, I briefly touch upon the potential contributions of party members coming 
from various different political backgrounds to the strategic inclinations of the party. In 
this section I demonstrate the aspects in which the JDP was different from its rightist 
predecessors in terms of organizational dynamics and electoral strategies. In the same 
section, I identify the JDP elite’s long-term strategic aim as “maintaining predominance”. 
Despite their short-term electoral benefits, the JDP elite embraced a rather controlled 
approach to redistributive strategies and particularism. The party also did not compromise 
extensively with local power holders in order to protect the autonomy of the party and, 
thus, the technocratic capacity of the JDP governments.  
In section three I briefly look at what was substituted by the JDP elite in place of the 
overwhelmingly patronage- and clientelism- based strategies and agreements with local 
and national politically salient individuals and social groups. As the electoral 
effectiveness of “classical patronage politics” and particularism decreased, the party elite 
started to invest heavily in discursive-emotional techniques in electoral propaganda in 
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order to consolidate its electoral support. In section four I give a detailed picture of the 
JDP’s communication instruments in which conventional, organization-based 
communication methods were supported by the strong pro-JDP media. I argue that, 
without the combination of these two, the JDP elite’s and Erdoğan’s interventions in 
public debate would have been much less effective and the party’s predominant role in 
Turkish politics would not have been protected. 
5.2 Rightist predecessors and the JDP organization: striking a balance between 
the Islamist past and the centre-right present 
In this section, I draw attention to the difference between the JDP’s organizationa l 
dynamics and electoral strategies and those of its rightist predecessors.  
5.2.1 The JDP and its rightist predecessors: moving beyond the basics of Turkish 
politics 
The JDP had always been seen as a grand coalition of the rightist politicians from various 
diverging backgrounds under the control of a previously Islamist elite. This characterist ic 
of the party was underlined by many students of Turkish politics as well as the party’s 
members. Tuğal, by referring to a sub-provincial (ilçe) organization of the JDP, 
underlines the fact that even this local branch was a coalition of Islamists, the centre-right 
and nationalists (2009: 151). Furthermore, some prominent social democratic politic ians 
were also involved in the foundation process and this greatly enhanced the pluralist 
appearance of the party organization. As Hale and Özbudun note, particularly in the 2007 
general election, the JDP deliberately nominated almost 170 deputies with liberal and 
centre-right backgrounds, and even a politician with a social democratic background 
could become a minister in the JDP government after this election (2010: 43). According 
to the statement by Hüseyin Çelik, one of the founding figures of the party, made in 2003:  
It cannot be said that everybody in the JDP has broken their ties with 
the tradition symbolized by Erbakan [Islamist National View tradition]. 
Nevertheless the important thing is the attitude of the staff committee 
and the change at this point is clear. […] The JDP was founded by the 
people from different backgrounds and tendencies. […] It is true that 
most of the people who established the JDP have their origin in the 
[Islamist] National View tradition. However there are people like me 
from the [centre-right] Motherland Party, the True Path Party (Doğru 
Yol Partisi) and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi) and even people from the left. This is not only valid for the high 
echelons of the party, it is also valid for the party branches as well 




It should also be mentioned that this coalitional character of the party was complemented 
by the diversity of its electoral base. According to the statistical analysis of the JDP’s 
electoral base in 2002, with reference to voters’ choices in the general elections in 1999, 
26% of the JDP’s constituency voted for the first time in 2002, 22% came from the 
Nationalist Action Party’s base, 28% from the Islamist National View background, 9% 
from the Motherland Party, 7% from the True Path Party and 7% from the Democratic 
Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti) (Erder, 2002: 129). As Hale and Özbudun argue, “AKP 
[JDP] appears to have successfully rebuilt the Özal-ANAP [Motherland Party] coalition, 
bringing together former centre-right voters, moderate Islamists, moderate nationalists 
and even a certain segment of the former centre-left” (2010: 37). This situation was 
usually evaluated as a potential problem for the party since it might have a detrimenta l 
effect on its cohesion. Yet there was also a positive contribution of this pluralism to the 
JDP in terms of its elite’s strategic inclinations and skills. Although the JDP located itself 
in the history of a longer centre-right tradition, the elite of the party were always aware 
of the weaknesses of the previous centre-right parties as well as the Islamist Welfare Party 
thanks to their previous experiences.  
It can be argued that the most crucial lesson the JDP took from the experience of its 
predecessors was the problems entailed by the heavy reliance on “classical patronage 
politics”. During the JDP years, social expenditure by the state increased (Karagöl, 2013: 
57) and this, apparently, contributed remarkably to the party’s lasting electoral 
achievements. Nevertheless, the party was extremely successful at reducing the state 
budget deficit (Karagöl, 2013: 42) and during the JDP years the number of public 
employees did not increase significantly, either (DİSK, 2014: 3–4). Limitations on the 
rise in the number of public employees and the balanced public budget during the JDP 
years suggested that the party had moved beyond “classical centre-right patronage” in 
Turkey. The main indicators of classical patronage in Turkey were significant increases 
in the number of public employees and generous public expenditures that caused public 
budget deficits. Another component of the classical patronage and clientelism in Turkey 
was the influence of powerful local and traditional actors in politics, such as tribal leaders, 
notable families, religious authorities and large landowners of provincial cities, leading 





“Induced participation” (Özbudun, 1975) or “vertical mobilization” (Sayarı, 1975) refer 
to the incorporation and mobilization of, particularly, rural popular sectors of Turkish 
society by political parties through negotiations with local and traditional power holders. 
Hence, since the transition to multi-party politics in the middle of 1940s, local patronage 
networks, and local and traditional elites together with the resources provided by the 
import substitution economy created the main ground of the “classical patronage politics ” 
in Turkey.3 Nevertheless, since the 1980s, economic liberalization, domestic immigrat ion 
and the rise of urban poverty drastically dissolved the socio-economic basis of the 
classical patronage.4 
As Kopecky and Spirova (2012: 27) underline, it might be misleading to use public 
employment numbers and expenditure as “proxy indicators” of party patronage. Instead 
they recommend the use of expert interviews to see the full extent of the phenomenon. In 
line with this perspective, when I argue that the JDP did not depend on classical patronage 
politics as much as its rightist predecessors, I also depend heavily on my personal 
observations in the fieldwork.5 However, it does not mean that the party leadership did 
not deploy new methods of patronage which heavily relied on suspicious links between 
private sector and public resources.6 Highly publicized corruption probes against the JDP 
governments at the time of writing had something to do with these novel methods of 
patronage and party finance. However, from the perspective of the explanations I gave 
above on “classical patronage politics” of the centre-right in Turkey, the JDP definite ly 
represented a novel force in Turkish politics and moved beyond conventional politica l -
electoral strategies of the right in Turkey.  
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(1975).  
4  See Kemahlıoğlu (2012) for the gradual dissolution of this classical patronage politics after the 
introduction of neo-liberal reforms. 
5 I illustrate details supporting this claim in Chapters 6 and 7. 
6  I briefly mention these new methods of patronage in the next chapter. It should also be noted that, 
particularly in the peripheral and poor urban contexts, the JDP deployed redistributive strategies and created 
clientelistic networks. And the JDP’s “low-populist” appeal delineated in Chapter 3 was central to the 
smooth functioning of these redistributive strategies and the transformation of clientelistic networks into 
votes. After all, as Auyero’s excellent account on “Peronist survival and problem solving  networks” 
illustrated, without the proper emotional and cultural bond between the supplier and receiver in clientelistic 
exchange, the clientelistic relationship cannot be sustained and cannot be transformed into electoral gains. 
The only difference to the JDP’s redistributive strategies in localities was  that, unlike Peronist personal 
mediation for problem solving, the JDP leadership to a large extent did not allow any sedimentation of 
brokers or patrons in localities. High degrees of circulation in JDP local governments as well as local-
provincial executive branches was evidence that this rather bureaucratized clientelism depended more on 




As one of the prominent public opinion researchers of the party emphasized, “the JDP 
was aware of a Demirelist (Demirelci) rightist tradition which heavily relied on limit less 
promises to voters” (Interviewee 38 2014, April 25). Süleyman Demirel was always a 
symbolic name in Turkey, and he represented the pragmatic inclinations of the centre-
right politics as well as a strategy that relied heavily on classical patronage politics, 
generous subsidies for agricultural products and highly unrealistic promises to the 
electorate. This was why JDP cadres usually tended to ignore his place among their 
centre-right predecessors. They tended to refer to Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal, not 
Demirel, as the party’s predecessors. Hence, it is fair to argue that the party, unlike its 
centre-right predecessors, deployed a rather “controlled”7  approach to redistributive 
policies and cautiously engaged with local power holders in order to remain in power for 
a longer time. In this sense, it is important to have a closer look at the differences between 
the JDP and previous rightist parties that deeply shaped the JDP politics, namely the 
Islamist Welfare Party and the Motherland Party.  
5.2.1.1 Legacy of the Welfare Party: the importance of a year-round, large and 
pervasive membership organization 
Most of my interviewees tended to see the main difference between the Islamist National 
View parties and the JDP on an ideological basis. It is known that the founding leader of 
the National View tradition, Erbakan, said many times that “if you have faith you have 
opportunities” (iman var imkan var!) and “I do not have supporters; I have believers”, 
which indicated the role of ideational-emotional links between the Islamist National View 
tradition and its followers. Another interviewee, a knowledgeable sympathizer and 
bureaucrat, also underlined the same motivations of the members of the Islamist National 
View parties. According to him, Islamist National View members did not really observe 
the “benefit–cost balance” (nimet-külfet dengesi) in their engagement to the party 
(Interviewee 19 2014, February 26). A high up member of the Felicity Party (Saadet 
Partisi), the most recent party of the Islamist National View tradition, also emphasized 
that “belief” was the basis of the organization in the National View tradition: “Erbakan 
Hodja had this expression: ‘if you have belief, you can squeeze milk from a male goat’ 
(inanç tekeden süt çıkarır)” (Interviewee 1 2013, September 2).   
                                                                 




As Delibaş (2015: 54–64) underline, all of the Turkish political parties headed towards 
capital intensive 8  and media-based electoral strategies during 1980s and 1990s. In 
contrast, the Welfare Party of the Islamist National View tradition was busy since the 
beginning of the 1990s constructing a large and year-round active membership 
organization that relied heavily on a membership profile motivated by strong collective 
incentives. Poor government performance, the increasing organizational decline of 
centrist parties, electoral volatility and the fragmentation of the political system 
(discussed in length in Chapter 2), gave an advantage to the Welfare Party’s strategy of 
using a year-round active, ideologically motivated and large membership organiza t ion 
over the clientelistic and media-oriented strategies of its electoral competitors, 
particularly during the mid-1990s. Beyond strategic inclinations, the Islamist Welfare 
Party past of the JDP made a direct contribution to the party’s human resources. One of 
my interviewees, a sub-provincial JDP chair with a National View background, described 
this organizational legacy of the Islamist past of the JDP succinctly: 
The organizational work and approach (teşkilatçılık) of the people 
coming from the [Islamist] National View past is different. There were 
people in the party from the Motherland Party, the True Path Party or 
the Republican People’s Party. They cannot stand our activities. You 
may ask why this was the case. Our organizational activity is ballot box 
based. In other words it targets ballot boxes. The main things are the 
ballot box representative, the neighbourhood administrations above him 
or her, and establishing these governing bodies in neighbourhoods. 
Every week there is a neighbourhood meeting. In these meetings we 
check whether our ballot box representatives are OK. Our work is 
entirely targeting the base. I still could not overcome this. There are 
protocol meetings and inaugurations. Believe me, I cannot attend them. 
Because the organizational work makes you exhausted. Why? Every 
week we have different meetings in 15 neighbourhoods. Every week, 
[we had] regular neighbourhood meetings, neighbourhood consultat ion 
meetings including our ballot box representatives. We put enormous 
effort into the organization of these meetings. People coming from other 
parties are not really used to this kind of party activity. They are usually 
used to “high” politics. This is to say that: you go and see influentia l 
people, you talk to a single person and expect “this many votes would 
come [through this person]”. They have always done this kind of 
politics. But it is not the case in the JDP. We try to establish one-to-one 
contact with every voter. You gain votes one-by-one, by register ing 
[individual] members. […] Membership enhances the link between the 
                                                                 
8 For the distinction between labour intensive and capital intensive campaing techniques , see Farrell (1996: 
171). While the former depends on party workers , volunteers, canvassing, mass meetings and individual 




party and the voter. […] The people coming from other parties are not 
really prone to this kind of approach (Interviewee 26 2014, April 4). 
From the perspective of the distinction I made between selective and collective incentives  
in the introduction, it seems that “collective incentives” had a major role in the 
engagement of the members of the Islamist National View parties to the organizat ion. 
The JDP elites with a National View background were aware of the benefits of collective  
incentives as well as having a large and pervasive membership organization that 
established a direct connection between the party and the electorate, without the 
mediation of other channels such as influential persons. This led the JDP elite to strike a 
very fine balance between “collective” and “selective” incentives, unlike the previous 
centre-right parties which heavily relied on classical patronage politics and clientelis t ic 
networks. As one of my interviewees underlined, the JDP’s organization “mainly relied 
on the National View tradition. And the organization in the National View stemmed from 
the fact that the party had a strict ideology, a specific cause (dava) relying on a politica l 
movement” (Interviewee 40 2014, May 2).  
Nevertheless, the JDP could not have survived by remaining an overwhelmingly 
ideological Islamist party given the electoral and political circumstances outlined in 
previous chapters. The party had to sacrifice some of the benefits that might stem from 
strong collective incentives – in other words, the ideological, programmatic and 
emotional engagements of its members – in order to appeal to the median voter and come 
closer to a centre-right position. In this sense, the Motherland Party cadres had a quite 
decisive influence on the strategic inclinations of the JDP organization (Aydın & Dalmış, 
2008: 201). 9  This is why it is crucial to look briefly at the difference between the 
organizational dynamics of the Motherland Party and the JDP.  
5.2.1.2 Legacy of the Motherland Party: the failure of overwhelmingly patronage-, 
clientelism- and media-based strategies 
Just after the military coup in 1980, the centre-right Motherland Party unexpectedly won 
the general elections in 1983 and formed a single-party government. The Motherland 
Party captured the centrist and pragmatic inclination of the Turkish electorate through a 
discourse around economic rationality, the free market and service delivery (Ergüder, 
1991: 156–157). What characterized the Motherland Party in organizational terms were 
                                                                 




its solid factions. Factions in the party were kept together, to a certain extent, through the 
personality of the party leader Turgut Özal and, to a greater extent, by “intraparty 
clientelism” (Türsan, 1995: 177). After Özal became President and left the party, and after 
the victory of Mesut Yılmaz, the representative of the liberal faction in the 1991 
convention, conservative and religious figures in the party gradually started to split away 
from the organization (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 51).  As one of my interviewees, a top 
Motherland Party politician, argued, “the religious, conservative masses did not enjoy the 
leadership of Yılmaz as they enjoyed the leadership of Özal, Demirel or Erdoğan” 
(Interviewee 22 2014, March 5). As another of my interviewees, a former local 
Motherland Party executive member who would go on to become a member of the JDP, 
underlined, the exit of the conservative elite and thus the split of conservative figures 
from the party base had a corrosive effect on party activities on the ground (Interviewee 
13 2014, February 7). 
The response of one of the abovementioned top Motherland Party politicians to a question 
regarding the superiority of the JDP over the Motherland Party accurately summarized 
the differences between the JDP and its centre-right predecessor: 
What is different in the JDP is the fact that they are coming from the 
“school of Erbakan” (Erbakan mektebi). The school of Erbakan is 
highly disciplined and attaches great importance to technology. […] 
and they work for the God’s sake (Allah rızası). Once Yılmaz told me 
that we should organize like the Welfare Party. I told him that this is 
impossible. Because these people take part in the [Welfare] party to 
sacrifice not to receive benefits. […] National Salvation [the 
predecessor of the Islamist Welfare Party] was organized even in the 
apartment blocks […] They were all spending from their own pockets. 
[…] They were closely interested in all apartments and 
neighbourhoods. […] They use their own car for the party activities. 
They fill their cars with the people and bring them to the meetings and 
ballot boxes. This is an amazing discipline. No other party can come 
close to this. Because they do this for the God’s sake. […] The person 
who takes part in the Motherland, first of all, either seeks a job for his 
son or he wants to be a deputy or mayor. Nevertheless, the JDP has 
started to change as well. Some of them say “we were jihadists and we 
turned into contractors” (mücahitken mütahit olduk) (Interviewee 17 
2014, February 25). 
Despite the decrease in the motivations of the party members, and the corrosive effects 
of power on collective incentives, it would not be an exaggeration to highlight the role of 
the Islamist National View tradition, most notably the importance attached to the 




electoral performance of the JDP. The most crucial lesson the JDP elite took from the 
Motherland Party experience must have been the problems entailed by heavy dependence 
on classical patronage and clientelism as well as on media- and capital-intens ive 
strategies, which ignored the vital roles played by the party on the ground. The JDP elite 
were aware of this strategy’s detrimental impact on the Motherland Party’s electoral and 
political destiny.   
5.2.2 The JDP’s long-term political aim: “maintaining predominance” 
Considering the failures of its rightist predecessors, it is highly plausible to argue that the 
JDP elite did not simply want to increase its vote share by any means at hand. Instead, 
the JDP struck a balance between the short-term requirements of the electoral processes 
(responsiveness) and the long-term requirements of being in office (responsibility). One 
of my high-ranking interviewees from the JDP vividly described this balance: “doing 
politics [for the JDP elite] is this kind of business, and I think it is the hardest part: you 
have to be the man inside the taxi driver and you have to convince the academic at the 
same time. In other words, you have to convince academics and intellectuals as well as 
the taxi driver” (Interviewee 36 2014, April 24). The key instrument of this balance 
between the short-term requirements of elections and the long-term requirements of being 
in office was the highly autonomous leadership and party structure.10   
Furthermore, as some of my interviewees mentioned, the party elite started to see the JDP 
as the predominant force of Turkish politics. According to a deputy from the JDP, “this 
party will remain in power for a very long time. Not even ten or twenty years, it might 
remain in power even for fifty years. I have studied other examples of parties that 
remained in office for long terms. […] In Japan we have seen that the Liberal Party had 
remained in power without interruptions for 56 years. In Sweden, Canada, South Africa, 
Malaysia [you have similar parties]” (Interviewee 29 2014, April 16). Hence, given the 
JDP’s long-term aims and the party’s electoral potential as revealed by previous elections, 
deploying full-scale vote maximization strategies such as highly redistributive policies 
and generous promises was not a preferable option for the JDP elite. This was why, in an 
answer to a question about redistributive strategies, one of my interviewees, an advisor 
to party leader Erdoğan and an expert on social policies, gave the following answer: 
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The JDP’s aim of creating a welfare state is supported by the careful 
conduct of the economy and resources generated by this. The JDP’s 
social policy expenditures are made carefully. The party has been very 
careful about embracing an electoral economy, 11  a redistributive 
strategy, particularly requested by mayors before elections. 
Nevertheless, by the time the JDP came to power, poverty was a 
problem and this was why the party also had to apply short-term 
solutions as well.12 But we have told ourselves at the beginning that we 
won’t surrender to the populist style of rightist politicians (Interviewee 
35 2014, April 22).13 
Given the abovementioned interviewee’s point, it is plausible to think that the party 
leadership frequently encountered the demands of the provincial party elite, provinc ia l 
chairs and mayors of initiating redistributive policies. However, given the state budget 
balance protected throughout the JDP rule, it is possible to think that the leadership firmly 
rejected these demands in general. From the same perspective, it is also plausible to think 
that the leadership also inhibited a move towards the other extreme, protecting the party 
from falling into a purely technocratic, long-term political strategy that depended on 
drastic decreases in public spending given the volume of the social policy expenditure by 
the party since the beginning of JDP rule. As Şentürk, a former JDP vice-chair in İstanbul, 
underlined, the electorate can bear unpopular measures for overcoming political and 
economic crises for a while, but politicians should not think that this goes on forever 
(2007: 186–187).  
In sum, the JDP must be considered as a party outside the classical patronage-based 
centre-right politics of Turkey explained above. Since the social and economic structure  
(particularly import substitution economy) that gave rise to classical patronage politics of 
the centre-right had already started to decline (by the rise of neo-liberal policies and 
regulations which target privatization and reducing the role of state in economy), the JDP 
                                                                 
11  “Electoral economy”, in this context, means increasing social expenditures and state subsidies 
immediately before the elections. 
12 Distributing coal and food in poor neighbourhoods became a well-known practice throughout the JDP 
years as well as other social policy reforms and expenditures in favour of low-income social segments. 
13 It should be noted that, in the JDP discourse revealed by the written material such as the party program 
and speeches of its leaders and prominent figures, populism referred to highly redistributive strategies. Just 
after the Syriza victory in Greece, and the declaration by party leader Tsipras that the country would not 
pay its foreign debt, one of the comments of Erdoğan regarding Tsipras was the following: “He has to be 
quite cautious in some of his messages. Politics does not bear being sentimental. You have to balance 
populism” (Milliyet, 2015). This was also emblematic of the fact that populism was seen as an unrealistic 
economic outlook by the JDP elite. Yet at the same time, this comment also illustrated that the JDP leader 
Erdoğan saw “balanced” redistributive policies that relieved the popular masses to be, to a certain extent, 




was required to adapt new strategies. This peculiarity of the party was accurately captured 
by Özdan (2014), a critical commentator: 
In Anatolia, there was a centre-right politics which was under the 
monopoly of the families whose large lands were primarily a result of 
unjust enrichment. These people were also the lords of politics 
(siyasetin ağaları). Without the support of these people, becoming a 
candidate and winning elections were almost impossible. Later on, 
agriculture ceased to provide money. Big families started to dissolve 
and migrate to big cities. People who were previously day workers or 
share croppers became land owners and their children got univers ity 
educations and have become professionals in their hometowns. […] 
Economic dependence on land and land owners decreased and the era 
of the lords of politics came to an end. People found the JDP cadres that 
they saw around them, and who live according to the similar customs 
like them, familiar. This gap was occupied by younger and more 
ambitious JDP cadres who got mature enough in the local governments, 
and who addressed the problems of Turkey from a proper perspective 
under the circumstances of a suitable political and economic global 
conjecture.     
As discussed above, and as will be elaborated in the following chapters, as a part of its 
long-term aim of maintaining predominance, the JDP elite avoided relying heavily on 
provincial patronage networks. The party also avoided recruiting its political cadres 
extensively from local power holders in provincial Turkey.14 Instead, the party tended to 
replace these kinds of cadres with younger, highly educated, more ambitious, career-
oriented yet submissive people. As Özdan underlined, “Prime Minister [Erdoğan]’s most 
important skill is to create continuous expectation and keep these expectations alive 
[among the party cadres]. The JDP’s constant renewal of the party cadres, except the core 
team, creates continuous energy and enthusiasm in the party. This situation successfully 
addresses the new generations’ inclinations of quickly becoming rich and prominent, 
gaining privilege through appearance, prioritizing individual interest” (2014). 
This dynamic was also underlined by a Central Executive Committee member of the party. 
According to him, the possibility of getting elected to a post provided an enduring energy 
to the party: 
There is the motivation stemming from the possibility of being elected. 
[…] There are many elections. If you cannot become a deputy, you can 
become a provincial (il) chair, if not a provincial chair you become a 
provincial administration board member. If you are a member of the 
sub-provincial administration board and wanted to become a local 
                                                                 




assembly member and could not make it, you become one of the 
members of the administration board of the ruling party. […] In short, 
motivation comes from frequent elections. Normally it is hard to 
motivate the organization when the amateur spirit is replaced by an 
institutional one. Nevertheless, as a result of these elections, the 
possibility of gaining new titles provides motivation. This enhances the 
engagement to the organization (Interviewee 37 2014, April 24). 
Hence, the predominance of the party provided wider flexibility to the party elite for 
finding required human resources: young and ambitious people. Nevertheless, the 
leadership also carefully dealt with an overwhelmingly careerist inclination in the party. 
This was why one of the commentators close to the JDP underlined Erdoğan’s talent at 
striking a balance between “interests” and “mission” (Koru, 2012). It should be also by 
noted that this frequent circulation in executive cadres of the party also inhibited any 
sedimentation of power holder intermediaries within the party and in localities. As a result 
of the strategic experience from the previous centre-right parties and the socio-
demographic change which undermined classical patronage politics, the JDP became a 
genuinely novel political force in Turkish politics.  
In this section, I illustrated the difference between the JDP and its rightist predecessors, 
most notably the Motherland Party and the Islamist Welfare Party. In terms of its 
organizational dynamics, the JDP neither embraced a strategy entirely depending on 
selective incentives, like the Motherland Party, nor a strategy overwhelmingly dependent 
on collective incentives and strong ideational links with party members and the electorate, 
like the Islamist Welfare Party. Instead, the party elite observed a balance between these 
two and was able to keep collective and selective incentives-driven party cadres together 
through a high degree of leadership and party autonomy. The JDP elite also identified the 
long-term political aim of the party as “maintaining predominance”. In order to achieve 
this, JDP cadres avoided relying on unrealistic promises and overwhelmingly 
redistributive strategies. The JDP elite and strategists tended to maximize the party’s vote, 
like every other party, but they also carefully avoided full scale maximization of votes 
through uncontrolled redistributive strategies, unsubstantiated promises, classical 
patronage politics and negotiations with local power holders. A year-round active, 
pervasive and highly motivated membership organization under the control of an 




in providing this balance. The abovementioned differences of the JDP from its rightist 
predecessors have been summarized below in Table 5.1.15 
Table 5.1: The JDP and its rightist predecessors  
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Source: Author’s compilation  
Note: These distinctions marked with “*” are discussed in length in other chapters. 
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the JDP from its rightist predecessors. In the following chapters I elaborate on these dimensions of the JDP 




5.3 Controlled tension: the JDP as the representative of the “downtrodden” 
majority 
In this section, I look at what mainly was substituted by the JDP elite in place of the 
highly redistributive strategies and classical centre-right politics of patronage and 
clientelism.  
5.3.1 Playing with emotions 
In the previous section, I illustrated how classical centre-right patronage declined in 
Turkey and how the JDP’s long-term aim of becoming a predominant party ruled out 
highly redistributive electoral strategies. As a result, investing in discursive and emotiona l 
techniques by drawing mostly upon the party leader Erdoğan’s personality and politica l 
interventions became a crucial electoral tactic for the JDP elite. Erdoğan was usually 
accused of “polarising” society and politics through his public speeches.16  Commentators 
in Turkey usually pointed out the potential dangers of the discriminating tone of his 
speeches and complained that Erdoğan was a highly divisive figure who separated society 
into camps according to people’s attitudes towards conservative hegemony in Turkey.  
I would like to call this electoral tactic of the JDP “controlled tension”.17  Controlled 
tension can be described as artificially increasing political tensions in pre-election periods 
by subtle discursive attacks on political rivals with reference to the high- low, democracy-
anti-democracy and secular-religious divides. This, in turn, helped the ruling party to 
enlarge the boundaries of its electoral base in pre-election periods by antagonising its 
electoral rivals and pushing undecided voters to choose camps. Relying on the party’s 
low political appeal/style elaborated in Chapter 3, the tactic of controlled tension helped 
the JDP to consolidate its electoral base by labelling its electoral competitors, depending 
on the context, as either elite, anti-democratic or anti-religious forces against the JDP 
government. Yet, in every possible case, the logic remained the same: the JDP elite 
intentionally created simple dualities before elections and ensured the existence of a mood 
                                                                 
16 Although political commentators in the media tend to call this tactic “polarisation”, the term in fact 
denotes a structural quality of party systems which is characterized by the distance of political actors on a 
given cleavage dimension such as left and right (Sani & Sartori, 1983). For instance, as competing political 
actors cumulate at the extreme poles of a left-right dimension, this means a high degree of polarisation in a 
given party system. In the Turkish case, Erdoğan increased tensions among competing political actors, yet 
his constant interventions  in Turkish politics did not create a polarized party system. Instead it caused a 
“bifurcation”. 
17  The term “controlled tension” originally belongs to Duran (2013), and by this term he implied the 
resistance and counter-attack of the JDP to secularist actors such as army and bureaucracy. In this text when 




that elections were held mainly between the JDP and others. These interventions by the 
party elite, more often than not, defined the electoral drama of the country and drew the 
JDP’s political opponents into a discursive struggle defined by the JDP.  
In the use of the tactic of “controlled tension”, the JDP elite tended to either put electoral 
rivals in a single hostile group or only took one of its electoral rivals seriously, according 
to the political circumstances. The tactic of controlled tension always appealed to the 
fears of the electorate. In pre-election periods, the JDP elite convincingly created a mood 
that only the JDP was capable of protecting the long-lasting traditions and values of 
society and only it was strong enough to provide political (and, to a lesser extent, 
economic) stability to the country. The JDP elite made great efforts to present the party 
as the true representative and the authentic defender of the common cultural and politica l 
values of the nation. High voter turnout in elections as well as the declining vote share of 
smaller, more ideological parties in the electoral system could be considered indicators 
of the tactic of “controlled tension”.18 Through increasing the fears of the low-income, 
conservative-religious majority of the country vis-a-vis the alleged threat of the elite-
secularist oppression, the tactic of controlled tension consolidated the party vote19 by 
transforming undecided voters into decisive supporters, decisive sympathisers into party 
members and party members into party activists. 20  Although it created a much more 
decisive opposition against the JDP, the tactic of controlled tension consolidated party 
cohesion as well as the party’s electoral base, and at the same time increased the number 
of voters. For instance, in the 2014 local elections, the JDP’s electoral propaganda framed 
the election as the “independence struggle of the new Turkey” and depicted Erdoğan as 
the leader of this struggle (Aktifhaber, 2014a). It should also be underlined that 
personalization of politics also played its part in this strategy, and political divides in the 
                                                                 
18 In Turkey, voter turnout has always been very high compared to the Western democracies. Nevertheless, 
there was a considerable change over time. In the 2002 general election and 2004 local elections voter 
turnout was below 80%. After the introduction of “tactic of controlled tension”, voter turnout in elections 
started to increase. In the 2011 general election it was 83% and in the local elections in 2014, 89%.  
19 When the JDP discourse was mainly reliant on a pro-democracy and pro-EU conservative democracy 
narrative, the JDP vote started to decline and hit rock bottom in the local elections in 2009 with 38%. Since 
that election, the JDP elite, and most notably the party leader Erdoğan , tended to use a tension-increasing, 
exclusionary language in their public speeches , particularly in pre-election periods. Since 2009, the party 
vote started to increase considerably. In the 2011 election the JDP got almost 50% of the votes , and in the 
2014 local elections the party got remarkably higher than the previous local election with 43% of the 
popular vote. Although the decline and subsequent rise of the party vote over this period cannot be 
explained only by the tension-increasing interventions of the JDP elite, there appears to be a strong 
correlation. 




country, most notably the high- low divide elaborated upon in previous chapters, also 
became an anti-Erdoğanism-Erdoğanism divide. 
Deploying controlled tension was a less risky strategy for the JDP given its “low-populist” 
appeal outlined in previous chapters. After all, according to the narrative constructed by 
the JDP elite and the pro-JDP media, JDP cadres already came from humble social and 
political backgrounds. This in turn provided, to a great extent, historical legitimacy for 
the assaults by the JDP elite that increased political and social tensions in Turkey. 
However, the party elite took great care to not be perceived as the aggressive side of the 
tension in the eyes of the electorate and worked hard to protect the JDP’s victimized 
image. This was why Erdoğan usually used the expression “we were not aggressive but 
we stand tall” (dikleşmeden dik durduk). In other words, the party tried to protect an image 
that it had always suffered the attacks of its opponents but resisted them. One can also see 
great efforts of the supporters and members of the JDP in discrediting the critiques of 
intellectuals and political opponents of the party who argued that in order to get votes 
Erdoğan increased tensions. This kind of defensive position mostly justified Erdoğan’s 
attacks on his opponents.21  
The nature of the opposition to the JDP and the assaults usually made by the Republican 
People’s Party helped the JDP elite to consolidate its victimized and defensive image. By 
relying on the “low” appeal of the party, which depicted the JDP as the representative of 
the downtrodden peripheral majority, the JDP elite also easily exploited the secularist 
critiques of the main opposition and reflected these critiques to its supporters as potential 
threats to the values of the conservative-religious majority of the country that stemmed 
from the allegedly “elite” secularist opposition. 22  It should also be underlined that 
criticism towards the religiosity of JDP politicians by the Republican People’s Party was 
usually interpreted by the JDP elite and JDP supporters as evidence of the main 
opposition’s disdain for devout and ordinary people. 
                                                                 
21 According to Esayan, a pro-JDP columnist, the reason behind the “polarisation” in Turkey was not 
Erdoğan but those “arrogant” and “reactionary” forces who resisted demands of equality for religious 
people. According to Esayan, “Erdoğan’s talent at managing polarisation politics  does not mean that he 
prefers this or, at least, does not mean that he started this. […] He only protects himself” (2014a).  
22  Many speeches of Erdoğan can be found  that drew upon the theme of “assaults by the Republican 
People’s Party to religion”. For a news report on Erdoğan’s claims with “documents” that the Republican  
People’s Party sold some mosques and turned some of them into storehouses during 1930s and 1940s , see 
Aktifhaber (2012). Erdoğan also said the following: “Our nation remembers well how the mosques were 





Furthermore, the Republican People’s Party’s secularist critique of the JDP also provided 
the party elite with the upper hand in presenting the JDP as the only capable protector of 
the conservative-religious sectors of society against the assaults of the secularist 
establishment and the elite (Çınar, 2013: 46). Thus, by reframing and presenting secularist 
critiques as a threat to the religious, conservative sectors, the JDP elite reminded its 
electorate that its survival in power was vital for the interests and survival of the Islamic 
identity in the cultural, intellectual and economic realms (Çınar, 2013: 45). This defined 
the character of “survival politics” (Çınar, 2013: 45) as a primary component of the JDP’s 
discursive strategy. Hence, as one of my interviewees underlined, conservative-religious 
(muhafazakar-mütedeyyin) segments of society always had this fear that if the JDP fell 
from power, they would be treated unjustly (Interviewee 20 2014, February 26). As noted 
by Duran, “the politics of controlled tension [Duran’s emphasis] and Erdoğan’s superior 
performance in manipulating public debate allowed the AK Party [JDP] to effective ly 
take advantage of these polarizations and to solidify popular support” (Duran, 2013: 102).  
In this section, I underlined the fact that, in the absence of widely available redistributive 
strategies for elections, the JDP elite invested heavily in emotional-discursive techniques 
in order to protect its share of the electorate. In order to do this, the JDP elite depicted the 
party as the only true representative and the protector of the downtrodden and 
conservative majority against the allegedly “elite” secularist opposition of the country. 
Erdoğan’s tension-increasing interventions in politics had a special role in this 
propaganda method.  
5.4 Communication strategy: “strong organization” and the pro-JDP media 
The JDP strategy with regards to organizational dynamics and electoral propaganda was 
also complemented and supported by its communication instruments. In this section I 
give a detailed picture of the two-fold communication strategy of the JDP. On the one 
hand, the JDP had the advantage of having a “strong organization”. This is to say that, 
from the practical point of view of the JDP elite, the party was organized at the 
neighbourhood level and had large numbers of motivated and qualified members 
(Şentürk, 2008a: 21). On the other hand, the JDP leadership also supported the efforts of 
its large and pervasive membership organization with the construction of a decisively pro-
JDP media. These complementary aspects of the JDP’s communication activity 




5.4.1 “Strong organization” 
As will be illustrated in detail in the next chapter, the JDP had a highly developed 
organization with large numbers of members organized even in the smallest corners of 
the country. In this section I focus firstly on the uses of the JDP’s large and pervasive 
membership organization as an effective communication channel.23 As illustrated by the 
study of Çaha and Guida (2011) on the campaigning activities of the JDP and the 
Republican People’s Party in the 2009 local elections, the JDP had a clear superiority 
over other parties in preparing and motivating its organization for party activity on the 
ground through education (2011: 66). In my fieldwork, too, my questions about the 
educational activities of the JDP were usually met with an emphasis on the education of 
members on electoral issues (Interviewee 7 2014, January 15). An examination of the 
official JDP publication, Turkey Bulletin (Türkiye Bülteni), also revealed the prominence 
of topics on electoral affairs in the party’s education activities. In addition to highly 
educated members on electoral affairs, the JDP also had a very pervasive organiza t ion 
which extended to villages and neighbourhoods (Çaha & Guida, 2011: 66).  
According to Çaha and Guida’s observation on the eve of the 2009 local elections, other 
parties were lacking an organization like the JDP’s, which was not only active during the 
elections but during in other periods, as well. Indeed, as one of my interviewees 
underlined, the JDP had a sensitivity towards keeping party organizations active even 
during the regular periods when there was no election approaching: “you know the 
expression: ‘you come only around election time’. […] We are going to every door lest 
people think that we only go for elections. […] This is the impression we had from the 
previous era” (Interviewee 10 2014, January 18). According to Çaha and Guida, the JDP 
constantly kept its organizations active through education activities and the periodic and 
routine activities imposed on the provincial, sub-provincial, neighbourhood and village 
organizations of the party (2011: 67).   
According to Şentürk, a former JDP executive from İstanbul, “despite a shorter 
institutional history and a mass party base, the JDP members have a stronger loyalty to 
the party. Because the party has a strong and active organization, and a large and active 
party organization enhances the loyalty of the members” (2008: 287). Indeed, the 
observations of Çaha and Guida in the 2009 elections were in line with Şentürk’s 
                                                                 





statement: “In the Republican People’s Party there was a scattered mass and a limited 
number of volunteers who had no belief in the leadership, whereas in the JDP there was 
an army of volunteers who were disciplined and hardworking and also work with a sense 
of duty and mission and who sanctified the leadership of the party” (2011: 72). One 
should also bring the robust and hardworking women’s branches of the JDP into the 
picture. According to Çaha and Guida, for example, in Küçükçekmece, a sub-province of 
İstanbul, the JDP was able to mobilise a large army of volunteers consisting of youth and 
women. In line with my findings on the vitality of the women’s branch of the party, Çaha 
and Guida argued that the JDP derived most of its dynamism from the work of young 
people and women (2011: 103). 
5.4.1.1 Face-to-face interaction 
The first contribution of such a pervasive and effective organization to the JDP was the 
leverage that it provided to the party for face-to-face interaction with the electorate. The 
JDP elite always considered face-to-face interaction as the most important method for 
reaching the electorate and this situation should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric. 
According to Şentürk, a former JDP executive from İstanbul, the most important 
instrument of communication is face-to-face interaction because it is always more 
persuasive than other methods (2006: 119). Face-to-face interaction included house visits, 
work place visits, coffee house visits and meetings organized in private halls (Şentürk 
2006: 154). Indeed, as Çaha and Guida (2011) observed in the 2009 local elections, the 
party took face-to-face interaction seriously in its electoral campaigns. For instance, the 
JDP candidate for the mayoralty in one of the central sub-provinces (Üsküdar) in İstanbul 
told researchers that he relied heavily on the strategy of “warm contact” (sıcak temas) 
with the electorate (Çaha & Guida, 2011: 113).  
One of the strategic assumptions of the JDP elite which led them to take face-to-face 
interaction seriously was the predominance of oral culture in Turkish society: 
In societies where oral culture is predominant and which are 
characterized by a low degree of reading habits, the strength of party 
organizations gain a special significance. Parties with a strong and 
active organization are able to send their message to the electorate 
through one-to-one communication established by its members. […] 
Today the JDP runs its campaigns with its strong organizationa l 
structure. […] The JDP particularly attaches a special importance to 
women’s branches and hundreds of thousands homes have been visited 




Nevertheless, the JDP elite, members and strategists were also aware of the limitations of 
face-to-face activity. According to one of my interviewees, face-to-face interaction 
became less and less effective because of the change of information technologies and the 
rise of the social media: “soon we might not find any people on the streets to shake their 
hands” (Interviewee 38 2014, April 25). On the other hand, one of the vice-chairs of the 
party’s İstanbul branch also told me that they saw professional campaigns and 
conventional face-to-face interaction as complementing each other (Interviewee 11 2014, 
January 22). Therefore, the JDP had a hybrid approach to campaign techniques which 
blended capital and labour intensive strategies (also see Table 5.1). 
The contribution of face-to-face interaction should not be understood only in the context 
of immediate electoral benefits. It seems that the importance attached to face-to-face 
interaction also had something to do with the desire of the JDP elite to keep party 
organizations active and alive with electoral work even in the periods when there was no 
election approaching. In addition, an active membership organization that visited the 
electorate and worked in the field motivated party members and supporters as well as 
provided crucial visibility to the JDP in elections. One should also underline the practical 
importance of “strong organizations” in providing ballot box safety. As one of my 
experienced interviewees underlined, one of the primary roles of party organizations in 
Turkey was to protect the ballot boxes on election days from potential fraud (Interviewee 
17 2014, February 25).24  
In this sense too, the JDP had a clear advantage. In the 2014 local election in Ankara, for 
example, the Republican People’s Party organizations were quite unsuccessful at 
providing ballot box records, which were necessary for appeals against disputed election 
results. An interview with one of the leading figures of a neutral civil organization for 
observing the elections highlighted this superiority of the JDP organization. According to 
Ayberk Yağız, “the Republican People’s Party organization was in such bad condition 
[on the election day of the 2014 local elections] that we thought that there was a 
conspiracy behind this. We had to collect ballot box records from the Nationalist Action 
Party and the Great Union Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi) independently from the Republican 
People’s Party organizations. People did not enter results and the Republican People’s 
                                                                 
24 It was really striking to see that this particular interviewee, a top Motherland Party politician, had a very 
limited perspective on the importance of membership organizations and evaluated its role simply as a tool 
for safeguarding ballot boxes in election days. This was emblematic of the perspective which caused the 




Party’s [online] system was down.  Therefore they searched ballot box records through 
the internet. […] The most well-organized party was the JDP. They had at least one 
representative per ballot box, and there were people who were serving tea and food in the 
breaks. In the afternoon, other people came as replacements. While the ballot box staff of 
other parties were tired, the JDP brought fresh and new people. The Nationalist Action 
Party was quite organized too. The Republican People’s Party was the worst. It had 
something to do with the general organization of the party” (Güvenç, 2014).  
5.4.1.2 Meetings 
Face-to-face interaction should not be seen only in the context of the work of junior party 
members. As one of my expert interviewees underlined, Erdoğan’s meetings and mass 
rallies of JDP should also be seen in this context (Interviewee 28 2014, April 10). For 
example, before the 2007 general elections, it was reported that Erdoğan visited 54 
provinces out of 81, whereas his closest rival, Deniz Baykal, then the chair of the 
Republican People’s Party, had only been to 31 (Hürriyet, 2007). Similarly, Erdoğan’s 
performance before the 2009 was better, too. According to a news article published a 
couple of days before the elections, Erdoğan had visited 57 provinces, whereas his closest 
rival Baykal had only visited 30 by then (Zaman, 2009). Erdoğan had also visited 68 
provinces during the 2011 election campaign (Memurlar, 2011). Before the 2014 local 
elections, Erdoğan had been to 56 provinces for meetings, although this time the 
opposition leader, the Republican People’s Party’s new leader Kılıçdaroğlu, had a better 
performance by participating in meetings in 60 provinces (Milliyet, 2014a).  
The participation numbers were also usually remarkably higher in Erdoğan’s meetings. 
For instance, for the 2011 general election in İstanbul, parties had meetings in the same 
square and the participation numbers were significantly different. According to the police 
records, while 400,000 people participated in the JDP meeting in Kazlıçeşme, the 
Republican People’s Party could attract only 82,000 people to the same square (Milliyet, 
2011). Participation in the JDP mass rally just prior to the 2014 local elections was also 
another indication of its organizational capacity. Although the numbers of participants 
had been an issue of dispute since then, during the meeting Erdoğan claimed that there 
were two million people in the meeting space (Radikal, 2014a).  
Mass rallies provided a remarkable visibility for the JDP. It is also plausible to argue that, 




keeping party organizations active given the demanding work for “filling the meeting 
space”. As one of my interviewees, an expert academic on the centre-right, underlined, 
one of the reasons why Erdoğan organized this meeting was to revitalise the party 
branches: “When the Prime Minister will be coming there, [for example], the Kayseri 
branch of the party will start to work a week before” (Interviewee 28 2014, April 10). The 
organizational workload for the meetings also enhanced the hierarchical cohesion and 
solidarity of the party. Central decisions of organizing mass rallies in any part of the 
country started a chain reaction that went all the way down from the headquarters to the 
neighbourhood branches. The plans prepared by the headquarters were realized by the 
work of the subordinated segments of the party. For example, for a meeting in İstanbul, 
the party headquarters in Ankara asks the provincial party branch to organize the meeting 
and the provincial party branch asks the sub-provincial branches to call as many people 
as possible from their own regions. Sub-provincial party branches also pushs 
neighbourhood representatives under their control to call as many people as possible from 
their neighbourhoods.  
Apart from that, it also seems that Erdoğan had a special appetite for meetings, and he 
found refuge in mass rallies during the political crises that the JDP encountered. As one 
of my expert interviewees underlined, mass rallies had a therapeutic effect on Erdoğan 
(Interviewee 28 2014, April 10). For instance, as a response to the summer 2013 mass 
protest movements in Gezi Park in İstanbul, the JDP organized two mass meetings in 
Ankara and İstanbul under the title of “respect for the national will” (AA, 2013). One 
should also note that Erdoğan was always present at these meetings, which were 
organized around his personality. It should also be underlined that Erdoğan was always a 
remarkable orator and the texts of his speeches were written by talented propagandists. 
The JDP’s use of mass rallies constructed around the presence of Erdoğan should also be 
seen as a dimension of the party’s personalistic communication style (Interviewee 49 
2014, May 8).  
Lastly, it should also be highlighted that the “strong organization” had a meaning beyond 
electoral purposes for the JDP elite and, as elaborated upon in previous chapters, it was 
also seen as as a power base and/or a mobilizational resource by the [formerly Islamis t] 
party elite against potential threats by the powerful non-party political actors in the 
country, such as the military, the judicidary and the bureaucracy, as well as against social 




conflict in the country elaborated upon in previous chapters (particularly in Chapters 2 
and 3) were other factors making a year-round, large and pervasive organiza t ion 
indispensable for the JDP elite. 
5.4.2 The pro-JDP media 
Relying only on the JDP organization was not felt to be sufficient by the JDP leadership 
and this was why the party started to construct a strong and decisively pro-JDP media. 
One would think that it would be misleading to call a part of the media pro-JDP. 
Nevertheless, it makes sense since the people in the executive positions of these media 
channels had no problem with being affiliated with the party. A former chief editor of the 
pro-JDP daily newspaper Star explicitly underlined the necessity of having a media for 
the 50%, which apparently denoted the vote share of the JDP (Karaalioğlu, 2014).  
Hence it is safe to talk about a pro-JDP media consisting of at least five highly influentia l 
and strongly pro-JDP newspapers such as Sabah, Türkiye, Star, Yenişafak, Akşam besides 
minor ones such as Yeni Akit and Milat. According to the figures of the official Press 
Notification Institution (Basın İlan Kurumu), the total circulation rate per day of the 
abovementioned newspapers at the time of writing was close to one million.25 One should 
also mention the appointments of pro-JDP columnists to mainstream newspapers such as 
Hürriyet and Habertürk as another instrument of the JDP’s grip over the media. It is also 
known that Erdoğan, in person, directly tried to control the news through his relationship 
with media bosses (Radikal, 2014b). There were also several pro-JDP TV channels 
broadcasting nationally such as 24, Ülke TV, Beyaz TV, TGRT, A Haber, ATV and Kanal 
7 besides many local newspapers and TV channels under the control of the local and 
provincial JDP elite. One should also add the unprecedented tight control over the offic ia l 
Turkish Radio Television (Türkiye Radyo Televizyonu) to the picture. 
One of my expert interviewees underlined the importance of media control for the JDP 
through a very illustrative comparison between the politics of the 1990s and the JDP. This 
quotation is rather important since it also underlined a couple of important features of 
political conflicts in Turkey, most notably the deep involvement of non-party actors in 
party politics:  
Tayyip Erdoğan realized how important the support of the media was 
for his survival in power and therefore he created his own media. [...] 
                                                                 





In the past the Motherland Party [and] the True Path Party tried to keep 
the mainstream media under their control through granting them 
priviliges in state contracts. But it was a very risky strategy. We saw 
this in the example of Aydın Doğan [most influential media boss of the 
country]. [...] The True Path Party period was a clear example of this. 
[...] I think somehow Berlusconi was a source of inspiration for him 
[Erdoğan] in this sense. [...] For instance, Erbakan, in the Welfare Party 
period, did not use a similar strategy. He thought that Milli Gazete alone 
would be sufficient. This was a huge mistake. [...] At that time, during 
the Motherland Party period, Aydın Doğan had such an enormous 
influence on politics that he could push governments to change 
ministers. [...] For instance, Aydın Doğan waged war [through his 
newspapers] against the minister of internal affairs of the era, Saadettin 
Tantan, because of his words over Dış Bank. [...] And the Motherland 
Party had to change him. [...] For the sake of this media power 
Motherland Party sacrificed him (Interviewee 39 2014, May 2). 
Another interviewee from the JDP also had similar observations. According to him, 
without the pro-JDP media created by the support of pro-government business circles, the 
JDP could have been crushed by the powerful non-party actors such as the military and 
bureaucratic elite (Interviewee 7 2014, January 15). Hence it seems that the former media 
order in Turkey, and its influence on Turkish politics throughout 1990s, led the JDP elite 
to construct their own media. The JDP elite strategically learned lessons from the politica l 
failures of former centre-right parties and the Islamist National View parties that had 
partially stemmed from the lack of a full grip over the media.  
According to a news report based on the leaked audio recordings of some businessmen 
and government members, the JDP leadership actively collected money from 
businessmen into a “pool” in return for some privileges in state bids in order to buy and 
run two highly influential newspapers and a TV channel as pro-JDP instruments (Zaman, 
2014).  Thus, the JDP managed to create an effective pro-JDP media, ironically enough 
at the cost of its newspapers and TV channels being referred to by opponents of the party 
as the “government bulletin” (hükümet bülteni), “partisan media” (yandaş medya) and 
“pool media” (havuz medyası). Lastly, it should be mentioned that the pro-JDP media did 
not only contribute to the JDP’s visibility and electoral campaigns, but also played a vital 
role in the manipulation of the public opinion by the interventions of party leader 
Erdoğan. Without the support of the pro-JDP media, the political crises that the party 
encountered would definitely have left much deeper wounds in the JDP organization.  
In this section I have illustrated how, on the one hand, a large, pervasive and a year-round 




in the party’s communication activities and in its electoral campaigns. While the efforts 
of this large and pervasive membership organization provided an upper hand to the party 
for face-to-face interaction with the electorate and for ensuring the safety of ballot boxes 
on election days, the pro-JDP media also supported the activities of this massive 
membership organization and helped party leader Erdoğan to easily manipulate public 
opinion. As a result, I underlined the importance of the combination of these two 
communication instruments for increasing the visibility of the party, reaching large 
numbers of voters and influencing public opinion for the JDP’s electoral benefit.  
5.5 Conclusion: the JDP and its rightist predecessors 
The electoral achievements of the JDP were much more enduring than previous rightist 
and centre-right parties in Turkey. While the Democrat Party rule between 1950 and 1960 
was marked with a steady decline of the party’s votes, the ruling Motherland Party of the 
1980s also started to lose momentum at the beginning of the 1990s. In addition, the votes 
of the Islamist National View parties started to decline after reaching their peak in the 
mid-1990s. In contrast, the JDP increased its votes in almost every election between 2002 
and 2014 and remained in power as the single-party majority government. The discussion 
in this chapter has pointed out a couple of distinguishing features with regards to 
organizational dynamics, electoral tactics and communication strategies which, together, 
contributed to the JDP’s unprecedented electoral predominance as well as politica l 
resilience in Turkish political history. 
First of all, previous centre-right parties in Turkey usually depended heavily on highly 
redistributive strategies such as classical patronage and clientelism for party cohesion as 
well as for vote maximization. Hence, the role of selective incentives had played a major 
role in those parties’ survival and electoral achievements. Unlike those parties, thanks to 
its Islamist National View past, the JDP leadership also attached great importance to the 
role of collective incentives. In order to consolidate its rank-and-file and its electoral base 
it frequenly appealed to a tension-increasing discourse in which Turkish politics was 
depicted as a struggle between the JDP, the representative of the conservative 
downtrodden peripheral masses, and the allegedly “elite” secularist opposition.  
Secondly, although previous centre-right parties had robust membership organizations, 
their elite usually viewed the role of ‘membership organization’ from a very limited 




membership parties’ efforts, those centre-right parties mostly depended on the support of 
local elites, religious communities and tribal leaders in order to protect their electoral 
bases. In addition, the Motherland Party in particular tended to rely on professiona l 
campaigning and gave up being interested in the membership party at the beginning of 
1990s. Hence, the membership party lost its significance for those parties and their 
leadership had to further compromise with particularistic interest groups outside the party. 
Unlike these parties, the JDP elite attached great importance to the membership party and 
relied on its effort in extracting votes from local constituencies through individua l 
interactions with the electorate, in addition to the effective use of a highly developed pro-
JDP media. This increased the party’s autonomy vis-a-vis local and national power 
holders outside the organization.  
Last but not the least, although the predecessors of the JDP were very centralized centre-
right parties, historical evidence also showed that there was a much more tolerant 
intraparty atmosphere in those parties. Unlike the JDP, those parties’ mode of 
centralization created space for the accumulation of power in the hands of local and 
national elites other than the leadership. Hence, despite the influence of the leadership in 
those parties, they also had to struggle with various local and national power holders. 
Unlike previous centre-right parties, the JDP elite embraced a much more disciplined yet 
consensual intraparty political conduct (delineated in the next chapter) and carefully 
inhibited the accumulation of power in the hands of local and national elites other than 
the party leadership. All these organizational dynamics and electoral strategies depended 
on the autonomy of the leadership and the party and, under the circumstances of the 
diminishing effectiveness of classical patronage, provided better grounds for the 
implementation of technocratic policies. Better government performance,26 in turn, also 
increased the party’s lasting electoral support. In the following chapter, I elaborate upon 
the organizational architecture on which the strategic approach of the JDP outlined in this 
chapter has been constructed.  
                                                                 
26  When I mention goverment performance, except for the increase in the GDP and the decrease in 
consumer price inflation, I am not referring to the objective and real achievements of the JDP governments . 
Illustrating the government’s performance in those senses would require a different research agenda and 
method. Instead, I am referring to the perception of the government’s performance. In line with this 
position, relying on statistical analysis, Gidengil and Karakoç’s (2014) study on the reasons for the JDP’s  
success illustrated that the party owed its electoral achievements to a large extent to the perception of the 
majority of the people that the party’s  government performance was successful regarding issues such as the 




6 The JDP ORGANIZATION: a PERSONALISTIC MEMBERSHIP PARTY 
 
6.1 Introduction  
According to records, in 2013 the Justice and Development Party (JDP – Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi) had almost eight million members (Milliyet, 2013). These members, 
coming from distinct backgrounds, were channelled by the party to the ballot boxes along 
with their friends and relatives by the thousands of party branches that penetrated into 
even the smallest corners of the country, each of which was kept under the control of the 
central JDP elite. When the numerous political crises that the JDP had encountered since 
its foundation are taken into account, the resilience and electoral predominance of such 
an enormous organization seems puzzling. How was the central JDP elite able to keep 
this massive membership organization under its control and successfully deploy it for 
electoral success?  
In this chapter I propose that three practical organizational factors were central to the 
electoral achievements and the political resilience of the JDP. First, the JDP had a year-
round active, very large and pervasive membership organization. Second, the JDP 
leadership exerted very tight control over this massive membership organization. Third, 
the JDP elite also paid great attention to the “controlled participation” of the party base 
in order to absorb potential dissent against this firm control. These organizational factors 
have led me to identify the JDP as a “personalistic membership party”. 
In this chapter, before focusing on the JDP organization, I first take a closer look at 
theories on party typologies in section two. In this literature I paid particularly close 
attention to studies by Duverger (1974) and Epstein (2000), which focused on the 
relationships between organizational structures and changes in the electoral market. This 
literature led me to understand the organizational dynamics of the JDP as a specific 
response to the electoral market and to the broader political conflict in the country, rather 
than an institutional unfolding of a genetic origin, as did Panebianco in his approach 
(1988). Hence, one of the presumptions in this chapter, and throughout the dissertation, 
is that the organizational model of the JDP was directly connected to the party’s electoral 
achievements. I consolidate the theoretical assumption expanded upon in section two with 




These rather theoretical considerations surrounding the case of the JDP also justify the 
necessity of having a relational perspective for understanding the organizationa l 
dynamics’ contributions to the party’s electoral achievements and political resilience. In 
other words, neither a perspective exclusively focusing on the high echelons of the party 
– the party central office and the party in public office – nor an approach solely focusing 
on the grass roots would give a comprehensive understanding of the contribution of 
organizational dynamics to the JDP’s electoral success. Instead, I preferred to focus on 
the relationship between these two faces of the party, both of which are central in the 
electoral processes: the party central office (and more precisely the party leadership) and 
the party on the ground (the massive membership of the JDP). While the latter was an 
extremely important nexus for the JDP in reaching out to the electorate, the former was 
key to the identification of the electoral and organizational strategies of the JDP,1 and the 
mode of relationship between these two faces was central to the party’s lasting electoral 
success and political resilience. 
In section four, I briefly describe the legal framework relevant to the JDP organiza t ion 
such as the Law on Political Parties (SPK - Siyasi Partiler Kanunu) and the JDP statutes. 
In this section I also give an overview of the formal organizational structure of the party: 
its territorial dispersion, the party’s local presence, and its membership structure. In 
section five and six I illustrate the kind of instruments through which the JDP elite exerted 
a tight control over this massive party base without causing discontent amongst party 
activists. After this empirical exposition, I evaluate the JDP organization from a broader 
theoretical perspective in section seven, and I argue that the JDP organization represented 
a hybrid party, or more precisely a “personalistic membership party”, with regards to ideal 
typical models of the “mass-based” and “elite-based” models discussed in section two. 
This situation also demonstrated that, in certain aspects, the mass party model still has 
been shaping party organizations, particularly in the developing world.2 
                                                                 
1 See Kumbaracıbaşı for the importance of the Central Decision and Administration Board of the party in 
the policy making processes (2009: 133). 
2 I use the term “developing world" for referring to a context where liberal democratic architecture is 
considerably weak and socio-economic development (as we saw in advanced industrial countries), which 
gave rise to a certain party organizational development in Western democracies , remained far from being 
complete. In these contexts, political systems are usually labelled as competitive authoritarianism, electoral 
democracy or hybrid regimes. But the term “developing world” indicates wider circumstances  that include 
socio-economic and socio-cultural features. For a discussion of the term and consideration of Turkey as an 
upper-middle-income developing country, see Calvert & Calvert (2014). The world systems analysis was 
also one of the approaches behind my understanding of the socio-economic conditions of the party politics 




6.2 Concepts and theories on organizational models: a view from the periphery 
This analysis of the JDP organization mainly focuses on the complex relationships 
between the membership organization of the JDP and its central office.3 The analys is, 
both in this chapter and throughout the dissertation, has mostly excluded the discussion 
regarding the party’s position in the public office vis-a-vis party on the ground and within 
the central office. I benefitted greatly from Levitsky’s (2003) account in terms of my main 
approach to the fieldwork, which puts a special emphasis on the relationship between the 
various levels of a party’s organization. In addition, I see parties “as clusters of 
relationships rather than as unitary ‘black boxes’” (Massicard & Watts, 2013: 4).  
In this analysis I have used several conceptual tools derived from the literature on party 
organization. I use the concept of centralism to refer to the domination of the party’s 
central office over the party’s units on the ground and to the lack of any meaningful power 
placed in the hands of these subordinate units (Duverger, 1974: 94). The JDP centralism 
and their organizational mechanics also worked in favour of “leadership autonomy”, and 
did not allow the formation of other strong power foci inside the party. Following the 
perspective of Levitsky (2003), I define “leadership autonomy” as the party leader having 
a great degree of flexibility and room for manoeuvre in quick decision-making without 
needing approval from competing individual or collective power holders within the party. 
A related concept here is that of “party autonomy” and, following Panebianco (1988: 56–
57), I define the term as the exclusion of politically salient actors outside the party – 
whether national or local, collective or individual – from the decision-making processes, 
drawing neat boundaries between the party and the wider environment surrounding it.  
I also draw on the literature on party typologies to develop a comprehensive view of the 
JDP organization. Since this research aims to explain the relationship between the 
electoral success of the JDP and its organizational dynamics, it adapted an “electoral 
competition approach” rather than an “institutional” or “sociological” approach to the 
party typologies and organizations (Ware, 1996: 92–112). This is to say that my main 
understanding of party typologies is based heavily on the approaches of Duverger (1974) 
and Epstein (2000) and, more recently, literature which followed the discussions 
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developed by these scholars that understands party organizational development mainly as 
a response to changes in electoral markets.  
Although the literature on party typologies is a very rich one, it is possible to define a 
basic distinction that is present, either implicitly or explicitly, in the majority of the works. 
This distinction is between “elite-based” (cadre, catch-all, electoral-professional and 
cartel) and “mass-based” (mass party) models.4 One of the sources of this distinction, not 
surprisingly, is the seminal work of Duverger (1974). In his work on political parties 
published in the early 1950s, Duverger (1974) differentiated the “committee” or “caucus” 
organization of the “elites” from the “branch” organizations of the “working classes”. 
Duverger associated the committee or caucus organization with cadre parties and the 
branch organization with mass parties (1974: 114). According to him, the difference 
between these two parties was related to a structural quality rather than the quantity of 
their members (1974: 106). To Duverger, mass parties were distinguished from the cadre 
parties with the importance attached to the local presence5 of the party and the regularity-
permanence of the party activities as well as the centrality of indoctrination and education 
of party members (1974: 60). Another distinguishing point of the mass party that 
Duverger pointed out was the importance of the financial contributions of ordinary 
members in this kind of organizational structure (1974: 107). In contrast, cadre parties 
depended on the financial means of limited interest groups as well as on technicians who 
know how to run campaigns (Duverger, 1974: 107). According to Duverger, electoral 
achievements of mass parties led many elite-based parties to adopt the organizations of 
mass parties and started a process of “contagion” from the left (1974: 61–62).  
More than a decade after Duverger, as a result of the rise of television and the social 
transformations that started to dissolve the class bases of the mass parties in Western 
democracies, Epstein argued that the mass party was not the rule but the exception with 
regards to party organizational change (2000: 100). According to Epstein, the golden age 
of the mass parties was a very short period during the 1950s (2000: 251), which was 
followed by the rise of “Americanization” or “heavily financed mass media campaigns” 
(2000: 257). Epstein contended that social and technological transformations triggered 
counter-organizational tendencies, and therefore a process of “contagion from the right” 
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(2000: 260), where active members of the parties started to be seen as liabilities more 
than assets (2000: 258). Epstein even tended to see these counter-organizational trends as 
the future of the political party (2000: 260). 
These two main analyses of the party organizational typologies gave the main lines of 
two ideal typical party models and two main strategic inclinations: a mass-based approach 
depending on tight control over a massive membership organization, and an elite-based 
one depending on mass communication, centralized finance, campaign technicians and 
professionals. Relatively recent literature has also confirmed this distinction between 
mass parties and more modern elite parties that relied on technological instruments 
instead of a massive membership organization. For instance, Panebianco differentiated 
the “mass bureaucratic party” from the “electoral-professional party” and pointed out the 
decline of the classe gardee, or the particular, insulated social segments in which parties 
took root as the main reason for the decline of the mass party (1988: 263). According to 
Panebianco, electoral-professional parties were distinguished from the mass parties by 
the importance they attached to campaign professionals and experts instead of the party 
bureaucracy (1988: 264). Electoral-professional parties targeted the “opinion electorates” 
while mass parties were based on the “electorates of belonging” (Panebianco 1988: 264). 
While mass parties depended on the sources created by members, electoral-professiona l 
parties depended on financial means provided by interest groups and the state 
(Panebianco, 1988: 264). Panebianco also pointed out the central role of ideologies in 
mass parties, whereas the emphasis shifted to leaders’ competence and managerial issues 
in electoral-professional parties (1988: 264).  
Other contributions to the party organizations’ literature usually followed this main 
distinction and elaborated on the features of the mass-based and elite-based parties in line 
with Duverger (1974). According to Kirchheimer, for instance, the “mass integrat ion 
party” was aimed at the “intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses” (1966: 184). 
There was a strong tendency in the literature to define the mass party model through the 
size and structure of its membership organization as well as the ideological-programmatic 
convictions of the party elite and members. In contrast, the catch-all party, or the elite-
based parties in general, have been defined by the decline of the party’s “ideologica l 
baggage”, the “strengthening of the top leadership groups” and the “decline of the role of 
individual members” (Kirchheimer, 1966: 190), which were compensated for by the 




use of mass media and technology to connect the party leadership directly to the electorate 
(Katz & Mair, 1993: 615). Political marketing techniques, such as the frequent use of 
public opinion surveys, were also at the heart of catch-all strategies and elite-based parties 
in general (Scammell. 1999: 726–734).  
As the works of Katz and Mair (1995; 1996; 2002; 2009), Mair (1992) and Blyth and 
Katz (2005) illustrate, more contemporary studies tended to introduce more sophisticated 
distinctions than the one between elite-based (cadre and catch-all) and mass-based (mass 
party) parties. For instance, Katz and Mair differentiated between the catch-all party and 
what they described as the “cartel party” (1995). According to them, the catch-all party 
had been a short-lived phenomenon that emerged after the historical achievements of the 
mass party such as the improvement of the conditions of the working classes through 
generous welfare regimes established under mass party rules (Katz & Mair, 1995: 12). 
The dissolution of the class bases of mass parties under these improved social and 
economic conditions led political parties in Western democracies to target a more 
heteregenous electorate than before, “an electorate made up of voters who were learning 
to behave more like consumers than active participants” (Katz & Mair, 1995: 7). 
According to Blyth and Katz, the catch-all parties were creatures of the Keynesian 
economies (2005: 42) and as they increased promotion of public goods in order to appeal 
to a heteregenous electorate they reached certain fiscal limits and created apathy towards 
party politics (2005: 40). Hence, the catch-all model was replaced by the cartel party as 
parties in Western democracies moved closer to the state and started to depend on public 
resources increasingly (Katz & Mair, 1995).  
Meanwhile, parties started to invest less and less in the party on the ground or membership 
parties (Mair 1992: 4–5). According to Katz, the fall of the mass party and the rise of 
increasingly elite-based catch-all or cartel parties required the “de-activation of activist 
members” within the parties.6 Another important feature of the cartel party for Katz and 
Mair was that they established “stratarchical” connections with (what was left of) the 
party on the ground instead of creating hierarchical-vertical ties (2002: 129).7 Katz and 
Mair also underlined the importance of professionalized and capital-intensive campaigns 
for the cartel party model (2009: 755). Hence, according to Katz and Mair, for parties in 
                                                                 
6  Katz, Richard. “Political Parties and Democracy”. ECPR Summer School on Political Parties and 
Democracy, Leuphana University of Luneburg, Germany. 9 Sept. 2013. Lecture. 




Western Democracies, being in government has become extremely crucial for the 
organizational survival and, hence, party systems dominated by cartels started to make it 
as hard as possible for other parties to gain prominence. This was the point at which the 
term “cartel” became crucial and the label of “cartel parties” mainly underlined the 
collision – or proximity – between main parties in terms of policies and organizations in 
a given party system (Katz & Mair, 1995: 17). Despite the theoretical elegance of Katz 
and Mair’s studies (particularly the one published in 1995), as Koole underlined later, the 
cartel party model used a systemic property to identify individual parties (1996: 508). 
Another criticism was that the distinction made by Katz and Mair between the state and 
society was far from grasping the blurred boundaries between the two (Koole, 1996: 513). 
Apart from these general theoretical concerns about the concept, one of the main 
problems with these theoretical sophistications in the recent literature was that, from the 
perspective of the particular case of the JDP, and from the perspective of party politics in 
the developing world in general, these discussions on the nuances between various types 
of elite-based parties did not address the uneven socio-economic developments (the 
weakness of the welfare regimes and the much slower development of communica t ion 
and technological infrastructures) outside the Western liberal democratic contexts. 
Furthermore, the cartel party hypothesis presumed orderly and legitimate alternation of 
power among parties of the cartel, but this simple condition was usually lacking in many 
electoral democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes in the developing world where 
political developments were interrupted with coups, revolutions, insurgencies and states 
of emergency. Hence, the cartel party hypothesis assumed a basic political regime 
stability with peaceful alternation in power, historically based on the dissolution of the 
working classes as an outcome of the achievements of a once robust welfare state.  
Hence, in the context of Western liberal democracies, functions of party organiza t ion 
could easily be restricted to the electoral processes, and therefore it would be plausible to 
assume the fall of the party on the ground and “warm bodies” (Mair, 1992: 15), the decline 
of the party central office, and the rise of the party in public office since nationalized, 
professionalized campaigns backed by state resources would be sufficient to secure 
remaining in power. But when party politics and electoral politics are perceived as a game 
played by powerful and politicized non-party actors such as armies, powerful judicial and 
bureaucratic elites, and allegedly mainstream but deeply partisan media groups who 




organizations should be considered something more than a professional player in an 
ordinary game of electoral politics. In these kinds of circumstances, it is better to 
understand mobilizational functions of party organizations as “power capabilit ies” 
available to “power contenders”.8  
As Roberts (2006: 137) underlined in the context of Latin America, the deeper the 
political conflict between a party and its opponents – whether other political parties or 
non-party politicized veto players – parties tend to have more solid organizations. After 
all, in such circumstances, “followers not only vote; they may be called upon to mobilize 
for rallies and demonstrations, participate in strikes and occupations, or even take up arms 
to defend their leader in times of peril” (2006: 137).9 Under the conditions of uneven 
socio-economic development – including a weak welfare regime and lack of state 
capacity to fulfill some of the social policy responsibilities as well as the slower 
development of communication and technological infrastructure – mass-based 
organizations did not only provide superior mobilizational capacities to leaders, but they 
also undertook crucial roles for distributing aid in cash or kind to the low-income 
segments of the electorate by providing “warm bodies”. This canvassing and pork-barrel 
function of party organizations made an invaluable contribution to the electoral fortunes 
of parties in the developing world. This is also to say that at least some of the traits of the 
mass party model were highly relevant for many parties outside the Western liberal 
democracies, and particularly in the context of electoral democracies or competitive 
authoritarianisms. Hence, the need to “foster a presence on the ground” for these parties 
was not simply due “to the legacy of the past and to the inheritance of earlier models” 
(Katz & Mair, 2002: 127), but emerged as a real necessity which deeply influenced the 
electoral and political resilience of parties outside the Western liberal democracies. 
One of the main concerns regarding the cartel party model is also the fact that the 
depiction of the party organizational change in Katz and Mair’s approach implic it ly 
                                                                 
8 For the terms “power capabilities” and “power contenders”, see Anderson (1967: 91).  
9 Here some evidence comes from the case I know best. During the massive street protests against the JDP 
government in the summer of 2013, one of Erdoğan’s  first reactions to protesters’ occupation of the Gezi 
Park in Taksim was to threaten them with mobilizing his supporters – the 50%. During negotiations with 
the representatives of protestors , Erdoğan told them that, “At the moment we hardly keep the 50% of this 
country’s people at their homes. We tell them to be patient and do not be provoked by these tricks” 
(Hürriyet, 2013b). Not surprisingly, in the middle of June 2013, and approximately two weeks after the 
protests started in İstanbul, Ankara and other parts of the country, Erdoğan held two mass rallies in Ankara 
and İstanbul under the title “Respect for National Will” (AA, 2013). The resilience of the JDP elite against 
the sytemic veto players in Turkey described in Chapter 2 also had something to the with the mobilizational 




envisaged an irreversible development towards the cartel model. 10  In other words, 
according to Katz and Mair, the mass party model has become obsolete, a thing of the 
past “at least across Europe” (2009: 760). However, the social and technologica l 
transformations which led to the decline of mass parties and the rise of elite-based parties 
have not been as complete in the developing world as they were in Western liberal 
democratic systems. Although the rise of television and other mass communica t ion 
technologies was a global phenomenon, in vast areas across the world the degree of 
technological development remained highly uneven, and therefore tightly controlled 
membership parties remained as highly effective linkages between parties and electorates. 
This is to say that while some social segments in these kinds of political settings could be 
easily reached by television, mass media or the internet, to reach certain low-income 
segments of these societies required the presence of robust organizational leverages with 
strong vertical ties – more precisely, a mass-based organizational strategy. Hence, it is 
more plausible to expect to see in the majority of the countries outside the Western liberal 
democratic settings a move towards the hybridization of party models instead of an 
irreversible trend towards the “Americanization” or “presidentialization” of party politics.  
Even in liberal Western democracies, recent studies on party organizations and party 
membership underlined the vital roles assumed by members and the party on the ground 
and the inadequacy of the exclusively elite-based strategies. According to Seyd and 
Whiteley, for example, Labour’s main mistake which led the party to a series of electoral 
failures in the second half of the twentieth century was the extensive use of centralized 
communication and campaigning (1992: 11) while ignoring an energetic grass roots 
organization. Susan Scarrow’s studies also demonstrate the crucial role played by the 
membership parties in terms of providing legitimacy and establishing contacts with the 
electorate (1996; 2000; 2014). According to Scarrow, the mass party in its origina l 
historical form as defined by Duverger and Neumann (1954; 1956) could be considered 
to be a thing of the past, as something historically exceptional (2000).  Nevertheless, 
Scarrow also drew attention to the fact that, even in Western democracies, parties were 
still organizing themselves as “membership-based organizations” (2000: 80).  
As Scarrow’s work on prominent British and German parties illustrates, even parties in 
liberal Western democracies attached great importance to building massive membership 
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organizations (1996). Hence, Scarrow identifies these parties as “membership parties” 
(1996: 20), which could be seen as something short of the original mass party model in 
terms of the party structure and ideological encapsulation of party members. However, 
Scarrow also argues that efforts of “membership parties” to enrol members and to involve 
them in year-round activities were not merely inspired by tradition; in these parties, 
leaders view members as potentially valuable electoral assets. This definition suggests 
that “indicators of strategy, not of size, will be needed in order to answer the question of 
whether membership parties are disappearing” (1996: 20). Scarrow’s works demonstrate 
the fact that, even in Western liberal democratic settings, empirical realities of party 
organizational change have been much more complicated than the irreversible trends 
envisaged by the clear-cut theoretical schemes regarding party typologies.  
Instead of the demise of a certain model and the rise of another one, what we 
overwhelmingly witnessed could be considered to be the rise of hybrid forms (Ware, 
1996: 102). Hence, despite the discussions and theoretical sophistications developed after 
Duverger and Epstein, a fundamental, ideal typical strategic distinction between elite-
based and mass-based parties remained highly useful in understanding empirical realities 
of organizational change and typologies. Nevertheless, it is enormously important to 
underline that this distinction should not be seen as a simple, nominal dichotomy. Instead, 
in line with Ware (1987; 1996), I view elite-based and mass-based party models as the 
ideal types or extreme ends of a continuum:  “two poles on a continuum, rather than with 
two sharply defined categories into which all parties have to be fitted” (Ware, 1987: 6). 
Given the theoretical discussion above I see the ideal typical elite-based and mass-based 
parties as related to the following features and locate the JDP somewhere in between these 











Table 6.1: Mass-based and elite-based parties as ideal types and the relative situation of the JDP 
Party types Mass-based Elite-based JDP: a personalistic 
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vague (Political 
marketing) 
Membership salience High Low High 
Local presence High Low High 
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Leader - Party central 
office 
Source of financial 
resources 











Permanent –  
year-round  
Professionals Not important Important Important 
Top leadership  Not visible Highly visible Highly visible 
Party bureaucracy Developed Weak Developed 
  
Source: Author’s compilation of indicators addressed in various theoretical sources discussed above 
 
6.3 Party organizations in Turkey and the novelty of the JDP  
Turkish politics has always been overwhelmingly party-based (Özbudun, 2001: 238). 
However, the literature on party politics in general, and the literature on party 
organizations in particular, remained unusually underdeveloped for decades until the rise 
of the Islamist Welfare Party11 in the middle of the 1990s on the ground of its robust 
organizational structure. Until then, only a few major studies focused on party 
organizations in Turkey.12 A pioneering work in this sense was Sayarı’s Aspects of Party 
                                                                 
11 For a brief overview of the Welfare Party and other parties mentioned in this section, see Appendices 1 
and 2. 
12 Apart from Özbudun’s studies cited in this section, exceptions to this lack of interest to party politics are 
editions by Heper & Landau (1991), Rubin & Heper (2002), Sayarı & Esmer (2002), Kabasakal’s Political 
Party Organizations in Turkey (1991) and Bektaş’s Leadership Oligarchy in the Process of 




Organization in Turkey (1976). One of the assertions of Sayarı in this article was that, 
despite the rise of new social groups in Turkey, such as working class populations in 
urban centres, party politics remained under the control of notable families (1976: 187). 
The depiction of Turkish political parties in the middle of the 1970s by Sayarı drew a 
picture in which parties were only active during the electoral campaigns and did not pay 
attention to recruiting new members (1976: 188). According to Sayarı, local party 
organizations in Turkey during the 1970s were weak (1976: 197) and, particularly in 
provinces, politics was under the control of traditional elites (1976: 198). Hence Sayarı 
argued that “in general […] Turkish parties have more in common with the cadre than 
with the mass membership model” (1976: 188). In this analysis, party politics in Turkey 
appeared mainly as a reflection of local patronage networks in relation to the import 
substitution economy and heavy dependence on patronage through state resources.  
Later major contributions to the analysis of the main characteristics of the Turkish parties 
underlined similar tendencies. Özbudun, at the very beginning of his oft-cited study, 
argued that Turkish parties were closer to the “cadre, catch-all or cartel” models than the 
“mass party” model (2000: 74). In a more up-to-date study, Özbudun (2001) also argues 
that some parties in Turkey could be considered cartel parties. He pointed out trends of 
professionalization, claims regarding managerial efficiency in the image-build ing 
processes of parties, rising importance of capital-intensive methods in electoral 
campaigns, and parties’ dependence on the state for financial resources (2001: 250).13  He 
also underlines the centrality of “personalism” and lack of issue orientation in Turkish 
parties (2000: 86). Özbudun argues that patronage and clientelism inhibited the rise of 
organizations relying on common class and group interests in Turkey (2000: 82). Yet he 
also underlines Turkey’s relatively more institutionalized parties as superior to many new 
democracies (2000: 73) along with the presence of remarkably active grass roots 
organizations of Turkish parties for electoral mobilization (2000: 84).  
Özbudun emphasizes that the organizational capacities (and grass roots presence in 
particular) of Turkish parties disappeared after the decline of the role of the state in the 
economy due to the privatization and economic liberalization processes started in the 
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(2010) and Massicard and Watts (2013). 
13 The trends mentioned by Özbudun in Turkish party politics are undeniable. Nevertheless, because of the 
reasons discussed above on the wider theoretical problems of the cartel party hypothesis , and specific 
difficulties regarding its application to the political context of the developing world , I would refrain using 




1980s (2000: 84). At the same time, during the 1980s and 1990s, Turkish parties started 
to rely more on “media appeals and image building with the help of professional public 
relations experts” (Özbudun, 2000: 84). According to Özbudun, as a result of the 
convergence of these dynamics, there was a dramatic decline in the organizationa l 
capacity of the main Turkish parties (mainly centre-right parties: the Motherland Party 
and the True Parth Party but also other parties on the left), particularly during the 1990s 
(2000: 84).14 Hence Özbudun underlines the overall organizational decline in Turkish 
parties at the end of the 1990s and argues that “Turkey seems to have made a direct leap 
from the cadre party to a catch-all or cartel party without having gone through a mass 
party phase” (2000: 99). The only exception Özbudun underlines in this sense is the 
Islamist Welfare Party in the 1990s: the predecessor of the JDP (2000: 99). Here Özbudun 
considers the connection of the Islamist Welfare Party with the urban lower classes, the 
party’s robust local presence, year-round active grass roots organization and the 
importance attached by the party elite to the political indoctrination of members as 
indicators of being a mass party (2000: 91–92). 
Despite the marked agreement on the robust organizational presence and “mass partyness” 
of the Islamist Welfare Party (White, 2002; Delibaş, 2015), the literature on the 
organizational characteristics of the JDP use various labels for it. For instance, while 
Kumbaracıbaşı identifies the party as a “modern party with traits of an electoral-
professional party” (2009: 137), Hale and Özbudun argue that the JDP approximated a 
“mass party” model (2010: 47). Although she does not use the categories of the party 
typologies, in one chapter of her study Eligür also demonstrates the robust organizationa l 
presence of the JDP which helped the party elite to reach out a heteregenous electorate 
including low-income social groups, and she identifies the JDP as a “people’s party” 
(2010: 254). This disagreement in the studies on the JDP organization could be considered 
proof of the hybrid nature of the JDP organization. In other words, the JDP organiza t ion 
should be seen as a very innovative mixture of mass-based models (its organizational past) 
and elite-based methods (its organizational present).15 Hence, as can be seen in Tables 
6.1 and 6.2, I describe the JDP as a hybrid organization, and more precisely as a 
“personalistic membership party” that blended a year-round active, pervasive, highly 
                                                                 
14 Also see Özbudun (2001) for a detailed exposition of organizational decline of Turkish parties. 
15 Also see Chapter 5 for the senses in which I tend to see the JDP as a novel force in Turkish politics. 
Besides incorporating a robust organizational network with a decisively pro -JDP media and political 
marketing techniques, the JDP also broke ties with “classical centre-right patronage” and heavy dependence 




bureaucratized, routinized and tightly controlled membership organization with a diligent 
personalistic leadership relying on capital intensive campaign methods and politica l 
marketing techniques. In the following parts of the chapter I present the empirical findings 
of my research that led me to this conclusion. 
 
Table 6.2: Islamist National View Parties and the Motherland Party: predecessors of the JDP 
Relationship 
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High High Low High 
Ideology Square Vague Vague Vague - 
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marketing 



















Local presence Strong Strong Weak Strong 





Source: Author’s own compilation of data and comments in sources cited in the section above 
 
6.4 The formal organization: a large, pervasive and year-round active 
membership organization 
In this section I briefly outline the legal framework in which the JDP’s organizationa l 
structure was formed. I also demonstrate the territorial dispersion and the membership 
structure of the party. The Law on Political Parties (SPK – Siyasi Partiler Kanunu), issued 
in 1983, regulates the structure of parties’ central, provincial and sub-provincial units. 




chairman, and other decision-making, administrative, executive and discipline organs 
(SPK, 1983: 5706). The SPK also regulated the provincial (il) and sub-provincial (ilçe) 
organizations of parties. The main organs of provincial and sub-provincial organizat ions 
are the convention, party chair and the administrative and disciplinary committees (SPK, 
1983: 5708). 
Given this highly restrictive legal framework, every political party in Turkey had a very 
similar hierarchical organization, both centrally and in the provinces and sub-provinces.16 
In this sense, the JDP was not an exception. However, since the mid-1990s, the Islamist 
National View tradition, the predecessor of the JDP, had begun developing grass roots 
units such as neighbourhood representatives, ballot box committees and women’s 
branches. Following this organizational tradition, the JDP also had neighbourhood 
representatives and ballot box committees as well as women’s and youth branches (Ak 
Parti, 2012a: 28). According to the JDP statutes, in line with the SPK, every level in the 
JDP organization consisted of the following elements: a convention, a chairman, an 
administration board, an executive board (the highest ruling organ of party branches), a 
women’s branch and a youth branch. Under the sub-provincial branches, special attention 
was paid to the neighbourhood representatives and ballot box committees (AK Parti, 
2012a: 29) through which the JDP derived its main strength.  
6.4.1 Local presence of the party 
In order to understand the hierarchical ties and territorial penetration of the party it would 
be helpful to have a closer look at a concrete example. In İstanbul, the JDP’s provinc ia l 
executive board consists of 14 people while the administration board consists of 50 people  
at the time of writing. 39 sub-provincial branches were under the control of the provinc ia l 
branch of the JDP in İstanbul. Under these sub-provincial branches one can find 
neighbourhood representatives (see Figure 6.1). The Bakırköy sub-provincial branch of 
the party in İstanbul consists of an executive board, administration board, women’s 
branch and youth’s branch. These units include 14, 17, 30 and 28 people respectively at 
the time of writing. And under the Bakırköy sub-provincial branch of the party, one can 
find 11 neighbourhood representatives.17These neighbourhood representatives (mahalle 
                                                                 
16 See Kabasakal (2014) for the illustration of this formal similarity of organizations of different parties in 
Turkey. Works by Sayarı (1976) and Özbudun (2000) also underline this similarity. Bektaş’s (1993) and 
Musil’s  (2011) studies underline the predominance of leaders and authoritarian party structures in Turkish 
parties in general. Musil’s (2011) study also points out the variance in authoritarianism in Turkish parties. 
17  These numbers can be seen on the party branch websites of İstanbul provincial and Bakırköy sub-




temsilcileri) also form ballot box administration committees (sandık yönetim kurulları), 
each consisting of nine people. For instance, in Cevizlik, a neighbourhood of İstanbul, 
Bakırköy sub-province, there are 4450 electors and 14 ballot boxes (Interviewee 27 2014, 
April 5).  
Another important thing that one should bear in mind about the JDP organization in these 
localities is that it did not inflate in the pre-election period and deflate in the rest of the 
year,18 but was a year-round active organization constantly in touch with the electorate.  
As one of my interviewees underlined, the JDP activists “wander from door-to-door” 
throughout the year “lest people think that they only come before the elections […] like 
previous parties” (Interviewee 17 2014, January 18). Even if we think that my 
interviewees from the JDP were prone to exaggerate the local presence of the JDP and 
the party’s attention to allocating people to ballot boxes, there were still other 
observations confirming that the JDP was very successful at the local level as well as at 
keeping ballot boxes under this kind of tight control, particularly on election days. Eligür, 
for example, gives vivid details about the robust local presence of the JDP and confirmed 
the superiority of the party on the ground (particularly see 2010: 259). Not surprisingly, 
Tosun and Tosun’s study also confirms the superiority of the JDP organizations in local-
provincial contexts statistically. According to their study, compared to other parties in 
Turkey, the organizational density of the JDP in the 80% of provinces in Turkey were 
much greater than other parties (2010: 55). This is to say that in the majority of the 
provinces of Turkey, the share of JDP members in total numbers of party members was 





                                                                 
18  Most of the populist-personalistic parties, and most notably the personal parties of Berlusconi, inflated 
during election periods and deflated in other times when there is no election approaching. For this see 
McDonnell (2013) and Albertazzi and McDonnel (2015). For this reason, their structures are rather different  
from permanent membership parties and they approximate the elite-based parties. In other words, while 
Berlusconi’s parties are elite-based “personal parties”, the JDP in Turkey, despite the central role of 





Table 6.3: Formal structure of the JDP organization, its hierarchy and the approximate number of 
party branches 
Numbers Branches 
1 JDP headquarters in Ankara 
Grand convention and chairman 
CEC and CDAB Main unit 
Executive committee and administration board Women’s branch  
Executive committee and administration board Youth branch 
81 Provincial branches 
Provincial convention and chair 
Executive committee and administration board Main unit 
Executive committee and administration board Women’s branch 
Executive committee and administration board Youth branch 
957* Sub-provincial branches 
Sub-provincial convention and chair 
Executive committee and administration board Main unit 
Executive committee and administration board Women’s branch 
Executive committee and administration board Youth branch 
394* District branches 
20,000* Neighbourhood administrations 
170,000* Ballot box committees 
 


















Figure 6.1: An example from İstanbul of the territorial and hierarchical relationships among 
branches in the provinces, sub-provinces and neighbourhoods 
 




The territorial and hierarchical relationship between party branches of the JDP can be 
seen in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.1. Table 6.3 demonstrates the vertical, hierarchical order 
of the JDP branches. On the top of numerous provincial, sub-provincial branches, 
neighbourhood representatives and ballot box committees, the JDP headquarters exerted 
a tight control even on the smallest local party base –the ballot box committee – through 
the vertical ties cutting all the way down through provincial, sub-provincial branches and 
neighbourhood representatives. Figure 6.1, by using the example of İstanbul province, 
demonstrates the deep territorial penetration of the JDP organization. Turkey is officia l ly 
divided into 81 provinces. These provinces in turn are divided into various sub-provinces, 
and the sub-provinces are further divided into neighbourhoods. The JDP sub-provinc ia l 
branches divided these neighbourhoods into ballot box regions and attempted to allocate 
a committee to every single ballot box. There are approximately 170,000 ballot boxes in 
urban Turkey (Hürriyet, 2014a) and the party formed almost an equal number of ballot 
box committees. Each ballot box sought to include 300 voters. The JDP tried to control 
every ballot box through a committee of nine people: three representatives from the 
party’s main units, three from women’s branches and three from youth branches 
(Interviewee 4 2013, September 6). Even at their most cautious, the JDP strove to keep 
each ballot box under the control of at least five members (Interviewee 13 2014, February 
7).  
An interview with one of the leading figures of a neutral civil organization for observing 
the elections confirmed this ability of the JDP organization at “safe guarding ballot boxes” 
(frequently called “sandıkları kollamak” or “sandıklara sahip çıkmak” by my 
interviewees). According to Ayberk Yağız, on the election day of the 2014 local elections, 
the “most well-organized party was the JDP” (Güvenç, 2014). Nevertheless, even the JDP 
could be unsuccessful at appointing ballot box observers at times and in certain localit ies 
but this would not change the overall superiority of the JDP organization to competing 
parties on the ground. Considering that the JDP had 170,000 ballot box committees across 
Turkey, the JDP would have required around 850,000 active members in order to keep 
these ballot boxes under its firm control through ballot box committees consisting of five 
members. The claims of the JDP members, however, were that the party’s total 
membership was much higher still. In the following section I will have a closer look at 





6.4.2 The JDP’s membership structure: “speed membership” a la turca 
In Kumbaracıbaşı’s study it was indicated that the JDP had around 1.8 million members 
in 2004 (2009: 127). Hale and Özbudun’s study claimed that the JDP had 3,688,761 
members in 2008 (2010: 47). Tosun and Tosun’s study on party membership in Turkey, 
however, contended that the JDP had only 1,796,799 members in 2008 (2010: 187). The 
difference between the numbers indicated by Hale and Özbudun’s and Tosun and Tosun’s 
studies should be explained on the ground of legal-institutional changes. According to 
Tosun and Tosun, during the period from 2005 to 2008, total party membership numbers 
in Turkey decreased more than 2.5 million due to a new electronic registration method 
which eliminated dual and false membership records (2010: 47). Nevertheless, a couple 
of years after these reforms in the official registration methods of party members, in a 
news report in the daily Milliyet it was argued that the JDP had 7,551,472 members in 
2013 (Milliyet, 2013). In 2014, one of the founders of the JDP, Bülent Arınç, also claimed 
that the party had over 9 million members (Hürriyet, 2014b).  
These dramatic inconsistencies among various figures, and particularly these huge leaps 
in membership figures of the JDP from 2008 to 2013, indicated an important feature of 
party membership in Turkey as underlined by students of Turkish party politics. 
According to Özbudun, in Turkey, what a party member usually means is something little 
more than a supporter (2000: 80). If we take a party member to mean someone who has 
the right to vote in intraparty candidate selection processes and participate in decision-
making processes and who, at the same time, has the obligation of paying dues and not 
being registered to any other party (Scarrow, 1996: 16), then most of the JDP members 
would not be qualified as party members in its strictest sense since most of them have no 
right to vote in intraparty elections and do not pay dues. However, I am inclined to think 
that these figures later indicated by the party elite and published in the national media 
pointed out a particular strategic inclination of the JDP leadership. What we see in these 
inflated membership figures is a kind of strategy, a “speed membership”19 a la turca, 
through which the JDP leadership tried to encapsulate voters by registering as many of 
them as possible as members. For instance, JDP activists register members during election 
                                                                 
19 In her study, Scarrow (2015) defined “multi-speed membership” as new methods introduced by political 
parties in order to increase membership numbers. One of the main inclinations in this process has been 
multiplying membership status with varying degrees of rights and obligations and by using the internet for 
enrolment. This dynamic’s emphasis on “speed” was highly relevant for the JDP although the party did not  




periods in mobile registration vehicles and during spontaneous contacts with the party’s 
supporters and sympathisers.  
This tendency to register as many official party members as possible could be viewed as 
an inheritance of the classical strategies of the Islamist National View organizations.20 As 
one of my interviewees, a sub-provincial chair of the JDP in Konya, underlined, the JDP 
elite, too, pay particular attention to registering as many members as possible: “As our 
Prime Minister said, ‘we are the most alive party in the world with the largest 
membership’. Every year our member numbers increase. We always have membership 
forms nearby. If someone wants to become a member we immediately fill out these forms” 
(Interviewee 6 2014, January 14). Registering as many members as possible might have 
been seen as a successful electoral strategy from the perspective of the JDP elite, similar 
to that of Austrian parties (Müller, 1994: 66–67). The JDP elite might have expected that 
a single member would bring at least one vote, if not two, in addition to his or her own 
and, to a great extent, previous elections demonstrated the credibility of this expectation. 21  
The importance the JDP elite attached to forming a year-round active, large and pervasive 
membership party was a legacy of the Islamist National View politics of the 1990s and a 
response to the weakening and eventual demise of centre-right parties in Turkey during 
the same period as a consequence of their heavy dependence on the media-based and 
capital-intensive organizational strategies as well as their underestimation of the critical 
functions played by the party on the ground (Delibaş, 2015: 54–64).22 Hence, the JDP 
developed a mass-based face – a massive membership organization firmly controlled by 
the centre – to counterbalance the insufficiencies of the elite-based models in the Turkish 
context. The JDP elite also developed appropriate organizational solutions that kept this 
massive membership organization under firm central leadership control without 
alienating the party base. Hence, the massive membership of the party was, in a sense, 
monitored and contacted by a large, tightly controlled activist organization. In the 
following section I will have a closer look at these mechanisms. 
                                                                 
20 An instruction by the Islamist Welfare Party on organization-building revealed the party elite’s attention 
to “registering members” (Güney, 1995: 122).  
21 For example, in the local elections in 2014, the JDP received almost 18 million votes, around twice the 
number of its members. 
22 Tanıyıcı also emphasized how the Islamist Welfare Party “avoided the organizational decline” of the 




6.5 Leadership control  
It has already been emphasized that the JDP exerted very tight control over the party base 
(Kumbaraсıbaşı, 2009: 78), yet little effort has been made to illustrate the instruments and 
methods of this control. In this section I illustrate the crucial instruments of control for 
the JDP over party activities on the ground. First, I look at the role of centrally-conducted 
public opinion surveys. I then draw attention to the role of technologically sophisticated 
communication channels. I also underline the importance of centrally-appointed party 
coordinators, the circulation of ministers and deputies by the party leadership and the 
party finance by the elite in the tight central control of the provincial and local party life 
of the JDP.  
6.5.1 Public opinion surveys or “questionnaires” (anketler): the JDP and political 
marketing  
One of the most important instruments for the JDP leadership in maintaining control of 
the party base was public opinion surveys. These surveys were demanded by the 
headquarters and provincial branches of the JDP and conducted by professional research 
companies close to the party. Surveys were conducted nationally or among the electorate 
of a certain region in order to understand the electoral inclinations as well as the attitude 
of the people with regards to certain, mostly unpopular, policies of the party. Since the 
JDP’s coming to power, there was a remarkable increase of news in the media on these 
public opinion surveys, which particularly focused on the electoral inclinations of voters 
and were conducted by several different research companies. In addition, the owners of 
these research companies gained considerable visibility and some of them became well-
known public figures.  
It was frequently mentioned both in the media and in popular comments that the JDP 
relied heavily on public opinion surveys for its decisions. 23  Indeed, most of my 
interviewees underlined the importance attached to public opinion surveys (or 
“questionnaires” (anketler), as they were called by my interviewees, in the decision-
making processes of the party (Interviewee 5 2014, January 14). 24  Besides regular 
monthly public opinion surveys on the general inclinations of the electorate, the party 
                                                                 
23 Dalay, a researcher in a think-tank close to the JDP government, underlined how extensively 
“questionnaires” were used by the JDP (2014). In an interview, the former İzmir chair of the party said: 
“But you know, one of the most important things for Mr. Prime Minister is public opinion research. He 
frequently orders questionnaires. He evaluates them personally and follows the performance of the 
prominent figures of the provinces and sub-provinces” (Soyoğul, 2013).  




also used many specified opinion surveys on its important national as well as minor and 
regional decisions (Interviewee 38 2014, April 25). Several of my interviewees noted that 
the party did not rely on a single research company but used a few different companies in 
order to get reliable results.25 
In discussions of the opinion polling activity of the party, a remarkable difference 
occurred between the narratives of high-ranking party members and the narratives of 
junior members, failed candidates and former party members. While the former tended to 
underline the importance of public opinion surveys for overcoming the blindness caused 
by “the provincial- local organizational solidarity” (teşkilat taassubu) (Interviewee 18 
2014, February 26), the latter – in other words, failed candidates, junior party members 
and former party members – underlined the problems of opinion surveys. 26  This 
difference could be seen as evidence of the role of public opinion surveys as a central 
control mechanism.  
An interview with the owner of one of the research companies working for the JDP 
provided some solid information on the use of public opinion surveys by the party. My 
interviewee emphasized that “questionnaires” (anketler) was a decision support 
mechanism and the party regularly conducted research once a month. He underlined that 
when there were specific agendas the JDP tended to conduct surveys much more 
frequently. According to my interviewee, it was the public opinion surveys that illustrated 
to the party leadership that they should get rid some of the ideological-programmatic 
principles of the Islamist National View tradition right on the eve of the foundation of the 
JDP. He argued that the research conducted by his company prior to the foundation of the 
JDP revealed that the anti-EU and anti-globalisation discourse as well as the redistributive 
“just order” (adil düzen) promise of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) were not 
embraced by the majority of the population. He argued that, through these surveys, the 
party leadership could see the “pro-market” orientation of the electorate.  
Hence, the rise of the JDP could also be seen as the decisive victory of political marketing 
techniques over redistributive, contentious and somehow more idealistic Islamist politics 
in Turkey. The rise of the JDP in a sense was an outcome of “tailor[ing] the product 
according to consumer taste” (Scammell, 1995: 8). As my interviewee bluntly put it: 
                                                                 
25 See Interviewee 23 2014 March 7; Interviewee 29 2014, April 16; Interviewee 35 2014, April 22. 





“There is this concept of ‘political marketing’ (said in English). The JDP uses this with 
fidelity. In other words, the party conducts a careful market analysis before the decision-
making process” (Interviewee 38 2014, April 25).  
Relying on the data gathered via public opinion surveys, the party also began to change 
its strategy towards local power holders in some provinces (Interviewee 38 2014, April 
25). My interviews with failed candidates just before the local elections in 2014 
strengthened this impression. For example, one of those failed candidates – most probably 
a local boss located in the middle of a local patronage network – complained that after 
the failure of his candidacy within the party, he did not know what to do with his hundreds 
of supporters in the sub-province (Interviewee 15 2014, February 19). It seems that the 
party did not trust the claims of the local elite. Instead, the party centre conducted surveys 
in these regions and measured the real support of local bosses. Even if the claims of local 
bosses were proven true by the surveys, the JDP leadership tended to choose more 
competent and obedient people if it was possible to win elections with such candidates.  
Nevertheless, one of my interviewees, a chair of a provincial party branch, also 
highlighted the fact that the party carefully handled the local power holders and networks , 
too (Interviewee 43 2014, May 3). Although the party did not rely on specific persons or 
families, it could get the votes from tribal families and religious communities as well in 
that particular province. This was to say that although the party leadership, to a great 
extent, did not compromise with local, regional power holders, they did not alienate them, 
either. It is plausible to think that extensive and frequent use of public opinion surveys 
provided the party leadership with superior knowledge regarding the inclinations of the 
electorate and enhanced leadership control over provincial and local branches of the party 
and local elites.   
6.5.2 Use of technology for the surveillance of party activity on the ground: 
unmediated connections between the electorate, activists and leadership  
The knowledge generated by the public opinion surveys was also supported by the 
knowledge gathered by the party headquarters about local and provincial party life. 
Regarding the control of party activities, one of my interviewees mentioned the highly 
sophisticated monitoring of the activities of the local-provincial organizations. According 
to the numbers she provided, 1.2 million households in İstanbul were continuous ly 




men). These visits were recorded and monitored by a barcode system (Interviewee 11 
2014, January 22).  
In 2003, the party also launched a centralized communication centre. According to 
official party documents, every year tens of thousands of applications were received by 
AKİM (AK İletişim Merkezi – AK Communication Centre) via phone, email or in person, 
and the majority of demands and problems expressed in these applications were 
responded to by the party’s professional staff (Ak Parti, 2004). According to Eligür, in 
these communication centers – both in headquarters and in provinces – all citizens were 
allowed to express their complaints and demands and discuss them with party members 
(2010: 245). She also underlined the fact that all of the problems expressed in these 
communication centers were trasmitted to the relevant state authorities by AKİM workers 
and followed up by the party staff until they were responded to (Eligür, 2010: 245).  
AKBİS (AK Parti Bilgi Sistemleri – The Justice and Development Party Information 
Systems), an intraparty online system for the surveillance of the party activities of 
provincial branches, should also be included in the picture (Interviewee 13 2014, 
February 7). In an interview, the İzmir party chair described how AKBİS worked: 
Our deputies make us aware of their activities in the provinces by 
saying, for example, “Today I went to Tire, to these villages”. We enter 
these activities into AKBİS. She [the deputy] also enters her activities, 
but first she has to get permission from the provincial branch. 
Headquarters can see the deputy’s performance by pressing a key. For 
instance, Ali Aşlık, our deputy, where does he go? [Headquarters] sees 
this. Our sub-provincial chairs and the vice-chairs of municipa l 
assembly groups are told, “Who are the ones who participate in the 
meetings for the municipality assembly, who are the ones who attend 
the party’s activities? Who are the ones who pay their dues?” This is 
party identification. “Does this member do the work she’s been 
assigned by the party? Does she visit villages, does she visit the citizens, 
does she participate in the party activities?” The provincial vice-chair 
responsible for the local government there provided us with records for 
all members of the municipality assembly. Who participated and how 
many times did they participate in the group meeting about the 
metropolitan municipality? We even know how long they stayed in the 
meeting. Sometimes, they just show up, sign the sheet and leave. But 
we have records. Sooner or later you definitely face these records 
(Soyoğul, 2013).  
The party directly evaluated and controlled local-provincial party activity via AKBİS. As 
one member of headquarters told the system’s users in local-provincial party branches, 




single key” (Ak Parti, 2011). The party heavily relied on technology to surveil local-
provincial organizational activity (Interviewee 28 2014, April 10). Thus, while the party 
leadership established a direct connection with the electorate via AKİM, the party 
headquarters used AKBİS and its knowledge of the minute details of party activity on the 
ground to enhance its position against provincial and local party branches, by-passing the 
organizational medium between the party leadership and the electorate on the one hand , 
and party activists on the ground and the party headquarters on the other. 
6.5.3 Party coordinators: the bureaucratic face of the JDP 
The party coordinators also tightened the control of JDP headquarters over the provinc ia l 
and sub-provincial branches through their in-person presence. The JDP headquarters 
divided Turkey into several regions, and each region was supervised by a regional 
coordinator from either the Central Executive Committee (Merkez Yürütme Kurulu) or 
the parliamentary group of the party. These regions were further divided into sub-regions 
according to the provincial borders, with each sub-region supervised by the deputy of 
another city. Kumbaracıbaşı gives a detailed picture of these regions created by the JDP 
headquarters (2009: 133). He indicates that the JDP divided Turkey into two main 
domains: east and west. While the east comprised of seven regions, the west comprised 
of six regions. And these regions were comprised of several cities and kept under the 
control of JDP deputies (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 133).  
As Kumbaracıbaşı indicates, these deputies were not locals of these regions and cities and 
this was why they could take an objective stance against the local politics and give 
detailed accounts to JDP headquarters about the details of the local political situation 
(2009: 133). Thus, provincial politics were kept under control by centrally-appointed 
party coordinators who were not a part of the local politics. For example, a deputy from 
an inner Anatolian city could be the coordinator of the Eastern Black Sea region 
(Haberler.com, 2013). The role of city and regional coordinators was to provide constant 
and neutral feedback to the party leadership from the provincial branches. Particular ly 
during the candidate selection processes, reports from the regional and city coordinators 
might have provided neutral information to the party leadership that was oriented to the 
general party interest.  
The same model was applied to the provincial level as well. Sub-regions created by the 




appointed by the provincial party branch.27 Thus, the control exercised over provincia l 
party branches by the headquarters was complemented by the control exercised over sub-
provincial party branches by the provincial party organizations (Interviewee 6 2014, 
January 14). Regions comprising only a few neighbourhoods were also supervised by 
coordinators appointed by the sub-provincial party branch.28 The party exerted intense 
central control even over the most capillary segments of the party organization. To this 
end, the party leadership carefully appointed outsiders to these settings in order to protect 
their neutral, central stance against local politics. These control mechnanisms alone 
created a considerable bureaucracy in the JDP. 
6.5.4 Control by ministers and deputies: elected elite as the agents of the JDP 
central office 
The circulation of JDP ministers and deputies also played a crucial role in the central 
control of party activities in provinces and local settings. One of my interviewees drew 
attention to the fact that the formation of the JDP cabinets revealed a certain pattern in 
the distribution of ministerships (Interviewee 29 2014, April 16). For example, a look at 
the JDP cabinets formed after the 2011 general elections revealed that the party leadership 
allocated and distributed ministerships to as many different influential cities as possible. 
Not only İstanbul and Ankara, but also other major provincial power centres of Turkey 
such as Bursa, Konya, Kayseri, İzmir, Diyarbakır, Trabzon, Gaziantep, Mersin, Kocaeli, 
Samsun and Rize were represented by ministers in the cabinet. These ministers were not 
necessarily locals of these provinces, and some of them were intentionally nominated by 
the party headquarters for these cities. The result was the headquarters’ tighter control 
over these cities through the intervention of ministers in some of the important decision-
making processes at the provincial level, such as candidate selection and the identifica t ion 
of governing bodies of the party. These ministers, under the control of the party leadership, 
also responded to the particularistic demands of the electorate in these cities without 
entirely surrendering to local politics. Hence, allocating ministerships to different cities 
                                                                 
27 In a news article, it was indicated that İzmir had been divided into six sub -regions by the provincial party 
branch and each of these regions, consisting of five or six sub-regions, was allocated a coordinator by the 
provincial branch (Milliyet, 2014b).  
28 On the website of one of the provincial branches of the JDP it was reported that a certain neighbourhood 





enhanced the party centralism29 and, at the same time, absorbed the reactions of local 
party bases through the centrally supervised direction of selective resources.  
A very similar dynamic was followed in the use of deputies. For example, a member of 
the JDP elite from İstanbul, based on her familial origins in a provincial city in Anatolia, 
could be nominated to represent this city by the demand of the party headquarters. This, 
in turn, provided the party leadership with stronger leverage over both the deputy and 
local politics because in the general elections, as most of my interviewees underlined, the 
electorate usually voted for the personality of Erdoğan and the party rather than for the 
individual candidates. As a consequence, most, if not all, JDP deputies were more likely 
to defend headquarters’ opinion against local dynamics. As one of my interviewees from 
a provincial city said, “here, deputies are like civil servants [of the party headquarters]” 
(Interviewee 44 2014, May 4). Although Turkish politics have always been prone to the 
predominance of party leaders in candidate selection processes in localities, the presence 
of many colourful and powerful figures (mostly relying on extensive local patronage 
networks) have always been one of the characteristics of the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey. As discussed in the next chapter, the JDP central elite had a surprisingly deep 
suspicion towards local elite and local politics and this was one of the reasons behind the 
JDP elites’ strategy of effectively inhibiting the presence of powerful local personalit ies 
in the parliament. In this context, circulation of ministers and deputies and the detachment 
of individual JDP politicians from their local settings gave the central party leadership an 
upper hand over both provincial and local settings as well as over the ministers and 
deputies themselves. 
6.5.5 Party finance by the JDP elite 
The essential component of the highly centralized JDP organization was party finance by 
the elite. Central party finance has always been a consolidating element of party 
centralism in Turkey (Gençkaya, 2002: 44–45). Within the framework of existing laws 
regarding political parties, state subsidies to the parties were allocated centrally, and the 
party headquarters had the power to decide how to distribute these resources. At the same 
time, parties could collect only scant membership dues, and most of the party branches 
relied on the central funding of activities and on resources generated by local party elite 
(Uysal & Toprak, 2010: 209). This picture of party finance in Turkey was, to a great 
                                                                 




extent, applicable to the JDP as well. As the ruling party and winner of several elections, 
the JDP received a considerable amount from the state for party activities,30 and the party 
also used public facilities for its electoral campaigns.31  
Two of my interviewees told me some typical incidents revealing the dynamics of party 
finance in the JDP. One of them was about the central finance of the party in its foundation 
and pointed out one of the origins of the leadership domination within the JDP. It seems 
that, besides the role of state aids, party leaders’ financial autonomy in the foundation of 
parties is a crucial element for the future domination of party life by the leader:  
Finance is important because of this: he who financially supports a party 
actually owns the party. […] [When the JDP was founded] Mr. Tayyip 
rented a headquarters building at the monthly cost of 36 billion liras.  
We had 73 founders and no one among them put hands in her pocket. 
This is very important. The whole rent was a serious amount by then. 
[…] Mr. Tayyip paid the rent alone. When saying this – of course 
perhaps he had collected money from various sources – I am trying to 
underline that he did not receive any money from the founders. And at 
that moment, Mr. Tayyip actually owned the party. Like an asset, like 
owning a flat. The property of the party belongs to Mr. Tayyip 
(Interviewee 21 2014, February 28–March 4). 
Another interviewee, regarding a question about the party finance in the sub-provinces 
told me the following:  
Where does the water for the mill come from? (değirmenin suyu 
nereden geliyor?) [...] The share you get from the headquarters or the 
official budget only pays for the regular expenditure of the [local] 
organization. […] We, as the members of administration board, pay our 
dues. You are done; what else you can do? […] We define our election 
budget as 100 billion. […] If we get 8 billion from the headquarters 
where does the rest come from? We ask the candidate for mayoralty and 
candidates for the municipal assembly, administration board members 
and then we go to our elders that we know they are JDP supporters and 
request help for the party. […] If he cannot support in cash we say, “you 
rent a car and cover it and we do not pay for it”. For instance if we need 
furniture and refurbishment for the branch building we ask these of 
some of our elders [who have a relevant business] (Interviewee 7 2014, 
January 15). 
Apparently, the party heavily relied on the resources generated by its central and 
provincial elite for its activities. Predominance of the JDP in local governments should 
                                                                 
30 According to the website of the JDP, 96.9% of the party’s  income comes from state subsidies. See 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/gelir-gider (accessed: 25.2.2015). 
31 Ferries and buses of the Municipality of İstanbul brought thousands of people to the meeting space in 




also be kept in mind since municipal resources provided a considerable financial resource 
to the local JDP elite. However, the autonomous financial resources provided by the JDP 
municipalities for the local JDP elite should not be considered something that enhanced 
the local elites since the central JDP elite always had a close eye even over the minor 
centrifugal dynamics within local politics (as elaborated upon in the next chapter). Close 
relationships with business circles were also vital for the central party finance, particula r ly 
for the building of a strong pro-JDP media.32  
In this section as a whole, I have illustrated the mechanics behind the “tight leadership 
control” the JDP exerted over its base. I have argued that, through the use of public 
opinion surveys and technologically sophisticated surveillance instruments, as well as the 
“appointment” and circulation of party deputies, ministers and coordinators, the JDP 
headquarters maintained firm control over the party base. Central party finance had a vital 
contribution in the construction of this control. This situation provided the central party 
leadership with the upper hand over provincial and local branches, the party base and 
provincial and local elite both inside and outside the party. Yet this very tight control over 
the party base posed dangers to the stability of the JDP simply by increasing discontent 
amongst party activists against the central control. In the following section I will address 
how the JDP elite overcame this problem through the introduction of controlled 
participation channels for party activists. 
6.6 Controlled participation 
In this section I focus on three key mechanisms of the JDP organization that provided a 
very strong sense of participation to the party base and diminished the potential corrosive 
effects of tight central control over the massive membership organization of the party. 
These are “regular consultations”, “non-binding elections among selected party members” 
and the “extensive use of women’s branches for the party activity”.  
                                                                 
32  As an initial evaluation, these relationships between businessmen and the JDP elite could also be 
considered “new patronage relationships” of the JDP years which replaced the old -style, centre-right 
patronage in Turkey (explained in the previous chapter), which mainly relied on heavy state subsidies and 
massive public employment. The examination of this aspect of JDP politics would be very interesting, yet 
it is beyond the scope and extent of the dissertation research. For a very detailed account of the patronage 




6.6.1 Regular consultations (istişareler): listening to activists and keeping them 
busy 
The most pronounced instrument revealed through my interviews for controlling the 
participation of the party base in the decision-making processes of the JDP was that of 
“consultations”.33 The intense consultation activity of the JDP started at the top of the 
organization. The JDP held weekly Central Executive Committee consultation meetings 
and monthly Central Administration Board Consultation meetings besides regular weekly 
meetings of the cabinet (Interviewee 14 2014, February 10).  All of these regular 
consultation meetings were held under the personal presence of Erdoğan. One of my 
interviewees, a former JDP member and a critical observer of the party, very neatly 
described this attention of Erdoğan with a humorous exaggeration: “I do not think that 
there has ever been a single meeting in the history of the JDP without the attendance of 
Erdoğan” (Interviewee 21 2014, February 28–March 4). 
Erdoğan was also always present in the regular monthly consultation meetings with the 
81 provincial chairs, provincial mayors and sub-provincial mayors of the party 
(Interviewee 14 2014, February 10). One of my interviewees, a provincial chair, described 
the function of regular consultation meetings and pointed out the reasons for the great 
importance attached to these meetings by the party leader Erdoğan: 
At the moment Prime Minister [Erdoğan] is in his twelfth year as the 
party chair. Is he not? If he does not gather provincial party chairs for 
the [monthly] consultation meeting for three or five months no one 
would say why this party does not conduct the [monthly] consultation. 
But he gathers these people for the monthly consultation meeting. We 
also do consultation meetings here [in the province]. In other words we 
always come together through this consultation meetings and people 
sometimes criticize this. Other parties do not bother themselves for such 
meetings. In the sub-provinces, too, [you have] weekly sub-provinc ia l 
meetings and extended consultation meetings (genişletilmiş danışma 
meclisi toplantısı), weekly provincial meetings as well as weekly 
meetings of the executive committee of the provincial party branch. In 
addition you have the meetings of provincial mayors and the meetings 
of members of the provincial municipality assembly. Sometimes even 
we criticize this: “we should do these meetings in three months time, 
monthly meetings are too frequent”. But even the constant movement 
for these meetings increases the motivation. This was one of the reasons 
why the JDP was so dynamic and alive. The Prime Minister knew this. 
We learned this by experience. [When you do these meetings] people 
[party members] do not speak [about the problems of the party] in 
                                                                 




coffee houses or in other irrelevant places. They come to the meeting 
and criticize the provincial chair in the party and you get something 
from him/her. You say, “There is a problem in one of our sub-provinces. 
I shall go there.” But if you want to know these problems you have to 
conduct these frequent meetings. You also transmit to them what you 
have received in Ankara. He/she [the provincial party activist] does not 
know every detail. You cannot learn everything from the TV and from 
newspapers. You [as the provincial chair] go to Ankara and come back 
and transmit these details to them. [… ] And you also discuss “what are 
works to be completed?” You control [the sub-provinc ia l 
organizations]: “are your ballot box observers OK? Have you 
conducted your consultation meetings?” (Interviewee 4 2013, 
September 6). 
It is apparent that regular consultations enhanced the intraparty connections of the 
hierarchical units of the JDP, and frequent meetings also kept the JDP activists busy 
permanently. One could also presume that these regular meetings had also contributed to 
the emergence of a party sub-culture. The JDP headquarters also carefully controlled 
whether the local-provincial branches held their own weekly consultation meetings for 
party administration and monthly consultation meetings with the sub-provincial chairs 
(Interviewee 6 2014, January 14). The provincial governing bodies of the party also 
ensured that the same meetings were held at the sub-provincial and neighbourhood levels 
(Interviewee 7 2014, January 15). One of my senior interviewees argued that the intens ity 
and frequency of these consultation meetings were unique to the JDP, and that other 
political parties in Turkey hardly ever gave such importance to consultations (Interviewee 
14 2014, February 10).  
For example, one of my interviewees, a sub-provincial mayor who previously had a 
political experience in the centre-right Motherland Party, and later in the JDP, related an 
incident where he missed a consultation meeting at the JDP headquarters in Ankara due 
to his work in his sub-province. Unlike in the Motherland Party period, he told me that 
he was immediately called by a vice-chair from the headquarters and was asked for the 
reasons for his absence (Interviewee 30 2014, April 19). As one of my interviewees 
pointed out, these meetings not only provided feedback to the party headquarters from 
local-provincial branches, but also motivated the local-provincial activists of the party: 
“[when you do these meetings] you also provide motivation. These people say that ‘they 
[the headquarters] are taking me seriously” (Interviewee 39 2014, May 2). 
It should also be noted that istişare has a religious connotation as well and implies the 




accordance with verdicts of the Quran. Nevertheless, one of my interviewees, a highly 
critical member, told of an interesting incident that provided vivid details about the nature 
of central consultation meetings of the party:  
[In Islamic thought] there is indeed the consultation concept but there 
are also some requisites of it on the basis of equality and freedom of 
expression. How are consultations held in the JDP? […] [In a 
consultation meeting], we had to vote on whether participants should 
talk for two minutes or three minutes. People chose two with the wide 
margin of votes. […] And you spend half of it with greeting the protocol. 
[…] I raised my hand and said ‘you call it a consultation meeting but 
you sit two meters above us. One of the traits of the consultat ion 
meeting is the fact that people consult with each other and sit around a 
table at the same level.’ (Interviewee 21 2014, February 28–March 4).  
Nevertheless, most of my interviewees who had high-ranking positions in the party 
implied that, despite the authoritarian appearance of Erdoğan from the outside, he was 
tolerant towards intraparty negotiations and he opened room for vivid discussions  
(Interviewee 35 2014, April 22). Yet it would be really misleading to consider the results 
of these meetings binding for the leadership (Interviewee 34 2014, April 22). Instead, it 
was evaluated as a method by the JDP leadership that replaced intraparty democracy 
(Interviewee 37 2014, April 24).34  
A Central Executive Committee member of the JDP explained to me why the consultat ion 
meetings were not binding through a distinction he made between “mass oriented” (kitle 
temelli) and “principle based” (ilke temmelli) tendencies (Interviewee 34 2014, April 22). 
According to him, it was not always healthy to follow the tendencies of the majority, or 
mass oriented inclinations, in consultation meetings since the majority might be prone to 
observe day-to-day interests and solutions. Hence, for him, there was no problem at all 
about the fact that consultation meetings were not binding in the JDP. His narrative 
implied an identification of elite choices with long-term, general interests and princip les. 
One should also note that, as one of my interviewees highlighted, consultation meetings 
were much more binding for the provincial administrators than the party chair and the 
national party elite (Interviewee 40 2014, May 2). This also entailed a lesser autonomy 
for provincial chairs vis-à-vis provincial junior administrators and kept them weaker 
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before the provincial party base as well as before the party headquarters. This situation 
should also be evaluated as a side effect of consultation meetings, which increased the 
party leadership’s autonomy vis-à-vis provincial party bosses and local power holders.  
At first glance these consultation meetings appeared to be an opportunity for junior party 
members and the party base to express their ideas and demands. However, these meetings 
were not only a means of getting feedback from the party base, but were also an 
instrument through which the party leadership could persuade less senior and junior party 
administrators and the party base to accept headquarters’ decisions. 35  One should 
therefore note the double role of these regular consultation meetings: feedback and 
control/persuasion. As one of my interviewees implied, in cases where the leadership 
made unpopular decisions, they also made great efforts to convince the provincial and 
local party branches to accept them (Interviewee 36 2014, April 24). However, it is 
plausible to argue that regular consultations provided a strong sense of participation for 
the party base and provincial organizations. Hence, the party base tended to embrace even 
the most unpopular decisions made by the party leadership, and consultations increased 
the legitimacy of the JDP leadership in the eyes of the party on the ground. 
6.6.2 Non-binding elections among selected party members (teşkilat temayül 
yoklamaları): giving a voice to party members 
Another important instrument used to control the participation of the party base in the 
party’s decision-making processes, as outlined by my interviewees, was that of non-
binding elections among selected members of the party. According to the statutes of the 
JDP, the party could conduct “elections for defining organizational tendencies” (teşkilat 
temayül yoklaması) in order to choose its candidates (Ak Parti, 2012a: 74). But just like 
the consultation meetings, these elections did not produce binding results for the party 
leadership. Instead, the results of these elections, which were conducted among the party 
elite, high-ranking party members and members of the administration boards in a given 
province, were only considered a component of a wider decision-making mechanism. The 
results of these elections were not usually publicized and were only made available to the 
party leadership. Since the party base had no information on the results of these non-
binding elections, the party leadership did not take the risk of facing bottom-up dissent, 
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and since the results were not publicized, the party leadership could also use these 
elections to explain the failure of certain candidates who were not approved by the 
headquarters.36  
As one of my interviewees underlined, there were many examples in which the results of 
non-binding elections did not match the desires of the party leadership (Interviewee 4 
2013, September 6). In these cases, the decisions of the party leadership were usually 
accepted by the provincial and local organizations since there was a widespread trust in 
the personality and political experience of Erdoğan. Non-binding elections provided 
feedback to the party leadership about the organizational inclinations by officially asking 
the opinion of the party base via a simple vote-casting procedure. More importantly, non-
binding elections fulfilled the party base’s desire to participate in the decision-mak ing 
process. This is why one of the elites of the JDP and the Islamist National View 
organizations, in his guide to aspiring politicians, argued that non-binding elections were 
held to appease the party base (Şentürk, 2006: 99).  
During the interviews, a certain pattern appeared when high-ranking party members tried 
to explain why the results of intraparty elections for defining organizational inclinat ions 
(teşkilat yoklamaları) in the JDP were not considered binding by the party leadership. 
Senior party members frequently argued that provincial organizations and local politics 
were prone to particularistic tendencies and driven by local interests. Some of my 
interviewees called this tendency “organizational conservatism” (teşkilat taassubu) or 
“organizational nationalism” (teşkilat milliyetçiliği), which denotes a local organizationa l 
solidarity that is not considerate of the general interest of the party and the country.37 It 
was, therefore, not surprising that party leader Erdoğan, in a party consultation meeting 
prior to the 2014 local elections, emphasized that non-binding elections would not be the 
only decision-making instrument in the candidate selection processes: “Our aim is not to 
provide posts to some people. Our aim is to produce service for our cities. We know, in 
too many places, there is serious institutional nationalism (kurumsal milliyetçilik). Non-
binding election (teşkilat yoklaması) results would not be decisive. We know how, 
sometimes, these elections are held” (Hürriyet, 2013a). This shows that Erdoğan himse lf 
thought that local politics and local organizational solidarity could produce inappropriate 
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candidates for elections. Non-binding elections were therefore another instrument for 
controlling the participation of the party base while helping the leadership avoid so-called 
“organizational conservatism” in the provincial and local branches.    
6.6.3 Women’s branches as the main tool of the party activity: reaching out to low-
income, conservative households 
Another channel that fulfilled the JDP base’s desire to participate in politics and which 
remarkably helped the party get in touch with the electorate was the activity of women’s 
branches. Most of my interviewees underlined the extraordinary role played by women’s 
branches in party activity, 38  and even neutral observers confirmed their vital role 
(Interviewee 39 2014, May 2). As one of my interviewees described it, the Welfare Party 
phase of the Islamist National View tradition was the ‘discovery of the women electorate’  
(Interviewee 19 2014, February 26). And, it seems that one of the most crucial 
organizational inheritances of the JDP from the National View tradition was women’s 
branches and the importance attached to the women electorate (Interviewee 1 2013, 
September 2). In fact, Erdoğan attached great importance to women throughout the JDP 
years, too. Hence, there was a remarkable women and youth quota in the JDP, albeit an 
unofficial one.39 
According to my interviewees, the primary benefit of strong women’s branches was the 
opportunities that the presence of women provided to access conservative, low-income 
and religious households in Turkey.40 According to my interviews with party members 
involved with women’s branches of the JDP, the women in the household could change 
the men’s decision (Interviewee 10 2014, January 18). At least, the activity of women’s 
branches helped persuade women to vote differently than their husbands (Interviewee 49 
2014, May 8). Hence, the women’s branches had also a particular importance as the 
primary medium of one of the important communication methods of the party underlined 
in the previous chapter: “face-to-face interaction with the electorate”.  
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39 There used to be an official quota implemented by the party but this was removed later on. Nevertheless, 
according to a research regarding women’s branches of the party, there was an unofficial quota which 
anticipated 30% female participation (Tür & Çıtak, 2010: 620). Also see Soyoğul (2013). In this interview, 
Akay, the İzmir chair of the JDP, mentioned that “in our sub-provincial conventions we have a scheme 
provided by the headquarters. [Among the party’s candidates] 30% would be women, 30% would be youth, 
30% would be university graduates.” Also see Interviewee 49 2014, May 8. 




One of the founders of the party argued in the official publication of the party, the Turkey 
Bulletin (Türkiye Bülteni), that “to us the healthiest way of connection with the people is 
face-to-face communication” (Mercan, 2003: 12). He elaborated on the importance of the 
face-to-face communication method with the case of the first electoral success of the JDP 
in 2002. In this text Mercan argued, “if you look at the period before the November 3rd 
[2002] election you would see that we did not use any advertisement in newspapers. In 
order to explain ourselves in the November 3rd election we focused on two methods. One 
of these was the use of billboards in every city in the country. The second one was the 
efforts of our organization, most notably the effort of the women’s branches, in visit ing 
every neighbourhood and tradesman and petty merchant” (Mercan, 2003: 12). Women’s 
branches also played a vital role in distributing aid in cash or kind in low-income 
neighbourhoods (Interviewee 10 2014, January 18). Hence, active women’s branches also 
cut the connection between local power holders and selective resources distributed to the 
low-income electorate, therefore inhibiting the development of local political machines. 
The work of JDP women’s branches also established an emotional link with the electorate 
(Interviewee 32 2014, April 20). During my interviews I observed that members of the 
women’s branches tended to be motivated more by collective incentives than the selective 
incentives that party life provided as a result of the charity-like nature of the party activity 
conducted by the women’s branches. It is plausible to think that most of the members of 
the women’s branches enjoyed the spiritual satisfaction of helping the poor and viewed  
the party activity from this perspective. The women’s branches of the JDP also showed a 
striking loyalty to Erdoğan. One of the substantial reasons behind women’s participat ion 
in the JDP was their affection for Erdoğan and their belief in his “rightness, sincerity, 
manners, diligence, charisma, leadership and the importance he attached to women” (Tür 
& Çıtak, 2010: 622). 
In accordance with the vital duties of the party’s women’s branches, as one of my 
interviewees underlined, the party leadership systematically privileged women: 
“sometimes […] the party nominates women from some provincial cities and local 
politicians of these cities just argue that ‘this region cannot tolerate women’. In these 
cases the party leadership strongly supports the women” (Interviewee 49 2014, May 8). 
This statement was confirmed by another study as well, where participants from the 
women’s branches of the party argued that Erdoğan himself attached great importance to 




620). As one of my interviewees argued, the JDP strongly encouraged the participat ion 
of women and youth in politics (Interviewee 29 2014, April 16).   
The importance attached to women’s branches, as well as to the youth, also had a 
centralising effect. Since women and young people tended to be more loyal to the 
leadership and less competitive over selective incentives as a consequence of the charity-
like nature of their engagement with the electorate, relying on these secondary branches 
for party activity could be considered a deliberate strategy of party centralization. After 
all, as one of my interviewees from a sub-provincial women’s branch pointed out, 
“actually women are not into politics, they are mainly concerned about the spiritua l 
(manevi ve vicdani) aspect of the activity” (Interviewee 32 2014, April 20). However, the 
main reason behind the intensive use of women’s branches was to easily get in touch with 
the low-income, conservative and religious households of Turkey. Greater autonomy of 
the party leadership vis-a-vis the provincial- local party bosses and the elite was an 
unintended consequence of the extensive use of women’s branches.  
In this section, I have illustrated that the potential dissent towards the tight central control 
of party activity on the ground was carefully managed by the JDP elite. To this end, the 
party elite attached great importance to regular consultations, held non-binding elections 
among selected JDP members in the provincial and local branches and intensive ly 
employed its women’s branches. These methods together provided the party base with a 
strong sense of participation and remarkably increased the legitimacy of the party 
leadership. As a result, authoritarian intraparty governance of the JDP was tolerated 
remarkably by the JDP activists since they had a strong sense of participation to the 
decision-making processes and activities of the party.41 
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Figure 6.2: The JDP as a personalistic membership party: elite-based and mass-based dimensions  
 




6.7 The JDP organization in perspective: a personalistic membership party 
The organizational dynamics of the JDP, as elaborated above, paint a remarkably different 
picture than that of party organizational change in Western democracies. As discussed 
above in the section on concepts and theory, many students of party organizations have 
contended that the mass party lost its significance with the rise of elite-based “catch-all” 
or “cartel parties”. The literature usually argued that massive membership organizat ions 
lost their importance in most Western democracies.42 In contrast, the JDP elite carefully 
protected and improved the party’s membership organization, increased the number of 
JDP members and made great efforts to build party branches in even the remotest and 
smallest corners of the country. This situation was also a divergent strategic choice 
compared to those made by most of the JDP’s predecessors in the 1990s and its current 
competitors in the Turkish party system.    
The JDP elite, primarily through central interventions, created a year-round active, highly 
centralized, large and pervasive membership organization, and as a result the JDP came 
to resemble a mass-based party. Nevertheless, the JDP also attached importance to public 
opinion surveys, direct communication channels with the electorate and a communica t ion 
strategy that placed Erdoğan at its centre. The party leadership created a strong, pro-JDP 
media and used political marketing techniques in general. Hence, the JDP also had the 
face of an elite-based party. Figure 6.2 illustrates these two faces of the party and provides 
a general diagram of the JDP’s organizational mechanics. (Also see Table 6.1, Table 6.2. 
and Table 5.1 in the previous chapter for various organizational and strategic 
characteristics of the JDP that made the party a hybrid electoral machine and 
distinguished it from its rightist predecessors in Turkish politics, namely the Islamist 
Welfare Party and Virtue Party and the centre-right Motherland Party.) The blue lines 
indicate the components of the elite-based dimension of the party, and the green lines 
cover the elements in which the JDP resembled a mass-based model. Thus, I am strongly 
inclined to identify the JDP as a hybrid electoral machine: an organization that blended 
the mass-based and elite-based party models and which targeted electoral predominance 
                                                                 
42  For a critical discussion on the party decline literature, see Ignazi (1996). According to Ignazi the 
literature on “the crisis of party” misled researchers into thinking that there was a general decline in party 
politics. Ignazi drew attention to the fact that the decline analysed by “the crisis of party” literature was 
actually about the decline of a particular party model: the mass party (1996: 550). Despite his attention, 
Ignazi’s work still remained within a euro-centric view on party organizations where the mass party 
represented a thing of the past. But as the case of the JDP in Turkey illustrates, in the context of developing 




through robust organizational leverage supported by political marketing techniques. 
Given the centrality of the party leader Erdoğan in this massive membership organiza t ion 
it could be called a “personalistic membership party”. 
In this innovative mixture of various traits of the mass-based and elite-based party models, 
the JDP elite were also able to overcome the potential problems entailed by both models.43 
Bureaucratic and ideological rigidity and lack of flexibility (a problem of the mass party 
model) were ruled out by the creation of an autonomous party leadership through the use 
of public opinion surveys, technological surveillance techniques, and central party 
finance. The party also overcame its members’ lack of motivation (a problem of the elite-
based models). Through regular consultations, non-binding elections among selected 
members and active women’s branches, the JDP elite was able to provide a strong sense 
of participation, and thus motivation, throughout this massive membership organizat ion. 
As a result of the simultaneous use of these instruments, the JDP was able to form a highly 
autonomous leadership, as well as a highly autonomous party, and overcome the problems 
entailed by the purely mass-based and elite-based parties while benefitting from the 
electoral advantages of both models.   
As briefly discussed in the section on theories on the party typologies, this mixture 
achieved by the JDP was a response to the electoral market and the political context which 
gave rise to the JDP. Under these circumstances, the JDP could not risk exclusive ly 
relying on elite-based models given the resistance triggered among powerful non-party 
political actors by the rise of the JDP and due to the party’s strictly Islamist past. Apart 
from this, the JDP elite also took lessons from the previous centre-right parties’ 
organizational decline in the 1990s and the electoral costs entailed by this organizationa l 
decay. Hence, the JDP adopted techniques from modern elite-based parties but carefully 
combined them with a mass-based model. This did not only provide an upper hand to the 
party in elections, but also consolidated its resistance against hostile non-party politica l 
opponents. The case of the JDP illustrates that, in the context of developing countries 
where social and technological change did not match the pace of that of liberal Western 
democracies, some aspects of the mass party model have been still shaping party 
organizations. Here, the broader theoretical implication is this: a non-critical engagement 
with party models predominantly based on theories of the cases of Western liberal 
                                                                 




democratic settings might be misleading in explaining the party organizationa l 
development in the developing world.  
6.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, after a theoretical discussion on party typologies and a brief evaluation of 
party organizational development in Turkey, I have argued that one of the reasons behind 
the JDP’s electoral predominance and political resilience was a particular organizationa l 
formation. The JDP elite exerted tight control over a year-round active, large and 
pervasive membership organization with eight to nine million members – in a country 
with a population of approximately 80 million – and created JDP branches in even the 
remotest corners of the country and the smallest provincial neighbourhoods. The votes 
received by the JDP in previous elections were around twice the number of the party’s 
members, which showed that the JDP’s electoral strategy of encapsulating its supporters 
as members were successful. The JDP leadership gathered comprehensive knowledge of 
the subordinate segments of the party and electorate, and exerted tight control over this 
massive membership party through public opinion surveys (anketler), sophisticated 
technological and communication tools, party coordinators, ministers and deputies. The 
JDP elite also made great efforts to create a strong sense of participation in the party base 
through regular consultation meetings (istişareler), non-binding elections among selected 
party members (teşkilat temayül yoklamaları) and the intensive use of women’s branches 
for party activity. The JDP leader Erdoğan was located in the centre of this organizationa l 
circuit, and the simultaneous use of these instruments did not simply enhance the JDP 
centralism but also that of the autonomy of the party leader, preventing the accumula t ion 
of effective power in the hands of any individual or collective competitor within the 
organization.  
From a much broader theoretical perspective, I have argued that these organizationa l 
features of the JDP located the party in between the ideal typical mass-based and elite-
based party models elaborated upon in the theoretical section. While the JDP overcame 
the bureaucratic and ideological rigidity of the mass-based models through instruments 
of leadership control, controlled participation also helped the party to overcome the lack 
of motivation among the party activists found in elite-based models. The control of 
leadership over participation within the JDP prevented any fragmentation and dissolut ion 
of this large organization. Relying on the organizational dynamics delineated in this 




result, the JDP emerged as a hybrid electoral machine, or more precisely a “personalis t ic 
membership party”, achieving remarkable political resilience and electoral predominance. 
The case of the JDP therefore demonstrated that the mass-based models cannot be seen 
as a thing of the past as their various organizational legacies continue to shape politica l 
parties, particularly in the developing world.  
From the perspective of this chapter, a couple of future trends could also be identified 
with regards to the evolution of the JDP’s organizational dynamics. It is plausible to think 
that, while the JDP remain in power, as the party elite start to feel themselves more secure 
against the non-party political opposition, and as the party’s supporters take advantage of 
the party’s position in power for upwards socio-economic mobilization, the party might 
move closer to elite-based models. It can also be expected that, as the party remain in 
power, its incorporation with the state apparatuses might also enhance this trend towards 
the adaptation of elite-based models. The wider socio-economic transformation of Turkey 
throughout the JDP years might also have a deep impact on the JDP’s long-term evolution. 
As income levels of voters increase, internet use becomes widespread, and the rise of 
consumerism in Turkey gains a new momentum and provides more interesting social 
activities than party activism to the conservative JDP supporters, the party elite might 
increasingly need to adapt elite-based models. Hence, the depiction of the JDP 
organization in this chapter should be considered as a picture taken at a certain point 





7 ELITE RECRUITMENT in the JDP: “YOU DO NOT WANT THESE KINDS of 
PEOPLE in the PARLIAMENT” 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Since its foundation, the JDP’s ruling cadres were considered highly competent by the 
majority of the electorate and this perception contributed significantly to electoral support 
for the party, as previous research (Gidengil & Karakoç, 2014) has illustrated. This was 
why the JDP’s political appeal always contained the claim that “service delivery” (hizmet) 
by the “hard-working”, “competent” cadres was essential to the party’s mission. Hence, 
it is crucial to understand the dynamics of the JDP’s elite recruitment processes in order 
to understand its claim of managerial competence and the party’s electoral support that 
partly relies on this claim. How did the JDP define its candidates for crucial posts like 
local and national government? In this chapter I argue that the party leadership1 was able 
to select and support competent (in other words highly educated and experienced) and 
obedient candidates instead of popular local bosses by inhibiting factionalism through 
robust interventions to local and provincial party life. The JDP leadership carefully 
designed the formation of provincial governing bodies of the party, and this in turn 
provided it with almost indisputable authority over the party candidate selection 
processes, inhibited centrifugal tendencies and opened up room for the JDP elite to 
elevate competent candidates.  
In this dissertation, party organizations are seen “as clusters of relationships rather than 
as unitary ‘black boxes’” (Massicard & Watts, 2013: 4). Hence, it is vital to elaborate 
upon the recruitment processes since this is one of the most important activities in 
intraparty politics where researchers are able to see “clusters of relationships” among 
party hierarchies. As Hazan and Rahat underlined, candidate selection processes are “the 
best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party” (2010: 8). 
                                                                 
1 The term leadership with regards to JDP intraparty politics specifically refers to party chair Erdoğan. It 
also covers some other high-ranking, but not very visible, JDP members and advisors around Erdoğan who 
had strong leverage in the party’s decision-making processes. Although it is hard to single out names of 
these people, one of my interviewees , for example, underlined the influence of a powerful group around 
Erdoğan, three or four people who  ultimately defined the candidates of the party (Interviewee 9, 2014 
January 17). Regarding other fields of decision-making in the party, the leadership can refer to a wider 
group such as the Central Executive Committee. However, it would not be unfair to argue that Erdoğan had 
an overwhelming dominance over these secondary segments of the leadership whose positions were usually 




Candidate selection dynamics illustrate vital features of party organization (Hazan & 
Rahat, 2010: 10). In line with Hazan and Rahat, I understand the various methods of 
candidate selection processes to fall mainly on a scale between the “most exclusive” and 
“most inclusive” extremes, where the former represents the selection by one person [the 
party leader] and the latter represents selection by all voters (2010: 35). 
In section two I briefly describe the rise of leadership domination in the JDP and the 
formation of provincial governing bodies since these were key to inhibiting factiona lism 
within the party and, therefore, central to bringing the candidate selection processes under 
the control of the party leadership. In section three, I elaborate on the candidate selection 
processes. I pay a special attention to the different perceptions of candidate selection 
processes by people at different hierarchical levels of the party. I demonstrate that the 
party leadership had the ultimate say in the candidate selection processes and, despite the 
“official story” (Katz & Mair, 1994) described in the party statutes, the JDP elite 
embraced a highly exclusive selection method. The party leadership mostly took the 
results of public opinion surveys into account and made great efforts to make the party 
base feel that they had an influence over the candidate selection processes through the use 
of non-binding elections among selected party members.  
7.2 Inhibiting factionalism: leadership domination and provincial-local JDP 
branches 
In this section I firstly demonstrate the legal basis for the rise of central leadership 
domination in the JDP over both the central and provincial party elite, and the 
consolidation of party centralism in general. Afterwards, I illustrate briefly the extent and 
functioning of this central control over the provincial and local branches of the party 
through the example of the contentious JDP provincial branch convention in İstanbul in 
2009. In the last part of the section I draw attention to the general lines of the JDP elite’s 
outlook towards provincial- local politics. 
7.2.1 The rise of leadership domination in a young organization: “this is his store” 
Most of my interviewees agreed that there was tight control of the party leadership over 
provincial organizations. Some of my interviewees argued strongly that no one could 
remain within the organization, in central or provincial branches, against the will of 
Erdoğan (Interviewee 9 2014, January 17).2 As one of my interviewees told me, there was 
                                                                 




a well-known expression used by party members which indicated the tight grip of 
Erdoğan even over the smallest localities of the organization: “this is his store” (dükkan 
onun) (Interviewee 9 2014, January 17). According to the JDP statutes, the party 
leadership had the right to remove and change party chairs on the grounds of loosely 
defined reasons which weakened the legal protection of subordinate segments of the party 
vis-a-vis the central leadership (Ak Parti, 2012b: 36; articles 58 and 58.1). Apart from 
this, the party leadership also had the right to appoint party chairs and the governing 
bodies of the party (Ak Parti, 2012b: 36; article 57).  
According to one of my interviewees, a former JDP deputy, the first party statute of the 
JDP was written by a commission chaired by Hayati Yazıcı, a figure close to party chair 
Erdoğan (Interviewee 23 2014, March 7). The same interviewee also argued that the first 
statute of the party was “unrealistically” democratic and it gave too much power to 
ordinary party members and too little authority to the executive positions within the 
governing bodies of the party. Therefore, the same interviewee asked the commission to 
re-write the statute before it was too late and to place more power in the hands of 
provincial and sub-provincial chairs as well as the chairman of the party. As he 
mentioned, this statute of the party changed repeatedly even before the first general 
convention of the party.  
The amendments to the first party statute in 2001, where provincial party administrat ions 
and delegates were selected according to the “blanket list” (çarşaf liste) method, should 
be particularly highlighted. The “blanket list” method in the identification of party 
governing bodies was much more democratic since the delegates had a chance to identify 
individual members among a larger set of names for governing bodies of party branches 
instead of voting using an already prepared committee list for a given candidate for the 
chairmanship, as is the case with the “listing method” (blok liste). With the amendments 
to article 30.7 and 46.7 of the JDP statute in 2003, these positions started to be filled by 
the demands of the provincial party chairs. In addition, later amendments also granted the 
provincial and sub-provincial party chairs the right to define the composition of the local 
party executive committees.3 These amendments to the first party statute pushed the JDP 
in a much more hierarchical and centralised direction.  
                                                                 




This picture was also complemented by the consolidation of the party leader’s power vis-
a-vis the Central Decision and Administration Board (Merkez Karar ve Yönetim Kurulu)4 
of the party in 2003. The tight control of the leadership, and of Erdoğan in particular, was 
gradually constructed within the JDP through the collaboration between Erdoğan and the 
founders’ committee of the party and sustained through regular interventions by the party 
headquarters. This was mainly done through the consolidation of the party leader’s say in 
the appointment of national and provincial party executive committees and by truncating 
every potential accumulation of power at the local level through careful candidate 
selection processes. One of my interviewees, who was one of the founders of the party in 
a province, described the development of leadership domination in the JDP right at the 
beginning of the party’s political life in a detailed way. It should also be underlined that, 
in the beginning, the JDP had some really high standards, ideals and goals about intraparty 
democracy.5  
We had the general election in 2002. Two months before the general 
election they [most probably Erdoğan and his close colleagues] called 
upon the founders’ committee to make a statute change. In that meeting 
Mr. Tayyip told that “we are approaching the general election”. When 
we were approaching the general elections we were [around] 120 
people: 73 founders and 51 deputies. He [Tayyip Erdoğan] said, “We 
are approaching the general elections. Dear founder friends, I do not 
want to put you in a bad position before provincial and sub-provinc ia l 
chairs. If we go to the election with these articles [granting too much 
power to the party base and ordinary members in the identification of 
candidates], in order to become candidate deputies you might be a toy 
to provincial and sub-provincial chairs and members. And probably 
most of you would not be able to be nominated. This is why we have to 
change these articles”. I raised my hand and said, “I am here for these 
articles. This aspect distinguishes us from parties in the past. I know 
there are many problems with this method but it also puts our party in 
very close touch with ordinary people. Strong names, people who have 
strong representation capacity might come as deputies [as a result of 
this method]”. […] At the end, the committee voted through the changes 
[proposed by Erdoğan]. The result was this: 117 people voted yes for 
the changes and 3 people voted no. And people gave the chairman a 
five-minute standing ovation (Interviewee 21 2014, February 28–
March 4). 
                                                                 
4 The Central Decision and Administration Board of the party is a large central decision-making body in 
the JDP headquarters consisting of around 50 people. But the highest official ruling segment of the party is 
the Central Executive Committee which consists of only around 20 people. 
5 The first promotional video of the JDP in 2001 can be seen on YouTube. In this video, one of the repeated 
themes is the importance attached to intraparty democracy within the JDP. See the video titled Ak Parti’nin 





The centralisation within the party and the accumulation of power in the hands of the 
party leader continued after the abovementioned changes. In 2003, the party leadership 
abolished the articles on the election of the Central Decision and Administration Board 
of the party via a “blanket list” and instead adopted the “listing method”, where a single 
list prepared by the candidate for the chairmanship was voted on in the party’s grand 
convention. In addition to this, articles in the party’s first 2001 statute regarding the 
formation of the Central Executive Committee (Merkez Yürütme Kurulu) with an election 
among the Central Decision and Administration Board members of the party was 
amended in 2003 as well (Interviewee 21 2014, February 28–March 4). The new 
regulation reduced the strength of the Central Decision and Administration Board vis-a-
vis the party leader (Interviewee 21 2014, February 28–March 4). According to the new 
regulation, “all members of the central executive board other than the general chairman, 
as well as the chairman and deputy chairmen of the party’s GNAT [Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey – Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi] group, shall be nominated by the 
general chairman from among members of the central decision and administra t ive 
committee” and “all or some of members of the central executive board can be replaced 
by the general chairman” (Ak Parti, 2012b: 47; Article 79). 
Figure 7.1 illustrates how the first JDP statute envisaged a more or less even distribution 
of power within the party and how quickly this idea was abandoned by amendments to 
the first party statute. At the beginning, ordinary party members had a greater say in the 
formation of governing bodies in the localities and the party elite (the Сentral Decision 
and Administration Board) also had some sort of control over the formation of the Central 
Executive Committee – and, therefore, over the party leader. After the amendments, the 
party leader acquired the right to select all members of the Central Executive Committee, 
and the headquarters gained the right to define minute details of the provincial governing 
bodies through the abolition of the blanket list method. As a result, the party leader’s 
power vis-a-vis the party elite and the party base increased enormously in formal terms 




Figure 7.1: Approximate graphic representation of the change in the distribution of power, degree of 
centralisation and hierarchy within the JDP after amendments to the party statute of 2001 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
The party leadership not only exerted a tight control over the formation of party governing 
bodies in provinces but also took great care in creating an image of a highly unified and 
cohesive party organization in the eyes of the electorate. The party headquarters 
encouraged provincial branches to decide who would be party chair by an interna l 
discussion within local organizations before provincial- local conventions. That is to say, 
most of the JDP provincial conventions were only held to vote on a single candidate and 
a single party administration list: “The JDP has recommended a single list for 
conventions. There was an effort of reconciliation between groups supporting different 
lists” (Çarkçı, 2006: 9). Needless to say, it was much easier for the party leadership to 
shape provincial intraparty politics behind closed doors than in open competition between 
different lists in party conventions. 
7.2.2 An example of the central intervention in provincial organizations: the JDP 
İstanbul branch convention in 2009 
There were several exceptions to this imposition of the party leadership over the 
provincial branches in previous years. A particularly important exception was the 2009 
party branch convention in İstanbul, where two candidates – and, therefore, two different 
lists – were presented to the provincial party delegates. The convention resulted in the 




the party headquarters.6 In this convention, despite his support among the party base, the 
failed candidate could not overcome the support of the party leadership for the existing 
party chair of İstanbul. According to an observer of the convention process, one of the 
reasons behind the support of the party leadership for the existing chair was the failed 
candidate Külünk’s influence on the party base: “Külünk is liked by the party organiza t ion 
[in İstanbul]. It is unacceptable for a party leader to support a candidate for the İstanbul 
party chairmanship who has high leadership potential and is loved and respected by the 
party organizations” (Çetiner, 2009).  
Here, one should also note that Külünk had a very similar political background to that of 
Erdoğan. He came from the party base and worked at almost every level of the Islamist 
National View parties. He was also a remarkable orator. Hence, it is highly credible to 
think that Erdoğan did not want a potential competitor at the top of the İstanbul 
organization. However, one should also add that, during this period, Külünk carefully 
refrained from open confrontation with Erdoğan and publicly praised him (Aktifhaber , 
2009). Eventually, Külünk was nominated as a candidate in the 2011 general elections 
and became a deputy in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Although the new title 
sounds like a promotion, it was hardly a better and more influential position than being 
the İstanbul chair of the ruling party.7   
This convention indicated that the party leadership carefully designed and supervised 
provincial organizations and inhibited the rise of powerful local bosses. Yet, one should 
also note cautiously that, given its importance, İstanbul was too big a party branch for the 
party leadership to lose its grip over the local organization. However, throughout this 
                                                                 
6 According to a news article, the party convention was held in a tense atmosphere where there was a 
competition between Metin Külünk, who was supported by the party base, and Aziz Babuşcu, who was 
supported by the party headquarters (Milliyet, 2009).  
7 It could be possible to consider Külünk’s  candidacy for the İstanbul chairmanship as a deliberate tactic to 
make himself more visible and gain a position within the party. Thus, he was able to be nominated by the 
party for the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This tactic of aspiring politicians “gaining position by 
candidacy” was underlined by various sources. According to Şentürk’s guide to aspiring politicians, “if the 
conjecture is suitable, even if you do not have a chance to be nominated you should be a nominee for 
candidacy. As a result, party administrators would later nominate you for another post [albeit a smaller 
one]” (2006: 72). A very similar situation was indicated by the İzmir chair of the party: “A guy tells me 
that I am a candidate for the mayoralty within the party. Hence, he thinks that his candidacy for the 
municipal assembly is fixed then. For instance the candidacy for the Grand National Assembly of Turkey… 
He puts some money and becomes a candidate for the Grand National Assembly of Turkey within the party. 
There is no doubt that he would not be nominated as a candidate for the Grand National Assembly of Turkey 
by the party. But what does he do? He tells me that ‘I was a candidate for the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey within the party’ and expects a promotion within the bureaucracy” (Soyoğul, 2013). This can be 




dissertation, I have illustrated that the party leadership wanted to tighten its grip even over 
less significant local-provincial segments of the party. This was why, as one of my 
interviewees underlined, the party headquarters always encouraged provincial party 
organizations to have a single candidate and, thus, a single party administration list in 
provincial party conventions (Interviewee 16 2014, February 20). It was apparently much 
easier for the party leadership to influence discussions behind closed doors than the 
transparent competition of different candidates and lists in conventions. Nevertheless, if 
the party leadership encountered such open competition, they did not refrain from 
explicitly supporting one of the candidates. According to one of the abovementioned 
observers of the 2009 İstanbul party convention, one of the vice-chairs of the party and a 
member of the Central Executive Committee said that “no party leaves its conventions to 
the chance. We have worked on this too and one and a half months ago decided to 
continue with Aziz Babuşçu [the then existing party chair in İstanbul]” (Çetiner, 2009). 
7.2.3 Legitimizing rationales behind the central interventions: central suspicion 
towards local politics 
It is safe to argue that the party leadership attached great importance to the formation of 
provincial governing bodies of the party. According to one of my interviewees, a hard-
working provincial chair always made a huge difference and the supervision by the 
headquarters over the provincial organizations was necessary for inhibiting the 
development of so-called “particularistic relations”, in other words centrifugal, provinc ia l 
power holding groups/coalitions and local political machines, in the local branches 
(Interviewee 49 2014, May 8). The same interviewee also told me that the party paid great 
attention to the formation of party governing bodies in order to eliminate the presence of, 
for example, two members with a business partnership or familial relationship. The party 
leadership usually did not allow the existence of strong particularistic coalitions at 
provincial levels.  
Another interviewee, an executive committee member of a provincial party organizat ion, 
argued that, unlike previous parties in South East Turkey, the JDP was always careful not 
to be seen as strongly identified with a specific social group in the city (Interviewee 46 
2014, May 6). Hence, according to my interviewees’ narratives, the party tried to reflect 
the plurality of the electorate in party governing bodies. And this situation was often used 
as the justification for regular interventions by the party headquarters in local politics. 




the party that may arise from the nature of local politics and its particularistic tendencies, 
and used this as the basis for central interventions. Hence, the party leadership had a firm 
belief in the necessity of close supervision by headquarters and a weak trust in the 
spontaneity of local politics.  
This picture should also be complemented by the frequent circulations in party governing 
bodies due to interventions by the party leadership. As one of my senior interviewees 
underlined, the benefit of this circulation was the revitalization of the party governing 
bodies by new, enthusiastic, aspiring people (Interviewee 37 2014, April 24). But it seems 
that another benefit of the frequent circulation of provincial governing bodies as well as 
parliamentary deputies was inhibiting any potential consolidation of factions or 
particularistic interest circles other than the leadership within the party. Another indicator 
of this strategy was the discussions within the JDP over the “three-term rule” in the party 
statute. According to these articles, the party leader, deputies, mayors, provincial, sub-
provincial and town chairs from the JDP could not run as candidates for a fourth 
subsequent term.8 Although at the time of this writing this regulation would affect 73 
existing deputies of the party, including several ministers and executive committee 
members, it was not changed (Sabah, 2014).   
In this section of the paper I have illustrated that, despite the party’s high standards with 
regards to intraparty democracy at the time of its foundation, the leadership constructed 
the legal grounds for a firm grip over provincial party life and over potential centrifuga l 
tendencies within the higher echelons of the party through amendments to the party 
statutes at the very beginning of its political life. As the example of the İstanbul 
convention of the party illustrated, the party leadership actively inhibited spontaneous 
developments in the provincial branches and carefully designed governing bodies in 
localities. The party leadership often legitimized central interventions on the grounds that 
local and provincial politics were prone to defending particularistic interests instead of 
the general interests of the party and the country. 
7.3 Elevating competent candidates 
In this section I take a closer look at the JDP’s candidate selection processes. I firstly 
illustrate the formal regulations of the party and draw attention to the difference of the 
processes in practice from those in written regulations – or the “official story”, as Katz 
                                                                 




and Mair (1994) have termed it. Afterwards, I demonstrate two competing views on the 
candidate selection processes, those of the party elite and the party rank-and-file. These 
different points of view specifically illustrated the highly “exclusive” approach to 
candidate selection in the JDP. In the last part of this section, I illustrate the strategy of 
the central JDP elite towards local and provincial power holders in the party’s candidate 
selection processes. 
7.3.1 Formal regulations and practical realities 
According to the written party regulations, three methods were used in the identifica t ion 
of the candidates for local and general elections and the party had the right to use different 
methods in different instances of candidate selection: “primary elections” (önseçim), 
“non-binding elections among selected party members” (or “organizational roll call” as 
they described it in the English translation of the JDP statute) (teşkilat temayül yoklaması) 
and the “central roll call” (merkez yoklaması) (Ak Parti, 2012b: 69). According to the JDP 
statute, “an organizational roll call is an event which is held for the purpose of [the] 
identification and ranking of candidates of the party by […] members of the party, who 
are considered as voters for the organizational roll call, using the method of secret ballot 
and open classification under judicial supervision and audit in accordance with the 
principles and methods laid down in the Law on Political Parties” (Ak Parti, 2012b: 70). 
On the other hand, the “central roll call”, according to the JDP statute, “is an event which 
is held for the purpose of [the] identification and ranking of candidates of the party 
directly by the central decision and administrative committee” (Ak Parti, 2012b: 70). 
What distinguished the organizational roll calls from primary elections was the specific 
definition of the people eligible to vote in these elections, most of whom came from the 
executive positions of the party organizations. More importantly, unlike primary 
elections, organizational roll calls did not produce binding results for the party 
headquarters and were only seen as a decision support mechanism, a single component 
of a wider set of data received by the party headquarters. One should also add that 
“organizational roll calls”, or “non-binding elections among selected party members” as 
they are termed in this dissertation, were used for examining the inclinations of party 
branches. This is why it was called teşkilat or temayül yoklaması in Turkish, which 
literally translates as “organizational inclination examination” in English. Although the 
party statute indicated that there would be an open classification for the organizationa l 




declared to the party base by headquarters (Çarkçı, 2006: 6). According to the JDP statute, 
the individuals eligible to vote in the “organizational roll calls” or “the non-binding 
elections among selected members” were mostly active and former members of the party 
with high-ranking, executive positions (Ak Parti, 2012b: 70).  
However, most of my interviewees underlined three methods in their narratives on 
candidate selection processes, and it seems that the practical realities of these processes 
were quite different from those set out in the written regulations of the party. The methods 
indicated by my interviewees were “non-binding elections among selected members” 
(known as teşkilat temayül yoklaması in Turkish), “a public opinion survey conducted by 
the party headquarters” (popularly known as ‘questionnaire’, or anket, among the party 
members) and “the consultations of the party headquarters” (popularly known as istişare 
among the party members). According to the views of a high ranking member in the 
official publication of the party, the Turkey Bulletin (Türkiye Bülteni), the candidate 
selection process appeared to be an evaluation of the data in the party headquarters  
received through questionnaires, consultations and non-binding elections (Çetinkaya, 
2003: 51). Apparently, the last word in the candidate selection process belonged to the 
party headquarters as it was with the formation of provincial governing bodies. Apart 
from these mechanisms, the role of the deputies and ministers from the region was 
influential in the process (Interviewee 8 2014, January 15).9    
Thus, the tight control over provincial organizations and local politics by the party 
leadership described above was complemented by the close supervision of the candidate 
selection processes. Nevertheless, candidate selection processes reflected the main 
problems of tight leadership control over provincial branches: the tension between 
provincial organizations, the party base and the party leadership, or the tension between 
“inclusive” and “exclusive” methods in candidate selection processes. This tension paved 
the way for two different narratives of candidate selection processes: the narrative of the 
party elite vs. the narrative of the “true democrats”, junior members and failed candidates. 
Here I argue that, these two narratives were two sides of the same coin and the JDP 
leadership was usually successful at striking a fine balance between these segments’ 
diverging expectations within the organization. The autonomy of the JDP leadership, 
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interview with the JDP İzmir chair. In this interview the JDP chair described an incident where a deputy 





which was reliant upon the tight leadership control, on the one hand, and the controlled 
participation of the party base on the other hand, as illustrated in the previous chapter, 
was key to this capacity of the JDP leadership.  
7.3.2 Two narratives: the party elite vs. “true democrats” 
There was a particular advantage in interviewing party members from different 
hierarchical levels of the organization and with different positions within the party. These 
different points of views illustrated the uneven distribution of power within the 
organization and demonstrated how the lack of any meaningful power in the hands of the 
party base was justified and explained by more senior members. These narratives of the 
members of different levels of the party also illustrated the fragile balance between the 
leadership and grass roots organization. They revealed how important it was for a party 
to protect the balance between “responsiveness and responsibility” and “popularity and 
merit”. In other words, as discussed in previous chapters, striking a fine balance between 
the “short term requirements of electoral processes” and the “long term requirements of 
being in office” was one of the the main achievements of the JDP leadership. Overcoming 
the discontent of the party base stemming from the central interventions was key to this 
achievement. 
During my interviews I observed that questions regarding the candidate selection 
processes within the party received a straightforward answer. The headquarters, and 
particularly the party leader Erdoğan, had the ultimate say in the process (Interviewee 9 
2014, January 17). Most of my interviewees told me that public opinion surveys 
(questionnaires) were the main instrument used in the decision of the party headquarters.10 
Nevertheless, one of the interviewees also told me that organizational roll calls or non-
binding elections among selected members made a difference if there were two good 
candidates from the same branch of the party (Interviewee 18 2014, February 26).   
Apart from this, my interviewees often told me that even very limited personal contact 
with Erdoğan provided a huge advantage in party candidate selection processes. One of 
my high-ranking interviewees, who occupied a senior ministerial post, told me that he 
had just been physically present with Erdoğan in the same place a couple of times and 
Erdoğan did not forget this (Interviewee 14 2014, February 10). Another interviewee, 
who was a former deputy, also underlined the importance of personal contact with 
                                                                 




Erdoğan. The crucial part of this example was that it showed how a personal reference 
from Erdoğan by-passed the local dynamics: 
From my electoral province the party had six deputies [in parliament]. 
Three of them were directly chosen on the demand of the Prime 
Minister [Erdoğan]. None of those three had any stable connection with 
my province. One of those deputies was the [relationship redacted] of 
the Prime Minister, one of them had […] ties with him and the third one 
was another person who had a personal contact with Prime Minister 
(Interviewee 23 2014, March 7).  
According to my interviewees, Erdoğan’s main criteria in this selection were loyalty and 
obedience to the leadership (Interviewee 7 2014, January 15). This dynamic in the 
candidate selection processes should also be considered as one of the very fundamenta l 
aspects of personalism in the JDP, elaborated upon in depth in Chapter 4. Thus, in his 
book, written in an ironic style, Şentürk (a former member of the Islamist National View 
parties and the JDP) illustrated the leadership domination over the candidate selection 
processes in Turkey’s political parties with the following joke:  
A deputy who had been elected to the parliament for a couple of 
consecutive terms was asked about the reasons for his achievement. He 
neatly replied, “I do whatever my electorate says.” Then he was asked, 
“How is it possible to do whatever you are told by thousands of 
people?” He replied, “I do not have thousands of voters. I have only a 
single electorate. He is my chairman. I do whatever he asks.” (2006: 
43). 
In the following sub-sections I demonstrate how this overwhelming domination of the 
party centre and this highly exclusive method of candidate selection was rationalized and 
legitimized by the party elite and to what extent these justifications were accepted by the 
party rank-and-file. 
7.3.2.1 Party elites assessing the candidate selection processes: “you do not want these 
kinds of people in the parliament” 
During my interviews I observed that there were some regular patterns of justifica t ion 
used by the party headquarters against local branches. For example, one of my 
interviewees told me that when the party needed some people with particular expertise 
for bureaucratic positions, it became natural – and, most of the time, inevitable – to ignore 
the choices of local party branches (Interviewee 12 2014, February 6).  
The need for experts within parliament, local governments, and local assemblies was 




into provincial- local politics. It should be noted that the higher the position of the party 
member, the more likely that s/he highlighted the necessity of having experts and well-
educated people within the party ranks. High-ranking party members were also more 
likely to say that “tricks” and “ruses” were used by the people in the lower party 
hierarchies in candidate selection processes. One of my interviewees told me that 
organizational roll calls or non-binding elections among selected party members cannot 
be considered a reliable method without reservation. He explained this opinion with a 
fictional example: “if the only criterion in candidate selection process was the success of 
the candidate in the non-binding election (teşkilat yoklaması), a local mafia boss could 
have easily provided the support of some of the members of the local branch through 
money. You do not want these kinds of people in the parliament” (Interviewee 14 2014, 
February 10).  
Another high-ranking interviewee highlighted a similar explanation for the necessity of 
mechanisms other than “non-binding elections” in candidate selection processes. 
According to this interviewee there was a tendency called “organizational conservatism” 
(teşkilat taassubu). This tendency simply referred to the local party branches’ tendency 
to support candidates from within the local organization. He argued that: 
Local party branches might tend to support their own people even if 
they are incompetent. This is why there are questionnaires [public 
opinion surveys] and reliable people who provide references for 
candidates. Take a candidate with a graduate degree from abroad and 
who is really competent and has the required skills and expertise as an 
example. The local organization and electorate of the region do not 
know this candidate (Interviewee 18 2014, February 26). 
Indeed, it seems that the party elite usually did not rely on the view of the provincial- loca l 
party branches and the base, and thought that relying on them might be misleading, as 
Şentürk, one of the JDP elites, implied in an interview: 
Sometimes, the selectorate attaches too much importance to themselves 
and tends to choose candidates among themselves. However, the party 
has to provide a vision to society. They have to make some people 
visible but these kinds of people do not really have a chance in the party 
base. The party base tends to protect their own members. […] When 
you ask the party base, they point out each other. Especially 
neighbourhood representatives have a very strong solidarity and they 
vote each other. Hence, candidates who are not neighbourhood 




Hence, the party elite thought that “it would be misleading only to rely on views stemming 
from the party branches” (Çarkçı, 2006: 11). Thus, it seems that in order to solve the 
contradiction between organizational belonging vs. merit, and responsiveness vs. 
responsibility, the party elite saw the headquarters’ intervention as inevitable. In other 
words, in order to provide competent enough cadres, the JDP elite sometimes had to 
intervene into local politics and implant candidates preferred by the party headquarters in 
place of candidates proposed by local JDP organizations. However, these interventions 
were made in such a way – through the use of non-binding elections and consultations – 
that the party base did not feel that they did not have any say in the process. To a certain 
extent, ignoring local-provincial choices was, in fact, necessary to elevate competent 
candidate profiles within the party for a massive organization like the JDP. Yet these 
explanations could also be considered as justifications for central leadership domination 
within the JDP.    
7.3.2.2 Reflections of disappointed candidates, the rank-and-file and “true 
democrats” 
Not surprisingly, lower-ranking members or members with looser links with the party due 
to their failure in candidate selection processes tended to be more critical of the processes. 
The party rank-and-file complained about the interventions and resistance of high-rank ing 
members to the wishes of local JDP branches. Nevertheless, the party rank-and-file 
usually had no problem with the final say of the party leader Erdoğan, but they tended to 
complain about the “manipulative interventions” of deputies, ministers or influentia l 
people in the decisions of the leader  (Interviewee 8 2014, January 15).  As the party 
became more and more centralised, as illustrated in the previous section, public opinion 
surveys conducted by the party headquarters became much more effective than non-
binding elections among selected party members in the identification of candidates. It 
also seems that candidates close to decision makers in the headquarters were always much 
more advantaged than other candidates with weaker ties to the centre (Interviewee 10 
2014, January 18).  
Nevertheless, particularly in the identification of candidates for local elections, local party 
branches had some leverage in the process, especially through non-binding elections 
among selected party members. For example, in local elections, according to one of my 
interviewees, it was almost impossible to nominate a candidate for the mayoralty if the 




This was why, in his guide to aspiring politicians, Şentürk, a former JDP vice-chair in 
İstanbul, underlined the necessity of being supported by the local party organization and 
the base: 
If you are done with getting the support of the high-ranking party 
members you need to get the support of lower levels of the party as a 
legitimizing factor. They [high-ranking party members] are less 
hesitant to support the candidate who is supported by the party rank-
and-file. But they hesitate to support the candidate who is absolutely 
disliked by the party base. […] They [high-ranking party members] 
need to write the candidate who is liked by the party branches to the 
middle of the list if not to the top (2006: 71). 
Hence it seems that, especially in local elections, local party branches might not have 
been successful at identifying a candidate supported by the local branch but they could 
stop the nomination of a candidate who was disliked by the entire branch. Thus, local 
party branches had a kind of negative force in the candidate selection processes within 
the party, particularly in local elections.  
There were also other factors and instruments influential in the party candidate selection 
process. According to one of my interviewees, a deputy from a different province was 
sent to another province as a neutral observer of the local candidate identification process 
(Interviewee 7 2014, January 15). Another interviewee, a neighbourhood representative , 
also told me that regions with deputies and ministers were less successful in the local 
elections due to the influence of these people from the higher levels of the party in the 
local candidate identification process. He also expressed his doubts about the public 
opinion surveys used by the party headquarters in the identification of candidates 
(Interviewee 8 2014, January 15). Indeed, it seems that public opinion surveys could also 
be manipulated. As Şentürk underlined, “there were parties in the past which wanted to 
decide [only] by relying on public opinion surveys. But what have we witnessed? All 
these public opinion surveys were manipulated. […] These have been distorted in favour 
of particular candidates” (Çarkçı, 2006: 7).  
Another interviewee also described the candidate selection process within the party in 
line with the above accounts. According to her, people close to the headquarters always 
had an upper hand in the candidate identification processes (Interviewee 10 2014, January 
18). Another interviewee described the process in a similar vein. According to him, 
particularly in the identification of candidates for the parliament, local party organizat ions 




10%. For instance, non-binding elections (teşkilat temayül yoklamaları), according to 
him, had almost no effect in the identification of candidates for parliamentary elections 
(Interviewee 9 2014, January 17). This statement was confirmed by Şentürk in his 
interview on intraparty democracy. According to Şentürk: 
If we consider the identification of the candidates according to non-
binding elections (teşkilat yoklaması) which was especially deployed 
by the Welfare Party in the past... Here again, there is a problem. 
Usually particular people had been already defined by the party 
headquarters. They ask the organization in order to legitimize this 
decision. They do not declare the results either. In other words there is 
a secret ballot, and secret counting. Votes are secret but counting should 
be transparent. But in those years no single result of non-binding 
elections were declared to the organizations. Because they usually did 
not observe the results. If they thought it was appropriate they just told 
people that “brother, you wanted this” but usually they remained silent. 
This was a pretence. This is cheating the people. This is an appeasing 
meeting, it is not a consultation. You should not abuse the concepts. It 
is appeasing the [local] organization by telling them you had a 
consultation, a non-binding election. In this sense [these instruments ] 
do not make sense for intraparty democracy (Çarkçı, 2006: 6).  
Instead, according to one of my interviewees, candidates for the parliamentary group were 
chosen by Prime Minister Erdoğan and his three or four close colleagues (Interviewee 9 
2014, January 17). As underlined above, a question regarding the criteria used by decision 
makers in the candidate selection process also revealed the hierarchical, centralized and 
personalist characteristics of the JDP organization. Not surprisingly, one of my 
interviewees defined the ultimate criteria in the candidate selection process within the 
party as “loyalty and fidelity” to Erdoğan (Interviewee 7 2014, January 15).  
Despite the tight grip of the leadership over provincial organizations, during my interview 
process I also noticed that there was also a particular gap between provincial and sub-
provincial party branches in big cities such as İstanbul, Ankara and Konya. One of my 
interviewees told me that local dynamics played a major role in the sub-provinc ia l 
branches of the party. According to him, sub-provincial party chairs were directly 
exposed to the local demands. He argued that sub-provincial and neighbourhood levels 
were the main levels where you “do politics” (Interviewee 12 2014, February 6). As a 
result, despite the tight control of the party leadership over provincial organizations, it 
seems that a particular gap started to appear between sub-provincial party organizat ions 
and the provincial and national leadership. This gap could even be observed between the 




the party elite tended to underline the necessity of leadership interventions due to the 
technocratic requirements of the governmental processes, the party base tended to 
complain about the weakness of the leverage of ordinary members in the formation of 
governing bodies and identification of candidates. While the former legitimized its 
intervention through defending the general interests of the party and the country, the latter 
complained about the party’s disregard of local dynamics. Yet the latter did not show 
massive dissent against the central interventions at the level of provincial-local politics 
due to their trust in Erdoğan and the controlled participation channels illustrated in the 
previous chapter. 
7.3.3 Coping with local bosses and centrifugal tendencies 
As illustrated in the previous section, the formation of provincial party branches was 
closely supervised by the headquarters and the party leadership constantly impeded the 
development of centrifugal tendencies or accumulation of power in the hands of local 
elites. In order to do this, the party mainly relied upon specific candidate and local chair 
profiles in provinces and localities. These people in the key executive positions of the 
party in the provinces revealed a particular socio-economic similarity. For instance, none 
of my interviewees from the executive circles of the party in the provinces came from 
rich, influential local families and they did not have any power base of their own. Most 
of them were rather submissive, civil-servant-type administrators with white-collar jobs 
and a fairly good education instead of rich, local bosses with influence in the city politics. 
Indeed, more than half of the party provincial chairs had white-collar jobs at the time of 
writing of this dissertation.11 Only 13 of these provincial chairs were businessmen or 
owners of small businesses (esnaf). The rest of the provincial chairs were lawyers, 
engineers, financial advisors and pharmacists; in other words they had white-collar 
occupations and highly educated backgrounds compared to the average Turkish citizen. 
The professional distribution of JDP provincial chairs could be seen in the following 
Table 7.1.  
 
 
                                                                 
11  In order to see the backgrounds of JDP executives I mainly relied on the short biograp hies of the 




Table 7.1: Professions of the JDP provincial chairs by 2014 
Professions Numbers 
Lawyer 28 
Businessman - small commerce  13 
Engineer  8 
Financial advisor 3 
Pharmacist 2 





Source: Author’s compilation of the information in short biographies of JDP provincial executives on JDP 
provincial branch websites  
 
This pattern is also compatible with the importance attached to the candidates’ 
educational level by the party leadership. Despite the “low-populist” political appeal of 
the party illustrated in Chapter 3, there was a strong tendency in the preferences of the 
party leadership towards competency and education over popularity in the recruitment of 
its national and local elites.12 It seems that, to a great extent, the same pattern was valid 
for deputies of the party and candidate profiles in general in provincial cities. The party 
leadership preferred relatively more obedient but well-educated candidates for general 
elections.  Hence, this pattern is a concrete evidence of the fact that the party leadership 
had a remarkably “high” attitude towards intraparty politics.  
All of these methods, in the context of the abovementioned identification of the local and 
provincial party governing bodies and deputies, provided strong leverage to the party 
leadership vis-à-vis local and provincial power holders. In interviews, party members 
tended to underline the strength of ordinary people before local elites through the support 
of party headquarters (Interviewee 49 2014, May 8). To a great extent this was, indeed, 
the strategy of the JDP leadership. One indication of this strategic tendency was, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the women and youth quotas that the party 
implemented. Nevertheless, it seems that the party leadership also did not hesitate to 
nominate local bosses as long as they remained loyal to the leadership. This was why one 
of my interviewees, the chair of one of the South Eastern provinces, underlined the 
success of the party in his region, where traditional-local elite such as elders of tribal 
                                                                 




families and religious figures had a decisive influence over politics (Interviewee 43 2014, 
May 3).  
However, compared to its rightist predecessors (as elaborated upon in Chapter 5), the JDP 
leadership tended to establish less compromising links with those groups that had the 
potential to cast bloc votes consisting of thousands. In other words, instead of accepting 
all the demands raised by powerful groups and individuals in localities and negotiat ing 
with the representatives of these communities for votes, as the former centre-right parties 
did, the JDP elite preferred reaching voters individually through its robust membership 
organization and through by-passing powerful intermediaries whenever it was possible. 
After all, as one of my interviewees explained in great detail, relying on powerful 
intermediaries also entailed specific problems that the JDP wished to avoid: 
When you put a tribe’s candidate [on the candidate list for the office] 
and when he is elected by a slim margin by the support of his tribe you 
usually lose the votes of other electors in the region. What the JDP 
underwent in 2009 was this. […] When you ignore all these options and 
nominate ordinary candidates from among the people you get 63%. […] 
These guys [candidates of tribes] come to interviews for the candidacy 
and argue, “I have this many guaranteed – bloc votes (paket oy). 
Therefore nominate me and win the election. For if you do not nomina te 
me you won’t win.” There is this arrogance (küstahlık) too. Until now, 
every righ-wing party believed this and was afraid of challenging this 
force [of local power holders]. It is pragmatical too: “Why shall I fight 
with these people. Put the guy on the list, after all he has bloc votes.” 
This [strategy] even has short-term [negative] consequences. Because 
when you put tribal candidates you make them happy but you upset the 
rest of the electorate. […] When you do not develop alliances with the 
tribes the only option remains for protecting your power is collaborat ing 
with masses in the region. This is what JDP does (Interviewee 38 2014, 
April 25).  
In order to target voters individually the JDP, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
developed elaborate ballot box committees.13 As one of my interviewees from the South 
Eastern region of the country underlined, “through a ballot box-based approach, the JDP 
tries to activate all individual members of the party. […] A ballot box-based approach is 
this: there are approximately 350 members in each ballot box [region]. […] and in these 
ballot box [regions] the party has approximately 20–30 members. The party defines an 
administration board from among these members of the ballot box [region]: the ballot box 
committee. This committee organizes a meeting with all party members in this ballot box 
                                                                 




[region]. We call this a ballot box consultation meeting. And in these meetings [the party] 
tries to activate the members and tries to reach all the voters in this ballot box through its 
members. This is to say that party members are constantly in touch with voters on behalf 
of the party” (Interviewee 46 2014, May 6). As another interviewee pointed out, “the aim 
here is to reduce the election campaign to the level of the ballot box. One-to-one marking! 
(Bire bir markaj!). This is a much more effective method than speaking to an audience in 
a coffee house, in a meeting with the microphone in your hand” (Interviewee 7 2014, 
January 15). 
A strong indication of this strategic tendency was the JDP’s approach to the powerful İzol 
tribe in Urfa in the 2011 general election. In this election, the JDP headquarters did not 
nominate the candidate of the İzol tribe. Apart from him, it seems that the party leadership 
avoided nominating any tribal leader in the city.14 Indeed, as I illustrated in the previous 
chapter, the JDP headquarters used public opinion surveys in order to examine the valid ity 
of the claims of the provincial-local power holders. As one of my interviewees underlined, 
party research conducted prior to the 2011 general elections in Urfa revealed that the 
existing local political elite in the city at that time had not really been embraced by the 
electorate of the province (Interviewee 38 2014, April 25). Thus, the party leadership was 
able to reject the demands of local power holders.  
It seems that not only in Urfa but also in Diyarbakır the JDP leadership was able to 
nominate people other than local power holders (Gürses, 2011). This situation illustrated 
the role of public opinion surveys in the concentration of power in the hands of the central 
JDP leadership. As some of my interviewees underlined, there was already a weakening 
of the local political elites’ power base in the region due to the PKK’s (Partiya Karkeren 
Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers’ Party) assaults on tribal leaders and the accelerating 
urbanisation and improvements of mass communication channels (Interviewee 38 2014, 
April 25).15  Hence, tribal vote blocs had already started to dissolve. As one of my 
interviewees underlined, even if a tribal leader decisively supported another direction than 
the JDP, due to their sympathy towards Erdoğan, a considerable number from that tribe 
would vote for the JDP (Interviewee 44 2014, May 4).    
                                                                 
14 According to a news article, except for one person, the JDP did not nominate any tribal leader for the 12 
chairs allocated to Urfa in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in the 2011 general elections (Takvim, 
2011).  




It seems that public opinion surveys provided the party with a much more solid idea about 
the inclinations in local politics, and thus encouraged the party leadership to deploy a 
centralized strategy in the region for candidate selection processes. Indeed, particula r ly 
in Urfa in the 2011 general elections, the JDP was very successful using the 
abovementioned strategy, winning 10 seats out of 12. As underlined by a local journalist, 
as a result of coming from a different background than tribal families, candidates of the 
JDP were more prone to cooperation in that particular election and this convinced the 
electorate that the JDP would be beneficial as a team to the city. He also argued that “the 
election in Urfa revealed the following truth: the predominace of tribes’ influence on 
politics in Urfa is over. From now on tribal candidates should not argue that ‘I have this 
many votes’. […] Now in every tribe every individual has dared to cast his/her vote 
according to his/her logic” (Kapaklı, 2011). It seems that, as much as the gradual decline 
of feudal ties in the city, the local election results in Urfa also indicated the firm grip of 
the JDP leadership on provincial organizations and local politics. This was even the case 
in a city like Urfa where informal-primordial networks had such a remarkable influence 
on party politics.16 Thus, it would be plausible to argue that the JDP leadership established 
unprecedented control over provincial, local politics across Turkey.    
In this section I have illustrated that there was a certain gap between the formal 
regulations and practical realities and between the official and the real story regarding the 
candidate selection processes in the JDP. In practice, the JDP’s candidate selection 
processes were highly exclusive, in other words, there was almost only a single 
selectorate: the party leader Erdoğan. In this section I have also illustrated that there was 
a certain difference in the perception of the candidate selection processes in the JDP. 
While the party elite saw the central interventions in the candidate selection processes as 
inevitable and necessary due to the so-called “organizational conservatism” in the 
provincial- local party life, the party rank-and-file, “true democrats” and failed candidates 
tended to underline the problems of central interventions and complained about the lack 
of any meaningful leverage in the hands of the party base. However, the party base usually 
did not show any massive dissent against these interventions, mostly because of their 
emotional engagement with the leadership and partly because of the organizationa l 
mechanics of the party, described in the previous chapter, which created a strong sense 
of participation in the party base. This tight control over the party base in the JDP was 
                                                                 




complemented by a less compromising attitude towards local and provincial power 
holders with regards to the candidate selections processes. This also increased party 
autonomy and opened up room for the JDP elite to promote well-educated and competent 
– yet, at the same time, highly obedient – candidates. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have illustrated how the central JDP leadership constantly intervened in 
the formation of local-provincial governing bodies of the party across Turkey and how 
they elevated competent yet obedient candidates within the party. The party leadership 
decisively tried to inhibit the formation of strong local particularistic coalitions through 
constant interventions and frequently changed governing bodies in local branches. The 
JDP elite legitimized central interventions in local politics through highlighting the 
potential dangers to the party’s general policies that could stem from the popular but 
incompetent candidates chosen by local party branches. Therefore, the JDP candidate 
selection processes were “highly exclusive”. Total control by the JDP leader Erdoğan 
over the identification of candidates for local and national governments inhibited the rise 
of local political elites with strong support bases. Instead, the JDP leadership preferred 
highly obedient but well-educated and competent candidates. These candidates selected 
by party leader Erdoğan, in turn, remained loyal to the general party policies and Erdoğan, 
and could not develop strong particularistic interests or local political machines. 
The potential dissent against the highly exclusive candidate selection processes was also 
absorbed by the party leadership. On the one hand, on the basis of their trust in Erdoğan’s 
personality and political experience, the party base tended to approve the interventions of 
the centre in local politics. Intensive consultation meetings (istişareler) and non-binding 
elections among selected party members (teşkilat temayül yoklamaları) also provided a 
strong sense of participation by the party base in candidate selection processes. On the 
other hand, the direct appeal of Erdoğan to the electorate and public opinion surveys 
conducted by the headquarters left the provincial-local power holders in a weaker position 
vis-a-vis the central JDP leadership and made resistance to the central elite interference 
in local politics a highly risky strategy. Despite its “low-populist” political appeal, the 
JDP elite had a strikingly “high” attitude with regards to the party’s recruitment processes.  
This highly exclusive candidate selection strategy, without the alienation of the party base 
and local elites, gave rise to more competent yet obedient candidates within the party and 




electorate. The image of the party’s managerial competence, in turn, consolidated the 




8 CONCLUSIONS: FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
8.1 The puzzle, main arguments and empirical findings of the research 
This dissertation has focused on the reasons for the electoral success and politica l 
resilience of the Justice and Development Party (JDP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in 
Turkey between 2002 and 2014. At the time of writing, the JDP had recently come to 
power for the fourth time with a snap election on 1 November 2015, receiving almost 
50% of the votes after losing power, or the ability to form a single-party majority 
government, on 7 June 2015. One of the most striking aspects of the JDP’s first major 
electoral failure was that the party received around 40% of the votes in the thirteenth year 
of its incumbency. Even a major electoral failure did not distort the picture of extremely 
steady popular appeal, which provided the JDP and its leader Erdoğan between 35–50% 
of all votes in the last ten Turkish elections. At the time of writing, despite many social, 
political and economic crises, which would have destroyed many governments in liberal 
democratic settings, the subject matter of this dissertation was still very much alive and 
perhaps stronger than ever. In this dissertation, I have proposed answers to the puzzle of 
the JDP’s electoral and political resilience from a party agency perspective. 
The proximity to the people through diligent organizational activity as well as through a 
“low-populist” political appeal/style were always central to the JDP’s electoral and 
political resilience. In other words, party agency – organization, strategies and politica l 
appeals – was the key to the JDP’s electoral and political resilience. In empirical terms, I 
have argued that the combination of a “low-populist” political appeal/style and a year-
round active, large and pervasive membership organization tightly controlled by a diligent 
leadership and supported by political marketing techniques and extensive media control 
(a personalistic membership party), was central to the electoral achievements and politica l 
resilience of the JDP for over a dozen years. Hence the primary contribution of this 
dissertation is the detailed empirical illustration of the functioning of the JDP’s 
organization and the demonstration of the party’s “low-populist” political appeal to the 
economically disadvantaged majority of the country who were also usually looked down 
on socio-culturally. Thus, from a broader, theoretical point of view, this research has 
highlighted the importance of party agency alongside external-structural economic, social 




In the introduction of the dissertation I focused on existing explanations of the JDP’s 
electoral and political achievements. I have pointed out how the majority of these 
explanations highlighted external-structural economic and social reasons as the basis for 
the rise and electoral predominance of the JDP. While some of these explanations focused 
on the role of economic growth and redistributive mechanisms as the main reasons for 
the JDP’s electoral rise and achievements, some of them illustrated the impact of Islamic 
business as the catalysing factor behind the transformation of Islamism and the JDP’s 
hegemony (the JDP’s cross-class coalition between low-income social segments and the 
Islamic- leaning dominant classes in Turkey). Although these structural factors were vital 
for the rise of the party, the rise and electoral achievements of the JDP as a post-Islamist 
party in Turkey was made possible by a specific “party agency” that capitalized on these 
suitable social, political and economic circumstances. Hence, I highlighted the 
importance of focusing on party agency for a better understanding of the JDP’s electoral 
and political predominance.  
In Chapter 2, I analysed the historical, political and social background of the 
transformation of Islamism and the rise of the JDP in Turkey. Here, in contrast to many 
studies relying on the secular-religious dichotomy, I began with underlining the “virtua l 
consensus” between the Islamist elite and the so-called secularist establishment elite of 
Turkey, which became particularly visible after the September 1980 military coup. In the 
post-coup period, while the main enemy for the establishment elite was leftists , 
particularly Kurdish separatists, Islamists were seen as more or less benign politica l 
players compatible with the status quo. The Islamist elite’s attention and the tight 
leadership control over the Islamist grass roots provided an upper hand to Islamist 
organizations (predecessors of the JDP in terms of human resources and organizationa l 
culture) in avoiding political violence in the pre-coup period. Islamist elite also continued 
to observe the rules of the game imposed by the military junta after the coup. This virtua l 
consensus granted a remarkable tolerance for the Islamic activism in the country that other 
political forces, which had the potential to channel lower class support, could not enjoy. 
Hence, I argued that the destruction of the leftist organizational networks after the coup 
in 1980, the introduction of the new conservative and nationalist official indoctrina t ion 
programme of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and new legal and constitutional regulat ions 
implemented in line with the strategy of “selective pluralism” opened up an unexpected 




The strategy of “selective pluralism”, or the exclusion of particular elite groups and their 
organizations from political competition and representation through legal and coercive 
means, while including others who are seen as compatible with the status quo, as defined 
in Chapter 2, after a certain period of time started to work against the secularist 
establishment elite and in favour of the electoral and political resilience of the post-
Islamist JDP. Not surprisingly, the JDP elite did almost nothing to change this restrictive 
political framework, including the unusually high 10% electoral threshold and many other 
legal and constitutional impediments for new political entrepreneurs and other elite 
groups. Other empirical evidence in this chapter showed that not only the external 
systemic pressure but, first and foremost, the internal debates of the Islamist elite and 
their revising of strategies as a consequence of electoral failures were the main causes for 
the transformation of Islamism and the rise of post-Islamist JDP. In this particular chapter, 
I also drew attention to a couple of other characteristics of the political conflicts in 
Turkey. The most important feature of the political struggles in the country in this sense 
was that it did not only include political parties competing for power, but other significant 
non-party power contenders such as the army and the high judiciary. This particular 
nature of political conflicts in the country deeply shaped the organizational formation of 
the Islamist parties and, later, the JDP as discussed at length in Chapter 6.  
In Chapter 3, after a theoretical discussion on concepts of cleavage, divide and populism 
and a brief illustration of the relevance of the high-low divide in Turkey (also see 
Appendices 1 and 2), I elaborated on the JDP’s political appeal and demonstrated how 
the party elite and the pro-JDP media located the party and its leader within Turkish 
politics. I argued that, more than the left-right or secular-religious divides, the high- low 
divide as the “manifestation in politics of social and cultural inequalities” (Ostiguy , 
2009c: 2) was the main framework of the JDP’s political appeal. Although emphases on 
religious sentiments and rightist-conservative motives were also central to the JDP’s 
political appeal, all these motives were turned into political assets through a “low -
populist” political appeal/style in which the JDP leadership and the pro-JDP media 
decisively depicted JDP cadres as the authentic representative of the despised, belittled, 
socially and culturally excluded, and downtrodden segments of the society.  
In order to support my argument I analysed the 2014 presidential election race between 
Erdoğan and the other highly conservative-religious candidate, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. 




basis of the party’s propaganda in which the pro-JDP columnists highlighted Erdoğan as 
the “man of the people” vis-a-vis the conservative but highly educated joint candidate of 
the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and the Republican People’s 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). Here it should also be noted that, particularly for 
Erdoğan, the “low-populist” political appeal/style was not simply the product of an 
artificial image-making activity but was embedded naturally in his biographic 
background, political experience and style (this was a point I delved into further in 
Chapter 4 on the JDP leadership).  
In this chapter, I also demonstrated how the fierce “secularist” opponents of the JDP 
helped the consolidation of this “low-populist” appeal through belittling JDP voters and 
even the JDP elite. I illustrated that the JDP elite consciously engaged with the “low -
populist” appeal, too. In order to show this I examined a guide prepared by the JDP 
headquarters for the party’s local and national candidates and advice of some of the party 
elite that repeatedly underlined the importance of modesty and simplicity in electoral 
campaigns. Hence, the JDP elite were able to convincingly deploy socio-cultura l 
inequalities, resentments and frustrations of the masses for political purposes. This not 
only provided the party with a great degree of flexibility in terms of its programme and 
ideology, but also helped the JDP elite to protect a strong emotional link with low-income, 
conservative and peripheral segments, and thereby provided collective incentives for the 
masses comprising very diverse social, ethnic and political groups.  
In Chapter 4, I gave a detailed picture of the JDP leadership. In this chapter, in contrast 
to the loose uses of the concept of charisma in studies of Turkish politics, and by relying 
on the original exposition of the concept by Weber (1974), I proposed to take charismatic 
personalism as a genuinely rare phenomenon characterized by the strong transformationa l 
impact of the leader on his followers, supporters and organization. Drawing on an analysis 
of secondary sources such as biographies of Erdoğan as well as my interviews, I described 
the case of Erdoğan’s leadership as an example of “non-charismatic personalism”. 
Following Ansell and Fish (1999), I identified the transactional role undertaken by the 
party leader through “robust action”, or the extensive effort put into organization building 
and consisting of extensive travelling, numerous meetings and countless speeches with 
diverse audiences, within the party for intraparty governance as the key trait of non-




from his “low-populist” appeal was, most of the time, considered to be evidence of his 
“charisma” by scholars of Turkish politics.  
This was not the case, and unlike charismatic leaders whose hallmark is “transforming 
their audience” (Ansell & Fish, 1999: 284), non-charismatic leaders diligently pursue 
series of procedures to achieve certain concrete-functional aims. In this sense, while 
charismatic leaders are akin to architects in terms of introducing novel narratives – which 
could be integrative as well as divisive, plausible as well as irrational – to their followers, 
non-charismatic personalist leaders such as Erdoğan resemble engineers focusing on 
achieving concrete-functional and pragmatic goals. In the case of politics, non-
charismatic personalist leaders are actors who are literally engineering electoral success 
through deploying robust organizational leverage and supporting this leverage with 
whatever other means necessary – such as political marketing techniques and media.  
In this sense, non-charismatic personalism should also be distinguished from the very 
similar phenomenon of personal party personalism, which puts a great emphasis on the 
party leader but ignores the critical functions of a tightly controlled, highly routinized 
organization and permanent membership party. Thus, non-charismatic personalism could 
be considered as a much more resilient phenomenon than personal party personalism. The 
ideal typical examples of the latter were the parties of Berlusconi in Italy (McDonnell, 
2013). From a broader, theoretical point of view, in this chapter I also drew attention to 
the compatibility between personalism and the mass membership organization despite the 
seeming contradiction between two. In order to do this I pointed out the distinct ion 
between institutionalization and routinization-bureaucratization. I argued that the JDP 
was a highly routinized and bureaucratized massive membership organization under the 
control of a highly personalistic leadership, but it was by no means a highly 
institutionalized one at the same time. 
The “populist emphasis”, as well as personalist dynamics of Turkish party politics, or the 
“low-populist” appeal and the personalistic leadership of the JDP analysed in Chapter 3 
and 4, led many researchers to focus on the role of patronage, clientelism and 
redistributive strategies in general as the main grounds of the JDP’s electoral and politica l 
resilience. In Chapter 5, in contrast to these widespread evaluations, I argued that the JDP 
had a highly cautious approach to classical redistributive strategies used by its centre-




centre-right patronage” in which generous state subsidies for agricultural products , 
massive public employment and “induced participation” of poor rural and provinc ia l 
masses through traditional- local elites had been central pillars of party politics for a very 
long time.  
In this chapter, I also demonstrated that, with regards to organizational and electoral 
strategies, the JDP diverged remarkably from its rightist predecessors and targeted 
electoral and political predominance; they strategically aimed for long-lasting rule since 
the very beginning of the JDP’s term of office. In order to maintain predominance, the 
JDP diverged remarkably from the Islamist National View tradition in terms of its 
communication strategy and put heavy emphasis on having a tight grip over a decisive ly 
strong pro-JDP media and political marketing techniques in general. In addition, the party 
also diverged from its centre-right predecessor, the Motherland Party, in terms of its 
attention to protect the tightly controlled, year-round active, large and pervasive 
membership organization for one-to-one vote canvassing activities. The main benefit for 
the party elite of this autonomous party structure and leadership, supported by a pro-JDP 
media, was the ability to strike a balance between the short-term requirements of elections 
(responsiveness) and the long-term requirements of being in office (responsibility), and 
between the collective and selective incentives, the mission and interest, and, last but not 
least, between the idealist and pragmatist cadres of the party.  
A remarkably autonomous party structure and a highly autonomous leadership were 
central to the electoral and political achievements of the JPD. Inheriting the organizationa l 
culture of the Islamist National View tradition, in which a great importance was attached 
to a year-round active, large and pervasive grass roots organization (Delibaş, 2015), the 
JDP also relied upon year-round activity and a massive membership organiza t ion 
consisting of 8–9 million members (or supporters encapsulated as members) that 
penetrated into even the smallest corners of the country such as sub-provinc ia l 
neighbourhoods. In Chapter 6, I have highlighted that this massive membership 
organization was kept under the tight control of the central JDP elite through public 
opinion surveys (anketler, as popularly known in Turkish), technological surveillance 
instruments such as AKİM (AK İletişim Merkezi – AK Communication Centre) and AKBİS 
(AK Bilgi Sistemi – AK Information Centre), and through party coordinators, deputies 
and ministers in person. Yet this firm control was also balanced through “controlled 




binding elections among selected members (teşkilat temayül yoklamaları) and an active 
women’s branch which, together, created a very strong sense of participation in decision-
making processes and party activities among the activists of this tightly controlled, 
massive membership organization.  
From a broader theoretical perspective, and through a critical evaluation of the recent 
literature on party organizational change and party decline, I argued that, given the 
importance attached by the party elite to a tightly controlled massive membership 
organization and political marketing instruments such as public opinion surveys as well 
as a decisively pro-JDP media, the JDP organization should be identified as a 
“personalistic membership party”. In other words, in Chapter 6 I described the JDP as a 
hybrid electoral machine which blended the mass-based party (a year-round active, tight ly 
controlled, hierarchical, massive membership organization) and elite-based party (a party 
with a less ideological orientation and highly visible leadership supported by politica l 
marketing techniques and extensive use of media) models. The theoretically significant 
point related to the specific case of the JDP in this chapter was that later sophistication in 
the literature on party typologies, such as the distinction between catch-all parties, 
electoral-professional parties and cartel parties, had some important shortcomings when 
it comes to applying these concepts to the contexts outside Western liberal democracies. 
In the specific case of Turkey, where the party organizations represented something more 
than an instrument of electoral mobilization for political entrepreneurs (a wider power 
capability against non-party political challengers as well as an instrument of redistributive 
tactics in poor urban contexts), various traits of the mass-based party model were still 
indispensable for electoral success.   
In Chapter 7, I elaborated further on the JDP’s intraparty governance through focusing 
on the rise of the leadership domination just after the party’s foundation and the formation 
of provincial governing bodies and candidate selection processes within the party. I have 
demonstrated that, immediately after the foundation, the JDP’s remarkably democratic 
first statute was changed through the collaboration of the party leader Erdoğan and the 
founding committee. A series of amendments to the first statute granted extensive rights 
to party chair Erdoğan and created leadership domination at a very early stage of this 
organization’s life. I also argued that the party centre designed the minute details of the 
provincial- local branches of the JDP through careful interventions and this, in turn, 




the candidate selection was highly “exclusive” (Hazan & Rahat, 2010: 35) within the 
JDP: party leader Erdoğan was almost the only selectorate of the party’s candidates, even 
for those coming from relatively insignificant local settings.  
Considering the separate accounts of senior party members, junior members, critical 
former party members and “true democrats” regarding the candidate selection process 
within the party, I have also shown how these frequent interventions in local politics were 
legitimized by the JDP leadership. Some of my interviewees, as well as other sources 
written by the JDP elite, repeatedly mentioned a tendency called “organizationa l 
conservatism” (teşkilat taassubu), which referred to the local party branches tendency to 
observe day-to-day interests of local politics but not to consider the general interest of the 
party and the country and their inclination to support so-called incompetent candidates 
coming from among the ranks of the local branch. Another consequence of this deep 
suspicion towards local politics by the JDP elite was the party’s cautious approach to the 
local political elite and power holders inside and outside the party, and it revealed itself 
particularly clearly in the JDP strategies in the 2011 general election in Urfa. This 
discussion in Chapter 7 also revealed the fact that, despite the party’s “low-populist” 
political appeal/style, the JDP leadership had a remarkably “high” attitude with regards 
to intraparty politics that attached great importance to the education and competency (as 
well as obedience) of its candidates and local administrators, and which exhibited a deep 
suspicion towards the spontaneity of local politics.  
8.2 Methodological and theoretical implications  
These findings of the research primarily enlarged our empirical knowledge of the JDP’s 
organization and Turkish party politics in general, but they also have the potential to 
contribute to larger literatures on party organizations, in particular those on party 
typologies, intraparty governance, and party leadership and candidate selection processes. 
In its each chapter, this research has proposed some new ways of thinking about the 
broader, theoretical issues: the importance of party agency in electoral success and in 
production of consent in the introduction; elite strategies, Islamism and post-Islamism in 
Chapter 2; populism and cleavage structures in Chapter 3; the distinction between various 
kinds of personalisms in Chapter 4; changing patterns of patronage, electoral 
predominance and organizational strategies in Chapter 5; intraparty governance and party 
typologies in Chapter 6; and legitimation patterns regarding central interventions in party 




8.2.1 Importance of focusing on intraparty organizational dynamics 
In this dissertation, I have primarily pointed out the importance of looking at the interna l 
organizational dynamics of parties in power in order to understand the contribution of 
their organization to their electoral success and political resilience as well as to the larger 
hegemonic impact of a political movement on society in general. The literature on the 
JDP’s hegemony (its cross-class political and electoral coalition) usually assumed the 
JDP to be an already unified political actor and a simple reflection of the social forces 
behind it, such as the Islamic bourgeoisie or the low-income conservative and religious 
segments of society.  
One of the theoretical implications of this dissertation in line with a recent study 
(Massicard & Watts, 2013) is that political parties should not be seen as unified actors 
exerting hegemony over society or as unified mediums used by dominant sectors for 
producing consent. On the contrary, various chapters in this dissertation have shown that 
consent was produced primarily within the organization by incorporating subordinated 
and dominant segments through organizational techniques. The production of consent, in 
other words, requires a great amount of party organizational effort on the part of the elites 
or dominant sectors.  
From a methodological point of view, understanding party organizations as complex 
power relationships also indicates the necessity of looking at intraparty political dynamics 
and informal interactions among various components of parties beyond formal 
organizational features. Researchers should take formal, informal and practical intraparty 
organizational dynamics into consideration if they want to properly understand the 
contribution of organizations to the electoral success and political resilience of parties. 
8.2.2 What is party agency? A critical approach to loosely used concepts  
Focusing on the role of agency in the electoral success and political resilience of the JDP 
also required a very careful handling of a couple of interrelated concepts regarding the 
analysis of Turkish politics. These are populism, personalism and charisma. Various loose 
uses of these concepts led many researchers either to simply underline the role of 
Erdoğan’s image and his direct appeal to the electorate or highlight the redistributive 
methods used by the party as the basis of the JDP’s popular durability. When, on the one 
hand, populism was understood as referring to redistributive mechanisms or discourse 




image of a national leader, a very narrow understanding of party agency automatica l ly 
prevailed in the literature.  
One of the main contentions in this dissertation when arguing that “agency matters” is 
that the electoral success of the JDP was not simply an outcome of the image of a popular 
leader and redistributive mechanisms, as many studies on the party using concepts of 
populism, personalism and charisma implied. Behind the electoral success and politica l 
resilience of the JDP there was a much more complicated, agency-based dynamic: not 
simply the image of the party leader and redistributive mechanisms but a specific mode 
of interaction between the leader and various diverse elements of a broader organizat ion.  
In addition to the fieldwork, careful theoretical considerations on concepts of populism, 
personalism and charisma were essential for understanding this specific mode of agency 
in this dissertation. Hence, in this dissertation, in line with Ostiguy (forthcoming) I 
avoided seeing populism as a set of redistributive tactics, as a [thin] ideology/discourse 
[as mere words], or as an [organizational] strategy, and I proposed instead to understand 
it as a political appeal/style emotionally connecting the JDP with the popular sectors (the 
low-income, conservative, peripheral and provincial majority) of Turkish society. In the 
case of charisma, too, by remaining loyal to Weber’s original use, I proposed to embrace 
a very cautious approach to the concept, which particularly focuses on the 
transformational impact of the leadership. In the use of the concept of personalism, I again 
tried to define a specific dynamic with the concept that surpasses the centrality of the 
leader’s image and focuses on his/her organizational role. The discussions on these 
concepts might be helpful in the future, too, on the analyses of actors in Turkish politics 
other than the JDP.  
8.2.3 Moving beyond the secular-religious polarization perspective 
This cautious approach to commonly used concepts in the literature on Turkish politics 
in this dissertation was also complemented by a similarly cautious evaluation of the 
paradigmatic centre-periphery approach to Turkish politics. Thus, another implication of 
the research was that the centre-periphery or secular-religious divide, which formula tes 
the struggle between Islamists and so-called secularist establishment elites as an 
antagonism, could be misleading for the analysis of the political opportunity structures 




of Islamism – and then post-Islamism – in Turkey benefitted greatly from the conservative 
and nationalistic views of the so-called secularist establishment elite of the country.  
A secular-religious divide does not help a full understanding of political appeals in 
Turkey, either. In this dissertation, it has been made clear that the JDP’s political appeal 
had something to do with the “populist emphasis” (Worsley, 1969) of Turkish politics, 
and the secular-religious divide was only a single element of this wider “populist script” 
(Ostiguy, forthcoming) deployed by the JDP. Hence, the dissertation findings might have 
also implications regarding the study of politics of other Muslim countries. Approaching 
these contexts either primarily or solely through the “secular-religious polarizat ion 
perspective”, as Turam (2012) terms it, could lead scholars to ignore vital elements of 
political divisions such as the manifestation of socio-cultural inequalities in politics.  
Another problem with the centre-periphery narrative was that it also led many analysts to 
outdated perceptions of Turkish politics in which the “induced participation” of the 
“peripheral” and conservative majority of the country through powerful local and 
traditional elites was central. The examination of the case of JDP (particularly in Chapter 
5) presented some evidence about the fact that, at least since the 1980s, the central role 
of local-provincial power holders and “classical patronage networks” deteriorated as a 
result of Turkey’s socio-economic change. This classical patronage politics (and rural 
poverty as the basis of it) was replaced, to a large extent, by new, more centralized forms 
of patronage (with urban poverty in the background), which gave rise to the 
unprecedented electoral success of the JDP. Understanding these new circumstances 
requires researchers to think outside the box of the “basics of Turkish party politics” and 
move beyond the centre-periphery narrative. 
8.2.4 A critical engagement with the literature on party typologies  
In this dissertation I also critically reinterpreted some of the concepts derived from the 
party politics literature. In contrast to the party decline literature, which argued that the 
mass party died many years ago, this dissertation has revealed the fact that various 
features of the mass-based party models such as hierarchical and massive membership 
organizations are still alive and can produce electoral success in combination with other 
contemporary electoral tactics. Despite their great relevance, the clear-cut dichotomous 
approaches that emerged from the analyses of party politics in Western liberal 




characteristics of political parties in the developing world. In other words, instead of 
pushing the empirical reality to fit into already existing ideal types and theoretically rigid 
categories, it is much more fruitful to focus on the interaction within organizations and 
hybrid forms in the analyses of party organizations outside Western liberal democracies.  
In sum, this dissertation demonstrated the importance of looking beyond the formal 
structures of party organizations and focusing on practical internal organizationa l 
dynamics of parties for the better understanding of the contribution of party agency to the 
electoral success of parties. Focusing on party agency also required a very careful 
approach to certain concepts closely related to the analysis of the JDP’s political agency 
such as populism, personalism and charisma. In addition, the approach embraced in this 
dissertation necessitated a very cautious approach to the some of the well-established 
conceptual tools in the literature on Turkish politics, such as the centre-periphery 
approach, and required a critical reinterpretation of the perspective. Another major 
theoretical implication of the thesis is in regards to the party typologies literature, and 
highlighted the importance of cautiously approaching it in the analyses of party 
organizations outside the Western liberal democracies. Apart from these, this dissertation 
has further specific and systematic implications regarding the effects of organizationa l 
factors in the transformation of Islamism. I will elaborate on these implications of the 
dissertation after a brief comparative evaluation of the role of agency-based factors in the 
transformation of Islamism and the rise of post-Islamism. 
8.3 The rise of post-Islamism in perspective: political institutional structures and 
the party agency 
In this part of the conclusion I will evaluate the JDP from the perspective of two closely 
related cases, and then point out a couple of significant theoretical and methodologica l 
implications of this evaluation. I will locate the transformation of the Islamist politics and 
the rise of the JDP in a wider global dynamic regarding the transformation of politica l 
actors from Islamism to post-Islamism in Iran and Egypt. I borrow my definitions of 
Islamism and post-Islamism from A. Bayat (1996). Very roughly, while the former term 
refers to a strictly Islamist politics that follows a top-down strategy to Islamicize the 
society, particularly through the seizure of the state, a post-Islamist movement refrains 
from such top-down strategies, adapts a perspective prone to conciliating religiosity with 
rights and liberties, and embraces a pluralist stance in which Islam is not considered the 




46). This discussion reveals the fact that certain organizational formations are more 
conducive to the rise and electoral success of the post-Islamist parties and represents solid 
evidence that analysing organizational structures is crucial in understanding the electoral 
and political resilience of post-Islamist political movements/parties (or normalized 
political parties with a strictly Islamist background).  
The transformation of political Islam and the rise and electoral success of the JDP in 
Turkey have been the subjects of lively scholarly discussions. Most of these studies 
tended to underline structural factors as the main basis of this transformation. One of the 
oft-cited studies by Mecham (2004) on the success of the JDP, for example, underlined 
the role of institutional constraints and democratic incentives. According to Mecham, 
there were “several institutional factors” behind the moderation of the Islamism and 
success of the JDP. He summarized these factors as “freedom to make strategic choices 
in a political system that rewards political entrepreneurship with credible opportunit ies 
for power”, “public institutional constraints on the movement's behaviour” imposed by 
“the state and elements of civil society”, and “iterated interaction between Islamist leaders, 
their constituency and the state” which “provided the movement with increased 
information about its potential appeal and strategic options over time” (Mecham, 2004: 
339). Mecham argued that “constraints alone did not change the movement's behaviour, 
but constraints within a context of democratic rewards did” (2004: 350).  
In order to illustrate the importance of the party agency – namely its political appeals and 
organization – in addition to these well-illustrated structural reasons, I focus briefly on 
three cases, including the JDP in Turkey, the Reform Front in Iran, and the Centre Party 
(Hizb-al Wasat) in Egypt. This comparison illustrates that, apart from relative ly 
permissive political and institutional settings, the combination of a strong and 
autonomous party organization and leadership as well as a carefully designed politica l 
appeal (the party agency) that could connect the post-Islamist party’s leadership to 
popular sectors (the low-income, peripheral segments of society) appeared to be vital for 
the rise, electoral success and political resilience of post-Islamist actors. I will start with 
Egypt, looking briefly at the role of the political institutional structures, organizations and 
political appeals of the Centre Party, a moderate offshoot of the Islamist Muslim 




8.3.1 Post-Islamism in Egypt: The Centre Party  
The emergence and the rise of the Centre Party, a moderate splinter of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, in the middle of 1990s encountered strong resistance from the 
political system of Egypt, which was dominated by the authoritarian rule of the president 
and affiliated state institutions such as the “Political Parties Committee”, which had the 
right to authorize the existence of political parties. As one of the prominent historians of 
the modern Egypt noted, the “Egyptian regime constantly opposed the creation of new 
parties through restrictive interpretation of the law” and political parties were 
“structurally isolated from the masses” (Roussillon, 1998: 381–382). A “highly 
centralized” political system “with authority concentrated in the presidency” (Brown & 
El-Din Shahin, 2010: 205) in Egypt imposed decisive restrictions upon the development 
of post-Islamist politics in Egypt during the 1990s and 2000s despite the limited 
liberalization of the regime. The emergence of a moderate Islamist party was seen as a 
great danger by the Egyptian political order (Wickham, 2004: 222–223). The Cente Party 
in Egypt was not officially recognized as a political party despite repeated attempts 
(Wickham, 2004: 213).  
The founders of the Centre Party also had very limited connections with the widespread 
grass roots organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood (Wickham, 2004: 223).  In other 
words, after the Centre Party left the Muslim Brotherhood, the leadership could not inher it 
its grass roots organizations – in contrast to the JDP1 – and remained as a quite isolated 
intellectual-elite circle. If they had not lost the connection with the low-income, 
conservative and provincial popular sectors, the Centre Party would have been much more 
successful and resilient before the restrictions of the political institutional structures of 
Egypt by enabling the party to mobilize its heterogeneous constituency for democratic 
demands. Nevertheless, an account of the founding cadres of the party witnessed the fact 
that most of the Centre Party’s members came from professional backgrounds such as 
“engineering, law and medicine” (Stacher, 2002: 431). Hence there is evidence that the 
leadership of the Centre Party in Egypt lacked a kind of populist appeal and was hardly 
in touch with the popular sectors of Egyptian society through a robust organizationa l 
medium controlled by an autonomous leadership. This agency-based weaknesses of the 
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Centre Party should also be taken into account alongside the extremely restrictive politica l 
framework of Egypt in the failure of post-Islamist “rumblings”.  
8.3.2 Post-Islamism in Iran: The Reform Front  
While in Turkey post-Islamist political actors encountered restrictions imposed by the 
non-elected institutions such as the military, the Constitutional Court (Anayasa 
Mahkemesi) and elected executive institutions such as the Presidency of the Republic,2 in 
Iran the reformist movement, namely the Reform Front, has since its emergence in the 
mid-1990s encountered constraints imposed by the non-elected Guardian Council and the 
Supreme Leader (Velayet-i Faqih), who was elected by the Guardian Council. As Tezcür 
asserted, “the Guardian Council makes the final decision and [can] disqualify any 
candidate. The Guardian Council does not provide a public rationale for its decisions” 
(Tezcür, 2010: 107).  The Supreme Leader also had “extensive supervisory” and 
“executive powers” in Iran (Keshavarzian, 2010: 237–238). The Reform Front in Iran 
also encountered much more severe restrictions than its counterpart in Turkey. The 
Guardian Council repeatedly restricted the participation of many reformist candidates to 
elections, vetoed elected candidates and, at times, used coercion as well (Tezcür, 2010: 
91–98).   
In the case of Iran, the weakness of the reformists, who were led by intellectuals and 
former revolutionists from the Islamist establishment of the country in their struggle with 
the Guardian Council, was primarily due to the lack of an organized mass movement 
behind the Reform Front. As Tezcür underlines, political parties in Iran “tend to be loose 
elite associations with little vertical linkage with the voters” (2010: 106). In addition to 
this, it is also evident that leaders of the Reform Front were not willing to deploy 
confrontational strategies at critical political junctures. It was noted in Bayat’s study that 
“Khatami’s [the moderate leader of the Reform Front] advisor […] urged Khatami to 
move beyond being merely a symbol of the reform movement and to act as its leader by 
establishing and heading a political party” (Bayat, 2007: 109). As also emphasized by 
Tezcür, the cost of unwillingness to show strong leadership and a lack of organizationa l 
capacity resulted in the dissolution of the social base of the Reform Front in Iran after 
waves of repeated repression by the regime. In other words, “the Reform Front lacked a 
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decisive leadership and pursued an accommodative and moderate strategy regardless of 
the consequences, lest it increase the repression it faced” (Tezcür, 2010: 138). Indeed, 
“the weakness of the Khatami’s leadership” and “the absence of a real political party” 
were behind the failure of the reform government (Bayat, 2007: 131).  
In other words, the lack of a well-organized party under the control of a strong leadership 
was decisive in the failure of the Reform Front against the establishment elite in favour 
of the status quo in Iran. The Reform Front also heavily depended on upper-middle-c lass 
intellectual circles, as was the case for the Centre Party in Egypt, and could not establish 
grass roots organizations under a tight leadership control. In the case of Iran, reflections 
on the leadership of the movement by various scholars revealed that they were mostly 
critical religious intellectuals coming from within the Islamic establishment (Bayat, 2007: 
84–94). This movement, which was led mainly by intellectuals, tried to grasp the support 
of the urban, professional, new middle classes (Bayat, 2007: 104). Hence, the remark of 
one of the theoreticians of political reform in Iran on the Reform Front was highly 
illustrative: “the Reform Front remained elitist” (Tezcür, 2010: 208). Hence, the Reform 
Front “failed to broaden its constituency and establish horizontal linkages with large 
segments of the society” (Tezcür, 2010: 207).   
8.3.3 Post-Islamism in Turkey: The JDP 
Comparison of the electoral and democratic experience and environment in these cases 
would reveal the fact that the Turkish Islamist parties had a very long electoral experience 
since the beginning of the 1970s, albeit with short periods of interruptions caused by the 
decisions of party closure by the Constitutional Court and military interventions. Thus, 
there was the plural and relatively healthy electoral environment for the Turkish Islamists 
that rewarded the normalization (the adaptation to the existing political system and 
becoming less unique compared to other parties in the system, not ideological moderation, 
per se) and facilitated the rise and electoral success of the post-Islamist JDP in Turkey, 
as illustrated at length in Chapter 2. The contribution of a long experience of Islamist 
parties in electoral politics should also be defined as a better context for “political learning” 
in the Turkish case. As could be seen in the very accurate definition of the JDP’s ideology 
as “conservative democracy”, the party leadership very carefully avoided any Islamic 
symbolism which could create a confrontational situation. This contributed significantly 
to the normalization of the JDP and made the party’s rise remarkably difficult to resist for 




in Turkey have historically been more accommodative to party politics and supportive of 
the rise and electoral success of post-Islamist politics compared to Egypt and Iran.  
Nevertheless, the failure of the “guardians” in the case of Turkey, but not in Iran and 
Egypt, also pointed out the distinctive characteristics of party agency in the case of JDP. 
What can be observed in the case of the JDP, as illustrated throughout this dissertation in 
terms of organization, was “a highly centralized and hierarchical” (Özbudun, 2006: 552) 
party controlled firmly by a strong and autonomous leadership. “Normalization”3  of 
Islamist political parties and movements created a very specific gap between the reformist 
leadership and the Islamist grass roots. A specific tension occurred between the 
expectations of the core Islamist constituency or grass roots, the median voters and the 
expectations of the elites in favour of the status quo. In order to overcome the problems 
caused by these diverging expectations and to protect and enlarge its electoral base, the 
JDP leadership deployed “tight [...] control over the party base and factions that may be 
more partisan in nature” (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 78) through the organizational methods 
and instruments demonstrated and analyzed in this dissertation. In the implementation of 
this tight leadership control, the JDP could also refrain from alienating its core, Islamist, 
low-income constituency.  
The rise and electoral success of the JDP relied heavily on the protection of the 
connections with the Islamist grass roots movement through a strong leadership primarily 
dominated by an experienced and diligent organization man (teşkilatçı): Erdoğan. The 
disappearance of the coherent Islamist ideology and the concessions gradually entailed 
by normalization was balanced by the consolidation of the “low-populist” appeal, the 
mass-based dimension of the JDP organization and the leadership control over this 
massive membership organization. It seems that, in the case of Egypt and Iran, post-
Islamist leaderships could not find similar solutions to this specific problem entailed by 
normalization.  
It should be also noted that, unlike the Reform Front in Iran and the Centre Party in Egypt, 
the rise of the JDP was not simply led by a dissident intellectual or professional group 
within the traditional Islamist politics, but by highly experienced political entrepreneurs. 
In the case of Iran and Egypt, the leadership of reformist movements mainly remained 
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within upper-middle-class intellectual and professional circles that had very limited 
connections with the popular sectors of their societies. In the case of Turkey, however, 
the post-Islamist leadership enhanced its linkages with low-income, popular sectors 
through the “low-populist” appeal and a robust organizational medium, and kept the core 
constituency of Islamism together with the new, post-Islamist orientation and 
constituency of the reformed (initially post-Islamist) party. In other words, the 
combination of the “personalistic membership party” and the “low-populist appeal” 
(together they comprise the party agency) was the key to successful normalizat ion, 
electoral success and political resilience. When evaluated from this wider theoretical 
perspective, this dissertation also represented an initial analysis of this crucial element of 
successful Islamist party normalization: party agency or, in other words, political appeal 
and organization.  
8.3.4 Implications of the research for the literature on [post-]Islamist parties: 
organization and normalization 
From a much broader theoretical perspective, thus, this dissertation has highlighted the 
importance of taking party agency seriously (political appeal, leadership, party strategy, 
intraparty organizational dynamics – such as the control over the party grass roots – and 
elite recruitment processes) in explaining electorally successful “normalization” of 
Islamist parties and, therefore, the rise of post-Islamist party. The analysis of the JDP in 
this dissertation illustrated several important organizational aspects regarding the 
dynamics of normalization of Islamist parties.  
The rise of Islamist parties, and later post-Islamist parties, emerges in relative ly 
permissive political contexts. These contexts could be “electoral democracies” or 
“competitive authoritarianisms”, but even in full-scale authoritarian regimes, 
establishment elites have allowed the formation and grass roots organization of various 
Islamist actors.4 One of the main characteristics of political conflict of these contexts is 
the presence of powerful non-party political actors, such as armies, monarchies, 
excessively strong presidents, self-proclaimed dynasties and restrictive state institut ions 
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including high judicial and bureaucratic authorities. In addition, due to uneven socio-
economic development in these contexts, large sectors of society cannot enjoy some of 
the basic comforts of voters in Western liberal democracies such as generous welfare 
regimes and access to mass communication channels, most notably the internet. 
Therefore, the peripheral, considerably poor and politically extremely salient rural and 
urban popular sectors is a decisive social force in these countries. Islamist parties need to 
respond organizationally and strategically to the abovementioned external circumstances 
in order to achieve electorally successful normalization and to pave the way for the 
creation of post-Islamist parties. 
In addition, the major organizational and strategic (or agency-based) problems 
encountered in the process of Islamist party normalization are the pluralisation within the 
party organization (both in the central leadership groups and in local-provincial branches) 
and the problem of “dual constituency”; in other words, the fragmentation of the formerly 
homogenous leadership, membership structure and electoral base of the Islamist party 
due to its enlargement after normalization. In the socio-economic context in which 
Islamist parties emerged, this problem was corroborated by another one: the socio-
economic diversity of the post-Islamist party’s electorate, which includes low-income and 
peripheral segments of society with relatively better-off middle class median voters at the 
same time. If the post-Islamist party is going to remain unified and reach these diverging 
segments of its electorate, its leadership should strike a balance between elite-based and 
mass-based party models, collective and selective incentives, careerist and idealist party 
cadres and labour-intensive and capital-intensive campaign techniques. At this point, the 
post-Islamist leadership encounters a specific problem regarding the rights- and liberties-
based post-Islamist discourse and identity, which would only appeal to the reformist 
Islamist intelligentsia and upper- and middle-class median voters. This would be a very 
restrictive discursive framework for the post-Islamist party elite in striking a balance 
between components of the party leadership and membership, its dual constituency and 
between mass-based and elite-based approaches. 
The case of the JDP revealed that one way to overcome these problems could be “the 
personalistic membership party”, or more precisely an organizational-strategic model 
combining highly autonomous leadership with a year-round active, tightly controlled, 
large membership organization supported by a strong partisan media and politica l 




populist” appeal which could articulate diverging segments of the dual constituency of 
the party and, most notably, incorporate popular sectors.5 For, if the post-Islamist party 
returns to an Islamist discourse in order to consolidate support among radical-leaning 
grass roots and fails to appeal median voters, it would cost the party the strong electoral 
support that could provide it with electoral legitimacy against the pressures from the 
establishment elite. And, if the post-Islamist party insists on the rights- and liberties-based 
discourse of post-Islamism and fails to appeal to the popular sectors, this would cost the 
post-Islamist party the electoral support and organizational capacity to resist the 
interventions of the powerful non-party actors through non-violent mobilizationa l 
techniques. To appeal to these diverging segments within the post-Islamist party and its 
electoral base at the same time requires a very specific organizational and discursive 
strategy elaborated upon in detail in this dissertation: the combination of a “low-populist 
appeal” with the “personalistic membership party”. 
The main contradiction in this process, however, is this: in order to remain in power as a 
unified political actor and survive, the normalization of the Islamist party should become 
deeper – it should increasingly adapt the “rules” of the democratically already deficient 
contexts and it should abandon the rights- and liberties-based post-Islamist discourse 
together with a decisively Islamist one. As a result, the rights- and liberties-based post-
Islamist identity declines and the majoritarian kernel of Islamism fully unfolds in the form 
of a “low-populist” appeal and personalism with conservative, nativistic and nationalis t ic 
repercussions.6  
As the case of the JDP revealed, a successfully normalized post-Islamist party starts to 
exploit the political, legal and institutional framework created by the strategy of selective 
pluralism and eventually ceases to be post-Islamist. In other words, as a personalis t ic 
membership party, the post-Islamist party starts to take advantage of the already existing 
restrictive political, institutional framework – or the weakness of the liberal democratic 
                                                                 
5 Also see Schwedler (2006: 195–196) for how, in terms of “moderation”, the better-organized Islamist 
Action Front (the party of the Muslim Brotherhood) in Jordan was much more successful than the loosely 
organized Islah Party in Yemen, which relied on a fragmented coalition of various Islamist and tribal 
groups. 
6  If the developments in Egypt and the rise of the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood was not 
interrupted by a military coup after the January 2011 revolution, it was highly likely that we would see a 
very similar process in Egypt. The Islamist party of Muslim Brotherhood  (The Freedom and Justice Party), 
after a short post-Islamist period, would probably embrace a populist appeal and exploit the restrictive legal 
and political institutional framework left by the Egyptian authoritarianism in order to survive and remain  




architecture in the political context in which they emerged – and becomes highly reluctant 
for further democratization of the system. In addition, the robust organizational leverages 
inherited by the successful post-Islamist party from its Islamist past, together with the 
advantages of being in power, create a fundamentally assymetric electoral competition 
for its opponents and increase frustrations and hostilities in the political system. Hence, 
successful normalization of an Islamist party in a democratically deficient context, to say 
the least, does not create highly propitious conditions for further democratization.  
8.4 Future research  
In this final section I briefly discuss three potential research projects for the future that 
could be built upon this dissertation. At first glance, these different projects might seem 
rather disconnected. Yet all of these projects are conducive to further generating and 
enriching our theoretical and empirical knowledge regarding the broader normative 
questions of political science on the relationships between party institutionalizat ion, 
democratization and political stability.  
As the recent volume of studies by Mecham and Hwang (2014) made clear, the analyses 
of the transformation of Islamism – in this respect it does not matter that scholars use 
different terms such as “moderation”, “normalization”, “liberalization” or “post-
Islamism” – have usually focused on the external social, economic and political causes 
of the phenomenon, as in the case of the JDP as illustrated in the literature review in 
Chapter 1. As Mecham and Hwang underlined (2014: 10) in their introduction to the 
volume they edited, in the literature on the transformation of Islamism, “there are some 
important caveats” such as the lack of analysis of “the effects of internal party 
organization” on the process. This research – including the brief comparison in this 
conclusion – led me to formulate the following hypotheses for potential future research:  
The more autonomous the party and its leader are from the Islamist movement (this is to 
say that the post-Islamist party and its leader should rely on its own robust organizationa l 
leverage rather than the social and organizational networks of the broader Islamist 
movement), the more successful its normalization. In addition, the more autonomous the 
party and leadership, the more successful it is at striking a balance between its Islamist 
past (core constituency) and its centrist present (its new supporters). The more successful 




One should also argue that the “low-populist” appeal is a highly convenient way of 
conciliating these different segments of the successful post-Islamist party’s constituency.  
In this context, the JDP, as a highly autonomous party, represents the most successful 
normalization of an Islamist party in the Muslim world and has become a pioneering post-
Islamist party (which, later, adapted a highly populist appeal). Of course, these 
hypotheses need to be tested with a couple of cases which could include the Reform Front 
from Iran and the Centre Party mentioned above, and the Freedom and Justice Party (the 
political party of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Egyptian Revolution) from Egypt and 
perhaps other potential cases from Tunisia and Morocco in particular. A research agenda 
focusing on relationships among normalization, organization and populism of Islamist 
and post-Islamist parties seems very promising.    
Apart from this potential research, the case of the JDP and the contribution of its specific 
organizational model to the party’s electoral success and political resilience could also be 
framed from a comparative perspective focusing on the relationships between populism, 
personalism and mass membership organizations. It seems very promising to evaluate the 
case of the JDP from the perspective of a systematic comparison that focuses on rapidly 
rising and falling personal and populist parties in Europe and Latin America, such as the 
parties of Berlusconi, Fujimori and Chavez as well as organizationally more rigorous and 
historically more resilient entities such as the Peronist Justicialist Party in Argentina.  
This kind of comparative research could shed light on the dynamics of the relationship 
between party institutionalization and personalistic leadership. Under which kind of 
political and social circumstances do personalistic leaderships prefer more rigorous and 
stable organizational leverage that could be potentially institutionalized? What kind of 
social, economic and political conditions are conducive to create, on the one hand, erratic 
personal parties and, on the other hand, much more entrenched organizational structures 
such as the JDP? This potential research might propose some hypotheses with regards to 
these kinds of questions.  
A rather restricted potential study that could be built on this dissertation might either focus 
further on the JDP or apply the same approach to the other parties of Turkey in order to 
see the reasons for their inability to challenge the JDP in elections. At the time of writing, 
as underlined at the beginning of this conclusion, the JDP had, for the first time, fallen 




official absence of Erdoğan, the first electoral failure of the JDP could be considered an 
indication of the importance of Erdoğan for the party’s electoral fortunes. But when it is 
taken into account that Erdoğan did not refrain from fully supporting the JDP for the June 
2015 elections, the picture becomes more complicated and indicated the relevance of this 
dissertation’s argument.  
The JDP’s success was not simply an outcome of its leader’s popular image, but was built 
upon the specific mode of relationship between Erdoğan and the organization – which, at 
least officially and constitutionally, changed dramatically after Erdoğan became president 
despite his efforts to the contrary. In addition, towards the end of the writing of this 
dissertation, the Prime Minister and the new chair of the JDP, Ahmet Davutoğlu, seem to 
have accumulated enough power to draw remarkable hostility from Erdoğanists in the 
JDP and the pro-JDP media. These current developments in Turkish politics, in fact, 
underline a curious and important question about the personalistic membership party that 
can not be authoritatively answered until the (political) passing of its founding leader: 
what is more important in the personalistic membership party, the personality of the 
leader or the office of the chairmanship? Hence, further observations on the future course 
of the JDP seem fruitful, too, since they might provide invaluable new insight into the 
reasons and circumstances of the potential trajectories of the personalistic membership 














Appendix 1 – Brief information on the political parties in Turkey 
 







The Republican People’s Party was established by the founder of the 
Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and his supporters just after 
the victory in the National Independence War. The party was the ruling 
one-party state between 1923 and 1945 and it was, to a large extent, 
incorporated with state institutions. The party have always been seen 
as the representative of the secularist establishment elite of the country. 
The party pursued predominantly statist economic policies throughout 
its one-party rule. Among its various principles, secularism later 
became the party’s hallmark in its struggles against a series of 
conservative and populist parties ranging from the Democrat Party of 
the 1950s to the JDP of present-day Turkey. Except for a brief period 
during the 1970s, the party’s continuous attempts to become a 
genuinely left-wing populist party failed. Organizationally, the 
Republican People’s Party was not different from the rest of Turkish 
parties in terms of the leadership domination over provincial politics. 
But its grass roots organizations have been usually much weaker and 
less active than the JDP (and its rightist predecessors), the size of its 
membership has been much smaller and its intraparty communications 
were irregular. For further information see Karpat (1991), Ayata 




At first, the Democrat Party was founded by a small group of dissident 
Republican People’s Party members. Initially the Democrat Party 
attempted to take a more liberal political and economic position than 
the Republican People’s Party. However, the party received 
unexpected support from the provincial and conservative popular 
sectors of the country and, although it was remarkably more liberal 
than the Republican People’s Party in terms of economic policies, it 
was by no means more liberal in political terms. The party, 
immediately after its foundation, started to represent the victims of the 
secular nation-building process initiated by the Kemalist Republican 
People’s Party and became the first party of a series of populist and 
conservative centre-right parties including its followers, the Justice 
Party of Demirel, the Motherland Party of Özal, the True Path Party of 
Demirel and, finally, the JDP of Erdoğan. When the party was at the 
peak of its strength, its majoritarian inclinations started to make 
secularist segments of society, and most notably the army, deeply 
uncomfortable. Overlapping this creeping authoritarianisation was a 
deteriorating economy, which paved the way to a military coup and, 
hence, to the end of the Democrat Party. The Democrat Party was 
organizationally a remarkable force that could develop party branches 
even in the remotest provincial corners of the country. However, the 
influence of local bosses over the local-provincial branches of the party 
and the local patronage was always central. For further information, 
see Sarıbay (1991), Eroğul (2003) and Demirel (2011). 
Justice Party 
(1961–81) 
The Justice Party was founded just after the military coup in 1960 as 
the continuation of the Democrat Party. After its initial years the party 




predecessor Democrat Party, Demirel neither came from a provincia l 
notable family nor from the traditionally predominant educationa l 
institutions of the Republic such as Mülkiye and Harbiye. 
Economically the Justice Party was very pragmatic and more pro-free 
market compared to the Republican People’s Party. The Justice Party 
was often in government throughout the period between two milita ry 
coups in 1960 and 1980. The military junta after the 1980 coup closed 
down the parties, including the Justice Party, and banned their leaders. 
This ban on leaders was lifted with a referendum in 1987. The Justice 
Party also inherited the organizational effectiveness of the Democrat 
Party and was always more successful in poor, urban contexts of 
Turkey than left-wing parties, with its robust grass roots presence and 
through better incorporation of local elites. For further information, see 





The Labour Party of Turkey was founded by leftist intellectuals and 
representatives of trade unions under the conditions of the relative ly 
pluralist political and legal environment of the post-coup period during 
the 1960s. The party was the first influential socialist organization of 
the country represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. 
The chair of the Party, Mehmet Ali Aybar, was a lawyer, and came 
from a notable Istanbulite family. He advocated a more liberal form of 
socialism, which drew much criticism from hardliners in his party and 
from the wider left-wing circles in the country. Despite the socialis t 
discourse, the party’s touch with low-income and provincial social 
segments of the country was remarkably weak. The party, 
organizationally, always suffered from factionalism on an ideologica l 
basis and its grass roots presence, despite its efforts in shantytowns of 
big cities, was not impressive. The party was banned twice in 1971 and 








The National Order Party was founded by Erbakan as the first 
representative of the Islamist National View tradition in Turkey. The 
party was supported by more religious, conservative and provincia l 
small- and middle-range businessmen of the country as a reaction to 
the uncomfortable situation created by the Justice Party’s 
encouragement of foreign capital and trade. The party did not live long 
and in 1972 faced the first of a series of interventions by the 
establishment elite that the Islamist National View parties would face 










The National Salvation Party was the second party of the Islamis t 
National View tradition. This time, the National Salvation Party 
managed to survive until the military coup in 1980. Under the rule of 
Erbakan, it achieved an influential position in the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey and was part of various coalition governments 
throughout the 1970s. The party’s position in economy was, if not 
statist, extremely protectionist and the political worldview of the party 
was a softer, legalist version of Islamism. The party’s founders were 
coming from notable provincial families and it was supported by 
provincial small- and medium-sized businessmen in Turkey. The party 




parties. Organizationally, until the rise of the Welfare Party in the mid-
1990s, the National View parties were not effective entities. They 
mainly relied on isolated, religious, informal networks and lacked 
rigorous grass roots presence, particularly in low-income regions of 





The Nationalist Action Party was founded by former colonel Alpaslan 
Türkeş towards the end of the 1970s. The party’s views on economy 
were eclectic and their political stance during the 1970s was one of 
authoritarian Turkish nationalism. The party found the opportunity to 
take part in a couple of conservative-nationalist coalition governments 
during the 1970s alongside the Justice Party and the National Salvation 
Party. Another mark the party left on Turkish politics was its 
engagement in political violence against leftist groups in the country. 
The party, despite the background of its leader in the Turkish milita ry, 
received much sympathy from lower- and lower-middle-class urban 
and rural social sectors. The party was banned by the military junta 
after the coup in 1980 but reappeared several years after. After the 
death of its founding leader and under the new leadership of Devlet 
Bahçeli, the party carefully avoided street violence and embraced a 
softer nationalistic stance during the 1990s and 2000s. The leader has 
always been extremely powerful in the party as a result of the 
authoritarian nationalist ideology and the party always had a 
remarkable grass roots presence that mainly relied on its youth branch, 
The Grey Wolves (Ülkü Ocakları). For further information see Landau 




The Motherland Party was founded by Turgut Özal, a former 
bureaucrat, just after the military coup in 1980. The foundation of the 
party and its participation in the first elections in 1983 was an 
extremely unexpected development for the military junta. Another 
rather unpleasant development for the junta was the Motherland’s 
electoral victory in this election against parties supported by the 
military regime. The Motherland Party embraced a radical liberal 
economic programme including drastic international trade 
liberalization and privatization, and politically it claimed to contain 
four different tendencies: nationalism, conservatism, liberalism and 
social democracy. The party was supported by urban and upward ly 
mobile middle classes as well as low-income conservative social 
segments, at least during its initial years. The party was seen as an 
attractive option for conservative and religious people since Özal was 
also a spontaneously religious man. The party started to lose 
momentum in the 1990s after a leadership change and in the 2002 
election it was de facto erased from Turkish political life. 
Organizationally, the party always suffered from intraparty 
factionalism. The grass roots presence in localities for the party was 
not a priority and was evaluated from a very limited perspective as a 
tool for ballot box safety. For further information see Ergüder (1991) 
and Kalaycıoğlu (2002). 
Nationalist 
Democracy 
The Nationalist Democracy Party was one of the two parties that 
emerged after the coup in 1980 by the open encouragement of the 






ambassador and it was expected to be the centre-right party submiss ive 
to the military regime. In the first election after the coup, the party 
received much fewer votes than expected and two years later dissolved 
itself. Some of its deputies joined the Motherland Party group and 





The Populist Party was the other party the military junta allowed to 
participate in the first “free” elections in 1983 after the coup. At first, 
the party received a degree of support from former Republican 
People’s Party supporters (the Republican People’s Party was banned 
by the junta after the coup in 1980) and secured more votes than the 
Nationalist Democracy Party, which was explicitly supported by the 
junta and became the main opposition. Nevertheless, with the 
emergence of the Social Democratic Party as the true heir of the 
Republican People’s Party, the Populist Party lost much of its support 






The merger between the Populist Party and the Social Democratic 
Party, which was established by Erdal İnönü, created the Social 
Democratic Populist Party in 1985. The Social Democratic Populist 
Party attempted to locate itself in a modern social democratic position 
and the party also took part in coalition governments in the first half of 
the 1990s. After the removal of the ban on the parties of the pre-coup 
period, the Republican People’s Party re-emerged and some of the 
deputies of the Social Democratic Populist Party joined the Republican 
People’s Party. These very similar parties co-existed in the parliament 





After the removal of the ban on politicians of the pre-coup period, 
Demirel could participate in elections with the True Path Party that he 
founded in 1983. The True Path Party, under the leadership of Demire l, 
was seen as the direct heir of the Democrat Party and the Justice Party. 
The only difference this time was that the True Path Party had to share 
the votes of this political tradition with Özal’s Motherland Party. 
Economically, the True Path Party was slightly more in favour of state 
intervention compared to the Motherland Party, and his supporters 
were slightly more rural than supporters of the Motherland. Other than 
this, the difference between these two centre-right parties was nothing 
more than personal hostilities between their second-generation leaders, 
Tansu Çiller of True Path Party and Mesut Yılmaz from the 
Motherland Party. The True Path Party de facto disappeared from 
Turkish Politics after its leader Süleyman Soylu joined the JDP in 
2012. A rigorous local presence in provincial Turkey side-by-side with 
the local patronage was a main organizational trait of the party. For 





The Democratic Left Party was founded in 1985 by the spouse of 
Bülent Ecevit, the prominent leader of the Republican People’s Party 
before the 1980 military coup. The party was slightly more nationalis t 
than other left-wing parties of the era. The party’s best time occurred 
in 1999 when it secured the biggest share of chairs in the Grand 




with the Nationalist Action Party and the Motherland Party. This 
coalition government was under pressure after its inability to cope with 
the devastating consequences of the İstanbul earthquake in 1999 and 
had to call for a snap election in 2002 after the economic crises in 2000 
and 2001. The party de facto disappeared from Turkish political life 
after its votes plummeted from 22% in 1999 to 1% in 2002. In 
organizational terms, the party was not more impressive than other left-
wing parties and the leadership was extremely cautious against the 
expansion of the party’s membership organization. For further 







The Welfare Party, established in 1985, was the third and the most 
influential party of the Islamist National View tradition. After the 
removal on the ban on the political leaders in 1987, the founder of the 
National View tradition, Erbakan, returned to politics and the Welfare 
Party, for the first time after the coup, reappeared in the parliament 
through an electoral coalition with the Nationalist Working Party 
(which would later become the Nationalist Action Party). The Party, 
through its redistributive promises that appealed to the urban and rural 
poor and through its robust organization, started to gain momentum in 
the middle of 1990s and became the first party of the 1995 election. 
The coalition government formed by the Welfare Party and the True 
Path Party came to an end when the military openly declared its 
reaction to the sensational public activities of the Welfare Party 
including pro-Sharia speeches by its prominent members. The party 
was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1998 on the grounds 
of anti-secular activities. The party, with its attention to rigorous local 
presence in low-income settings, a year-round active membership 
organization and Islamist indoctrination of these members, was the 
closest organization to the classical mass party model in the history of 
Turkish party politics. For further information see White (2002), Eligür 








The Virtue Party was founded just before the ban on the Welfare party 
and was used by the former Welfare Party members. Although the 
Virtue Party was the direct continuation of the Islamist Welfare Party, 
the normalization of the Islamist movement in Turkey started with the 
Virtue Party. On issues such as the European Union, relations with the 
West, free-market economics and secularism, the Virtue Party was 
remarkably more liberal than the Welfare Party. Nevertheless, this 
liberalization did not stop the Constitutional Court – and therefore the 
establishment elite of the country – and the party was closed down in 
2001. The Virtue Party period of the Islamist National View tradition 
also witnessed intraparty factionalism between so-called 
“traditionalist” (gelenekçi) old guard and the younger “reformis t” 
(yenilikçi) wing, resulting in the foundation of two parties after the ban 
on the Virtue Party.  One of these parties was the JDP of Erdoğan and 
the other was the Felicity Party of the old guard under the influence of 




The Felicity Party was founded just before the foundation of the JDP 









old guard National View elite after the Virtue Party period. The party 
remained loyal to the Islamist National View tradition’s founder 
Erbakan and his teachings and ideas. It could not gain any seats in the 





Since the beginning of the 1990s, parties defending Kurdish rights 
appeared in the parliament through various methods (such as running 
as independents and being nominated from other parties’ lists) despite 
the unusually high 10% national threshold. These parties are the 
People’s Democracy Party, Democratic People’s Party, Democra tic 
Society Party, Peace and Democracy Party and, more recently, the 
Peoples’ Democracy Party. All of these parties represented an ideology 
which was a blend of socialism and Kurdish nationalism. Pro-Kurdish 
parties in Turkey have been predominantly supported by the Kurds 
living in poor urban and rural Turkey and by certain segments of the 
left-wing Turkish voters. However, the relationship between pro-
Kurdish parties and the armed Kurdistan Worker’s Party has been 
extremely problematic for the former since the armed Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party has usually been the predominant part of this close 
relationship. Recently, the last chain of the tradition, the People’s 
Democracy Party, created an optimism among left-liberal circles of the 
country with its radical democracy program and its strategy of 
becoming the party of Turkey (Türkiyelileşme), but this normalizat ion 
was blocked after the Kurdistan Worker’s Party engaged in armed 
struggle with the security forces following a two-year-long ceasefire. 
Organizationally, pro-Kurdish parties have always had an almost 
unchallenged rigorous local presence in South East Turkey and this has 
been complemented by its presence in low-income Kurdish majority 
neighborhoods of big cities such as İstanbul and Ankara. Pro-Kurdish 
parties also have always been highly capable of mobilizing their 
supporters for elections as well as for protest marches and mass rallies. 
Given the centrality of nationalist-socialist ideology for its members 
and supporters, and its overwhelming reliance on Kurdish ethnicity, 
pro-Kurdish parties have approximated the mass-based party model. 




The Young Party was founded by a business tycoon, Cem Uzan, just a 
couple of months prior to the 2002 election. As a genuinely personal 
party without any permanent membership organization, the Young 
Party solely relied on its leader’s higly telegenic image, oratorical 
skills and the television and financial resources owned by Uzan. The 
Young Party unexpectedly received 7% of votes in the 2002 election 
simply by relying on its leader’s image and several redistributive 
promises. The party disappeared from Turkish politics after corruption 
investigations targeting Uzan’s companies and Uzan’s flight to France. 
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Appendix 3 – Information on interviewees 
 












































































Distribution of interviewees according to cities and participants’ relationship with the party 







Ankara 11 15 
İstanbul 8 1 
Trabzon 6  
Konya 6  
Mardin 5  
Urfa 1  
Diyarbakır 1  
Batman 1  
Active JDP members 26  
Former JDP members 13  
Total 39 16 
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